Smagala v. Astrue

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Maria Valdez on 3/31/2014: Mailed notice(lp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
GERARD R. SMAGALA,
Plaintiff,
v.
COLVIN, 1

CAROLYN
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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No. 12 C 4547
Magistrate Judge
Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff Gerard Smagala’s claim for
Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. The parties have
consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons that follow, Smagala’s motion for summary
judgment is denied, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment
[Doc. No. 28] is granted.

Carolyn Colvin is substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(d).
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BACKGROUND
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Smagala applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental

Security Income on October 22, 2008, alleging a disability due to borderline
intellectual functioning and low IQ since July 1, 2004. (R. 10, 181-90.) The
applications were denied on March 13, 2009 and upon reconsideration on June 22,
2009. (Id.) Smagala filed a timely request for a hearing by an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on September 15, 2010. 2 (Id.) Smagala, who was not
represented by counsel, personally appeared and testified at the hearing. (R. 10, 35107.) A medical expert and a vocational expert also testified at the hearing. (R. 10.)
On March 16, 2011, the ALJ denied Smagala’s claim for benefits and found
him not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 7-20.) The Social Security
Administration Appeals Council denied Smagala’s request for review on April 26,
2012, (R. 4-6), leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner
and therefore reviewable by the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes
v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).

An initial hearing was held on May 12, 2010, but no substantive testimony was
taken. Smagala instead asked for a continuance in order to seek representation. The ALJ
allowed the continuance but advised Smagala that the next hearing would proceed whether
or not he had secured a representative. (R. 10, 25-34.)
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II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

Background

Smagala was born on July 12, 1957, and was fifty-three years old at the time
of the ALJ hearing. (R. 49.) Smagala lives alone in a studio apartment. (R. 15, 55.)
He graduated from high school but was a C student. (R. 65, 92.) Smagala was
previously employed in a number of different jobs, including roofer, laborer,
packager, order picker, forklift driver, and material handler. (R. 49- 86-95, 202-04,
210-12.) He also received Social Security benefits from 1995 to 2008. (R. 10 n.1, 24,
44.)
B.

Testimony and Medical Evidence
1.

Smagala’s Testimony

Smagala testified that he had a nervous breakdown in approximately 1999,
after he was divorced, his mother passed away, and he had to care for his blind
father, who was on dialysis. (R. 42-43.) He was hospitalized at the time for two to
three weeks, and then he was recommended to Foxfire day treatment center, where
he went for counseling and treatment over a period of two or three years until 2000.
(R. 58-60.) He was on medication, including Lithium and briefly Zoloft, but he
experienced side effects from Zoloft. (R. 60.) He states that he was diagnosed with
manic depression at Foxfire before his alleged onset date of July 1, 2004. (R. 61.)
From July 2004 until the time of the hearing, he had not received treatment or
medication for any mental health issues, and he only saw a psychiatrist for
evaluations. (R. 61-63, 69.) Smagala testified that although he had access to doctors
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through Medicare from 2004 to 2008, he did not feel the need to see anyone. (R. 6364.) He said that he was gradually taken off of Lithium while at Foxfire because he
was doing well and was “balanced out.” (R. 63.)
Smagala stated that he left most of the jobs he had over the years for various
reasons, but he never had difficulty working with supervisors and co-workers and
generally has an easygoing personality and did as he was told. (R. 43-44.) He did
not return to work as a roofer because he found out he would first need to pay back
dues to the union, and he had only applied for a couple of other jobs, at Jewel and
the YMCA. (R. 64-65.) Smagala also did not pursue job placement through any state
agency. (R. 66.) He explained that he did not look for work very much because he
did not think anyone would hire him due to his age and work experience. (R. 65-66,
101.) He is not entirely sure what prevents him from working, and he does not know
why he quit various jobs. (R. 68.)
He testified that he applied for Social Security when his prior receipt of
benefits was stopped after determination that he had been overpaid funds because
he engaged in substantial gainful employment. 3 (R. 10 n.1, 45-47.) Smagala stated
that he did not actually receive many of those funds, because they were misused by
his sister or brother, who were his payees at the time. (R. 45-47, 70-72.)

