Haskins, Jr. v. Midwest Air Traffic Control Service, Inc. et al
Filing
110
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 12/10/2014: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Stancil Complaint 84 is denied. [For further detail see the attached order.] Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Lead Case No. 12-cv-04584
CHARLES G. HASKINS, JR., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MIDWEST AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SERVICE,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.
Consolidated with Case Nos.
12-cv-04598, 04600, 4601,
4602, 4603, 4604, 4605, 4606,
4607, 4608, 4609, 4610, 4611,
4612, 4614, 4616, 4617, 4618,
4620, 4622, 4623, 4625, 4626,
4627, 4629, 4630, and 14-cv2727
Opinion pertaining to
14-cv-02727
Judge Manish S. Shah
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On May 17, 2010, a plane crashed in Afghanistan, killing twenty-six
passengers and two pilots. The twenty-eight resulting suits, in which plaintiffs
assert negligence and strict liability claims against defendants Midwest Air Traffic
Control Service, Inc. and Honeywell International Inc., have been consolidated
before me. Defendants move to dismiss one of those suits—the one based on the
death of passenger Wayne Stancil—on the basis that it was filed after the relevant
statute of limitations had expired. For the reasons discussed below, that motion is
denied.
I.
Legal Standards
Defendants’ motion is brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. I therefore construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, accept as true all well-pleaded facts, and draw reasonable inferences in
plaintiff’s favor. Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc., 722 F.3d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 2013).
Defendants’ motion is based on a statute of limitations. “A statute of limitations
provides an affirmative defense, and a plaintiff is not required to plead facts in the
complaint to anticipate and defeat affirmative defenses. But when a plaintiff’s
complaint nonetheless sets out all of the elements of an affirmative defense,
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info.
Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012).
II.
Facts
This is a wrongful-death action, brought on behalf of Meghan Stancil, the
daughter of decedent Wayne Stancil. [77] ¶ 7.1 Wayne Stancil was killed in a plane
crash on May 17, 2010. [77] ¶ 4. His daughter is mentally disabled and mentally
incompetent, and has been since on or before June 3, 2008. [77] ¶ 6. As a result, she
is unable to handle her own affairs. [77] ¶ 7. She has had an appointed guardian
since June 3, 2008. [77] ¶ 7; [96] at 10. This action was filed on March 19, 2014. [84]
¶ 1; [96] at 1.
As conceded, plaintiff is not bringing a claim under the Illinois Survival Act, 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. § 5/13-209(a)(1). [96] at 13.
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III.
Analysis
A. The Applicable Statute of Limitations and Tolling Doctrines
The Illinois statute of limitations and tolling doctrines apply. Hollander v.
Brown, 457 F.3d 688, 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), and Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751–53 (1980)). Federal courts apply the relevant
Illinois law as it has been interpreted—or as they think it would be interpreted—by
the Illinois Supreme Court. James Michael Leasing Co. LLC v. Paccar, Inc., – F.3d
–, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22410, *13 (7th Cir. Nov. 26, 2014).
The Illinois Wrongful Death Act has a two-year statute of limitations. 740
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 180/2(c). Plaintiff’s suit was filed nearly four years after the
plane crash. I must first consider when the statute of limitations began to run. If
the statute began to run more than two years before this suit was filed, I must
consider whether the statute should be tolled.
B. The Illinois Discovery Rule
Illinois courts employ a “discovery rule,” which determines when a statute of
limitations begins to run. The discovery rule “postpone[s] the start of the period of
limitations until the injured party knows or reasonably should know of the injury
and knows or reasonably should know that the injury was wrongfully caused.” Khan
v. Deutsche Bank AG, 365 Ill. Dec. 517, 525–26 (2012).
1.
Application to Wrongful-death Actions
The Illinois Appellate Court has applied the discovery rule to several
wrongful-death actions, and the Illinois Supreme Court, while not deciding the
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issue, appeared to approve of those decisions. Wyness v. Armstrong World Indus.,
131 Ill.2d 403, 413–14 (1989) (“Although never addressed by this court, and indeed
not now before us, the delay of the running of the limitation period accepted by the
appellate court in some districts assures that a wrongful death action may be filed
after death when plaintiffs finally know or reasonably should know of the
wrongfully caused injury which led to death. Many wrongful death cases have
emphasized this ‘discovery’ time.”) (citing Arndt v. Resurrection Hosp., 163
Ill.App.3d 209, 213 (1st Dist. 1987); Coleman v. Hinsdale Emergency Med. Corp.,
108 Ill.App.3d 525, 529–31 (2d Dist. 1982); Fure v. Sherman Hosp., 64 Ill.App.3d
259, 272 (2d Dist. 1978); Praznik v. Sport Aero, Inc., 42 Ill.App.3d 330, 337 (1st Dist.
