Lofton v. Standard Parking Corporation et al

Filing 72

ORDER Signed by the Honorable John W. Darrah on 10/8/2013: Plaintiff LaShawn Nicole Lofton has brought this action against her former employer, Standard Parking Corporation, and her union, Teamsters Local Union No. 727. Lofton moved to proceed in f orma pauperis ("IFP"), which was granted; and counsel was appointed. Defendants have jointly moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, based on misrepresentations on Loftons IFP application, or, in the alternative, for judgment on th e pleadings. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants Motion to Dismiss based on Loftons IFP application 58 is granted; and the Motion for alternative relief is denied as moot. Furthermore, Teamsters Local Union 727s Motion to Dismiss 53 and Standard Parking Corporations Motion to Dismiss Counts 4 and 5 55 are denied as moot. The Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Civil case is terminated. Mailed notice (mgh, ).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
LASHAWN NICOLE LOFTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
STANDARD PARKING CORPORATION and
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 727,
Defendants.

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Case No. 12-cv-5716
Judge John W. Darrah

ORDER
Plaintiff LaShawn Nicole Lofton has brought this action against her former employer,
Standard Parking Corporation, and her union, Teamsters Local Union No. 727. Lofton moved to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), which was granted; and counsel was appointed. Defendants
have jointly moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, based on misrepresentations on
Lofton’s IFP application, or, in the alternative, for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons
discussed below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss based on Lofton’s IFP application [58] is
granted; and the Motion for alternative relief is denied as moot. Furthermore, Teamsters Local
Union 727’s Motion to Dismiss [53] and Standard Parking Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss
Counts 4 and 5 [55] are denied as moot. The Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice. Civil case is terminated.
STATEMENT
With regard to cases filed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides that “the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the allegation of poverty is
untrue.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Whether the dismissal of the case is with
or without prejudice is within the discretion of the district court. Mathis v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 133 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 1998). As the purpose of the IFP application is to encourage
forthrightness and discourage fraud on the court, dismissal with prejudice has been viewed as an
appropriate sanction for lying on the IFP. See, e.g., Thomas v. GMAC, 288 F.3d 305, 306 (7th
Cir. 2002); McRoyal v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 263 F. App’x 500, 502 (7th Cir. 2008).
In this case, Defendants have submitted information about Lofton’s bankruptcy
proceedings that directly contradict the representations that Lofton made on her IFP filed in this
case. Specifically, Defendants have shown that Lofton failed to disclose the following on her
IFP application: (1) that she owned a house; (2) that she received gifts in the amount of more
than $200 in the twelve months prior to filing her IFP application; (3) that she owned a car worth
more than $1,000; and (4) that she owned personal property with a current market value of more
than $1,000 in the form of a fur coat that she had purchased for $2,600. Lofton concedes that she

failed to disclose those assets but contends that she misunderstood the questions and that, in any
event, the errors are harmless because she is actually impoverished.
In completing her IFP application, Lofton verified that its information was correct and
that false statements would lead to dismissal of her lawsuit when she signed under the following
statement:
I declare under penalty of perjury that the above information is true and correct. I
understand that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2)(A), the court shall dismiss this
case at any time if the court determines that my allegation of poverty is untrue.
(See Dkt. No. 4.) The IFP application asked specific questions about real estate and vehicles,
including the current value and equity held in such items. (See id., Questions 7 & 8.) As shown
by Defendants, Lofton previously disclosed these assets when filing for bankruptcy.
Lofton has made misrepresentations about her financial status and committed a fraud on
the Court. Lofton’s argument that she misunderstood the IFP application’s request for
information about her assets is not well-taken in light of her bankruptcy filings disclosing those
very assets. Furthermore, any inadvertent errors Lofton might have made does not excuse her
deception. See Mathis, 133 F.3d at 547-48 (affirming dismissal with prejudice although plaintiff
averred that errors in IFP application were inadvertent errors). Lofton has benefited from her
fraudulent misrepresentations by avoiding paying the filing fee and having counsel appointed,
pro bono, to represent her in her federal lawsuit. Dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate
sanction.
Consequently, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [58] is granted with respect to Lofton’s
IFP misrepresentations and is denied as moot with respect to judgment on the pleadings.
Accordingly, Teamsters Local Union 727’s Motion to Dismiss [53] and Standard Parking
Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 4 and 5 [55] are denied as moot. The case is dismissed
with prejudice and is terminated.

Date:

October 8, 2013

______________________________
JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Court Judge

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