Sagar Megh Corporation v. United National Insurance Company
Filing
246
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John W. Darrah on 11/6/2013. Mailed notice(tg, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SAGAR MEGH CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED NATIONAL INSURANCE
CO.,
Defendant.
NATIONAL REPUBLIC BANK OF
CHICAGO,
Intervening Plaintiff.
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Case No. 12-cv-4959
Judge John W. Darrah
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Sagar Megh Corporation, filed a Complaint against Defendant, United National
Insurance Co. (“United”), on June 21, 2012, asserting United breached its obligations to Sagar
Megh under an insurance policy it issued and that United acted in bad faith. Sagar Megh moves
for partial summary judgment, seeking: summary judgment on its breach of contract claim and
awarding Sagar Megh $1,740,042.67, plus pre-judgment interest accruing on and after July 6,
2011, arising from the coverage under the policy and further reserving all rights of Sagar Megh
to pursue its claims relating to Count II of the Complaint, which seeks declaratory relief and
Count III, which asserts bad faith on the part of United. United filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment, seeking judgment entered on its behalf for all three claims asserted in the
Complaint, on the basis that Sagar Megh failed to comply with the protective safeguard
condition set out in the Insurance Policy. These motions have been fully briefed.
BACKGROUND
Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires a party moving for summary judgment to provide “a
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue . . . .”
Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires the nonmoving party to admit or deny each factual statement
proffered by the moving party and concisely designate any material facts that establish a genuine
dispute for trial. See Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005). A
litigant’s failure to dispute the facts set forth in an opponent’s statement in the manner dictated
by Local Rule 56.1 results in those facts’ being deemed admitted for purposes of summary
judgment. Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003). Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) further
permits the non-movant to submit additional statements of material facts that “require the denial
of summary judgment . . . .”
To the extent that a response to a statement of material fact provides only extraneous or
argumentative information, this response will not constitute a proper denial of the fact, and the
fact is admitted. See Graziano v. Village of Oak Park, 401 F. Supp. 2d 918, 937 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
Similarly, to the extent that a statement of fact contains a legal conclusion or otherwise
unsupported statement, including a fact which relies upon inadmissible hearsay, such a fact is
disregarded. Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 1997).
Here, United’s cross-motion fails to comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56.1,
which provides that a statement of material facts be filed in addition to the supporting
memorandum of law. Instead, United simply included eight statements of “undisputed material
facts” in the middle of its supporting memorandum of law with its cross-motion for summary
judgment. The statement of facts required in Local Rule 56.1 has been described as such:
It is a document separate from the supporting memorandum; it is neither a
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supplement to nor a surrogate for the memo. Rule 56.1 statements should
contain neither a narrative section nor a recitation of the summary judgment
standards. . . . Likewise, 56.1 statements do not abrogate a party's obligation to
recite its version of the facts in its supporting memorandum; it is inappropriate in
one's memo to simply refer the Court to the 56.1 statement. The purpose of the
56.1 statement is to identify for the Court the evidence supporting a party's
factual assertions in an organized manner: it is not intended as a forum for
factual or legal argument.
Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 585 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (emphasis added). “Courts in this district
have broad discretion to enforce the rule, and the Seventh Circuit regularly upholds strict
enforcement of Local Rule 56.1.” Mach Mold v. Clover Associates, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 1015,
1025 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (citation omitted). Accordingly, these purportedly undisputed facts
submitted in United’s brief in support of its cross-motion for summary judgment is stricken.
United did, however, submit a separate set of undisputed material facts in conjunction with its
cross motion, and Sagar Megh had the opportunity to respond to those facts; the facts asserted
properly under the Local Rules will be considered.
The following facts1 are taken from the parties’ statements of undisputed material facts
submitted in accordance with Local Rule 56.1. Sagar Megh is an Illinois corporation; United is a
Pennsylvania insurance company licensed to do business in Illinois. (Pl.’s SOF ¶¶ 1-2.)
Personal jurisdiction is proper as Sagar Megh is domiciled in Illinois and United regularly
conducts business in Illinois, and venue is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). (Pl.’s
SOF ¶¶ 4, 6.) Subject matter jurisdiction exists on the basis of diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
1
Admitted Statements of Material Facts by Sagar Megh are designated as “Pl.’s SOF”
with the corresponding paragraph referenced; Admitted Statements of Material Facts by United
are designated as “Def.’s SOF” with the corresponding paragraph referenced.
