Clearly v. Astrue
Filing
32
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Susan E. Cox on 8/19/13: (vkd, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES CLEARY,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.
No. 12-cv-4865
Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, James M. Cleary, seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his application for disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act (“the Act”).1 Mr.
Cleary has filed a motion to reverse or remand the decision of the Commissioner [dkt. 21]. The
Commissioner has also filed a cross motion for summary of judgement [dkt. 25]. For the reasons set
forth below, Mr. Cleary’s motion is granted and the ALJ’s decision is remanded for further
consideration.
I.
Procedural History
Mr. Cleary applied for DIB and SSI on January 22, 2009, alleging disability beginning June
1, 2006.2 On October 28, 2009, Mr. Cleary requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”), which was granted on August 30, 2010.3 A hearing took place before ALJ Joel G. Fina in
Oak Brook, Illinois, on October 5, 2010.4 Following the hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable
1
42 U.S.C. §§416(I), 423, and 1381 et seq.
R. at 16.
3
R. at 90, 100.
4
R. at 100-04.
2
Page 1 of 31
decision on November 8, 2010, concluding that Mr. Cleary was not disabled under sections 216(i)
and 223(d) of the Act through December 31, 2010, the last date insured.5 The Appeals Council
denied Mr. Cleary’s request to review the ALJ decision on April 20, 2012, meaning the ALJ’s
decision is the final decision of the Commissioner.6
II.
Factual Background
The facts set forth under this section are derived from the administrative record. Mr. Cleary
was born July 27, 1963, and was forty-seven years old on December 31, 2010, the date last insured.7
Mr. Cleary alleged a disability beginning June 1, 2006. He remained insured through December 31,
2010.8 Mr. Cleary must establish that he became disabled during this period.9
In this case, there is an extensive medical record stretching over roughly four years. But the
ALJ confined the majority of his consideration to 2009.10 In instances of alleged mental disability
it is essential to consider all the available evidence to create a complete picture of the claimant’s
fluctuating condition.11 Therefore, we closely reviewed the entire medical record spanning all the
years submitted, and summarized Mr. Cleary’s mental health condition. We begin our review of Mr.
Cleary’s relevant medical history on September 18, 2006.12 Mr. Cleary alleges disability beginning
June 1, 2006, however, we are unable to find any medical records between that time and September
18, 2006.13
5
R. at 16, 27.
R. at 1.
7
R. at 26 (claimant was forty-two on the alleged onset date, June 1, 2006); see 20 C.F.R. 404.1563.
8
R. at 16.
9
Id.
10
R. at 24.
11
Phillips v. Astrue, 413 Fed.Appx. 878, 881 (7th Cir. 2010).
12
R. at 410.
13
But see R. at 358 (noting that Mr. Cleary stated that he was sober for approximately two and a half years
and attended Alcoholics Anonymous until he began drinking in June, 2006).
6
Page 2 of 31
A.
2006
In 2006, Mr. Cleary was hospitalized three times for detoxification, alcohol abuse, and
suicidal thoughts.14 During these hospitalizations he received physical examinations which were
unremarkable.15 On September 18, 2006, Mr. Cleary visited Palos Community Hospital’s emergency
room (“ER”) for detoxification.16 Admitting physician, Paul S. Killion, M.D., noted that Mr. Cleary
was “extremely agitated, volatile, sarcastic, angry, cursing and still seemed to be somewhat
intoxicated.”17 Mr. Cleary also made “veiled references” to suicide when first admitted, but he
recanted when he was not intoxicated.18 Additionally, Dr. Killion also noted depression and a history
of chemical dependency.19 Dr. Killion opined that based on Mr. Cleary’s history of “noncompliance
with treatment recommendations in the past,”20 Mr. Cleary was unlikely to achieve abstinence.21
Next, Dr. Killion assessed Mr. Cleary’s mental state. Mental health clinicians commonly use
a multifaceted system to assess a patient's condition to capture the “complexity of clinical situations”
and create a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) in order to plan treatment and predict
outcomes.22 The GAF scale consists of ten ranges of ten points each, from 0 to 100.23 Dr. Killion
assigned Mr. Cleary a GAF score of thirty,24 which denotes “serious impairment in communication
or judgment or [an] inability to function in almost all areas.”25 Mr. Cleary was released three days
14
R. at 324, 336, 357-58, 416.
R. at 358-59, 413-14.
16
R. at 416.
17
R. at 417.
18
R. at 410, 416.
19
R. at 413, 416.
20
Id.
21
R. at 410.
22
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 27 (Text
Revision, 4th ed. 2000) (“DSM–IV”).
23
Id.
24
R. at 417.
25
DSM-IV at 34
15
Page 3 of 31
later on September 21, 2006.26
On December 25, 2006, Mr. Cleary was admitted to Saint Anthony’s Memorial Hospital for
alcohol abuse and thoughts of suicide.27 Mr. Cleary spoke with Counselor Amanda Bain,
B.S./M.H.P,28 with Heartland Human Services.29 Counselor Bain noted that Mr. Cleary was
intoxicated and had suicidal thoughts.30 Mr. Cleary was kept overnight.31 On December 26, 2006 Mr.
Cleary expressed that he no longer had suicidal thoughts and Counselor Bain assigned him a GAF
score of fifty-five, which denotes moderate difficulty with social and occupational functioning.32
Mr. Cleary was released from Saint Anthony’s Memorial Hospital December 26, 2006.33
Less than twenty-four hours later on December 27, 2006, Mr. Cleary was intoxicated, suicidal, and
threatening to shoot himself if he did not receive help.34 Mr. Cleary was readmitted to Saint
Anthony’s Memorial Hospital,35 and met with Counselor Bain.36 Counselor Bain noted that Mr.
Cleary appeared irritable, depressed and was intoxicated from having drank since leaving the
hospital.37 Counselor Bain assigned Mr. Cleary a GAF score of fifty, denoting serious impairment
in social and occupational functioning,38 and arranged for Mr. Cleary to be transferred to Sarah Bush
Lincoln Health Center.39
When admitted to Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center psychiatric, John C. Lauer, M.D. noted
26
R. at 410.
R. at 324, 336.
28
Bachelor of Science Mental Health Professional
29
R. at 336-46.
30
Id.
31
R. at 341.
32
R. at 345; DSM-IV at 34.
33
R. at 315.
34
R. at 313-15.
35
R. at 314.
36
R. at 308-12.
37
R. at 308-10.
38
DSM-IV at 34.
