Drobny et al v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association et al

Filing 28

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 9/19/2012: At a recent motion hearing in this matter, the Court advised the parties that it would issue a ruling on Plaintiffs' motion for appointment of counsel [16, 17] after revi ewing the motions to dismiss [18, 21] and memoranda in support [20, 25] that have been filed by Defendants. Having now examined Defendants' motions as well as Plaintiffs complaint, the Court concludes that appointment of counsel is not warranted at this time. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' amended motion for appointment of counsel 17 is denied at this time, and Plaintiffs' earlier motion for appointment of counsel 16 is stricken as moot. The Court notes that when it denies an initia l request for appointment of counsel, it reconsiders whether appointing counsel would be appropriate at each subsequent stage of a case. Thus, the denial of the request for counsel is without prejudice to a renewed request later in the case or to reconsideration on the Court's own motion. Please see below for further elaboration. Mailed notice(tbk, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Robert M. Dow, Jr.

CASE NUMBER

12 C 5392

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

9/19/2012

Drobny vs. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

At a recent motion hearing in this matter, the Court advised the parties that it would issue a ruling on Plaintiffs’
motion for appointment of counsel [16, 17] after reviewing the motions to dismiss [18, 21] and memoranda in
support [20, 25] that have been filed by Defendants. Having now examined Defendants’ motions as well as
Plaintiffs’ complaint, the Court concludes that appointment of counsel is not warranted at this time. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs’ amended motion for appointment of counsel [17] is denied at this time, and Plaintiffs’ earlier motion
for appointment of counsel [16] is stricken as moot. The Court notes that when it denies an initial request for
appointment of counsel, it reconsiders whether appointing counsel would be appropriate at each subsequent stage
of a case. Thus, the denial of the request for counsel is without prejudice to a renewed request later in the case
or to reconsideration on the Court’s own motion. Please see below for further elaboration.
O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
Civil litigants have no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in federal court. See Lewis v. Sullivan, 279
F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2002); Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F. 2d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 1983). Nevertheless, a
district court may, in its discretion, “request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.”
Gil v. Reed, 381 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)); Luttrell v. Nickel, 129 F.3d
933, 936 (7th Cir. 1997). On the basis of the financial affidavit submitted by Plaintiff Anita Drobny, it
appears that she and her husband qualify as indigent based on the limited social security income that they
receive. As the next step in deciding whether to appoint counsel, the Court must “determine if the indigent
has made reasonable efforts to retain counsel and was unsuccessful or that the indigent was effectively
precluded from making such efforts.” Gil, 381 F.3d at 656 (quoting Jackson v. Cnty. of McLean, 953 F.2d
1070, 1072 (7th Cir. 1992)). Plaintiffs have indicated that they contacted multiple law firms, who
presumably declined to represent Plaintiffs. The Court also considers (1) whether, given the degree of
difficulty of the case, the plaintiff appears competent to try it himself; and (2) whether the assistance of
counsel would provide a substantial benefit to the court or the parties, potentially affecting the outcome of the
case. Gil, 381 F.3d at 656 (relying on Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 322 (7th Cir. 1993)). The Court should
consider the capabilities of Plaintiffs to litigate their own case in deciding whether or not to appoint counsel.
Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F. 3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). It also should be noted that the Court grants
pro se litigants wide latitude in the handling of their lawsuits.
In considering these criteria, the Court notes that both in their written filings and in the one court appearance
to date, Plaintiffs have presented themselves intelligibly and appropriately. The Court further observes that,
according to their own complaint, both Plaintiffs “have been practicing accountants for over 40 years” and
12C5392 Drobny vs. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al.

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STATEMENT
“are experts in the field of mortgage modifications.” These circumstances lead the Court to conclude, at least
at the present stage of the case, that Plaintiffs are capable of representing their own interests in this litigation
without the assistance of appointed counsel. Should the complexity of the case increase over time, the Court
is open to revisiting the issue of appointed counsel. In the meantime, the Court advises Plaintiffs that the Pro
Se Help Desk in the Clerk’s Office may be a useful resource; should Plaintiffs wish to use that resource, they
may make an appointment to do so.
Courtroom Deputy
Initials

12C5392 Drobny vs. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al.

TBK

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