Hawkins v. Tenuto et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION signed by the Honorable Charles P. Kocoras on 10/31/2012.Mailed notice(sct, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL W. HAWKINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES TENUTO, et al.,
Defendants.
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12 C 5893
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Judge;
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Illinois State Board of
Elections (“Board”) and Board Hearing Examiner James Tenuto’s (“Tenuto”)
(collectively “Defendants”), motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12 (c). For the reasons set forth below, we grant Defendant’s
motion.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the alleged infringement of Plaintiff Michael Hawkins’s
(“Hawkins”) constitutional rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983").
Hawkins ultimately aspires to be placed on the ballot for the November 6, 2012 general
election as a candidate for President of the United States. To ensure that his goal came
to fruition, Hawkins filed a nominating petition with the Board listing his political
affiliation as an independent. Subsequently Hawkins filed an additional petition
seeking the admission of a new political party, the “Together Enhancing America”
party. Hawkins was notified that Illinois law prohibits a candidate to run both as an
independent and as a party candidate. Hawkins withdrew his initial independent
petition.
A third party (“Objector”) objected to Hawkins nomination petition because
Hawkins submitted less than the minimal number of signatures required for a new
political party nomination. Hawkins was notified of the objection and informed of his
opportunity to contest the objection, in the context of a hearing. Prior to the Board
hearing, Hawkins filed a motion to dismiss the objection and the Objector moved for
summary judgment. Tenuto was appointed by the Board as Hearing Examiner. The
duties of a Hearing Examiner range from gathering and preparing a report of all
evidence to making recommendations to the Board concerning hearing decisions.
Hawkins appeared at the July 9, 2012 hearing and professed the adequacy of his new
party application.
Due to the necessity of resolving ballot objections quickly, the Board Rules
pertaining to general elections calls for expedited proceedings based on raised
objections. After reviewing Hawkins new party nomination petition, Tenuto issued his
recommendation to the Board. Tenuto determined that Hawkins’s petition was 24,999
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signatures short of the minimum 25,000 signatures required by Illinois law to qualify
for access to the ballot as a new party candidate for the President of the United States.
After receiving Tenuto’s recommendation, on July 23, 2012, the Board found that
Hawkins’s petition contained fewer signatures than the minimum required by law, and
therefore would not certify Hawkins’ addition to the 2012 Illinois general election
ballot.
On July 26, 2012 Hawkins filed a complaint with the court, alleging that the
Defendants violated his rights under the federal Constitution’s due process clause and
state law.
LEGAL STANDARD
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001). The allegations
in the complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff need not provide
detailed factual allegations; it must only provide enough factual support to raise its right
to relief above a speculative level is all that is required. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Furthermore, a viable claim must be facially plausible, a
requirement that is satisfied “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
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alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In assessing a motion to dismiss,
the Court accepts all well pled facts as true and draws all permissible inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 334 (7th Cir. 2012). A document filed
pro se is to be liberally construed and however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
Hawkins’s complaint alleges that the Board and Tenuto failed to provide an
adequate hearing to resolve the objection to his petition for him to ultimately gain
access to the general election ballot. Specifically Hawkins complains that he was not
allowed to present mitigating evidence or question witnesses. Giving wide latitude to
the pro se nature of Hawkins’s complaint the Court gives considerable leeway in
addressing his arguments. We construe Hawkins’s complaint to allege that Defendants
violated his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and
related state law claims.
I. The Illinois State Board of Elections
The Board argues that they are immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment provides a state with immunity from suit in
federal court unless the state consents to the suit or Congress has abrogated its
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immunity. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). While the Eleventh
Amendment “is not jurisdictional in the sense that courts must address it sua sponte,”
its nature “suggests that it is a threshold issue.” Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State
of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 515 n.6. (1982). State agencies are treated as states for
Eleventh Amendment purposes. Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2012).
The Supreme Court has determined that there is no exception to state sovereign
immunity for § 1983 claims. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979). Additionally,
states and their departments are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
It is well settled that the Board constitutes a state agency and therefore is immune
from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)
(holding that a suit against a State Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment); Stevenson v. State Bd. of Elections, 794 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1986) (the
Board of Elections as an entity, is not a proper defendant to a constitutional challenge
to an Illinois statute). The Court dismisses Hawkins’s claims against the Board.
II. Hearing Examiner James Tenuto1
Hawkins cryptically makes two arguments concerning the procedures undertaken
during the course of his ballot objection hearing. First, Hawkins complains that Tenuto
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Tenuto is named as a Defendant in conjunction with his corresponding position with the
Board as a Hearing Examiner. In the absence of specifying the capacity which he is being sued
under, the Court construes the claims against him to be brought in his official capacity, due to the
inclusion of his position’s title.