3
Sagar Megh and the Lake Motel
Sagar Megh was created by Dipak Patel and his father, Ramanlal Patel, in 2003. (Def.’s
SOF ¶ 1.) Sagar Megh purchased a motel building located at 9101 South Stony Island Avenue in
Chicago, Illinois, and operated the Lake Motel at that property. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 1; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 7.)
Sagar Megh was run as a family business, with Dipak and his wife, Alka, managing the day-today business of the Lake Motel and Ramanlal being involved in occasional activities. (Def.’s
SOF ¶ 2.) At the time of the event in question, Dipak and Alka resided at the Lake Motel.
(Def.’s SOF ¶ 16.)
To purchase the property, Sagar Megh obtained a loan from the National Republic Bank
of Chicago (the “NRB”), a loan from the Small Business Administration, and a loan from TCB
Investments, with all three creditors taking mortgages on the property. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 6.) When
Sagar Megh applied for the NRB loan, Dipak indicated he had a net worth of $1,069,188.00 and
an annual income of $51,939.00; he had a credit bureau rating of “fair.” (Def.’S SOF ¶ 11.)
When Sagar Megh applied for a loan modification in 2010, Dipak indicated his net worth was
$34,408.00. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 11.) Beginning in 2008 or 2009, Dipak stopped receiving any
payroll compensation from Sagar Megh. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 39(a).)
In 2004, Sagar Megh obtained another loan with another mortgage from the NRB, to
perform renovations to the property. (Id.) Some of these loans were secured with personal
guaranties by the Patel family. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 9.) Prior to the fire in March 2011, Sagar Megh
had large outstanding loan balances, declining revenue, and increasing late loan payments.
(Def.’s SOF ¶ 7.) In 2009, Sagar Megh was sued by the City of Chicago for violating the city’s
municipal building code. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 8.)
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On or about September 30, 2010, United issued a commercial property insurance policy
(the “Policy”) to Sagar Megh. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 11.) Subject to the Policy’s provisions, fire is a
covered loss under the Policy, including fire damages caused to the Lake Motel as the result of
an intentional fire. (Pl’s SOF ¶¶ 13-14.) A Policy endorsement provides that “as a condition of
this insurance, [Sagar Megh is] required to maintain” “functional smoke detectors” in “all
buildings, occupancies, or units.” (Def.’s SOF ¶ 3; Policy at 52.) The policy further provides
that United would not pay Sagar Megh “for loss or damage caused by or resulting from fire, if,
prior to the fire, you: (1) Knew of any suspension or impairment in any protective safeguard
listed in the Schedule above and failed to notify us of that fact; or (2) Failed to maintain any
protective safeguard listed in the Schedule above, and over which you had control, in complete
working order.” (Policy at 52-54.)
The Fire
Early in the morning of March 5, 2011, a fire started in Room 109 of the Lake Motel.
(Pl.’s SOF ¶¶ 15-16.) That day, the Sagar Megh employees present at the Lake Motel were
Dipak, housekeeper Gabriella Valdez, guest reception desk clerk Ella Edwards, and assistant to
the housekeeper Emsil “Ronnie” Hammond. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 14.) Dipak had a master key, and
the housekeepers would occasionally receive individual room keys or the master key to clean
rooms. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 16.)
Edwards recalled that Dipak was at the Lake Motel when she arrived to work at 7:00 p.m.
and was still there when she was made aware of the fire at 3:00 a.m. on March 5, 2011. (Def.’s
SOF ¶ 15.) Dipak was in an office with surveillance camera monitors, and he could exit that
office without Edwards knowing. (Id.) Valdez recalled that Dipak was at the Lake Motel at the
time of the fire and that, while he would normally come in later, she saw Dipak at the Lake
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Motel when she arrived at 10:00 p.m. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 17.) Valdez was first instructed to clean
two rooms on the front side of the Lake Motel but then was instructed to clean four or five rooms
on the rear side of the building. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 18.) While she cleaned the rooms to the rear of
the Motel, Valdez did not see Dipak. (Id.) After cleaning those rooms, Valdez returned to the
laundry room to wait for Hammond, her assistant, but after waiting too long, went to clean the
two rooms at the front of the Lake Motel. (Id.)
Using a key to open the door to the first room she was to clean, Valdez noticed smoke.