The record reflects that Smagala earned $1,082.05 in 1995; $9,317.84 in 1996;
$13,749.26 in 1997; $11,482.65 in 1998; $15,709.71 in 1999; $2,134.96 in 2000; $5,378.66 in
2001; $1,368.50 in 2002; $6,228.62 in 2003; $2,063.79 in 2004; and he had no reported
income from 2005-2010. (R. 210-13.)
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Smagala does his own grocery shopping and also gets food from a church
pantry in exchange for helping set up and distribute the food. (R. 56-57.) He is able
to drive but does not currently own a car, although he occasionally borrows a car
from a friend. (R. 55-57.) He also walks, rides his bike, and takes public
transportation. (R. 57.) He is able to read the newspaper, he filled out all of the
Social Security paperwork by himself, and he can read and understand an
application. (R. 67-68.)
2.

Medical Evidence
a.

Susan Frederiksen, M.D.

Dr. Frederiksen completed a psychiatric consultative examination (“CE”)
report after a thirty-five minute interview on July 18, 2002, eight days after the
death of Smagala’s father. (R. 310-12.) She noted that Smagala was a limited
historian, had a “perplexed air about him,” was anxious, and did not have
spontaneous speech. He found it difficult to express his thoughts and would give
uncertain tentative responses.
She concluded that it was difficult to make a diagnosis due to the limited
amount of information available, but opined that chronic schizophrenia with
predominant negative symptoms was possible. Dr. Frederiksen also found that
Smagala seemed to have avoidant, schizoid, dependent features in his personality.
His ability to maintain attention and concentration was moderately impaired, and
his ability to comprehend instructions was intact but limited to concrete tasks.
Smagala’s ability to initiate, sustain, and complete tasks in a competitive work
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environment appeared to be moderately to markedly impaired, and his ability to get
along with co-workers and supervisors and to withstand normal work pressure
appeared to be markedly impaired.
b.

Dianne Stevenson, Psy. D.

Dr. Stevenson tested and interviewed Smagala over a period of four hours on
January 14, 2006. (R. 297-300.) She noted that Smagala did not offer spontaneous
conversational speech, his memory appeared to falter at times, and his conversation
was often tangential and circumstantial. She administered the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale-III (“WAIS-III”) test, and Smagala’s full-scale IQ was measured
at 79, which is borderline to low average. His verbal comprehension score was 89
(average) and was much higher than his perceptual organization ability score,
which was 74 (borderline impaired). On the Wide Range Achievement Test-2,
Smagala tested at the post-high school grade equivalent in reading, the high school
equivalent in spelling, and the fifth grade equivalent in arithmetic.
Based on the results of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2
(“MMPI-2”) test, Dr. Stevenson noted no significant elevations, although certain
items indicated fearfulness, problems with family members, low self-esteem, and
depression. She opined that he is deficient in interpersonal and social skills and
finds it difficult to trust anyone deeply.
Dr. Stevenson concluded that Smagala’s intellectual functioning is in the
borderline to low average range. He is a loner, finds it difficult to vary his life
experience, tends to be frustrated by his lack of accomplishment, has feelings of
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helplessness and hopelessness, and is worried about his future. He depends on
others for direction and help with decision making. Dr. Stevenson diagnosed
Smagala with Bipolar Disorder, Recurrent, Unspecified (per report); Personality
Disorder NOS, with avoidant and dependent traits; and Borderline Intellectual
Functioning. She concluded that Smagala would be unable to function in a normal
work-like setting. 4
c.

Jeffrey Karr, Ph.D,

Dr. Karr, a licensed clinical psychologist, examined Smagala for fifty minutes
and completed a psychological report on February 19, 2009. (R. 337-40.) Dr. Karr
observed that Smagala was polite and pleasant but appeared ill at ease and
anxious, and he had pressured speech. He also described to Dr. Karr that he was
compelled to engage in certain activities, such as cleaning, attending mass, and
taking walks. Dr. Karr’s diagnosis was Bipolar Disorder (per history) and OCD.
d.

Tyrone Hollerauer, Psy.D.