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did not follow Board policy and state law in conducting the hearing in violation of state
law. Secondly, the Court construes the complaint as alleging a due process violation
brought pursuant to § 1983. The Court will consider Hawkins’s arguments in order.
A. State Law Violations
Hawkins appears to primarily argue that the hearing he received was in violation
of Board Hearing Policy and the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. Hawkins alleges that
he was not able to question witnesses or present evidence in his favor. The nexus
between the alleged inadequate hearing and the procedures that were allegedly violated
involve state law. Tenuto argues that the Eleventh Amendment precludes the Court
from entertaining Hawkins’s request which would require him, a state official, to
conform his conduct to Board policy or state law. The Court agrees. A federal court
lacks jurisdiction to enjoin state officials to follow state law. See Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984). “[I]t is difficult to think of a greater
intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how
to conform their conduct to state law.” Id. The Court dismisses all state law claims
against Tenuto.
B. Constitutional Violations
In the interest of thoroughness the Court will analyze the merits of Hawkins
constitutional claim. Hawkins does not specify the type of relief he is seeking against
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Tenuto. Therefore as an initial matter this Court must determine the type of relief which
can be granted. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar an official capacity suit seeking
prospective injunctive or declaratory relief against a state official. See, e.g. Verizon Md.
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644-45 (2002); citing Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
Tenuto acknowledges that state officials can be sued for prospective injunctive
relief under a § 1983 claim. Hawkins does not specifically cite the type of relief he is
seeking, but he emphasizes his desire to run for President of the United States.
Hawkins asks the Court to rule as soon as possible due to the proximity of the
November 6, 2012 Presidential Election. The Court therefore construes the relief
sought as prospective in nature.
Hawkins does not specifically articulate the constitutional violation underlying
his § 1983 suit, but we construe his claim as a constitutional violation of his due
process rights. Tenuto asserts that he has qualified immunity and consequently his
conduct is immune from suit in this action. To assess if a defendant may assert
qualified immunity, the court must engage is a two-part inquiry. Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603, 609 (1999). The Court “must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged
the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, if so, [then we] proceed to
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determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.” Id.
We first assess whether Hawkins has sufficiently alleged an infringement on his
constitutional rights. To maintain a procedural due process action, Hawkins must
establish that a state actor has deprived him of a constitutionally protected interest
without due process of law. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). The
complaint must allege that (1) Hawkins possessed a constitutionally protected interest;
and (2) a state actor caused a deprivation of that interest without due process of law.
Id. If Hawkins failed to sufficiently plead either component, he has failed to allege a
viable constitutional violation negating the need to address the Tenuto’s claim for
qualified immunity.
Hawkins broadly alleges that Tenuto did not provide an adequate hearing in
violation of the Board’s hearing policy. As a result of the deficient hearing he alleges
that his party was not allowed on the ballot. It has been established that the concept of
“liberty” protects against state impairment of due process rights which include the
freedom of speech and association. Briscoe v. Kusper, 435 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1970).
This liberty interest may take the form of creating political affiliations or simply
supporting specific policies. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
Access to a presidential election ballot represents an integral element in the effective
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exercise and implementation of the aforementioned activities. See Hadnott v. Amos, 394
U.S. 358 (1969). The Court finds that Hawkins has pled a sufficient constitutionally
protected liberty interest in his right to ballot access.
After determining a Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected interest, the Court
must next determine “whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were
constitutionally sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court established a three prong test for evaluating
what process is due when the government effects a deprivation of a protected liberty
interest. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Eldridge requires courts to balance: “first, the private
interest that will be affected by the official act; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally the Governments interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id at 335.
Hawkins fails to elicit any evidence concerning the process required under the
Mathews balancing test to protect his liberty interest in access to the ballot. In the
absence of any argument concerning Hawkins’s position on the Mathews factors, the
Court balances each consideration. Hawkins’s protected liberty interest involves his
omission from the general election ballot as a consequence of the hearing. This interest
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is significant in light of the democratic principles of government that this nation was
founded on.
With this in mind, Hawkins’s interest must be balanced with the
procedures employed by Tenuto and the risk of erroneous deprivations which may
accompany the procedures. The Board instituted a hearing, appointed Tenuto as a
Hearing Examiner, and permitted Hawkins to contest the objection to his petition. An
expansion of the hearing format that Hawkins vaguely argues is feasible but in
consideration of the third factor it is procedurally and fiscally burdensome. A petitioner
having the unfettered ability to admit evidence and question witnesses at their discretion
would substantially impede the administration of an orderly and time sensitive hearing
process. Hawkins has failed to provide a sufficient procedural due process claim.
Accordingly, the constitutional due process claims against Tenuto in his official
capacity are dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we grant the Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Charles P. Kocoras
United States District Judge
Dated:
October 31, 2012
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