Shelton v. Cook County Jail Executive Director et al

Filing 7

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/20/2012: The habeas corpus petition (Dkt. No. 1 ) is dismissed for failure to exhaust an available state court remedy. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. Civil Case Terminated. [For further detail see written opinion] Mailed notice.(mr, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Robert W. Gettleman

CASE NUMBER

12 C 4664

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

06/20/2012

United States of America ex rel. Linda L. Shelton vs. Cook County Jail Executive
Director, Circuit Court of Cook County

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

The habeas corpus petition (Dkt. No. 1) is dismissed for failure to exhaust an available state court remedy.
The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. Civil Case Terminated.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
Pro se petitioner Linda L. Shelton has brought seven related habeas corpus petitions. Shelton v.
Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12 C 4656 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.), Shelton v. Circuit Court of Cook
County, No. 12 C 4657 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.), Shelton v. Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12 C 4660
(N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.), Shelton v. Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12 C 4663 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.),
Shelton v. Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12 C 4664 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.), Shelton v. Circuit Court
of Cook County, No. 12 C 4665 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.), and Shelton v. Circuit Court of Cook County, No.
12 C 4666 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.). These habeas corpus petitions arise from her pending seven
misdemeanor cases in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Municipal Division, District One.
I.

Background

According to attorney J. Nicolas Albukerk’s affidavit attached to each habeas petition, he represents
Shelton in one of the seven state cases. She is pro se in the others. (Shelton is pro se in all of the present
federal habeas corpus petitions before this Court.) Albukerk provides an affidavit in all seven federal cases
discussing Shelton’s state cases.
Albukerk explains that Shelton is presently on trial before the Honorable Peggy Chiampas in the
Circuit Court of Cook County in the seven cases. On March 21, 2012, Judge Chiampas sua sponte dismissed
Shelton’s pretrial motions. Shelton believes that she cannot receive a fair trial before Judge Chiampas, and
did not appear for her May 29, 2012, court hearing. Judge Chiampas issued a bench warrant for Shelton’s
arrest. Shelton is now detained at the Cook County Jail.
On May 30 and 31, Mr. Albukerk contacted the Chambers of the Municipal District’s Presiding Judge
Kenneth E. Wright, Jr. Albukerk wanted to bring an Illinois state habeas corpus petition under 735 ILCS
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STATEMENT
5/10-124 challenging Shelton’s confinement. Albukerk’s understanding of Cook County Local Rules is that
he must bring a habeas corpus petition before the presiding judge. Presiding Judge Wright’s staff allegedly
failed to assist Mr. Albukerk in filing Shelton’s state habeas corpus petition. Shelton believes that she has no
available state court remedy to challenge her current pretrial custody at the Cook County Jail due to the state
court’s failure to hear her state habeas corpus petition.
Shelton raises what she entitles an “emergency” habeas corpus petition before this Court. She
explains that she has serious health problems and believes that she is suffering from an unlawful confinement
due to the alleged deficiencies in medical care at the Cook County Jail. She is also raising the various pretrial
challenges that were rejected by Judge Chiampas.
The Court’s Executive Committee, when barring Shelton from bringing civil litigation or entering the
Everett M. Dirksen Courthouse, noted that she was a “convicted felon, who has been diagnosed by her
personal psychiatrist as having a ‘psychiatric condition’ resulting in her ‘misconception of ongoing events.’”
In re Shelton, No. 10 C 1995 (N.D. Ill Apr. 8, 2010) (Dkt. No. 10). The Executive Committee barred Shelton
due to her excessive frivolous litigation and verbal harassment and confrontations with Court staff. (The
barring order provides an exception for bringing habeas corpus petitions. (No. 10 C 1995, Dkt. No. 15).)
Shelton’s present habeas corpus petitions are:
Shelton v. Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12 C 4656 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.):
This petition challenges Illinois v. Shelton, No. 09 MC 286184 (Circuit Court of Cook County),
charging Shelton with disorderly conduct. Her claims are: Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation,
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation, and double jeopardy violation.
Although her first two claims invoke the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, it is clear that her claims
arise under Illinois law. Shelton applies the Illinois Speedy Trial Act requirement that she must be tried
within 160 days under 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b). As to the alleged due process violation, she invokes Illinois’s
statue allowing a party to request the substitution of a judge. 725 ILCS 5/114-5. Her discussion of the
claims are limited to state law.
Shelton v. Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12 C 4657 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.):
This petition challenges Illinois v. Shelton, No. 09 MC 223774 (Circuit Court of Cook County),
charging Shelton with trespass to real property, disorderly conduct, and obstructing / resisting a peace officer.
The petition raises the same speedy trial and due process arguments discussed above. This petition also adds
additional claims that she was arrested without probable cause, and the charges are fraudulent as shown by
the information contained in the police reports.
Shelton v. Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12 C 4660 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.):
This petition challenges Illinois v. Shelton, No. 09 MC 258392 (Circuit Court of Cook County),
charging Shelton with assault, disorderly conduct, resisting / obstructing a peace officer, and trespass to state
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STATEMENT
supported land. The petition raises the same speedy trial, due process, lack of probable cause, and false
charges arguments discussed above.
Shelton v. Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12 C 4663 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.):
This petition challenges Illinois v. Shelton, No. 09 MC 238219 (Circuit Court of Cook County),
charging Shelton with trespass to state supported land, disorderly conduct, and obstructing / resisting a peace
officer. The petition raises the same speedy trial, due process, lack of probable cause, and false charges
arguments discussed above.
Shelton v. Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12 C 4664 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.):
This petition challenges Illinois v. Shelton, No. 11 MC 241978 (Circuit Court of Cook County),
charging Shelton with two counts of simple battery, disorderly conduct, resisting a peace officer, and
criminal trespass. The petition raises the same speedy trial, due process, lack of probable cause, and false
charges arguments discussed above.
Shelton v. Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12 C 4665 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.):
This petition challenges Illinois v. Shelton, No. 09 MC 260540 (Circuit Court of Cook County),
charging Shelton with criminal trespass to state supported land. The petition raises the same speedy trial, due
process, lack of probable cause, and false charges arguments discussed above.
Shelton v. Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12 C 4666 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.):
This petition challenges Illinois v. Shelton, No. 09 MC 261096 (Circuit Court of Cook County),
charging Shelton with disorderly conduct. The petition raises the same speedy trial, due process, lack of
probable cause, and false charges arguments discussed above.
II.