DDS physician Dr. Hollerauer completed a Psychiatric Review Technique
(“PRT”) and a Mental Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) assessment in March
Three copies of Dr. Stevenson’s report are in the record. Two appear to be identical
copies and were included as part of the same exhibit before the ALJ. (R. 297-304.) A third,
(R. 293-96), was also before the ALJ but was offered as a separate exhibit. The third report
is nearly the same as the other two except with respect to certain redactions. In the two
identical reports, certain information is “whited out”; in the third, it is redacted with a
black pen. Most of the redactions are the same. However, in the two identical reports, Dr.
Stevenson’s conclusion states that “Gerald Smagala would be unable to function in a
normal work-like setting”; in the third report, the letters “un” are redacted, and thus the
conclusion is that Smagala would be able to function in a work-like setting. The discrepancy
is not explained in the record.
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2009. (R. 341-69.) During the interview, Smagala was cooperative and had no
problem with memory, concentration, or in answering questions.
He concluded that Smagala had impairments in the categories of Affective
Disorders (Listing 12.04), based on Bipolar Disorder by history, and AnxietyRelated Disorders (Listing 12.06), based on OCD features. Under the B criteria of
the listings, Dr. Hollerauer found that Smagala had mild limitations in his
activities of daily living and moderate limitations in the areas of maintaining social
functioning and concentration, persistence, or pace, with one or two episodes of
decompensation. Dr. Hollerauer stated that his functional limitations did not meet
or equal a listing.
Dr. Hollerauer’s Mental RFC found that Smagala was moderately limited in
his ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions; to work in
coordination or proximity to others; to complete a normal workday without
interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; and to accept instructions and
respond appropriately to criticism. He was not found to be significantly limited in
any other area. Dr. Hollerauer opined that Smagala was in the low average range
intellectually and could understand and carry out simple instructions, but he would
be limited to unskilled tasks.

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e.

Roy Gilliland, Ph.D.

Dr. Gilliland prepared a psychological evaluation on September 13, 2010, two
days before the ALJ hearing. 5 (R. 387-88.) Smagala reported to Dr. Gilliland that he
had “leveled out” and thus had not taken any medications for his psychological
problems since 2000. He also stated that he was not currently experiencing
significant symptoms of bipolar disorder. His speech was fluent, logical, and
coherent, although he appeared anxious with constricted affect. Smagala’s thought
process was disorganized and often required redirection. Dr. Gilliland found that
Smagala’s insight and judgment appeared good.
Testing suggested minimal depression and mild anxiety. The MMPI-2 test
revealed the highest elevated scale associated with individuals who are socially
introverted and have difficulty in social situations. Dr. Gilliland concluded that his
social phobia symptoms appeared to be limiting in terms of psychosocial
functioning. He did not demonstrate any clinical symptoms other than some
distractibility. Dr. Gilliland recommended a referral to a psychiatrist or counselor in
the event that Smagala’s symptoms worsened. Smagala was ultimately diagnosed
with Bipolar Disorder NOS, and R/O Social Phobia.
3.

Medical Expert’s Testimony

Dr. Michael Cremerius testified at the hearing as a medical expert. Dr.
Cremerius stated that Smagala’s medically determinable impairments supported by

The ALJ left the record open for two weeks in order to allow the record to include
evaluations that were not available on the date of the hearing. (R. 83-84, 105.)
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the record include borderline intellectual functioning (Listing 12.02) based on a fullscale IQ of 79, which is in the borderline low-average range; Bipolar Disorder
(Listing 12.04); OCD features (Listing 12.06); and personality disorder (Listing
12.08). (R. 73-74.)
Dr. Cremerius pointed out that Dr. Stevenson’s January 2006 CE provided
the diagnosis of bipolar disorder and borderline intellectual functioning, and the
February 2009 psychological CE performed by Dr. Karr diagnosed bipolar disorder
by history. (R. 75.) He opined that there was little additional evidence of
psychological limitations in the file. (R. 75.)
When asked to evaluate the B criteria, Dr. Cremerius concluded that based
on the record, Smagala’s presentation at the hearing, and the fact that the claimant
had not been in any psychiatric treatment or on medications for a number of years,
Smagala has at best only mild limitations in his activities of daily living; mild
impairments in social functioning; only mild limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace; and no periods of decompensation during the relevant time
frame. (R. 77-78, 80-81.) Dr. Cremerius concluded that Smagala’s Mental RFC
would include minimal limitations, and he would not be limited to simple, routine
work but instead could perform a variety of semi-skilled tasks. (R. 80-81.)
4.

Vocational Expert’s Testimony

Edward Steffan testified at the hearing as a Vocational Expert (“VE”). The
VE questioned Smagala in detail in order to properly classify his past work
experience. (R. 85-94.) ALJ asked the VE whether there would be any work
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available for a hypothetical individual with Smagala’s age, education, full scale IQ
of 79, and work experience, with no exertional limitations, but limited to semiskilled work. (R. 95-96.) The VE responded that the individual would be able to
perform all of Smagala’s past work. (R. 96.) The ALJ also asked whether work exists
for such a person if he were limited to simple, routine, unskilled tasks. (R. 96-97.)
The VE testified that such a person could perform a number of jobs, including
Smagala’s past job as an order filler, as well as mail clerk (5,000 jobs in the region);
office helper (more than 15,000 jobs); small products assembler (more than 15,000
jobs); and outside delivery. (R. 97-100.) Next, the ALJ added to the hypothetical a
limitation that the person would sometimes be slow in responding, and the VE
concluded that the assembler job would be eliminated, but he could perform the
other unskilled jobs, which are independently performed tasks. (R. 99-100.)
C.