39
R. at 312.
27
Page 4 of 31
that Mr. Cleary was “angry and intoxicated” and had a “lifelong history of alcohol dependance.”40
Mr. Cleary stated that he experienced withdrawal symptoms when not drinking.41 Finally, Mr.
Cleary stated that he had “low mood, hopelessness, poor concentration, and increased irritability.”42
Dr. Lauer found Mr. Cleary to be depressed and suffering from alcohol dependence and assigned
Mr. Cleary a GAF score of twenty-five, which indicates serious impairments or an inability to
function in most areas.43 Mr. Cleary’s condition improved and he was discharged six days later on
January 2, 2007.44
B.
2007
Mr. Cleary remained sober for a short time, until June 17, 2007,45 at which point he began
“drinking a liter of vodka per day.”46 His first hospitalization was on November 13, 2007, Mr.
Cleary was referred to the Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center from Saint Anthony’s ER because of
alcohol withdrawal and suicidal thoughts.47 Montgomery Lloyd, M.D., noted major depression,
personality disorder, as well as alcohol dependance and withdrawal.48 Dr. Lloyd assigned Mr. Cleary
an RFC score of twenty-eight, which denotes “serious impairment in communication or judgment”
or an “inability to function in almost all areas.”49
On November 23, 2007, Dr. Lauer noted that Mr. Cleary was being medicated for alcohol
withdrawal, depression, trouble sleeping, and anxiety.50 Dr. Lauer also noted that Mr. Cleary no
40
R. at 357-58.
R. at 358.
42
Id.
43
R. at 360; DSM-IV at 34.
44
R. at 357.
45
Father’s Day 2007 see http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/pdf/cb07-ff08.pdf
46
R. at 347.
47
R. at 351.
48
Id.
49
R. at 352; DSM-IV at 34.
50
R. at 350.
41
Page 5 of 31
longer had suicidal thoughts and expressed interest in a long-term treatment program.51 Finally, Dr.
Lauer noted Mr. Cleary’s history of substance abuse, alcohol dependance and alcohol induced mood
disorder in assigning a GAF score of fifty, denoting serious impairment in social and occupational
functioning.52
Twelve days after being admitted, Mr. Cleary was discharged from Sarah Bush Lincoln
Health Center on November 26, 2007.53 In his discharge summary, Dr. Lauer noted that Mr. Cleary
had responded well to medication.54 Dr. Lauer also noted that Mr. Cleary was no longer suicidal, but
suffered from major recurring depressive disorder, alcohol dependance, and alcohol withdrawal
symptoms.55 In determining Mr. Cleary’s GAF score, Dr. Lauer further opined that Mr. Cleary
displayed “cluster ‘B’ personality traits,” often characterized as “dramatic, emotional, or erratic.”56
These, along with Mr. Cleary’s physical pain and moderate to severe environmental stressors
resulted in a GAF score of forty-five, denoting serious impairment in social and occupational
functioning.57
Mr. Cleary was admitted to the South Suburban Council on November 27, 2007 and was
diagnosed with alcohol, opioid, and cocaine dependance.58 While in treatment, Mr. Cleary saw the
in-house psychiatrist, R. Songald, M.D., who on November 30, 2007 noted attention deficit
hyperactive disorder (“ADHD”), depression, and a history of substance abuse.59 Dr. Songald
assigned Mr. Cleary a GAF score of forty, denoting major impairment in work, family relation,
51
Id.
R. at 349; DSM-IV at 34.
53
R. at 347.
54
Id.
55
R. at 347-48.
56
R. at 348, DSM-IV at 685.
57
R. at 348; DSM-IV at 34.
58
R. at 377.
59
R. at 380.
52
Page 6 of 31
judgment, thinking, or mood.60 Dr. Songal did not assign another GAF score prior to Mr. Cleary’s
discharge on December 19, 2007,61 when Mr. Cleary entered Guildhaus halfway house for further
treatment.62
C.
2008
During 2008, Mr. Cleary was hospitalized at least six times and remained hospitalized for
a substantial portion of the year including almost all of March and April. His first hospitalization
was on March 2, 2008, when he was admitted to Advocate Christ Medical Center’s ER for alcohol
withdrawal and pancreatitis.63 An Kon Tsai, M.D., noted an unremarkable physical examination.64
Mr. Cleary told Dr. Tsai that he had been sober for two months before relapsing, and also admitted
to using “cocain, heroine, marijuana, [and] Xanax.”65 Dr. Tsai’s report indicates that he was
discharged on March 13, 2008 after being diagnosed with acute pancreatitis, major depression,
suicidal thoughts, and alcohol dependance.66
That same day, following his discharge from Advocate Christ Medical Center, Mr. Cleary
was admitted to Tinley Park Mental Health Center (“Tinley Park MHC”) in order to stabilize his
depression.67 Mr. Cleary stayed at the Tinley Park MHC until April 23, 2008.68 His GAF score
60
R. at 380, DSM-IV at 34.
R. at 378-82.
62
R. at 377 (“prognosis for continuing recovery is guarded”).
63
R. at 390; see also Schmidt, Attorney’s Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder, supra, at A-123-125,
P-35, inflamation of the pancreas that is accompanied by pain, tenderness, nausea and vomiting, and distention. The
pain and tenderness are located in the upper part of the abdomen, where the pancreas is situated. The disease is most
commonly associated with chronic alcoholism (90% of the cases). In patients in whom the disease is caused by
alcoholism, the pain usually starts between 12 and 48 hours after a drinking spree.
64
R. at 390.
65
R. at 390-91; Schmidt, Attorney’s Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder, supra, at B-71, Xanax is a
better known brand name of benzodiazepines, a group of drugs used to treat anxiety and insomnia.
66
Id.
67
R. at 521.
68
Id.
61
Page 7 of 31
improved from forty, denoting major impairment in social and occupational functioning,69 to sixty,
denoting moderate difficulty in social and occupational functioning.70 After over six weeks, Mr.
Cleary denied having suicidal thoughts and demonstrated no evidence to the contrary; therefore, he
was released on April 23, 2008, when he was accepted into the Brandon House ninety-day
rehabilitation program.71
On July 15, 2008, Mr. Cleary was admitted to the University of Illinois Medical Center under
the care of Eslyn Garb, M.D.72 Two weeks earlier, Mr. Cleary had a relapse after being sober since
March 2, 2008.73 Mr. Clearly told Dr. Garb that he was depressed, anxious and felt hopeless.74 Mr.