Analysis

Turning to the adjudication of Shelton’s present federal habeas corpus petitions, the Court notes that
each petition challenges a different state case. The Court has reviewed Shelton’s litigation history in
CMECF and determined that she has not previously challenged any of these state cases. She may proceed on
all seven federal habeas corpus petitions.
Shelton invokes 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in her present petitions, but these cases arise under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 because she is challenging her pretrial custody. Jacobs v. McCoaughtry, 251 F.3d 596, 597 (7th Cir.
2001); Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2000). Section 2241 allows a pretrial detainee to bring
a habeas corpus petition, but this ability is limited by the desire of federal courts not to interfere with pending
state criminal prosecutions except in special circumstances. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of
Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489-92 (1973); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Sweeney v. Bartow, 612 F.3d
571, 573 (7th Cir. 2010); Olsson v. Curran, 328 Fed. App’x 334, 335 (7th Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential
decision); United States v. Castro, 937 F.2d 293, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1991); Neville v. Cavanaugh, 611 F.2d
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STATEMENT
673, 675 (7th Cir. 1979).
The general rule is that the detainee must proceed with her claims through the regular state criminal
proceedings, and may raise claims through a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas corpus petition only after a
state conviction. Sweeney, 612 F.3d at 573. But an exception is made for claims that must be addressed by
the federal court prior to a state conviction in order to prevent them from becoming moot. Id. Speedy trial
and double jeopardy claims are two recognized exceptions allowed to proceed under § 2241. Id.; see also
Braden, 410 U.S. 489-92. Habeas corpus relief (under both § 2241 and § 2254) is limited to questions of
federal law; relief is unavailable for errors of state law. Estelle v. McQuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). Finally,
pretrial detainees raising permissible federal claims under § 2241 must exhaust those claims first through
available state court proceedings. Castor, 937 F.2d at 296-97; Olsson, 328 Fed. App’x at 335.
Shelton’s overarching argument in her present federal habeas corpus petitions is that she has serious
health issues, and should not be detained in the Cook County Jail. Judge Chiampas had Shelton arrested for
her failure to appear at the May 29th hearing. Although Shelton is not clear on this point, the Court presumes
that she was on bail and her bail was revoked by Judge Chiampas due to her failure to appear.
The Supreme Court has assumed the bail clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to the States
without addressing the issue directly. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); see also Galen v.
County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007); Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 903-04 (7th Cir.
1996); Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 718 n.8 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc). But even if Shelton has raised
a federal constitutional claim as to her bail situation in the present § 2241 petitions, this would not help her
cause because she has failed to exhaust the claim before the Illinois state courts.
Shelton’s attempt at exhaustion was an Illinois habeas corpus petition under 735 ILCS 5/10-124 in the
Circuit Court of Cook County. The Court is uncertain why Shelton chose to bring a state habeas corpus
petition when Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(c)(1) allows a criminal defendant to bring an immediate
interlocutory appeal of an adverse bail order. Illinois v. Santillan, 561 N.E.2d 655, 655 (Ill. 1990); Illinois v.
Morrow, 628 N.E.2d 550, 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). In contrast, an Illinois habeas corpus proceeding is
limited to a challenge to the state court’s jurisdiction, or an allegation that a subsequent event requires the
prisoner’s immediate release. Beacham v. Walker, 896 N.E.2d 327, 332 (Ill. 2008). The Illinois Supreme
Court teaches that constitutional claims cannot be brought in an Illinois habeas corpus proceeding because
constitutional claims do not fit into these two permissible categories for Illinois habeas corpus. Id.
Shelton’s proper action was to bring a Rule 604(c)(1) appeal, not a state habeas corpus petition. The
Circuit Court of Cook County’s alleged failure to adjudicate her state habeas corpus petition does not excuse
her failure to properly exhaust her federal claims. The exhaustion requirement requires the petitioner to
provide the state the “‘opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights.’”
Cheeks v. Gaetz, 571 F.3d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)).
Detainees must follow the “normal . . . and established” process for raising their claims to the state courts.
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). This also includes raising the claims through the state
appeals process to the state’s court of last resort. Johnson v. Hulett, 574 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted).