1976)); see also Young v. McKiegue, 303 Ill.App.3d 380, 388 (1st Dist. 1999).
2.
Application Where Injuries are Caused by Sudden and
Traumatic Events
Defendants argue that the discovery rule is inapplicable when an injury is
caused by a “sudden, traumatic event.” [85] at 6–7; [99] at 7–8 (citing Hollander,
457 F.3d at 692; Black v. Key Safety Sys., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84974 (N.D.
Ill. 2009)). In cases of sudden and traumatic events, application of the discovery rule
will often result in the limitations period starting on the day of the event. But that
is merely the outcome under a typical application of the discovery rule—it does not
mean that the discovery rule does not apply, nor is it necessarily the outcome under
all fact scenarios.
The “sudden, traumatic event” line of cases is exemplified by Golla v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 167 Ill.2d 353 (1995). That case concerned a plaintiff who was hurt in
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a car crash, and knew immediately that she was hurt, but did not know until later
that the crash caused her to develop a painful condition known (at the time) as
reflex sympathetic dystrophy. The court considered the following question: “when
an accident occurs which causes the plaintiff to suffer an immediate physical injury
(e.g., chest contusion) and later more serious injuries appear (e.g., reflex
sympathetic dystrophy) which arose from the same accident, when does the
plaintiff’s cause of action ‘accrue’ for statute of limitations purposes?” Id. at 359.
The court stated that “where the plaintiff’s injury is caused by a ‘sudden traumatic
event,’ . . . the cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, on
the date the injury occurs.” Id. at 362 (emphasis added). Later cases, with similar
facts, have repeated that language, including the two cases cited by defendants.
But the Golla court also stated that “an action for injuries arising from a
sudden traumatic event accrues when the plaintiff first knew of his right to sue.” Id.
at 370–71 (emphasis added). And in stressing that it was not announcing a harsh
rule, the court said that “[o]nce a plaintiff has notice of a physical injury arising
from a sudden, traumatic event, she, like other tort claimants, must determine
whether or not to file suit. She has two years to consult with the legal and medical
community about her claim and resulting damages.” Id. at 371 (emphasis added).
The fact that the court said that the statute begins to run on the date of the injury,
but later said that it begins to run when the plaintiff first has notice of the injury, is
a reminder that all of the court’s statements must be understood in the context of
the case: the case did not involve a plaintiff who, despite the sudden and traumatic
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event, was not immediately aware of her right to sue. Indeed, in the same
paragraph as the statement that the cause of action accrues on the date of the
injury, the court stated its rationale: “the nature and circumstances surrounding
the traumatic event are such that the injured party is thereby put on notice that
actionable conduct might be involved.” Id. at 363. That rationale is, at least
potentially, inapplicable in cases of severe mental disabilities.
The Golla court repeatedly stressed that the plaintiff was aware, at the time
of her accident, that she was wrongfully injured. See 167 Ill.2d at 363, 364, 365, 367,
368, 371. Accordingly, Golla is a routine application of the discovery rule, rather
than an announcement of a separate rule that, in all cases, causes of action arising
out of “sudden, traumatic events” accrue immediately upon the event’s occurrence,
no matter the extent of the plaintiff’s knowledge. Defendants cite no case that
applied such a strict rule, and such a strict rule would not serve the purpose of the
discovery rule, which the Golla court recognized as “alleviat[ing] the harsh
consequences that would flow from literal application of the limitations period” and
“eliminat[ing] the unfairness that would result to a plaintiff whose right to bring an
action for an injury is cut off before she is aware of the existence of such action.” Id.
at 360–61, 363.2
Several Illinois cases weigh the potential unfairness to the plaintiff against the potential
prejudice to the defendant in having to defend against a stale suit. Defendants have not
argued the existence of any prejudice in this case. It is unlikely that such an argument
would be persuasive, given the consolidation of the Stancil suit with twenty-seven other
suits, timely filed, concerning the same plane crash.
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Though a sudden, traumatic event might put most plaintiffs on immediate
notice, nothing in Golla, or any case cited by defendants, or any other case that I am
aware of, says that where an injury is suddenly and traumatically caused, the
discovery rule can never save an otherwise untimely complaint. Indeed, in Praznik,
the Illinois court applied the discovery rule to a case involving a plane crash. 42
Ill.App.3d at 337. Defendants explain why the discovery rule saved the complaint in
Praznik (because the crash was not discovered for two years), but the pertinent
point is that the discovery rule can apply in cases of sudden, traumatic events.