Cleary was lethargic and depressed but his memory, orientation, thought organization, cognition and
attention were all noted as normal.75 Dr. Garb found Mr. Cleary to be high risk for suicide and
opined that he should have frequent observation.76 Dr. Garb assigned Mr. Cleary a GAF score of
twenty to thirty, denoting serious impairments or an inability to function in most areas. Mr. Cleary
was discharged the morning of July 23, 2008.77
On August 9, 2008, Mr. Cleary was admitted to the Little Company of Mary Hospital’s ER
for depression and suicidal thoughts.78 Mr. Cleary admitted to the use of marijuana and had a blood
alcohol content of 0.168.79 While in the ER, Mr. Cleary was verbally abusive to staff and needed to
69
DSM-IV at 34.
R. at 521-23; DSM-IV at 34.
71
R. at 522.
72
R. at 498-502, 510.
73
R. at 498.
74
Id.
75
R. at 499-501.
76
R. at 501.
77
Id.
78
R. at 482.
79
R. at 482, 486.
70
Page 8 of 31
be restrained several times.80 Mr. Cleary was then transferred again to Tinley Park MHC where he
underwent a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation with Stuart Rich, M.D.81 Dr. Stuart noted that
Mr. Cleary appeared distressed and had poor grooming and hygiene.82 Dr. Rich also noted that Mr.
Cleary was uncooperative, agitated, refused to answer a number of questions, and demonstrated poor
judgement and insight.83 Upon his discharge on August 14, 2008, Dr. Rich noted “his hospital course
was characterized by hostility, belligerence, racism, agitation, lack of cooperation, and threatening
violence.”84 Dr. Rich noted drug seeking behavior and assigned a GAF score of fifty-five based on
“substance induced mood disorder, alcohol dependence, cocain abuse, [and] antisocial personality
traits.”85 A GAF score of fifty-five indicates moderate difficulty with social and occupational
functioning.86
On August 16, 2008, Mr. Cleary presented, once again, to Palos Community Hospital’s ER
with thoughts of suicide.87 Mr. Cleary told Stephen Spontak, M.D., that he had “tried to kill himself
in the past,”88 that he had “been drinking heavily for about [six] days, and [had] multiple episodes
of vomiting,” and was intoxicated.89 Dr. Spontak opined that Mr. Cleary suffers from acute major
depression, alcohol abuse, and mild pancreatitis.90
After being examined in the ER, Mr. Cleary was admitted to Palos Community Hospital’s
80
R. at 482-84.
R. at 453.
82
R. at 454.
83
R. at 455-56, 460-62.
84
R. at 449.
85
Id.
86
DSM-IV at 34.
87
R. at 417.
88
While the record describes numerous episodes in which Mr. Cleary was admitted to hospitals for thoughts
of suicide, this is the first evidence that suggests Mr. Cleary has actually taken steps and attempted suicide.
89
R. at 427; see R. at 428 (noting laboratory data indicating alcohol level 116 or 0.116% BAC); Alcohol
Toxicology for Prosecutors: Targeting Hardcore Impaired Drivers, American Prosecutors Research Institute, 2003,
p. 7, (July 17, 2013), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/toxicology_final.pdf.
90
Id.
81
Page 9 of 31
Psychiatric Center for further evaluation and treatment.91 Harshad M. Mehta, M.D., noted in his
psychiatric evaluation of Mr. Cleary, a history of alcohol and drug abuse as well as multiple
hospitalizations.92 Mr. Cleary admitted to a history of “Vicodin, cocaine, [and] benzodiazepine
abuse,” but denied using any substance lately.93 However, Mr. Cleary’s laboratory data indicated
the presence of both opiates and benzodizepine in his system.94 On August 17, 2008, Dr. Mehta
noted alcohol and drug abuse, mood disorder related to alcohol use, pancreatitis, poor compliance,
and severe environmental and social factors.95 Dr. Mehta assigned a GAF score of twenty,96 denoting
that Mr. Cleary was in “some danger of hurting [him]self or others or gross[ly] impair[ed] in
communication.”97
Mr. Cleary was discharged on August 20, 2008.98 Upon discharge, Dr. Mehta noted Mr.
Cleary’s positive response to treatment and that he no longer expressed suicidal thoughts.99 Dr.
Mehta also noted that Mr. Cleary remained unmotivated to pursue further treatment,100
acknowledged that he “procrastinated calling and securing [a] halfway house,” and displayed drugseeking behavior.101 Dr. Mehta assigned Mr. Cleary a GAF score of forty to fifty, denoting serious
to major impairment in social and occupational functioning.102
91
R. at 428.
R. at 430.
93
Id.; see Schmidt, Attorney’s Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder, supra, at B-71-73, Mr. Cleary has
had a history of abusing benzodiazepines (Xanax in particular). However, benzodiazepines are used to alleviate the
symptoms of withdrawal from alcohol addiction.
94
R. at 428.
95
R. at 431.
96
Id. (assigning “GAF 20/40"); see DSM-IV at 33 (“the final GAF rating always reflects the worse of the
two” scores assigned by the clinician).
97
R. at 431; DSM-IV at 34.
98
R. at 424.
99
Id.
100
See R. at 438-40 (Mr. Cleary refused all appointments and referrals and refused to sign his discharge
medication form).
101
R. at 424-25.
102
R. at 425; DSM-IV at 34.
92
Page 10 of 31
On September 15, 2008, Mr. Cleary was admitted to Westlake Hospital Department of
Psychiatry under the care of Shabbir Zarif, M.D.103 Mr. Cleary was transferred from the ER because
of suicidal thoughts,104 Mr. Cleary had no alcohol in his system according to the laboratory report.105
Dr. Zarif noted an unremarkable physical medical history,106 and that Mr. Cleary was edgy, irritable,
uncooperative, impulsive and unpredictable, and had poor hygiene and grooming.107 Dr. Zarif cited
major depression, agitation, anxiety, and a history of alcohol and drug abuse in assigning Mr. Cleary
a GAF score of twenty-nine,108 which denotes serious impairments or an inability to function in most
areas.109
Mr. Cleary was discharge from Westlake Hospital on September 23, 2008.110 At the time of
discharge, Dr. Zarif assigned a GAF score of forty-five,111 denoting major impairment in social and
occupational functioning.112 Mr. Cleary was admitted to a mental health facility on October 8, 2008,
where he was again treated by Dr. Zarif.113 On admission, Mr. Cleary was frustrated and upset, and
Dr. Zarif noted possible suicide risk, a tendency to make dramatic statements, and that he had poor
judgement.114 On October 9, 2008, Mr. Cleary was assigned a GAF score of thirty-five,115 denoting
major impairment in work, family relation, judgment, thinking, or mood.116 Mr. Cleary was
103
R. at 574.
Id.