ALJ Decision

The ALJ found that Smagala met the insure status requirements of the
Social Security Act through March 31, 2009, and he had not engaged in substantial
gainful employment since the alleged onset date of July 1, 2004. (R. 12.) At step 2,
the ALJ concluded that Smagala had severe impairments of borderline intellectual
functioning/low IQ and non-severe impairments of bipolar disorder by history,
obsessive compulsive features, and personality disorder. (R. 13.) At step 3, the ALJ
found that none of Smagala’s impairments, alone or in combination, met or equaled
a listing. (R. 13-14.)

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The ALJ next determined that Smagala had the RFC to perform a full range
of work at all exertional levels, limited to semi-skilled work. (R. 14-18.) The ALJ
concluded that Smagala was capable of performing his past relevant work as a
material handler, general laborer, forklift operator, and order filler and thus was
not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 18-20.)
DISCUSSION
I.

ALJ LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42. U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a claimant is
disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the claimant
presently unemployed? (2) Does the claimant have a severe impairment? (3) Does
the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments
enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform his former
occupation? and (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4) (2008).
An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the
claimant is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389
(7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a
finding of disability. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps 1-4. Id.
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Once the claimant shows an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts
to the Commissioner to show the ability to engage in other work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is
limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are support by substantial
evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d. 863, 869 (7th Cir.
2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v.
Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). This Court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence,
resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d
at 841.
The ALJ is not required to address “every piece of evidence or testimony in
the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning
behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th
Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to a claimant, “he must build an
accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d
at 872. The ALJ “must at least minimally articulate the analysis for the evidence
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with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.” Boiles v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 630, 634
(7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record before drawing any
conclusions, and must adequately articulate his analysis so that we can follow his
reasoning.”).
Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the
responsibility for determining whether a claimant is disabled falls upon the
Commissioner, not the court. Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1990).
However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors his
ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v.
Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994).
III.

ANALYSIS
Smagala argues that the decision was in error because the ALJ: (1) did not

properly evaluate the medical opinions, particularly that of Dr. Stevenson; (2) did
not properly evaluate Smagala’s credibility; and (3) did not sufficiently develop the
record.
A.

Medical Evidence

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Stevenson’s opinion
that Smagala would be unable to work in a competitive environment in favor of that
of testifying expert Dr. Cremerius. The ALJ assigned little weight to Dr.
Stevenson’s opinion because it was inconsistent with Smagala’s activities of daily
living and the record as a whole. She assigned significant weight to Dr. Cremerius’s
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opinion because it was more consistent with the record, he had the benefit of
additional evidence, and he was able to observe Smagala at the hearing. (R. 17.) She
further noted that the opinion of Dr. Gilliland, who was a consultant chosen by
Plaintiff and whose report was submitted after the hearing, also did not recommend
further treatment unless Smagala’s condition worsened.
As a general rule, opinions of examining physicians are given more weight
than those of non-examining physicians. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). However,
Dr. Stevenson was a consultant, not a treating physician, and therefore the ALJ
was not required to give her opinion controlling weight. 6 See White v. Barnhart, 415
F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, her opinion, which predated those of
Drs. Karr, Hollerauer, Cremerius, and Gilliland by several years, was not consistent
with the record as a whole in a way that would support a finding of total disability. 7
Plaintiff’s emphasis on consistencies in the record with regard to his limitations is
unpersuasive. It is not disputed that Smagala has impairments and limitations, and
the ALJ’s decision took those into consideration. The issue is whether his
limitations are disabling, and Dr. Stevenson’s opinion is the only evidence in the
record supporting that finding. The ALJ’s decision to assign little weight to Dr.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the fact that Dr. Stevenson spent four hours with
Smagala, longer than any other consultant, is not so relevant that the ALJ’s failure to
mention it in the decision warrants reversal. Dr. Stevenson administered four separate
tests during her consulting examination, including the WAIS-III, which was more testing
than any other consultant performed.
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Stevenson’s opinion was therefore supported by substantial evidence. See Young v.
Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004).
Similarly, the Court does not find error with the ALJ’s development of the
record at the hearing. Her failure to question Dr. Cremerius about specific aspects
of the record that Plaintiff believes are inconsistent with his opinion was at best
harmless error. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that even if Dr. Cremerius had
credited some of the more restrictive limitations given in some of the medical
evidence, he would not be capable of performing the independent, unskilled jobs
which the VE testified exist in significant numbers in the regional economy.
B.