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STATEMENT
Here, Shelton failed on two fronts. She did not raise her bail issue through Illinois’s established
process of a Rule 604(c)(1) interlocutory appeal. Attempting to file a state habeas corpus petition would
have been futile under Illinois law. And a second additional point is that she stopped her exhaustion efforts
at the trial court level. Exhaustion required Shelton to proceed through the full appellate process including to
the Illinois Supreme Court. These failures to exhaust doom her present § 2241 habeas corpus petitions.
In addition, there are various other reasons why Shelton’s petitions must be dismissed. In Shelton v.
Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12 C 4656 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.), she raises a double jeopardy claim.
But Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(f) allows an immediate interlocutory appeal by a criminal defendant
following the denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. Illinois v. Griffith, 936 N.E.2d
1174, 1187 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). Just like her failure to properly appeal the bail issue, this failure to exhaust
bars any double jeopardy claim.
Her other claims such as due process, lack of probable cause for arrest, and false charges allegations
cannot be raised in a § 2241 proceeding. These claims will not be mooted by petitioner’s state court
conviction and so are properly raised through a § 2254 proceeding following the completion of the state court
case should she be convicted. Finally, petitioner’s speedy trial and due process claims, though invoking
federal constitutional provisions, clearly arise under Illinois law because Shelton argues only the state law
statutory issue. These noncognizable state law claims cannot be adjudicated in a federal habeas corpus
petition. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996) (holding that a general invocation to due process,
without a discussion of the underlying merits of the claim, is insufficient to raise a federal constitutional
claim); United States ex rel. Kendrick v. McCann, No. 08 C 6281, 2010 WL 3700233, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
8, 2010) (invoking Illinois’s Speedy Trial Act, 725 ILCS 5/130-5, is insufficient to raise a federal
constitutional speedy trial claim because the Illinois Act provides rights above and beyond those provided by
the U.S. Constitution).
Consequently, all of Shelton’s present § 2241 petitions are dismissed. The Court also declines to issue
a certificate of appealability under Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts because there is no substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right in this case. See
Arredondo v. Huibregtse, 542 F.3d 1155, 1165 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893, & n.4 (1983)); Davis v. Borgen,
349 F.3d 1027, 1028 (7th Cir. 2003)) (setting forth requirements for a certificate of appealability); see also
Evans v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., 569 F.3d 655, 666 (7th Cir. 2009) (certificate of appealability is
required for appeal from denial of habeas corpus petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when the custody
is the result of a state court order).

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