Peterson v. Sheahan et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 11/6/2012: Mailed notice (mw, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
STEPHEN P. PETERSON,
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Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS SHEAHAN, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 12 C 5391
MEMORANDUM OPINION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendants’ motions to dismiss, and
Defendant Thomas Sheahan’s (Sheahan) motion in the alternative to stay. For the
reasons stated below, the motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part,
the remaining state law claims are dismissed without prejudice, and the motion to
stay is denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Stephen P. Peterson (Peterson) allegedly became a police officer with
Defendant Village of Oak Brook (Village) in September 2004. Peterson is the son of
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Drew Peterson, a former Bollingbrook police officer recently tried and convicted for
murder. Peterson claims that after his father was charged, Defendants conspired to
bring sham disciplinary charges against him in order to terminate Peterson’s
employment. Following an administrative hearing before the Oak Brook Board of
Fire and Police Commissioners (BFPC), Peterson’s employment was terminated.
Peterson appealed the BFPC ruling to the Circuit Court of DuPage County and the
matter was remanded back to the BFPC for the BFPC to sufficiently explain the basis
of its decision to terminate Peterson’s employment. (V. Ex. D 7). The
administrative proceedings currently remain pending. Peterson includes in his
complaint due process claims brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983)
(Count I), tortious interference with advantageous business relations claims (Count
II), breach of contract claims (Count III), defamation claims (Count IV), and
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims (Count V). Sheahan has filed a
motion to dismiss and motion in the alternative to stay. Defendants Fredrick Capetta
and the Village (collectively referred to as “Village Defendants”) have also filed a
motion to dismiss.
LEGAL STANDARD
In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6)), the court must draw all reasonable inferences
that favor the plaintiff, construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in
the complaint. Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 622 (7th
Cir. 2012); Thompson v. Ill. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.
2002). A plaintiff is required to include allegations in the complaint that “plausibly
suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a
‘speculative level’” and “if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court.”
E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir.
2007)(quoting in part Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007));
see also Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d at 622 (stating that “[t]o survive
a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and that “[a] claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged”)(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009))(internal quotations
omitted).
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DISCUSSION
Sheahan argues that the court should dismiss the Section 1983 due process
claims and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims. Sheahan also argues in the alternative that the court should stay the instant
action pursuant to the Colorado River abstention doctrine. Village Defendants argue
that the court should dismiss the Section 1983 due process claims pursuant to the
Younger abstention doctrine and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the remaining state law claims. Village Defendants also argue in the alternative that
the court should dismiss all claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
I. Section 1983 Due Process Claims (Count I)
Defendants argue that Peterson cannot premise his Section 1983 due process
claims upon an alleged withholding of evidence in underlying administrative and
civil proceedings. Peterson alleges in his complaint that his due process rights were
violated, contending that false statements were made about him and that, to “clear his
name,” he was only provided with a “sham administrative hearing.” (Compl. Par.
65-67). Peterson indicates in response to the instant motions that his due process
claims are solely based upon the principles set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963). (Ans. 2-4). The principles set forth in Brady “protect[] a criminal
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defendant’s right to a reliable trial verdict. . . .” Mosley v. City of Chicago, 2009 WL
3097211, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2009); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68
(1992)(explaining that, in Brady, the Supreme Court “held the prosecution to
uniquely high standards of conduct” in “the context of criminal trials”); Stachniak v.