105
R. at 587.
106
R. at 575.
107
R. at 576.
108
R. at 574.
109
DSM-IV at 34.
110
R. at 572.
111
R. at 572.
112
DSM-IV at 34.
113
R. at 656.
114
R. at 658.
115
R. at 686.
116
DSM-IV at 34.
104
Page 11 of 31
discharged eight days later on October 16, 2008.117 Dr. Zarif noted drug seeking behavior, major
depression, as well as drug and alcohol dependance in assigning Mr. Cleary a GAF score of fifty.118
A GAF score of fifty denotes serious impairment in social and occupational functioning.119
From October 16, 2008 to August 13, 2009, Mr. Cleary underwent monthly examinations
pursuant to the instructions of his discharge,120 with Rafael Carreira, M.D., of Resurrection Health
Care.121 Dr. Carreira concluded that Mr. Cleary suffered from major depression, anxiety and
borderline personality disorder.122 Patients suffering from borderline personality disorder have
difficulty perceiving and relating to their environment which can cause personal distress as well as
social and occupational limitations.123 Dr. Carreira assigned Mr. Cleary a series of GAF scores
ranging from forty-five to sixty-four, steadily improving over the period in question.124
D.
2009
Mr. Cleary underwent a consultive examination with Mahesh Shah, M.D., for the Bureau of
Disability Determination Services on May 5, 2009.125 Dr. Shah noted Mr. Cleary’s history of
anxiety, depression and bipolar disorder,126 as well as physical pains on his left side and in his lower
117
R. at 656.
R. at 658.
119
DSM-IV at 34.
120
R. at 847 (Mr. Cleary acknowledged that he “must see the doctor no less than every 90 days or my
prescription may not be renewed and my file may be closed for this service”).
121
R. at 848-70.
122
R. at 861, 867
123
Schmidt, Attorney’s Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder, supra, at P-198. DSM-IV at 32-34.
124
R. at 851 (October 16, 2008: GAF 45); R. at 848 (November 3, 2008: GAF 45); R. at 861 (November 17,
2008: GAF 49); R. at 860 (December 13, 2008: GAF 56); R. at 859 (January 15, 2009: GAF 57); R. at 858 (February
12, 2009: GAF 59); R. at 857 (March 12, 2009: GAF 60); R. at 856 (April 23, 2009: GAF 60); R. at 854 (May 12,
2009: GAF 61); R. at 854 (June 16, 2009: GAF 62); R. at 853; (July 16, 2009: GAF 64); DSM-IV at 34 (GAF scores
ranging from 45-64 denote serious to mild difficulty in social and occupational functioning).
125
R. at 743.
126
There is no previous diagnosis of bipolar disorder in the record; see R. at 449 (August 14, 2008, Dr. Rich
noted that no evidence for bipolar disorder).
118
Page 12 of 31
back.127 Dr. Shah also noted a history of drug and alcohol abuse, but that Mr. Cleary stated he had
not drank alcohol in two years (though his last drinking binge was only one year prior).128 Mr.
Cleary was able to walk around without assistance or difficulty and had no apparent restriction to
his movement.129 Dr. Shah noted mild tenderness in Mr. Cleary’s lower back, left shoulder, hip and
knee, but found no swelling or deformities.130 Dr. Shah concluded that Mr. Cleary had mild
limitation of range of motion in his lower back,131 pain in his “left shoulder, left hip, left knee, and
left foot,” but that he had a fairly good range of motion in those joints.132
Also on May 5, 2009, Mr. Cleary underwent a psychological evaluation with Michael J.
Ingersoll, M.D., for the Bureau of Disability Determination Services.133 Dr. Ingersoll noted that Mr.
Cleary was oriented and aware of his surroundings, but opined that he had some “impairment with
memory.”134 Dr. Ingersoll concluded by opining that Mr. Cleary had major depressive disorder, polysubstance abuse, and that Mr. Cleary was unable to manage his own funds.135
On June 10, 2009, Donald Cochran, Ph.D., completed a mental residual functional capacity
assessment for the Bureau of Disability Determination Services.136 Dr. Cochran opined that Mr.
Cleary was moderately limited in his ability to understand, remember and carry out detailed
instructions, and also moderately limited in maintaining attention and concentration.137 Finally, Dr.
127
R. at 743.
R. at 744; R. at 417-27 (noting Mr. Cleary’s most recent heavy drinking binge took place less than one
year prior in August 2008).
129
R. at 744.
130
R. at 745.
131
R. at 746.
132
R. at 746.
133
R. at 748.
134
R. at 749.
135
R. at 750.
136
R. at 818.
137
Id.
128
Page 13 of 31
Cochran opined that Mr. Cleary was moderately limited in his ability to complete a normal
workweek without interruption and may need a number of rest periods.138
On June 15, 2009, Virgilio Pilapil, M.D., completed a physical residual functional capacity
assessment for the Bureau of Disability Determination Services.139 Dr. Pilapil found no postural,140
manipulative, visual,141 communication, or environmental limitations.142 Dr. Pilapil concluded by
opining that Mr. Cleary “does not indicate any physical limitations, only occasional pain, which is
consistent with evidence.”143
Returning to Dr.Carreira on August 13, 2009, Mr. Cleary received no new GAF score and
again diagnosed with borderline personality disorder.144 Dr. Carreira opined that Mr. Cleary had
serious limitations with his “ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete tasks,” but offered
no explanation of his conclusion.145 Dr. Carreira also opined that Mr. Cleary resented criticism,
seriously limiting his ability to “respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and customary
work pressures,” and lacked the necessary motivation to perform tasks on a sustained basis without
interruption.146
At some point during 2009, Mr. Cleary began going to Stroger Hospital for various physical
and mental treatments. While the record is not clear, it appears Mr. Cleary’s first record is dated
March 11, 2009.147 Mr. Cleary was also diagnosed as bipolar and alcohol dependant, and assigned
138
R. at 819.
R. at 829.
140
R. at 824.
141
R. at 825.
142
R. at 826.
143
R. at 827.
144
R. at 867.
145
R. at 869.
146
R. at 870.
147
R. at 1097.
139
Page 14 of 31
a GAF score of forty-nine which denotes serious impairment in social and occupational
functioning.148 Progress notes from Mr. Cleary’s outpatient conversations also show diagnosis of
depression, anxiety, and manic behavior.149 On August 21, 2009, Mr. Cleary displayed clear drug
seeking behavior when he attempted to refill a medication twice in three days.150
E.