(Def.’s SOF ¶ 19.) In the bathroom, Valdez observed a charred piece of paper on the floor, a
hole in an interior partition wall separating the bathroom from the bedroom, and fire within the
interior partition wall with what appeared to be insulation burning in the wall. (Id.) Each motel
room contained a smoke alarm. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 8.) She grabbed a towel from the floor and a
smoke alarm fell out. (Pl.’s SOF ¶¶ 17-18.) Dipak knew that when people smoked in rooms and
the smoke alarms would sound, the sound would bother guests, and so people would remove the
batteries from smoke detectors. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 5.) No wire mesh or “bird cage” type wiring was
installed around the smoke detectors. (Id.)
Edwards, the receptionist, did not have any reports of people who should not have been
in the room going into Room 109 the evening of the fire. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 21.) She also was not
aware of anyone saying that the last guests of Room 109 were in that room before the fire began.
(Id.) After she learned there was a fire, Edwards knocked on Dipak’s office. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 20.)
Dipak left his office and was rubbing his eyes, which Edwards observed were red. (Def.’s SOF ¶
20.)
Dipak stated he was watching the surveillance camera monitor and observed Hammond
walk from Room 109 with linens, including towels, leading Dipak to conclude that Room 109
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was more than half way cleaned. (Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 20, 22.) Dipak went to speak to Hammond,
who informed Dipak that some smoke was found in Room 109. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 22.) Dipak said
“it must be a cigarette butt or something,” and sent Hammond to check a basement in another
area of the Lake Motel. (Id.) Dipak asserts he was never in Room 109 on the evening of the fire.
(Def.’s SOF ¶ 23.) Dipak did not attempt to recover the surveillance camera data for this
evening, and a few days after the fire, the surveillance camera system was stolen. (Def.’s SOF ¶
23.) None of the employees of Sagar Megh, including Dipak, attempted to use a fire
extinguisher to put out the fire. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 39(i).)
John Morris, the last registered guest of Room 109, stated that the room was clean when
he and his female guest entered the room. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 38.) Morris further stated that neither
he nor his guest smoked in the room, or smoked at all, and that there were no cigarette or cigar
butts in the room when he left to return the key. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 38.) Morris indicated that neither
he nor his guest brought anything into the room. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 38.)
Two other guests of the Lake Motel that night, Clifton Carter, Jr. and Brandon Brown,
stated that they woke up on March 5, 2011, to the smell and presence of smoke and did not hear
any smoke alarms sounding. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 4.) At 3:43 a.m., the first fire engine from the
Chicago Fire Department (the “CFD”) was dispatched to the Lake Motel. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 19.)
CFD Lieutenant Timothy O’Toole was on location during the fire and heard smoke detectors in
rooms of the Lake Motel. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 20.)
Sagar Megh is unaware of anyone who would have any motive to set a fire at the Lake
Motel. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 24.) After the fire, the City of Chicago issued a demolition order, and the
Lake Motel was demolished. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 30.)
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The Investigations of the Fire
A CFD fire marshal who investigated the fire, Karl Solms, arrived at the Lake Motel at
approximately 4:22 a.m. on March 5, 2011. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 24.) Solms investigated Room 109 and
found that a localized fire had occurred within that room. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 27.) Based on the burn
damage he observed, Solms believed the fire started in the bathroom of Room 109 and entered
into the wall. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 28.)
Solms prepared a report of his findings regarding the investigation of the fire (the “CFD
Report”). (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 31.) The CFD Report concludes that the fire originated in the bathroom
of Room 109 and was the result of the open flame ignition of rubbish. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 32.) As the
term is used by the CFD, “open flame” does not denote specifically either an intentional or nonintentional source. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 33.) Solms stated he did not find a smoke detector in Room
109. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 29.) According to the CFD Report, “After a thorough fire scene examination
and after ruling out any accidental or natural causal factors it is the opinion of the [Reporting
Fire Marshal] that this fire was caused by the open flame ignition of rubbish within the bathroom
of Unit 109 that then extended through the adjacent wall to the roof above and throughout the
subject structure.” (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 36, Pl.’s SOF Ex. I at 7.) The CFD Report continued, “[t]here is
the possibility that this fire was caused by the careless use of smoking materials[;] whether or not
there is criminal culpability shall be the subject of the [Chicago Police Department Bomb &
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Arson] Unit.”2 (Pl.’s SOF Ex. I at 7.) Solms did not investigate who may have started the fire or
why someone may have started it, but he determined that the fire was ignited as the result of a
human act. (Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 26-27.) Solms was aware that the last registered guest of Room 109
was John Morris, but he did not interview him. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 28.)
