King v. Illinois Department Of Corrections(IDOC)
Filing
51
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order:For the foregoing reasons, the IDJJ's motion for summary judgment, R. 33, is granted, and King's claim is dismissed. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 4/17/2014:Mailed notice(srn, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CHARLES KING,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 12 C 5450
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE,
Judge Thomas M. Durkin
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Charles King, who is African-American, alleges that his employer, the Illinois
Department of Juvenile Justice (the “IDJJ”), discriminated against him based on
his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et
seq. R. 1. The IDJJ has moved for summary judgment. R. 33. For the following
reasons, the IDJJ’s motion is granted.
Background
King was employed by the IDJJ in Joliet, Illinois, for eleven years as a
Juvenile Justice Specialist. R. 42 ¶ 1; R. 48 ¶ 2. On June 1, 2011, at about 5:00 p.m.,
King was assigned to monitor juvenile inmates as they left the dining area. R. 42 ¶¶
8-9. One inmate refused to leave the dining area and spoke disrespectfully to King.
Id. ¶ 9. The inmate eventually got up from his seat and began to leave the dining
area. Id. ¶ 13. The inmate, however, continued to speak to King disrespectfully, so
King ordered the inmate to turn around so King could handcuff him. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
When King attempted to handcuff the inmate, the inmate knocked King’s hands
away and spat in King’s face. Id. ¶ 15. King then tackled the inmate to the ground,
id. ¶ 16, and another Juvenile Justice Specialist, Alejandro Cervantes, assisted
King in placing handcuffs on the inmate. Id. ¶ 17. King then helped the inmate to
his feet. Id. ¶ 18. The inmate suffered scrapes on his head, knees, and elbow from
the altercation, id. ¶¶ 19-20, but King did not suffer any injuries. Id. ¶ 21.
King called his supervisor, John Henley, to inform him about the incident
and that King would be taking the inmate to the confinement unit. Id. ¶¶ 22, 24.
King then took the inmate to the confinement unit, id. ¶ 24, while Cervantes went
back into the dining area. Id. ¶ 23. The IDJJ’s statement pursuant to Local Rule
56.1 states that King “did not punch or kick the [inmate] while walking the [inmate]
to confinement,” and King of course agrees with this statement. Id. ¶ 27. The
inmate, however, claimed King punched and kicked him, id. ¶ 28, and the
investigation into King’s conduct concluded that he had punched and kicked the
inmate, while he was still handcuffed, sometime after they left the dining area and
before they reached the confinement unit. See R. 35-4 at 9; R. 35-6 at 12.
Another Juvenile Justice Specialist, Charles McKinney, met King at the
confinement unit and took custody of the inmate to escort him to the medical unit.
Id. ¶¶ 26, 29. Supervisor Henley arrived at the confinement unit about two minutes
after King got there with the inmate. Id. ¶ 30. At about 5:30 p.m., Henley called
Superintendent John Rita reporting that King had been assaulted by an inmate and
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described the incident. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33. Henley reported to Rita that the inmate had
been taken to the health care unit and returned to the confinement unit because the
inmate only had a few minor scratches on his face. Id. ¶¶ 33-34. Rita relayed this
information to Deputy Director Ron Smith. Id. ¶ 35.
At about 7:30 p.m., Supervisor Henley called Superintendent Rita again to
inform him that the nurse had placed the inmate on observation status due to a
bump on his head. Id. ¶ 36. Rita then spoke with Nurse Sherri Hurly and learned
that the inmate had been placed under observation for precautionary reasons
because the inmate had a few contusions on his head and may have hit his head. Id.
¶ 37.
The next day, June 2, Superintendent Rita was told by Chief of Security
Luther Byrd that the inmate appeared to have sustained serious injuries, which
Rita confirmed by visiting the inmate with Byrd. Id. ¶ 38. Rita informed Deputy
Director Smith of the update regarding the inmate’s injuries, and Smith instructed
Rita to request an external investigation of the incident. Id. ¶ 40.
Investigator A.C. Kinard, an investigator with the Illinois Department of
Corrections, was assigned to investigate charges against King of official misconduct,
battery of a youth, conduct of an individual, and use of excessive force on a youth.
Id. ¶ 41. Kinard interviewed King, the inmate, and other witnesses. Id. ¶¶ 44, 46.
Kinard’s investigation substantiated the charges against King, id. ¶ 47, and
concluded that King has assaulted the inmate, while the inmate was still
handcuffed, in between the time they left the dining area and arrived at the
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confinement unit. See R. 35-4 at 9; R. 35-6 at 12. The investigation also
substantiated charges against Supervisor Henley and Juvenile Justice Specialist
Cervantes
for
“provid[ing]
false
and
misleading”
information
during
the
investigation. R. 35-4 at 9-10. Based on Kinard’s investigation and conclusion, Chief
Byrd recommended, and Superintendent Rita determined, that King should be
referred to the Employee Review Board for disciplinary action. Id. ¶¶ 48-49.
King’s Employee Review Hearing took place on August 15, 2011. Id. ¶ 50.
Cervantes, the Juvenile Justice Specialist who helped King handcuff the inmate,
testified at the hearing. Id. ¶ 52. According to King, Cervantes testified at the
hearing that the inmate was handcuffed without incident, whereas Cervantes had
previously stated that an “incident” had occurred when King and Cervantes tried to
handcuff the inmate. Id.; R. 35-2 at 72. The hearing officer recommended to Deputy
Director Smith that King be discharged. R. 42 ¶ 54.
