Kubiak v. Meltzer et al
Filing
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ENTER ORDER: Plaintiff Malgorzata J. Kubiak seeks damages under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") against Defendants for sexual harassment and for interfering with her quiet enjoyment during her tenancy. The Court previously dismissed Defendan ts Marcia and Earl Meltzer, and Defendant Michael Meltzer now moves to dismiss the claims asserted against him 103 . For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Michael Meltzer's motion to dismiss 103 . This civil action is terminated. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 1/23/2014. MAILED notice(tbk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MALGORZATA J. KUBIAK,
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Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL H. MELTZER,
Defendant.
Case No. 12 CV 6849
Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.
ORDER
Plaintiff Malgorzata J. Kubiak seeks damages under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”)
against Defendants for sexual harassment and for interfering with her “quiet enjoyment” during
her tenancy. The Court previously dismissed Defendants Marcia and Earl Meltzer, and
Defendant Michael Meltzer now moves to dismiss the claims asserted against him [103]. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court grants Michael Meltzer’s motion to dismiss [103]. This civil
action is terminated.
STATEMENT
Plaintiff filed this federal FHA complaint against her landlord (Michael Meltzer), his
wife (Marcia), Michael’s father (Earl), two of his attorneys, and his law firm. Plaintiff dismissed
as Defendants the attorneys and the law firm, and the Court dismissed Marcia and Earl Meltzer.
In September 2013, Michael Meltzer moved to dismiss the claims against him. In response,
Plaintiff’s sole argument against dismissal was that an automatic bankruptcy stay had been
imposed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and therefore Meltzer’s motion could not be considered.
However, as set forth in more detail below, the bankruptcy court has since dismissed the
involuntary bankruptcy case that Plaintiff (and two others) filed against Meltzer. Thus, no
bankruptcy stay exists and Defendant’s motion is ripe for adjudication.
The sole discernable allegation in the complaint that pertains to a possible FHA claim is
that Defendant Michael Meltzer told Plaintiff that when his wife Marcia died from terminal
cancer, he would “cohabitate” with her, which would then reduce her rent. Plaintiff interprets
this as quid pro quo harassment based on an offer to lower her rent in exchange for sexual
favors. Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because it does not
state a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the
sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the case. See Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d
1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint first
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must comply with Rule 8(a) by providing “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)), such that the defendant is given “fair
notice of what the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Second, the factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to raise the possibility of relief
above the “speculative level,” assuming that all of the allegations in the complaint are true.
E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). “[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing
any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
The Court accepts as true all of the well-pleaded facts alleged by the plaintiff and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn therefrom. See Barnes v. Briley, 420 F.3d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 2005).
While a pro se litigant’s pleadings are held to a lesser standard, the pro se litigant must comply
with the court’s rules and procedures. See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1427 (7th Cir.
1996); Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir. 1994).
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she leases a single family home in Long Grove,
Illinois, which is owned by Defendant Meltzer. Kubiak and Meltzer attempted to negotiate the
sale of the home and then a new lease. Negotiations were ultimately unfruitful, and Meltzer
hired an attorney to prosecute an eviction action that Meltzer filed in state court. Kubiak
removed the state court eviction action, but this Court remanded the case. In an attempt to avoid
and delay the eviction, Kubiak attempted to remove the case a second time, but, after the case
was transferred from Judge Gettleman to this Court’s docket, the Court again remanded the
eviction action and warned Plaintiff of potential sanctions, a warning that has been repeated
multiple times.
In one last attempt to delay the eviction action, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Involuntary
Bankruptcy against Meltzer, Case No. 13 B 31151. Plaintiff claimed that Meltzer was
“obligated” to her in an “undisputed amount of approximately $2,500,000” due to the present
case. Meltzer has since won a judgment against Kubiak in the eviction action for approximately
$57,000, and the bankruptcy court has dismissed Plaintiff’s Petition for Involuntary Bankruptcy.
In dismissing the Petition, the bankruptcy judge noted that the petitioning creditors ignored the
court’s pretrial order and that at least two of the three petitioning creditors (including Ms.
Kubiak) had ignored the case since its inception. The bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction
solely to consider Meltzer’s requests for relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 303(k) and sanctions
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 303(i). As of September 3, 2013, Plaintiff no longer resides in the Long
Grove residence.
Ms. Kubiak’s complaint alleges sexual harassment and interference with her rights under
the FHA. However, the FHA does not create a right to live in another person’s house rent-free
and simply attempting to evict a tenant for not paying rent does not rise to the level of an FHA
violation. Given that the state court did evict Kubiak, the allegation that filing the eviction
complaint was somehow wrongful does not meet the plausibility standard that Plaintiff must
meet to avoid a motion to dismiss. Her one vague statement about “cohabitation,” with no
sexual reference at all and no unwanted touching, is insufficient to state a claim for sexual
harassment. Moreover, in her supporting affidavit (attached to her complaint), Kubiak states that
Meltzer made this statement to her on or about November 10, 2012. Yet Plaintiff’s complaint
was filed on August 27, 2012, at least two and a half months before the statement was allegedly
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made. The rest of Ms. Kubiak’s allegations are vague and conclusory and, without more, do not
state a claim for relief.
In short, Plaintiff’s FHA allegations of interference and sexual harassment are simply
implausible. A far more plausible reading of the complaint (which is bolstered by Plaintiff’s
actions throughout this case and in the bankruptcy case) is that Plaintiff, with the assistance of
her ex-husband, filed this action as a leveraging tool in an attempt to remain in Meltzer’s home
rent free or, at a minimum, to delay her eviction. Drawing on “its judicial experience and
common sense,” the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant
Meltzer, and her complaint is dismissed. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Dated: January 23, 2014
_____________________________
Robert M. Dow, Jr.
United States District Judge
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