2010
On May 3, 2010, Mr. Cleary was given a final psychological output report and expelled from
the program in part because he continued to misuse the prescribed medication.151 Mr. Cleary refused
addiction treatment, and the record noted that he lacked the insight to pursue further treatment.152
III.
ALJ Hearing and Decision
The hearing before the ALJ occurred on October 28, 2009 in Oak Brook, Illinois.153 Mr.
Cleary was present and represented by Sean Gingrich, an attorney.154 Also present was Larry M.
Kravitz, Ph.D., a medical expert (“ME”), and Aimee Mowery, a vocational expert (“VE”).155 On
November 8, 2010, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Cleary was not disabled, as defined in the Social
Security Act, from June 1, 2006, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2010, the date last
insured.156
A.
Mr. Cleary’s Testimony
Mr. Cleary began his testimony by confirming that he lived in a sober living group home.157
148
R. at 1097; DSM-IV at 34.
R. at 1103 (noting the absence of hallucinations and voices, but that Mr. Cleary was currently going to
Alcoholics Anonymous and maintaining sobriety).
150
R. at 1104.
151
R. at 1312.
152
Id.
153
R. at 16.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
R. at 27.
157
R. at 48.
149
Page 15 of 31
He explained that he originally lived in the group home, then moved into a friend’s basement but
had to move back into the group home.158 After approximately six months, there was a fire; Mr.
Cleary testified that he had no other option other than the group home.159 In total, Mr. Cleary has
lived in the group home for over a year.160 At the group home, Mr. Cleary had chore responsibilities
and cleaned up after himself, though he testified that he often forgets to do his chore.161 He also
testified that he cooked for himself using the microwave, went shopping and got around by walking,
taking public transportation, or by riding with friends.162 Mr. Cleary testified that he enjoyed the
sober living and did not believe he could have sustained himself outside the group home.163
Next, Mr. Cleary testified that he was currently unemployed, and that his last job was with
Jewel-Osco.164 Mr. Cleary stated that he was unable to sustain the pace of work because of the pain
in the “whole left side of [his] body,”165 “friction” with coworkers, and difficulty completing his
task.166 He was terminated after three days.167 The only other work discussed was Mr. Cleary’s
previous experience in a marble warehouse that involved a lot of heavy lifting.168 He testified that
while carrying the sinks, he injured the left side of his body, which causes pain when he lifts.169
Finally, Mr. Cleary also testified that he no longer had a drivers license because of two
DUIs.170 Mr. Cleary testified that his last DUI was in 2006 and that he had not drank since June
158
Id.
R. at 48-9.
160
R. at 49.
161
R. at 53-4.
162
R. at 54.
163
R. at 50.
164
Id.
165
R. at 51-52.
166
R. at 59.
167
R. at 51-52.
168
R. at 51.
169
R. at 55.
170
R. at 52-53.
159
Page 16 of 31
2009.171 Mr. Cleary also stated that he has not used street drugs for more than two years. He testified
that he is currently on antidepressant medication, Seroquel and Lamotrin,172 and did not have side
effects from his medication.173 Mr. Cleary also testified that there were times when he would be so
depressed that he would stay in bed for two days, the last occurrence was approximately one month
prior to the hearing.174
B.
ME’s Testimony
The ME began his testimony by acknowledging that Mr. Cleary had been diagnosed with
bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, and an unspecified personality disorder.175 Based on the
record presented, the ME testified that he concurred with those diagnoses.176 Further, the ME noted
Mr. Cleary’s history of substance abuse.177
Next the ME considered listing 12.00 for mental disorders - 12.04, 12.06, 12.08, and 12.09 and found that Mr. Cleary did not meet or equal any listing.178 The ME noted numerous exhibits
upon which he based his conclusion that Mr. Cleary was “doing very well,” and had a “basically,
intact mental status.”179 The ME also noted Mr. Cleary’s “fairly high GAF” scores from 2009, all
of which were in the sixties, and the lack of any delusions or hallucinations.180 (It should be noted
that the MF did not reference that on March 11, 2009, the records from Stroger Hospital show Mr.
171
R. at 56-57.
R. at 56.
173
R. at 61.
174
R. at 62.
175
R. at 40-1.
176
R. at 41.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
R. at 42-3.
180
R. at 43.
172
Page 17 of 31
Cleary was assigned a GAF score of forty-nine which denotes serious impairment in social and
occupational functioning).181
The ME testified that Mr. Cleary’s mental health impairments would result in limitations in
his ability to function in work settings since the alleged onset date of June 2006.182 The ME opined
that Mr. Cleary was “capable of understanding, remembering, and carrying out most simple detailed
instructions,” on a consistent basis.183 The ME also opined that Mr. Cleary should be limited to
“brief and superficial work place contacts,” and be limited to “normal levels of stress” characterized
by well-defined routine tasks.184 The ALJ asked if the ME would agree that Mr. Cleary’s “work
would be limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks” of three steps or fewer; the ME agreed.185
In addition to the brief and superficial work place contact, the ME extended this limitation to coworkers and the public.186 The ME opined that Mr. Cleary would perform best if he could “perform
his tasks relatively independently [because of] his tendency toward irritability and sensitivity to
criticism.”187
After Mr. Cleary’s testimony, the ME was again asked to testify. The ME opined that Mr.
Cleary was fairly independent and would be able to function outside of a highly supportive living
arrangement.188
C.
VE’s Testimony
181
R. at 1097; DSM-IV at 34.
R. at 45.
183
Id.
184
R. at 45, 47.
185
R. at 45-6.
186
R. at 46-7.
187
R. at 46.
188
R. at 63.
182
Page 18 of 31
The VE began her testimony by identifying Mr. Cleary’s past work in the last fifteen years.189
The VE opined that Mr. Cleary had three occupations that rose to the level of substantial gainful
activity: delivery driver, considered semiskilled with a medium exertional level;190 laborer,
considered unskilled with a medium to heavy exertional level;191 and, pool cleaner, considered
semiskilled with a medium exertional level.192
Next, the ALJ asked the VE two hypotheticals.193 The last hypothetical provided for an
individual who had the education, work experience, skill set, and was the same age as Mr. Cleary
who could work at a light exertional level; could lift twenty pounds occasionally, and lift or carry
up to ten pounds frequently.194 The VE opined that Mr. Cleary would not be able to perform his past
relevant work because it exceeded the light exertional level.195 The VE testified that Mr. Cleary
could perform three occupations at the light exertional level: cleaner, inspector, and hand
packager.196
Finally, Mr. Cleary’s attorney questioned the VE. The attorney first asked what percentage
of the day, aside from breaks, that an unskilled worker would be expected to spend on task; the VE
opined “eighty-five percent of the day.”197 Next, the attorney asked the VE what the tolerance is for
disruptions with coworkers or supervisors; the VE opined that there would be no such tolerance.198
Finally, the VE confirmed for the attorney that the tolerance for tardiness or absence was one day
189
R. at 65.
Id.