On March 10, 2011, Scientific Expert Analysis Limited (“SEA”) was hired by United to
investigate the cause and origin of the fire. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 40.) Sarah Pendley conducted the
investigation and prepared the Cause & Origin Report (“C&O Report”) on behalf of SEA, using
the National Fire Protection Association’s published guidelines as a guide. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 41;
Def.’s SOF ¶ 31.) Pendley first visited the Lake Motel on March 11, 2011; by that time, boards
were placed over the windows and doors of the motel. (Pl.’s SOF ¶¶ 42-43.) Pendley noticed
that the building appeared to have been vandalized; in particular, the heating and air conditioner
units were damaged. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 44.) Pendley observed a fence being placed around the
perimeter of the Lake Motel on March 11, 2011. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 46.) The Fire Marshal told
Pendley that there was a burnt towel found at the origin site, but she never found such a towel.
(Def.’s SOF ¶ 33.) Pendley determined that the most severe fire damage was within the cavity of
the partition wall of Room 109. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 34.) According to the C&O Report, there are two
potential ignition scenarios for the fire: “the ignition of combustible materials, due to the
discarding of smoking materials, or the intentional ignition of combustible materials.” (Pl.’s
2
Sagar Megh submitted, in support of its summary judgment motion, a report it contends
was prepared by the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) Bomb & Arson Unit regarding the
CPD’s investigation of the fire. However, this evidence was not authenticated. The “evidence
relied upon to establish facts for summary judgment purposes must be of a type admissible at
trial, including ‘properly authenticated and admissible documents or exhibits.’” Callpod, Inc. v.
GN Netcom, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 815, 826 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (quoting Smith v. City of
Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, the CPD Report is not evidence to be
properly considered for purposes of ruling on summary judgment.
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SOF ¶ 47.) Pendley concluded the fire was the result of a “human act,” that is, a human being
took an action with a heat-producing item that placed it in the proximity of a fuel source. (Pl.’s
SOF ¶ 51.) United does not dispute the C&O Report. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 50.)
The SEA investigation determined that the Room 109 smoke alarm was located in the
wastebasket of Room 109, and Pendley identified a mounting bracket on the ceiling of that room
that was similar to the mounting brackets used in the other rooms of the motel. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 52.)
A 9-volt battery was located in a plastic cup in Room 109, and the smoke alarm recovered from
the room required that type of battery. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 53.) Pendley concluded someone had
physically removed the battery from the smoke alarm. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 54.) The SEA investigation
was unable to determine whether the smoke alarms it removed from the Lake Motel had sounded
alarms during the fire. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 55.) Pendley did not determine who caused the fire.
(Def.’s SOF ¶ 32.)
The Insurance Claim
Sagar Megh reported the fire to United, and on March 9, 2011, United hired Greg Martin,
an independent property adjuster, to evaluate Sagar Megh’s losses under the Policy. (Pl.’s SOF
¶¶ 57-58.) That same day, Sagar Megh hired the Alex N. Sill Company to evaluate its losses
under the Policy. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 59.) Both Martin and the Alex N. Sill Company determined that
the actual cost value damages resulting from the fire was $1,740,042.67. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 60.)
A Sworn Statement Proof of Loss, prepared by Sagar Megh and Martin, was submitted to
United and asserted the amount of $1,740,042.67 as the actual cost value of the motel building.
(Pl.’s SOF ¶ 62.) United sent a letter to Sagar Megh denying coverage under the Policy on April
25, 2012, on the basis that Sagar Megh intentionally misrepresented and/or concealed material
facts and circumstances surrounding its claim. (Pl.’s SOF ¶¶ 63-64.)
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LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials
on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The moving party bears
the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying the
evidence it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving
party cannot rest on conclusory pleadings but, rather, “must present sufficient evidence to show
the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial.” Serfecz v.
Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986)). A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to
oppose a motion for summary judgment, nor is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.
Robin v. Espo Eng. Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Rather, the
evidence must be such “that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Pugh v. City of Attica, Ind., 259 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving
party’s favor. Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 773 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson,
477 U.S. at 255). The court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting
evidence. Id. In reviewing cross-motions, the Seventh Circuit’s “review of the record requires
that we construe all inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration
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is made.” Rosenbaum v. White, 692 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
ANALYSIS
Sagar Megh moves for summary judgment in its favor against United, asserting United
breached the terms of the Insurance Policy and is liable to Sagar Megh, relating to the actual cost
value of the motel building, in the amount of $1,740,042.67 plus pre-judgment interest since July
6, 2011, and also finding in favor of Sagar Megh on all other claims asserted against United,
including declaratory relief and bad faith. United opposes Sagar Megh’s motion and further
moves for summary judgment in its favor against Sagar Megh, on the basis that Sagar Megh
failed to comply with the Policy’s protective safeguard condition.