Hayes, 989 F.2d 914, 926 (7th Cir. 1993)(explaining that “Brady provides that the
suppression of evidence violates a criminal defendant’s due process rights if that
evidence is material either to the guilt or the resulting punishment of the accused”);
Montgomery v. Bobby, 654 F.3d 668, 677-78 (6th Cir. 2011)(explaining that “[i]n
Brady, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant’s due process rights are
violated if the prosecution suppresses exculpatory evidence that is material to the
defendant’s guilt or punishment”); Lackey v. Lewis County, 2009 WL 3294848, at *3
(W.D. Wash. 2009)(explaining that Brady “imposes a duty upon prosecutors to
disclose evidence that is favorable to an accused in criminal cases”). Peterson
acknowledges in his recitation of the law relating to Brady that one requirement for a
Brady claim is a showing that “the exculpatory evidence withheld could have
affected the outcome of the plaintiff’s criminal trial.” (Ans. 3). Peterson also admits
in response to the instant motions that “the instant litigation has nothing to do with a
criminal prosecution.” (Ans. 12). Peterson relies upon Tillman v. Burge, 813 F.
Supp.2d 946 (N.D. Ill. 2011), to support his Brady claim. (Ans. 3-4). However,
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unlike in the instant action where the plaintiff’s lawsuit relates to the loss of
employment, in Tillman, the plaintiff had been tried and convicted in a criminal
proceeding and the Brady claim was brought in regard to alleged governmental
misconduct in the underlying criminal proceedings. Id. at 953, 960. Thus, Tillman is
not on point in this case.
Peterson fails to cite any precedent holding that a disclosure obligation similar
to Brady applies in an administrative or civil context such as in this case. The
Seventh Circuit has declined to interpret Brady in such a broad fashion and this court
declines to interpret the scope of Brady in such a fashion as well. See, e.g,. Mister
Discount Stockbrokers, Inc. v. S.E.C., 768 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1985)(explaining
that Brady “involved a criminal prosecution, while the petition currently before the
court [in Mister] involve[d] the review of an administrative agency proceeding and
not a violation of the criminal law,” and that “[t]he difference is significant”). The
court notes that in certain exceptional instances, Brady has been extended beyond the
criminal context. See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 353 (6th Cir.
1993)(extending Brady “to cover denaturalization and extradition cases where the
government seeks denaturalization or extradition based on proof of alleged criminal
activities of the party proceeded against”). However, Peterson has failed to show
that the instant action represents the type of situation in which Brady should be
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extended. The underlying administrative and civil proceedings in this case, which
deal with Peterson’s employment, do not deal with allegations of criminal conduct
and are not even remotely analogous to a criminal proceeding in which Peterson
might face a criminal conviction and/or criminal penalties, such as a deprivation of
physical liberty in the United States. Thus, Brady is not applicable to the instant
action and Peterson has therefore failed to state a valid Section 1983 due process
claim.
Village Defendants also argue that the court should dismiss the Section 1983
due process claims pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. Since Peterson has
failed to state a valid Section 1983 due process claim in the instant action, the
applicability of the Younger abstention doctrine is moot. Therefore, based on the
above, Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Section 1983 due process claims (Count I)
are granted.
II. Remaining State Law Claims
Defendants argue that if the court dismisses the Section 1983 due process
claims, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims. Once the federal claims in an action no longer remain, a
federal court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
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remaining state law claims. See Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 125152 (7th Cir. 1994)(stating that “the general rule is that, when all federal-law claims
are dismissed before trial,” the pendent claims should be left to the state courts). The
Seventh Circuit has indicated that there is no “‘presumption’ in favor of
relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction. . . .” Williams Electronics Games, Inc. v.
Garrity, 479 F.3d 904, 906-07 (7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit has also stated
that, in exercising its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors,
including “the nature of the state law claims at issue, their ease of resolution, and the
actual, and avoidable, expenditure of judicial resources. . . .” Timm v. Mead Corp.,
32 F.3d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1994). The court has considered all of the pertinent
factors and, as a matter of discretion, the court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Therefore, the remaining state law
claims are dismissed without prejudice. Since all claims have been dismissed in this
action, the motion to stay is moot.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Section
1983 due process claims (Count I) are granted, and the remaining state law claims
are dismissed without prejudice. The alternative motion to stay is denied as moot.
___________________________________
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan
United States District Court Judge
Dated: November 6, 2012
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