191
R. at 65-6.
192
R. at 66.
193
R. at 66-7.
194
R. at 67.
195
Id.
196
R. at 67-8.
197
R. at 69.
198
Id.
190
Page 19 of 31
a month or fewer.199
D.
ALJ’s Decision
In an opinion issued on November 8, 2010, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Cleary was not
disabled within the meaning of the Act from June 1, 2006, through December 31, 2010, the last date
insured.200 The Social Security Administration has prescribed a sequential five-step evaluation
process for determining whether a claimant is disabled.201 The ALJ’s first step is to consider whether
the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, which would preclude a disability.202 In the
present case, the ALJ determined that Mr. Cleary was not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since June 1, 2006.203
The second step is for the ALJ to consider “whether the claimant has a medically
determinable impairment that is severe or a combination of impairments that is severe.”204 In the
present case, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Cleary had the medically determinable severe impairments
of: “degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; degenerative joint disease of the left shoulder and
hip; major depressive disorder; a[n unspecified] personality disorder; and a poly-substance abuse
disorder.”205
The ALJ’s third step is to consider “whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of
impairments meets or medically equals the criteria of an impairment listed in the regulations as
being so severe as to preclude gainful activity.”206 In the present case, the ALJ determined, and
199
R. at 69-70.
R. at 22.
201
20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a).
202
20 C.F.R. 404.1520(b).
203
R. at 18.
204
20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c).
205
R. at 18.
206
20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.
200
Page 20 of 31
explained at some length, that Mr. Cleary’s impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed
impairment under 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.207 The ALJ concluded that Mr. Cleary
had “moderate restriction in activities of daily living”; “moderate difficulties in social function”;208
“moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace”; and, “experienced one
or two episodes of decompensation.”209
In the event that no impairments are found to meet the Social Security Ruling listing
requirements, the ALJ proceeds to the fourth step of the test, in which the ALJ must first determine
the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”).210 The RFC is an assessment of the maximum
work-related activities a claimant can perform despite his limitations.211
If determining the claimant's RFC requires the ALJ to assess subjective complaints, then the
ALJ follows a two-step process.212 First, the ALJ must determine whether there is an underlying
medically determinable impairment, which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques, that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s
symptoms.213 If so, the ALJ then evaluates the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the
claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the claimant’s functioning and
ability to do basic work.214
Here, the ALJ decided that Mr. Cleary had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20
207
R. at 18-22.
R. at 20.
209
R. at 21.
210
20 C.F.R. 404.1520(e).
211
R. at 14.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
208
Page 21 of 31
CFR § 404.1567(b) with some additional limitations.215 The ALJ found that Mr. Cleary could “lift
a maximum of [twenty] pounds occasionally and lift and carry up to [ten] pounds frequently, stand
[or] walk about [six] hours in a normal [eight]-hour workday, sit about [six] hours in a normal
[eight]-hour workday.”216 The ALJ also found Mr. Cleary to be able to frequently lift, handle objects,
and finger bilaterally, with some limitations on his ability to manipulate.217 Finally, the ALJ limited
Mr. Cleary to “simple, routine and repetitive one to three step tasks while employed in a low stress
job with no changes in the work setting and only brief and superficial interaction with co-workers
and the public.”218
In support of the RFC, the ALJ then moved to an analysis of the claimant’s subjective
complaints, symptoms and Mr. Cleary’s credibility.219 The ALJ found Mr. Cleary’s testimony to lack
credibility because the objective evidence did not support his alleged inability to work.220 The ALJ
concluded that Mr. Cleary’s claim that he could not work was undercut by the fact that he was able
to maintain his personal hygiene, perform household chores, go shopping, and take public
transportation.221
The ALJ noted that Mr. Cleary’s subjective complaints of lower back pain as well as pain
in his left shoulder and hip were not severe enough to render him unable to perform any work.222 The
ALJ gave no credit to the physical residual functional capacity assessment submitted by Dr. Pilapil,
215
R. at 22; see also
R. at 22.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
R. at 23.
220
R. at 24.
221
R. at 24.
222
Id.
20 CFR § 404.1567(b)
216
Page 22 of 31
the consultant to the State agency,223 adopting instead the more limited assessment added at the
hearing.224 The ALJ concluded by finding that Mr. Cleary retained the ability to work at a light level
of exertion, with some additional limitations.225
Next, the ALJ considered Mr. Cleary’s testimony regarding his difficulty maintaining
concentration, poly-substance abuse, and issues of social interaction.226 The ALJ noted that Mr.
Cleary’s attention and concentration was rated fair or intact throughout the medical record,227 which
would support a finding of moderate difficulty maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.228
In regard to Mr. Cleary’s poly-substance abuse, the ALJ noted a number of examples of
drug-seeking behavior which took place in 2009 and 2010.229 Further, the ALJ noted an examination
in May 2010 in which Mr. Cleary’s diagnosis “was unclear as to whether the extent of his symptoms
were due to an affective disorder or due [to] substance addiction.”230
Finally, the ALJ found supporting objective evidence to be lacking in regard to Mr. Cleary’s
ability to interact with supervisors, co-workers, and the public.231 The ALJ noted that Mr. Cleary had
been diagnosed with serious limitations in his ability to respond appropriately to supervisors and coworkers.232 However, the ALJ found this to be inconsistent with Mr. Cleary’s testimony that he
essentially got along with the people at his last job.233
223
R. at 822-29.
R. at 25.
225
Id.
226
R. at 24-5.
227
R. at 24.
228
R. at 21.
229
R. at 24-5.
230
R. at 25.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
224
Page 23 of 31
The ALJ then considered the testimony of the VE, who opined that Mr. Cleary could not
perform any of his past relevant work because the mental and exertional limits of that work was
greater than those allowed by his RFC.234 The ALJ also considered the VE’s testimony that Mr.
