Dixon v. Wexford Health Sources Inc. et al

Filing 33

WRITTEN Opinion signed by the Honorable Charles P. Kocoras on 1/2/2013: Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc.'s motion to dismiss (Doc 21 ) is denied. Defendant is ordered to answer Plaintiff's complaint within 21 days of the date of this order. Plaintiff's "motion seeking trial practice and schedule for discovery" (Doc 29 ) is granted to the extent that a status hearing is scheduled for 1/30/2013 at 9:30 a.m. (For further details see minute order.)Mailed notice(sct, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Charles P. Kocoras

CASE NUMBER

12 C 5531

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

January 2, 2013

Clinton Dixon (B-57267) vs. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc.’s motion to dismiss (Doc [21]) is denied. Defendant is ordered to
answer Plaintiff’s complaint within 21 days of the date of this order. Plaintiff’s “motion seeking trial practice
and schedule for discovery” (Doc [29]) is granted to the extent that a status hearing is scheduled for
1/30/2013 at 9:30 a.m.

O[For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
Plaintiff, Clinton Dixon, has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
claims that he was subjected to deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition at Stateville Correctional Center,
relating to an injury to his finger.
Defendant Wexford Health Services has filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff has not shown or
alleged exhaustion of administrative remedies and that he has failed to state a claim against Wexford for deliberate
indifference. Defendant also argue that Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages should be dismissed. For the reasons
contained in this order, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.
It is well established that pro se complaints are to be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972); see also McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 325 (7th Cir. 2000). In addition, when considering
whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court takes the
allegations in the complaint as true, viewing all facts – as well as any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom – in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Marshall-Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 326 (7th Cir.
2000); Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, (2002)).
With respect to exhaustion, Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he did in fact exhaust, and he attaches to his
complaint a grievance, complete with a counselor’s response and the response to his appeal from the Administrative
Review Board in Springfield , which represents the final step in completing the grievance process. The internal
administrative grievance system of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) is set out in the Illinois
Administrative Code, 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810, et seq. Inmates must follow the following procedures: (1) The
inmate must first attempt to resolve the situation through his counselor; (2) If the situation remains unresolved, he may
file a written grievance within 60 days after the discovery of the incident, occurrence, or problem which gives rise to
the grievance. Upon completion of an investigation by the grievance officer, the conclusions, and, if necessary,
recommendations, are forwarded to the Chief Administrative Officer; (3) If the inmate does not believe the situation is
resolved, he may appeal to the Director of the IDOC. The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”), as the Director's
designee, reviews the appeal of the grievance and determines whether a hearing is necessary; (4) The ARB forwards its
decision and any recommendations to the Director or other designee, who makes a final determination. The Director
issues a final determination. Id. § 504.850(f). At this point, the administrative grievance process is complete, as there
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STATEMENT
are no further appeals. Plaintiff both pleads that he exhausted and provides evidence of exhaustion by attaching the
grievance and, counselor’s response, and letter from the ARB to his complaint. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has adequately pled exhaustion. The Court finds Defendant’s motion troublesome in that it appears to ignore
Plaintiff’s allegations and the exhibits attached to his complaint as well as settled law regarding the exhaustion
requirement. For instance, Defendant makes the argument that Plaintiff failed to adequately show or allege complete
exhaustion. The Supreme Court specifically has held, however, that “the failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense
under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); see also Thomas v. Kalu, 218 Fed. Appx. 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing
Jones and explaining that “[p]risoners need not allege that they have exhausted administrative remedies; rather, failure
to exhaust is an affirmative defense.”). As an affirmative defense, it is Defendant’s burden to prove failure to exhaust,
not Plaintiff’s. As Plaintiff has both pled exhaustion and provided evidence of it, he has certainly satisfied his burden
sufficient to withstand a motion brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Moving to Defendant’s substantive arguments, the Court notes that it already decided on initial review that
Plaintiff stated a claim against Wexford. In its motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has merely pled conclusions
against Wexford, insufficient to state a custom and policy of deliberate indifference. In analyzing a Section 1983
claim against a private corporation, the court uses the same principles that would be applied in examining claims
against a municipality. Brown v. Ghosh, No. 09 C 2542, 2010 WL 3893939, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 28, 2010) (citing
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2009)). Therefore an inmate bringing a claim
against a corporate entity for a violation of his constitutional rights must show that the corporation supports a “policy
that sanctions the maintenance of prison conditions that infringe upon the constitutional rights of the prisoners.”
Brown, 2010 WL 3893939, at *8 (quoting Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir.
2004)). Because liability is not premised upon the theory of vicarious liability, the corporate policy “must be the
‘direct cause’ or ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation.” Woodward, 368 F.3d at 927. Plaintiff has
sufficiently pled a custom and policy of deliberate indifference against Wexford, in that he claims that the lack of
proper medical care occurs because of a policy by Wexford to provide the least amount of care at the least cost to
Wexford at the inmate’s medical expense.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate that he received medical care for his injury,
and therefore cannot pursue a claim for deliberate indifference. However, Plaintiff pleads throughout his complaint
delay of treatment and failure to provide adequate treatment. The fact that a prisoner has received some medical
treatment does not necessarily defeat his claim; deliberate indifference to a serious medical need can be manifested by
“blatantly inappropriate” treatment, Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2005), or by “woefully inadequate
action,” as well as by no action at all. Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1999); Allen v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., No. 11 C 3834, 2011 WL 2463544, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 17, 2011). Giving Plaintiff the benefit of the
doubt, as the Court must on a motion to dismiss, he has clearly pled delay and inadequate treatment due to a policy of
Wexford.
Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages because his allegations do not
demonstrate motivation by evil motive or intent nor a reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff’s rights. This factual
argument is improper at this stage of the proceedings.
Based on the above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied. Defendant Wexford is ordered to answer
Plaintiff’s complaint within twenty-one days of the date of this order.

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