Priddle v. Darwin Asset Management et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable John W. Darrah on 6/26/2014.(lcw, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SOMA GETTY PRIDDLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEAN MALANIS. and
GREAT LAKES SERVICE II, INC.,
Defendants.
SOMA GETTY PRIDDLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
DARWIN ASSET MANAGEMENT;
THOMAS DRIVE PARTNERSHIP; and
owner of record of 705-715 THOMAS
DRIVE, BENSENVILLE, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.
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Case No. 12-CV-5831
Judge John W. Darrah
Case No. 12-CV-5833
Judge John W. Darrah
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Soma Getty Priddle (“Priddle”), filed two Amended Complaints: the
first, against Defendant Darwin Asset Management (“Darwin”), alleging one count of
premises liability; the second, against Dean Malanis (“Malanis”) and
Great Lakes Service II, Inc. (“Great Lakes”), alleging one count each of “Violation of
Illinois Tow Law” and replevin. Malanis and Great Lakes have filed a Motion to
Dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which Darwin has joined.
The Motion has been fully briefed. For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion is
granted.
BACKGROUND
Priddle is an airline pilot who resides in Norwalk, Wisconsin. (Am. Compl.
Malanis ¶¶ 1, 11.) 1 On the morning of July 24, 2010, Priddle was driving to O’Hare
International Airport, amid heavy rains, when police redirected her onto Thomas Drive in
Bensenville, Illinois. (Am. Compl. Malanis ¶¶ 12-16.) At a point between 705 and 715
Thomas Drive, police erected barricades and were instructing drivers to turn their
vehicles around in an adjacent parking lot owned by Darwin. (Am. Compl. Malanis
¶¶ 18-20.)
While attempting to turn around, a surge of water came through the lot. (Am.
Compl. Malanis ¶ 22.) Because Darwin’s lot was missing protective barriers, the flood
swept Priddle’s vehicle, with her inside, off of the lot and into an adjacent drainage ditch.
(Am. Compl. Darwin ¶¶ 21, 23.) Priddle was able to escape from her vehicle by
climbing out the sliding rear window and grabbing hold of a tree. (Am. Compl. Darwin
¶ 30.) Priddle’s vehicle came to rest approximately two blocks east of where it entered
the drainage ditch. (Am. Compl. Darwin ¶ 32.) Priddle was able to see her belongings,
including several computers and flight manuals, secured to the passenger seat when she
observed her vehicle in its final location. (Am. Compl. Malanis ¶ 30.)
Priddle was escorted to O’Hare by Bensenville Police, but returned later in the
day with colleagues and equipment to retrieve her belongings. (Am. Compl. Malanis
1
As set forth above, Priddle has filed two Amended Complaints. Facts alleged in
Priddle’s Amended Complaint against Malanis and Great Lakes are designated (Am.
Compl. Malanis), including the corresponding paragraph, and those alleged in Priddle’s
Amended Complaint against Darwin are designated (Am. Compl. Darwin), including the
corresponding paragraph.
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¶ 32.) Bensenville Police advised Priddle and her colleagues that the water level was still
too dangerous to attempt retrieval of her belongings and to return when the water had
receded. (Am. Compl. Malanis ¶ 33.)
Priddle returned with a tow truck driver the following morning, July 25, 2010, to
find her truck had been moved. (Am. Compl. Malanis ¶¶ 35, 36.) Unable to locate a
property owner who indicated approving a tow, Priddle reported her vehicle stolen. (Am.
Compl. Malanis ¶¶ 37, 38.) Bensenville Police denied authorizing a police tow, but were
able to locate the vehicle in Malanis’s possession. (Am. Compl. Malanis ¶ 38.)
Priddle spoke with Malanis and demanded immediate access to her vehicle, but
Malanis stated that he would need to speak to “his lawyer and his police chief” before
allowing her access. (Am. Compl. Malanis ¶ 39.) Malanis never contacted Priddle, but
the Bensenville Police advised that she would have to wait until the following day to
retrieve her possessions. (Am. Compl. Malanis ¶¶ 40, 41.)
On July 26, 2010, Priddle arrived to find her vehicle inside a secure area at
Great Lakes, a facility owned by Malanis. (Am. Compl. Malanis ¶¶ 42, 44.) Many of the
valuable contents of Priddle’s vehicle were missing, and Malanis denied any knowledge
of the contents. (Am. Compl. Malanis ¶¶ 46, 48.) Malanis demanded $2,400.00 from
Priddle, which she wire transferred the same day. (Am. Compl. Malanis ¶¶ 51, 53.)
When asked by Bensenville Police who authorized the tow of Priddle’s vehicle,
Malanis initially stated that he could not remember. (Am. Compl. Malanis ¶ 61.) Upon
further investigation, Malanis told police that he was authorized by a person named
“George” at an address near the final location of Priddle’s vehicle. (Am. Compl. Malanis
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¶ 62.) However, the address given by Malanis did not exist, and no one named George
was able to be located near the area. (Id.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal district courts have original jurisdiction of civil cases where the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.00 and is between citizens of two different states.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). “In all cases, the party asserting federal jurisdiction has the
burden of proof to show that jurisdiction is proper.” Travelers Prop. Cas. v. Good, 689
F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 289 U.S.
178, 189 (1936). The proponent of jurisdiction has the burden of proving citizenship and
the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. Lewis v. Weiss, 631
F.Supp.2d 1063, 1065 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (citing Meridian Ins. Sec. Co. v. Sadowski, 441
F.3d 536, 543 (7th Cir. 2006)).
When a party moves to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the district court must accept all well-pleaded facts within the
complaint as true, but may also consider evidence outside of the pleadings to ensure
jurisdiction is proper. Evers v. Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 656-57 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing
St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir.