Credibility

In her ruling, the ALJ found Smagala’s allegations of disabling limitations
less than fully credible based upon his wide range of daily activities; the fact that he
has not sought medical treatment or taken medication since his alleged disability
onset date; and that his main contention at the hearing was that he believed no one
would hire him, which is not a basis for a disability determination. (R. 15.)
The Court concludes that the ALJ’s credibility finding was adequately
supported. An ALJ’s credibility determination is granted substantial deference by a
reviewing court unless it is “patently wrong” and not supported by the record.
Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2007); Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431,

As discussed supra note 4, it is not entirely clear that Dr. Stevenson did conclude
that Smagala was unable to perform work activity, but for purposes of this decision, the
Court assumes that she did.
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435 (7th Cir. 2000). However, an ALJ must give specific reasons for discrediting a
claimant’s testimony, and “[t]hose reasons must be supported by record evidence
and must be ‘sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements
and the reasons for that weight.’” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535,
539-40 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887-88).
When assessing the credibility of an individual’s statements about symptoms
and their functional effects, an ALJ must consider all of the evidence in the case
record. See SSR 96-7p. 8 “This includes . . . the individual’s own statements about
the symptoms, any statements and other information provided by treating or
examining physicians or psychologists . . . and any other relevant evidence in the
case record.” Id. at *1. In instances where the individual attends an administrative
proceeding conducted by the adjudicator, the adjudicator may also consider his or
her own observations of the individual as part of the overall evaluation of the
credibility of the individual’s statements. Id. at *5.

Interpretive rules, such as Social Security Regulations (“SSR”), do not have force of
law but are binding on all components of the Agency. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1); accord Lauer
v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1999).
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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s credibility analysis was erroneous because it
included a meaningless boilerplate statement, 9 and additionally that the ALJ’s
stated reasons were insufficient. First, the mere presence of the boilerplate
language is insufficient grounds for remand where, as in this case, the use of the
boilerplate is incidental. See, e.g., Carter v. Astrue, 413 Fed. Appx. 899, 905-06 (7th
Cir. 2011).
Second, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s credibility finding.
Although Plaintiff correctly argues that an ALJ may not equate daily activities with
the requirements of competitive work, the ALJ has not done so here. She listed
certain of his daily activities but did not suggest that the list was exhaustive or
equated to a work environment. The problem for Plaintiff is that he has offered no
activities he is not able to do as a result of a disabling condition. To the extent the
record reflects anxiety in social situations, the jobs of office helper, mail clerk, and
order filler are independently performed tasks. The record does not require the ALJ
to have found that Smagala’s social limitations are wholly disabling.

The following is the language in question: “After careful consideration of the
evidence, I find that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably
be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the
extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” (R.
15.) This “credibility template” has been subject to criticism because of its meaninglessness
and the circular logic that it embraces. See Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir.
2012) (finding the template “gets things backwards,” and is “meaningless boilerplate” that
“implies that ability to work is determined first and is then used to determine the
claimant’s credibility”).
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There is also substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that
Smagala’s failure to receive any mental health treatment eroded his credibility. An
ALJ must consider a claimant’s reasons for not seeking treatment, see SSR 96-7p, at
*7, and in this case, the reason was that Smagala himself felt he had “balanced out”
or “leveled out.” Plaintiff argues at length that his reason for not seeking treatment
was that he had limited insight, but the record does not support this claim. Smagala
stopped taking medication under a physician’s care, not because he alone decided he
did not need it. Moreover, none of the psychological opinions in the record
recommended further treatment at any relevant time frame; the recommendations
only stated that he should pursue treatment if his symptoms worsened. The Court
therefore concludes that the ALJ’s credibility determination was not patently wrong
and was adequately supported by the record.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Gerard Smagala’s motion for summary
judgment is denied, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment
[Doc. No. 28] is granted.
SO ORDERED.

ENTERED:

DATE:

___________________________
HON. MARIA VALDEZ
United States Magistrate Judge

March 31, 2014

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