3.
Application in Cases of Mental Disability
Would Illinois apply the discovery rule to save an otherwise untimely
complaint, where the plaintiff’s mental disability prevents her from timely filing
suit? Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s assertion that the mentally disabled cannot
‘discover’ when an injury occurred effectively eliminates the need for any statutory
tolling provisions for the legally disabled.” [99] at 8. Defendants imply that such a
state of affairs is undesirable, and while that policy argument is not without merit,
defendants cite no Illinois case applying that policy to reject an application of the
discovery rule.3 Under Illinois law, what a plaintiff should reasonably have known
The Seventh Circuit alluded to a similar concern in Crawford v. United States, 796 F.2d
924 (7th Cir. 1986), but expressly declined to decide whether mental incapacity tolled the
relevant statute of limitations. Id. at 927. The concern is tempered by the availability of
statutes of repose, which are unaffected by the discovery rule. Evanston Ins. Co. v.
Riseborough, 378 Ill. Dec. 778, 784 (2014). Statutes of repose impose a cap on the
applicability of the discovery rule, extinguishing the possibility of liability after a definite
period of time. See Cunningham v. Huffman, 154 Ill.2d 398 (1993) (citing Mega v. Holy
Cross Hosp., 111 Ill.2d 416 (1986)). The Illinois legislature has enacted various statutes of
repose. For example, medical malpractice actions must be brought within four years of the
alleged wrongful conduct. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/13-212(a). There is no Illinois statute of
repose for wrongful-death claims.
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is analyzed from the perspective of the particular plaintiff. Fure, 64 Ill.App.3d at
271 (“[W]e must be practical in considering the widow’s situation and what is
‘reasonable diligence’ for a recently bereaved widow with four minor children, and
this is not a very high standard of diligence so far as gathering material with which
to prosecute a lawsuit is concerned.”).4
If Meghan Stancil was incapable of discovering her cause of action, barring
her suit on timeliness grounds would not serve the purpose of the discovery rule as
announced in Golla. 167 Ill.2d 360–61, 363. Moreover, applying various doctrines,
Illinois courts have excused mentally disabled plaintiffs from strict filing deadlines.5
The federal discovery rule is less generous to plaintiffs than the Illinois rule. Under the
Illinois rule, the start of the limitations period is postponed until the injured party knows or
reasonably should know of the injury and its wrongfulness. Khan, 365 Ill. Dec. at 525–26.
Under the federal rule, the period starts when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should
know of the injury, even if he does not recognize the wrongfulness. See Thelen v. Marc’s Big
Boy Corp., 64 F.3d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1995). In Estate of Henderson v. Meritage Mortg.
Corp., 293 F.Supp.2d 830, 835 (N.D. Ill. 2003), the court applied the federal discovery rule
and found that a mentally disabled plaintiff could not discover her injuries at the time they
occurred, but that the claim accrued when it passed to her estate. As the Henderson court
noted, the Seventh Circuit has twice confronted the issue (again, in the context of the
federal discovery rule), but has declined to decide it. Id. at 834 (discussing Crawford, 796
F.2d at 927 and Barnhart v. United States, 884 F.2d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1989)). If the federal
discovery rule can delay the accrual of a claim based on a plaintiff’s mental disability, then
it is likely that the Illinois rule would also apply under similar circumstances.
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See, e.g., Girman v. County of Cook, 103 Ill.App.3d 897, 898 (1st Dist. 1981) (“[S]tatutes of
limitations are generally tolled during a plaintiff’s infancy, mental incompetency, or
imprisonment.”); Haas v. Westlake Cmty. Hosp., 82 Ill.App.3d 347, 349 (1st Dist. 1980)
(rejecting laches defense where plaintiff is insane or mentally ill); In re Estate of Goldberg,
288 Ill.App. 203, 212–13 (2d Dist. 1937) (“An insane person cannot be held accountable for
any apparent negligence of laches or delay in seeking redress, through the courts or
otherwise, for any wrong that may have been done her in respect to her property, and she is
not affected by the statute of limitations, which but for her insanity would bar her rights.”);
Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk, 148 Ill. 9, 26 (1893) (same); Dodge v. Cole, 97 Ill. 338, 349–50
(1881) (same).
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Accordingly, I find that Illinois courts would apply the discovery rule in cases of
mental disability.