Cleary would be able to perform the requirements of cleaner, inspector, or hand packager.235 In
conclusion, the ALJ found Mr. Cleary able to make a “successful adjustment to other work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy,” and entered a finding of “not disabled.”236
IV.
Standard of Review
The Court must sustain the Commissioner’s findings of fact if they are supported by
substantial evidence and are free of legal error.237 Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.238 The standard of review is
deferential, but the reviewing court must conduct a critical review of the evidence before affirming
the Commissioner’s decision.239 Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ, the
responsibility for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled falls upon the Commissioner and not
the Court.240 Although the ALJ need not address every piece of evidence or testimony presented, he
must adequately discuss the issues and build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to the
conclusion.241 The Court will conduct a critical review of the evidence and will not uphold the ALJ’s
234
R. at 26.
R. at 27.
236
Id.
237
42. U.S.C. § 405(g).
238
McKenzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th
Cir. 2007); Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003)).
239
Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d
345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005)).
240
Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir.
1987)).
241
Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010); McKinzey, 641 F.3d at 889.
235
Page 24 of 31
decision if it lacks evidentiary support or “if the Commissioner applied an erroneous legal
standard.”242
V.
Analysis
Mr. Cleary proffers three arguments for remand, two of which we discuss here: the ALJ did
not properly evaluate Mr. Cleary’s mental RFC, or his credibility. But the principle issue in this case
is that the ALJ did not adequately consider the extensive medical record. Namely, he failed to
consider the evidence from 2006 to 2008, and did not address Mr. Cleary’s fluctuating mental health
as indicated by more than fifteen GAF scores. Rather, the ALJ only considered medical records from
2009 and 2010 in his analysis, and relied heavily upon the testifying ME for support.
A.
The ALJ Failed to Properly Assess Mr. Cleary’s Mental RFC
Beginning with Mr. Cleary’s strongest argument for reversal, he argues that the ALJ erred
in his determination of his mental RFC. Though Mr. Cleary raises a number of arguments, we will
focus only on the ALJ’s failure to account for Mr. Cleary’s limitations in responding appropriately
to supervisors, and his failure to address Mr. Cleary’s numerous GAF scores.243
We can address both of these arguments together. The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ
adopted the opinion of the ME, who “opined that [Mr. Cleary] should have only superficial, brief
interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the public,” and because the VE was present at the
hearing, she would have taken all the ME’s limitations into account.244 The Commissioner also
argues that the ALJ need not consider the GAF scores so long as he considered the mental status
242
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Rohan v. Charter, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir.
1996)).
243
Pl. Mem. at 12-14, dkt. 21.
Def. Mem. at 6. dkt. 26.
244
Page 25 of 31
examination findings present in the record.
The ALJ must acknowledge medical ailments and evaluations that are essential to creating
a complete picture of the claimant’s mental health.245 The ALJ’s RFC assessment must be based on
all of the relevant evidence.246 Finally, “[a]n ALJ must explain why he does not credit evidence that
would support strongly a claim of disability, or why he concludes that such evidence is outweighed
by other evidence.”247
With regard to Mr. Cleary’s limitations in responding appropriately to supervisors, the
Commissioner’s argument is counter to precedent. When “the ALJ poses a series of increasingly
restrictive hypotheticals to the VE, the court infer[s] that the VE's attention is focused on the
hypotheticals and not on the record.”248 Therefore, it would be incorrect to conclude that the VE took
anything but the specific hypothetical into account. The implicit inclusion of a limitation is not
sufficient to supply the VE with the information adequate to determine the claimant’s RFC.249
In addition, we find that in light of the extensive medical record and numerous and wide
ranging GAF scores, failure to consider them at all necessitates remand. The GAF score is a tool
used by clinicians to evaluate an individual in global terms, with respect to “psychological, social,
and occupational functioning.”250 The Commissioner argues that the GAF score is an unexplained
numerical score which does not reflect the clinician’s opinion of functional capacity.251 We disagree.
245
Farrell v. Astrue, 692 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2012).
Title II & XVI: Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, SSR 96.8P (S.S.A. July 2,
246
1996).
247
O'Connor, 627 F.3d at 621 (citing Giles ex rel. Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 488 (7th Cir.2007);
Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 888–89 (7th Cir.2001)).
248
O'Connor, 627 F.3d at 619; see Simila, 573 F.3d at 521; Young, 362 F.3d at 1003.
249
O’Conner, 627 F.3d at 618-19.
250
DSM-IV at 32.
251
Def. Mem. at 8. dkt. 26.
Page 26 of 31
The GAF score is accompanied by clinical notes and, throughout this record, is accompanied by the
clinical disorders, personality disorders, general medical condition and environmental factors, which
are all considered by the clinician in the assignment of a GAF score.252 Simply put, the GAF score
is a tool primarily used to assess the need for treatment or care at that current point.253 The Seventh
Circuit has utilized GAF scores in the assessment of a claimant’s mental RFC, particularly in cases
such as this one in where Mr. Cleary’s GAF scores are often below fifty254 denoting serious
symptoms or impairment.255
Furthermore, what was not addressed at all were Mr. Cleary’s fluctuating GAF scores,
sometimes within very short periods. In 2006, Mr. Cleary was assigned three GAF scores over the
course of three days: from fifty,256 to fifty-five,257 to twenty-five in a three day period.258 Similarly,
in 2007, Mr. Cleary’s GAF scores ranged from a low of twenty-five in early November, to a high
of only fifty, after ten days of treatment at the Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center.259 In 2008, Mr.
Cleary’s GAF scores varied significantly from a high of sixty in April,260 to lows in the twenties in
252
DSM-IV at 27-32.
DSM-IV at 33.
254
2006 - R. at 417 (GAF: 30); R. at 312 (GAF: 50); R. at 360 (GAF: 25). 2007 - R. at 352 (GAF: 28); R. at
349 (GAF:50); R. at 348 (GAF: 45); R. at 380 (GAF: 40). 2008 - R. at 521-23 (GAF: 40-60); R. at 502 (GAF: 2030); R. at 449 (GAF: 55); R. at 431 (GAF:20); R. at 425 (GAF: 40-50); R. at 574 (GAF: 29); R. at 686 (GAF: 35);
R. at 658 (GAF: 50). 2009 - R. at 851, see n146 (GAF: 45-64) R. at 1097 (GAF: 49).
255
DSM-IV at 34; see Farrell, 692 F.3d at 773 (finding the ALJ erred in ignored GAF scores, often in the
severe zone, which amounted to “extensive medical history in the record and emphasized contradictions with the
opinions of the government's doctors”); Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 307 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding “[a] GAF
rating of 50 does not represent functioning within normal limits. Nor does it support a conclusion that Campbell was
mentally capable of sustaining work”).
