Alanis v. Metra

Filing 122

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 3/20/2015:Mailed notice(rth, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ELDA ALANIS,

v.

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)
)
)
)
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)
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)
)

Plaintiff,

METRA,
Defendant.

No. 12-cv-07508
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On March 31, 2014, the Court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant Metra.
Shortly thereafter, Metra filed a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs [98] and a Bill of Costs [100].
The parties briefed Metra’s attorney fees motion pursuant to the Court’s order, but no briefing
schedule was set for Metra’s Bill of Costs. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Metra’s
motion for attorney fees and enters and continues the Bill of Costs.
BACKGROUND
Alanis originally filed her pro se action in September 2012 alleging that Metra discriminated
against her because of a disability. She alleged that Metra failed to accommodate her disability and
retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) and because she complained of discrimination. Alanis also alleged that
Metra subjected her to a hostile work environment and harassed her by subjecting her to different
terms of employment and violating her intermittent Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) rights.
See Dkt 96, the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order. Metra filed a motion for summary
judgment on March 14, 2013. After the matter was fully briefed, the cause was transferred to this
Court’s docket. On June 25, 2013, the Court granted Alanis’ motions to proceed in forma pauperis and
for appointment of counsel so that counsel could assist Alanis in opposing Metra’s motion for
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summary judgment. The parties unsuccessfully attempted to settle and then the Court granted Alanis
leave to file an amended response and Rule 56 Statement to Metra’s motion for summary judgment.
Metra was also given leave to file an amended reply. The Court ultimately granted Metra’s motion in
its entirety.
DISCUSSION
1. Attorney’s Fees
Legal Standard
The ADA specifically allows the prevailing party in an ADA action to recover attorney fees.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Whether to award attorney fees, however, is in the Court’s discretion. Id.
Courts have applied the Supreme Court’s holding that “a district court may in its discretion
award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff’s
action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective
bad faith[,]” to claims for attorney fees in ADA cases See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412, 421 (1978); Malkowski v. PTC Capital Corp., No. 96 C 3109, 1998 WL 3811050, *2 (N.D. Ill.
July 1, 1998) (applying Christiansburg and listing several cases doing the same). The Seventh Circuit
has defined a “frivolous” claim as one that has no reasonable basis, whether in fact or in law. Roger
Whitmore’s Auto. Servs., Inc. v. Lake County, 424 F.3d 659, 675 (7th Cir. 2005).
Metra seeks $42,363.25 in attorney’s fees because, it contends, Alanis’ ADA claims were
frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. It argues that Alanis was “put on notice that her
claims were spurious and without merit” because the Illinois Department of Human Rights
(“IDHR”) dismissed her claims for lack of substantial evidence. Dkt 98, ¶ The Court finds Metra’s
argument to be unpersuasive. In addition to finding that Alanis’ claims lacked substantial evidence,
the IDHR also provided Alanis with the option to file a civil action should she disagree with the

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IDHR’s findings. Alanis exercised her option to file suit by pursuing her disability discrimination
claim in the district court. The exercise of this option cannot be said to be unreasonable.
Further, Metra’s assertion that Alanis’ claims were “spurious and without merit” are not
supported by the record. The parties engaged in discovery which resulted in the taking of five
depositions, and then Metra relied on the evidence obtained during discovery in its motion for
summary judgment. In reviewing and deciding Metra’s motion for summary judgment, although
both Alanis and Metra argued that her ADA harassment and hostile work environment claims were
timely, the Court found that the Seventh Circuit actually has declined to recognize these causes of
action under the ADA. Regarding Alanis’ ADA failure to accommodate claim, the Court found that
while she argued that Metra’s revocation of her “flex schedule” constitutes a failure to
accommodate, the record ultimately did not support her claim. Reviewing Alanis’ retaliation claim
under the direct and indirect methods, the Court found that she failed to demonstrate a causal
connection between her complaints of discrimination and the change in her work schedule. She
failed to show retaliatory motive or pretext. Moreover, the Court granted summary judgment on
Alanis’ FMLA claims only after determining that the record reflected Metra’s concerns about Alanis’
safety and that the fitness-for-duty exams fell within the FMLA and ADA. See Dkt 96.
The Court reviewed the parties’ arguments and the evidence presented before determining
that Metra’s motion for summary judgment should be granted. “The fact that a plaintiff may
ultimately lose [her] case is not in itself a sufficient justification for the assessment of fees.” Hughes v.
Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980); see also Mortle v. United Parcel Service, 247 Fed. Appx. 820, 823 (7th Cir.
2007). Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that Alanis’ case was so lacking in facts as to be
considered frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless and denies Metra’s motion for attorney fees.

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2. Bill of Costs
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides that, other than attorney’s fees, the prevailing
party is entitled to recover its costs. “Prevailing party” means “the party in whose favor judgment
has been entered.” Republic of Tobacco Co. v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 481 F.3d 442, 446 (7th Cir. 2007).
The Seventh Circuit has held that costs “must be awarded to a prevailing party unless one of the
recognized situations warranting a denial of costs is present.” Mother & Father v. Cassidy, 338 F.3d
704, 709-10 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that denial is warranted only in situations involving misconduct
of the party seeking costs or where the losing party is indigent). Metra requests costs in the amount
$1,772.30, for the original transcript of Alanis’ deposition, as well as for electronic transcripts of four
additional witnesses and photocopy charges. These costs are taxable expenses contemplated by 28
U.S.C. § 1920 and the Court orders Alanis to pay Metra’s expenses in the amount of $1,772.30.
CONCLUSION
The Court denies Metra’s motion for attorney fees [98]. However, the Court orders Alanis to
pay $1,772.30 in costs as set forth in Metra’s bill of costs [100]. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Date: March 20, 2015

____________________________
Sharon Johnson Coleman
United States District Judge

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