2007)). This is especially true when the amount in controversy is challenged, requiring
the plaintiff to support its jurisdictional assertion with competent proof. McMillan v.
Sheraton Chi. Hotel & Towers, 567 F.3d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 2009) (quotations and
citations omitted). Such proof requires more than “point[ing] to the theoretical
availability of certain categories of proof.” Id. (citations omitted).
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“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotations and
citations omitted). 2
ANALYSIS
The instant cases come to this Court with a somewhat previously developed
procedural history. Prior to the cases being transferred to this Court, the Honorable John
A. Nordberg dismissed both complaints for lack of jurisdiction because Priddle “fail[ed]
to provide a plausible factual explanation for [her] damages.” (12-cv-5831 Dkt. No. 59 at
6.) However, the complaints were dismissed without prejudice, allowing Priddle to file
these Amended Complaints along with “a supporting memorandum explaining why she
believes she has met her jurisdictional burden.” (Id. at 7.) Priddle timely filed the
Amended Complaints, but has failed to provide the competent proof necessary to assert
proper jurisdiction.
In her jurisdictional memorandum, Priddle claims from Malanis $41,518.59 in
“compensatory damages” and $75,283.38 in “compensation for her costs to rebuild her
life .” (12-cv-5831 Dkt. No. 65 at 3.) Additionally, she claims from Malanis $83,037.18
in “punitive damages on a 1:1 ratio.” (Id.) From Darwin, Priddle claims “damages,
excluding the cost of rebuilding her life . . . in the amount of $61,239.11” and a “total
cost, including the rebuild . . . [of] $72,851.31.” (Id.) In support of these amounts,
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It is important to note that, although she is proceeding without counsel, Priddle
is not a typical pro se litigant. She holds at least a J.D. from the John Marshall Law
School, and it is believed she holds an LL.M. as well.
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Priddle has attached a 20-page spreadsheet, itemizing her alleged losses, and various
pricing lists from McKay’s Family Dodge, Inc. 3
If punitive damages are necessary to exceed the amount in controversy threshold,
it must first be determined whether punitive damages are permissible for the underlying
claim. LM Ins. Corp. v. Spaulding Enters. Inc., 533 F.3d 542, 551 (7th Cir. 2008)
(citations omitted). “If punitive damages are available, subject matter jurisdiction exists
unless it is ‘legally certain’ that the plaintiff will be unable to recover the requisite
jurisdictional amount.” Id. (quoting Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc., 230 F.3d 974, 978
(7th Cir. 2000)).
Defendants argue that Priddle’s claim of premises liability against Darwin cannot
sustain punitive damages because Illinois law “precludes plaintiffs from requesting
punitive damages on the face of any complaint based, even in part, on a negligence
theory.” McCann v. Presswood, 721 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). This
argument is persuasive as “[a] premises-liability action is a negligence claim” under
Illinois law. Nelson v. Aurora Equip. Co., 909 N.E. 2d 931, 934 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
Without the addition of punitive damages, Priddle’s Amended Complaint against Darwin
seeks $72,851.31, an amount short of the jurisdictional threshold.
With respect to Malanis and Great Lakes, Priddle’s allegations of violations of
“Illinois Tow Law” and replevin do not admit the availability of punitive damages.
Priddle makes vague reference to a scheme involving Darwin and Malanis in her
Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Pl.’s Response ¶ 33.), but such a scheme is
3
Priddle also includes numerous irrelevant police reports that cannot be properly
considered in any way.
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not alleged in the complaint. Further, Priddle’s vague accusations of “deliberate violence
and oppression” do not suffice to implicate punitive damages.
However, Priddle meets the jurisdictional threshold with respect to her Amended
Complaint against Malanis and Great Lakes on her compensatory damage allegations
alone. Defendants contest this amount and argue that Priddle provides insufficient
competent proof.
Judge Nordberg previously found Priddle’s claim of “rebuilding” her life too
speculative. Yet, Priddle has simply broken down the claim into smaller speculative
parts. For example, entry 466 on Priddle’s spreadsheet is labeled “Recreate law school
notes, records, study outlines, materials on computer and backup media.” (12-cv-5831
Dkt. No. 63 at 39.) Priddle claims to have engaged in this task for 40 hours and values
the time at $200.00. (Id.) It is unlikely that competent proof exists to justify $200.00 per
hour for compiling law school outlines, but even if it does, Priddle has failed to meet her
burden of producing it. Obscuring matters further, Priddle lists a “Subtotal time spent
trying to rebuild my life” of $33,756.14 and “Total damages from Mala[n]is to rebuild
life” of $33,764.79, with no explanation of the difference in amounts. Whichever amount
is chosen, it is too speculative to be applied to reach the jurisdictional threshold.
The estimate from McKay’s Family Dodge, Inc. requires similar speculation. The
quote (not a paid bill) is for $26,940.16 and admits to being a “very rough estimate.” (Id.
at 44.) Yet Priddle, without explanation, lists a range of $34,000 to $45,000 for “Damage
to 2006 Dodge [R]am truck.” (Id. at 21.) Far from competent proof, Priddle fails even to
direct which of these three numbers should be applied to calculations of the amount in
controversy.
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Finally, Priddle fails even to allege which defendant is responsible for which
damage. Defendants have contested the amount in controversy, and Priddle has failed to
meet her burden of competent proof to establish jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [76] is granted; and
both of Priddle’s Amended Complaints are dismissed without prejudice. Priddle may file
a second amended complaint in each of these cases, including specific damages with
supporting documentation, within twenty-one days of the date of this order. If second
amended complaints are filed, they will be referred to the magistrate judge for a
jurisdictional hearing.
Date:
June 26, 2014
______________________________
JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Court Judge
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