Whether the discovery rule saves an otherwise untimely complaint where, as
here, a mentally disabled plaintiff had an appointed guardian since before the
injury occurred is a separate question. The Seventh Circuit has suggested that the
federal discovery rule might not apply in such situations. Barnhart, 884 F.2d at 297
(“[W]here a plaintiff has an appointed guardian. . ., the plaintiff’s incapacity would
not appear to be similarly critical.”); Crawford, 796 F.2d at 927 (“[T]he statute
would not be tolled if Crawford had had a guardian or conservator.”). But Illinois
law controls, and Illinois cases suggest the opposite. Mazikoske v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 149 Ill.App.3d 166, 177–78 (3d Dist. 1986) (rejecting the argument that
the plaintiff’s disability was cured when a guardian was appointed); Van Buskirk,
148 Ill. at 26 (holding that the plaintiff’s rights could not be prejudiced by the fact
that his “next friend” did not timely bring suit after plaintiff was declared a
lunatic). Defendants did not raise this argument; therefore, I do not reach it at this
time.
Defendants may re-raise the issue of the statute of limitations after some
factual development. Clark v. Children’s Mem. Hosp., 353 Ill. Dec. 254, 279 (2011)
(“The time at which a party has or should have the requisite knowledge under the
discovery rule to maintain a cause of action is ordinarily a question of fact.”).
4.
Defendants
Adequacy of Pleadings
argue
that
“Plaintiff’s
Amended
Complaint
includes
no
allegations that the decedent’s death, or the manner in which it occurred, was not
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immediately known.” [99] at 8. But plaintiff alleged that Meghan Stancil was and is
mentally disabled and incompetent, and unable to handle her affairs. [77] ¶¶ 6–7.
Plaintiff also asserted that Meghan’s mental condition prevented her from
discovering the injury. [96] at 12–13. These allegations should be construed liberally
at this stage of the case. And in any event, plaintiff was not required to plead
around defendants’ affirmative defense. See Clark v. City of Braidwood, 318 F.3d
764, 767–68 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The City contends that the discovery rule does not
save Clark’s suit because his ‘complaint is wanting for any reasonable inference
triggering the application of the discovery rule or otherwise resulting in a tolling of
the limitations period.’ But again, a plaintiff is not required to negate an affirmative
defense, such as the statute of limitations, in his complaint.”). At this stage, I accept
plaintiff’s allegations as true, and under that version of the facts, the complaint is
timely.
C. Application of Tolling Principles
Because the discovery rule saves plaintiff’s complaint, at least at this stage, I
do not now decide whether any tolling doctrine applies to extend the filing deadline.
Because this issue may arise later, some comments on the arguments made to date
are appropriate.
The Wrongful Death Act explicitly provides for tolling, where the plaintiff is
under the age of 18 when her cause of action accrues, but it does not provide for
tolling where the plaintiff is mentally disabled. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 180/2. The
Illinois legislature has enacted a separate tolling statute. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 5/13-211. But its text suggests that it applies only to actions brought under
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§§ 5/13-201 through 5/13-210—a range that does not include the Wrongful Death
Act. Plaintiff cites Illinois common-law cases that tolled statutes of limitation under
certain circumstances, including the mental disability of the plaintiff. Defendants
argue that the Wrongful Death Act is a purely statutory cause of action (meaning
the cause of action was not recognized at common law), and thus under Demchuk v.
Duplanich, 92 Ill.2d 1 (1982), common-law tolling principles do not apply. After
Demchuk, the Illinois Supreme Court specifically rejected the notion that statutes of
limitation are conditions precedent to filing suit in Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill.2d 325, 338–340 (2002). The Belleville court
specifically cited Demchuk and also a case under the Wrongful Death Act (Pasquale
v. Speed Prods. Eng’g, 166 Ill.2d 337, 366–67 (1995)) as applying that incorrect rule.
Belleville, 199 Ill.2d at 338. Belleville made clear that under Illinois law, statutes of
limitation are conditions precedent to filing suit only in matters of administrative
review. Id. at 338–40. Common-law tolling may apply to claims under the Wrongful
Death Act, but I need not decide that issue to resolve the pending motion.6
Forthenberry v. Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp., 156 Ill.App.3d 634, 637 (4th Dist.
1987); Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill.2d 404, 419 (2008); and Rodgers v. Consol. R.R.
Corp., 136 Ill.App.3d 191, 196 (4th Dist. 1985), cited by defendants, concern how strictly
courts will interpret the elements of a wrongful-death action and who the proper
beneficiaries are. They do not interpret tolling principles and they do not apply here. In any
event, because I conclude that the statute of limitations issue survives the pleading stage,
whether and how common-law tolling doctrines apply to strictly interpreted claims like
wrongful death are questions for another day.
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IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss [84] is denied.
ENTER:
___________________________
Manish S. Shah
United States District Judge
Date: 12/10/14
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