Sagar Megh asserts that no genuine issue of material fact remains with respect to
United’s breach of the insurance contract. Under Illinois law, the elements of a breach of an
insurance contract are: “(1) the existence of a valid, enforceable contract; (2) performance by the
plaintiff; (3) breach of contract by the defendant; and (4) resultant injury to the plaintiff.” Bryant
v. Jackson Nat. Life Distributors, LLC, Case No. 12 C 9391, 2013 WL 1819927, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
April 30, 2013) (citations omitted). The parties agree that a valid, enforceable insurance contract
exists. It is also clear that United has not paid Sagar Megh under the terms of the Policy.
Protective Safeguards
The issue addressed by both of the cross-motions is whether or not Sagar Megh
adequately complied with the protective safeguard condition of the Policy. In particular, the
Insurance Policy provided that Sagar Megh was required to maintain functional smoke detectors
in each of the motel rooms. The Policy further indicates that Sagar Megh could not recover
under the policy if a fire resulted in damage where, prior to the fire, Sagar Megh either was
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aware of a suspension or impairment to the smoke detectors and failed to notify United, or if
Sagar Megh failed to maintain any protective safeguard, including smoke detectors, over which
Sagar Megh had control, in complete working order. (Policy at 52-54.)
Sagar Megh asserts it complied with this condition, because smoke detectors were
present in each of the Lake Motel rooms at the time of the fire. However, it is unclear from the
undisputed material facts if the smoke detectors in each room were in complete working order.
Further, it is possible that the smoke detector in Room 109, where the fire originated, was
removed at the time of the fire. Factual questions remain as to who may have removed the
smoke detector and when it was removed.
Moreover, even if the smoke detector was removed by an individual beyond Sagar
Megh’s direction or control, it is not apparent from the undisputed facts whether or not Sagar
Megh breached its duty by failing to incorporate additional safeguards, such as the construction
of mesh or wire cages around the smoke detectors, to prevent motel guests from tampering with
the smoke detectors.
In light of these issues, questions of material fact remain unanswered. “Summary
judgment is appropriate only if the jury could draw but one conclusion from the evidence.”
Aebischer v. Stryker Corp., 535 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Kedzierski v. Kedzierski,
899 F.2d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 1990)). These questions of fact regarding the condition of the smoke
detectors, and the duties owed by Sagar Megh, are more appropriately considered by a jury, and
it is improper to render summary judgment as to the issue of protective safeguards at this stage of
the proceedings.
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The Cause of the Fire
The parties also hold contradictory positions about Sagar Megh’s role in the cause of the
fire. Sagar Megh asserts that there is no evidence to suggest that the fire was caused by an
intentional act, nor any evidence suggesting Dipak or someone employed by Sagar Megh caused
the fire to ignite. United opposes that contention and suggests that the facts support its theory
that Sagar Megh or its officers caused the fire. Both sides agree that the fire was caused by a
human act and was likely caused by smoking materials or open flame ignition.
Many of the facts asserted regarding the cause of the fire are unknown. United relies on
information from the last registered guest of Room 109, John Morris, who insisted he and his
guest did not have cigarettes or smoking materials in the room. United further contends that
Dipak had motive to cause arson, due to his ongoing financial problems, and had the opportunity
to start the fire, because he was located in an office where he could leave without being detected
by the employees of the motel.
However, “evaluations of motive and intent are generally inappropriate for summary
judgment . . . .” Kyle v. Patterson, 196 F.3d 695, 698 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Bartman v. AllisChalmers Corp., 799 F.2d 311, 312 (7th Cir. 1986)). It is improper, in considering motions for
summary judgment, to make determinations of credibility or weigh conflicting evidence; these
matters are best left in the hands of a jury. Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc., 629 F.3d
697, 704-705 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Therefore, it would be inappropriate at this
juncture to weigh the conflicting evidence regarding the undetermined cause of the fire, and
summary judgment will not enter on this issue.
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CONCLUSION
Simply put, too many unsettled questions and factual disputes remain to permit summary
judgment to enter in favor of either party. The issue of whether or not Sagar Megh adequately
complied with the protective safeguard conditions required by the Policy and the issue of who
caused the fire are fact-intensive inquiries best left to a jury. Based on the foregoing analysis,
both motions for summary judgment filed by Sagar Megh [120] and United [212] are denied.
Date: November 6, 2013
______________________________
JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Court Judge
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