256
R. at 312.
257
R. at 345.
258
R. at 360.
259
R. at 349-51.
260
R. at 521-23.
253
Page 27 of 31
July,261 August,262 and September.263 In 2009, Mr. Cleary’s GAF scores did show some improvement,
as noted by the ME. However, despite the ME’s testimony that all of Mr. Cleary’s scores were in
the sixties,264 Mr. Cleary was assigned a GAF score of forty-nine on March 11, 2009, at Stroger
Hospital.265
Therefore, the ALJ’s failure to consider, analyze, or even mention Mr. Cleary’s GAF scores
gives us no confidence that he appropriately considered the medical findings and opinions as the
Commissioner argues. It is not our opinion that the ALJ must base his decision upon GAF scores.
But the ALJ must confront all the evidence that supports a claim of disability and explain why he
rejected that evidence.266 Particularly in cases where mental health is at issue, the ALJ should
acknowledge all evidence essential to creating a complete picture of Mr. Cleary’s mental health.267
B.
The ALJ Failed to Properly Evaluated Mr. Cleary’s Credibility
Mr. Cleary argues that the ALJ improperly assessed his credibility by failing to adequately
explain which of his allegations were credible and which were not.268 The Commissioner in turn
argues “the ALJ’s credibility assessment in this case was particularly lengthy and thorough and was
certainly not patently wrong.”269
According to SSR 96-7p, the ALJ must base his credibility finding on the entire record and
261
R. at 502.
R. at 431.
263
R. at 574.
264
R. at 43.
265
R. at 1097; DSM-IV at 34.
266
See O'Connor, 627 F.3d at 621; Farrell, 692 F.3d at 773.
267
See Farrell, 692 F.3d at 773; see Phillips, 413 Fed.Appx. at 881.
268
Pl. Mem. at 16-17, dkt. 21.
269
Def. Mem. at 9, dkt. 26.
262
Page 28 of 31
must sufficiently explain his conclusion of the claimant’s credibility.270 In analyzing inconsistencies
between a claimant’s statements and medical evidence, an ALJ must investigate “all avenues”
presented that relate to pain, including the observations by treating and examining physicians.271
While the ALJ may not reject subjective complaints of pain solely because they are not supported
by medical evidence, the ALJ may consider this conflict as probative of the claimant’s credibility.272
Last, this Court grants deference to the ALJ’s credibility assessment,273 and will only overturn it if
it is “patently wrong.”274
In this case, the ALJ found Mr. Cleary’s testimony unconvincing, and concluded that the
objective evidence did not support his alleged inability to perform work.275 For support, the ALJ
mentions Mr. Cleary’s ability to maintain his personal hygiene and perform daily household tasks
such as chores and shopping.276 However, the ALJ failed to provide an explanation of what he
considered when he arrived at his credibility conclusion. The ALJ also failed to address the periods
in which Mr. Cleary may not have been capable of performing daily tasks or when he was unable
to maintain his hygiene and grooming.277 While the ALJ is not required to consider every piece of
270
Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims: Assessing the Credibility of an
Individual's Statements, SSR 96-7P (S.S.A July 2, 1996).
271
Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Briscoe ex rel. Taylor, 425 F.3d at 351).
272
Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000); see Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th
Cir. 2006) (citing Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 753-54 (7th Cir.2004) (finding “[a]n ALJ may disregard a
claimant's assertions of pain if he validly finds her incredible”).
273
Sims v. Barnhart, 442 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that an ALJ’s credibility determination can
only be reversed if his finding is “unreasonable or unsupported”).
274
Jones, 623 F.3d at 1160; see also Powers, 207 F.3d at 435 (finding that an ALJ’s credibility
determinations must have been “patently wrong” in order to be overturned).
275
R. at 24.
276
Id.
277
R. at 24; see R. at 454 (noting that Mr. Cleary appeared distressed and had poor grooming and hygiene);
R. at 576 (noting that Mr. Cleary had poor hygiene and grooming); see Carradine, 360 F.3d at 755-56 (finding that
the ALJ must explain the inconsistencies between activities of daily living and the medical evidence).
Page 29 of 31
evidence, mental health symptoms can ebb and flow; therefore, failure to consider the full range of
evidence in the record fundamentally distorts the picture of Mr. Cleary’s mental health.278
The ALJ continued by citing a lack of objective evidence to support Mr. Cleary’s allegation
of physical pain and impaired concentration.279 Here again, the ALJ
did not discuss the
inconsistencies regarding Mr. Cleary’s concentration. The ALJ notes two examinations in which Mr.
Cleary’s concentration is intact and is attentive, but does not address previous medical examinations
that found Mr. Cleary did have some “impairment with memory.”280
Finally, the ALJ noted Mr. Cleary’s history of drug-seeking behavior.281 Mr. Cleary’s history
of poly-substance abuse in addition to multiple instances of drug-seeking behavior can be considered
when assessing his credibility.282 The ALJ notes Mr. Cleary’s drug-seeking behavior throughout
2009 when he attempted to procure Vicodin prescriptions and multiple refills of a Valium
prescription.283 However, though this is relevant to a credibility assessment, the ALJ does not create
the necessary logical bridge between Mr. Cleary’s drug-seeking and his credibility findings. It is
incumbent upon the ALJ to explain how Mr. Cleary’s drug-seeking behavior influenced his
credibility conclusion so that it can be reviewed by this Court.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we remand for further clarification and analysis of Mr.
Cleary’s medical record, mental RFC, and credibility. Mr. Cleary’s motion is granted [dkt. 21]. The
278
See Farrell, 692 F.3d at 773; see Phillips, 413 Fed.Appx. at 881.
R. at 24.
280
R. at 749; R. at 818 (finding Mr. Cleary moderately limited in his ability to understand, remember and
carry out detailed instructions, and also moderately limited in maintaining attention and concentration).
281
R. at 24-25; see also R. at 449, 658, 1104.
282
Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 519-20 (7th Cir. 2009).
283
R. at 24.
279
Page 30 of 31
Commissioner’s motion for summary of judgement is denied [dkt. 25].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: August 19, 2013
________________________
Susan E. Cox
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Page 31 of 31
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