Based on a review of the hearing officer’s findings, Investigator Kinard’s
findings, and a report from Chief Byrd, Deputy Director Smith agreed to discharge
King. Id. ¶ 55. Director Author Bishop approved King’s discharge. Id. ¶ 56. King
was terminated on October 1, 2011. Id. ¶ 58.
King cites one other non-African-American IDJJ employee, Juvenile Justice
Specialist, Marcus Vasquez, who he alleges committed similar violations but who he
alleges was disciplined more leniently. Vasquez is a Latino-American. Vasquez was
assaulted by an inmate. R. 42 ¶ 60. King testified that other IDJJ employees told
him that in defending himself, Vasquez punched the inmate many times and broke
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his hand doing so. Id. ¶¶ 61-62. King testified that he saw the inmate after the
incident, and the inmate was seriously injured. R. 48 ¶ 7. King, however, did not
witness the incident, review documents regarding the incident, or speak with
Vasquez about the incident. R. 42 ¶¶ 63-64. Chief Byrd investigated Vasquez’s case
and determined that Vasquez’s conduct did not merit discipline. Id. ¶ 68; R. 48 ¶ 9.
There is no other evidence or testimony in the record about Vasquez’s case.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986). The Court considers the entire evidentiary record and must view all
of the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant. Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir. 2013).
To defeat summary judgment, a nonmovant must produce more than “a mere
scintilla of evidence” and come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Harris N.A. v. Hershey, 711 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 2013).
Ultimately, summary judgment is warranted only if a reasonable jury could not
return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986).
Analysis
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against an employee on account of his “race, color, religion, sex, or
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national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The “central question at issue is whether
the employer acted [adversely against the plaintiff] on account of the plaintiff’s
race.” Morgan v. SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990, 997 (7th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff can
answer this question according to either of two “methods” of proof. The “direct
method” is nothing more than relying on any evidence—whether direct or
circumstantial—that “link[s] an adverse employment action to an employer's
discriminatory animus.” Id. at 995. The indirect method is “a particular way of
using circumstantial evidence at the summary judgment stage,” id. at 996, that
requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination—meaning
that the defendant afforded more favorable treatment to similarly situated
employees of a different race—and then show that any non-discriminatory reasons
for the adverse employment action “were dishonest or phony,” or pretextual. See
Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 647 F.3d 652, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2011); see also
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). Whether evaluated
according to the direct or indirect method, circumstantial evidence that requires
“guesswork and speculation [is] not enough to avoid summary judgment.” Good v.
Univ. of Chi. Med. Center, 673 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2012).
King concedes that he has no direct evidence that the IDJJ discriminated
against him. R. 40 at 3. Instead, King argues that both he and Vasquez were
accused of using excessive force in defending themselves from inmate attacks, but
he was fired and Vasquez was not disciplined; King contends that this is indirect
evidence that the IDJJ discriminated against him. R. 40 at 4. There is no admissible
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evidence in the record, however, showing that Vasquez’s case is analogous to King’s
case. King’s testimony about what other IDJJ employees told him regarding the
Vasquez incident is hearsay that cannot serve to create a genuine question of fact
on summary judgment. See Luster v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 652 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir.
2011) (the plaintiff’s lack of personal knowledge about a certain fact meant the
plaintiff’s testimony was inadmissible and could not create a genuine issue of
material fact on summary judgment). Furthermore, the IDJJ determined that King
had assaulted the inmate while the inmate was handcuffed, and King does not
allege that the Vasquez incident involved similar circumstances. Rather, the record
in this case includes evidence that an investigation into Vasquez’s conduct
determined that he acted appropriately in the circumstances, whereas an
investigation into King’s conduct found the opposite. Although King testified that
the inmate involved in the incident with Vasquez was seriously injured, King has
presented no evidence that Vasquez caused those injuries, or if Vasquez did cause
those injuries, that his conduct warranted discipline. Additionally, King has not
presented evidence of the precise charges against Vasquez, or alleged that the
charges Vasquez faced were the same as King’s. Without admissible evidence that
King’s conduct was analogous to Vasquez’s, Vasquez is not an adequate comparator
for King’s case, and Vasquez’s case cannot serve as evidence that the IDJJ
discriminated against King.
Even if King could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, no genuine
question of material fact exists regarding the motivation for King’s termination. The
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IDJJ, of course, contends that King was fired because he used excessive force
against the inmate. R. 34 at 10. King argues that this reason is “insufficient to
motivate the termination,” R. 40 at 6, but he does not support this argument.
Instead, King alleges that the IDJJ coerced Cervantes into changing his testimony
at King’s hearing. R. 40 at 6. The IDJJ admits that Cervantes changed his
testimony in some fashion, R. 42 ¶ 52, but there is no evidence in the record to
support King’s allegation that Cervantes was coerced. Absent evidence that the
investigation and hearing regarding King’s conduct was somehow rigged, the Court
cannot act as a “superpersonnel department” and reconsider “the merits of an
employer’s decision . . . to determine best business practices.” Blise v. Antaramian,
409 F.3d 861, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the IDJJ’s motion for summary judgment, R. 33, is
granted, and King’s claim is dismissed.
ENTERED:
______________________________
Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: April 17, 2014
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