Alanis v. Metra

Filing 96

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 3/31/2014:Mailed notice(rth, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ELDA ALANIS,
Plaintiff,

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v.
METRA,
Defendant.

Case No. 12-cv-7508
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Elda Alanis (“Alanis”) brings forth this action alleging that defendant Metra
discriminated against her because of a disability. Alanis alleges that Metra failed to accommodate
her disability and retaliated against her because she filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and complained of discrimination. Alanis also
alleges that Metra created a hostile work environment and harassed her by subjecting her to
different terms of employment and violating her intermittent Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”) rights. Metra moves for summary judgment on all of Alanis’ claims. For the following
reasons, Metra’s motion is granted in its entirety.
Background 1
Alanis was hired by Metra on July 30, 2007 as a DBE Associate. Alanis is presently still
employed as a DBE Associate with Metra and spends the majority of her time working from her
desk reviewing and inputting invoices or other files. (Alanis Dep. 109:1-23). Alanis’ job duties
include monitoring DBE compliance on professional service contracts. Id. Alanis suffers from
several medical conditions including sinus issues, asthma, and thalassemia, which is a blood
disorder that causes iron deficiencies. Alanis testified that none of these ailments affected her

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This case was originally assigned to District Court Judge Conlon when Alanis first filed her complaint pro se on
September 19, 2012. On September 27, 2012, Judge Conlon denied Alanis’ motion for appointment of counsel as well
as Alanis’ request to proceed in forma pauperis. Discovery was completed and Metra subsequently moved for
summary judgment on March 14, 2013. That motion was fully briefed by the parties before Judge Conlon. On June 3,
2013, this case was reassigned to Judge Coleman. On June 25, 2013 Judge Coleman granted plaintiff’s motions to
proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel. The parties then attempted, but eventually failed, to reach a
settlement. On October 15, 2013, Judge Coleman entered an order granting Alanis leave to file an amended response
and Rule 56 Statement to Metra’s motion for summary judgment. The Court also allowed Metra to file an amended
Reply brief. Accordingly, any previous Response or Reply briefs filed before Judge Conlon are stricken as moot and
are not considered by this Court for purposes of ruling on the instant motion for summary judgment.

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ability to work and that she did not require any accommodations upon employment in 2007.
(Alanis Dep at 84:19-23).

Alanis also testified that she has narcolepsy and fibromyalgia which

affect her ability to sleep and can result in her falling asleep while at work.
Metra has a policy that typically requires all employees to work between the “core hours” of
8:30 am through 4:00 pm. The parties dispute whether Metra also had a flex-time program which
exempted certain employees from this general “core hours” requirement. Nonetheless, the parties
agree that upon hiring Alanis somehow negotiated a work schedule of 9:00 am to 5:30 pm. Alanis
testified that she discussed her work hours with a Metra recruiter who assisted in her hiring process
and that she was allowed to work a schedule of 9:00 am to 5:30 pm. Alanis also testified that the
reason why she needed this adjusted work schedule was because she wanted to be able to take her
son to school. (Alanis Dep. 93:10-12). Alanis also stated that there were no other reasons or issues
that required her to start work at 9:00 am. (Alanis Dep. 93:13-14).
When Alanis first started working for Metra in 2007, she worked under the supervision of
Sandi Llano. In December 2010, Janice Thomas (“Thomas”) was hired to replace Llano upon
Llano’s retirement in January 2011. In February 2011, Thomas informed Alanis that she would be
required to work during Metra’s core hours of 8:30 am to 4:00 pm. Alanis argues that her work
schedule was changed in retaliation for her complaining to Thomas about alleged discrimination in
January 2011. Alanis also filed a complaint with the EEOC on November 28, 2011 alleging that
she was subjected to harassment and different terms of employment.
Between 2009 and 2011 Alanis was certified for intermittent leave under the FMLA for her
own health conditions as well as health conditions concerning her children. (Dkt. 84 at ¶ 37).
Metra required Alanis to have fitness-for-duty examinations after returning from FMLA leave.
Alanis argues that the change in her work schedule and Metra’s requirement that she have fitnessfor-duty examinations violated her ADA and FMLA rights.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and a party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Johnson v. General Bd. of Pension & Health Benefits of
the United Methodist Church, 733 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
This standard places the initial burden on the moving party to identify those portions of the record
that “it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) (internal quotations
omitted). Once the moving party meets this burden of production, the non-moving party “must go
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beyond the pleadings” and identify portions of the record demonstrating that a material fact is
genuinely disputed. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). All inferences drawn from the facts must be
construed in favor of the non-movant.
Discussion
1. Harassment & Hostile Work Environment
Initially, Metra moves to dismiss Alanis’ harassment and hostile work environment ADA
claims as untimely. Metra argues that requiring Alanis to resubmit FMLA certification forms and
requiring fitness-for-duty examinations is insufficient to constitute harassment. The Seventh
Circuit, “has yet to recognize a cause of action under the ADA for harassment or hostile work
environment” claims. Valadez v. Steiner Corp., 156 Fed. Appx. 821, 824 (7th Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, based upon the facts of this case, this Court also declines to recognize a cause of
action for such claims under the ADA.
2. Failure to Accommodate
Next, Metra moves to dismiss Alanis’ failure-to-accommodate claims. Metra argues that
Alanis was given reasonable accommodations for her health issues because she was given time off
and had been excused from the company’s driving requirement. Alanis agrees that Metra never
refused to give her time off when medically necessary. (Dkt. 84 at ¶ 73). It is unclear from Alanis’
complaint, brief, or supporting affidavit what precise accommodations, beyond time off, were
requested or how Metra failed to meet those requests. Alanis merely alleges that she requested
“reasonable accommodations” and that she requested a reduced and flexible work schedule, the
ability to work from home, and a work office with temperature controls. (Dkt. 13, Compl. at ¶ 13).
The record shows no evidence to support Alanis’ contentions that she requested an adjusted work
schedule as an accommodation.
Alanis merely argues that if her “flex schedule” was granted as an “informal
accommodation,” the revocation of that schedule somehow constitutes a failure to accommodate.
At the time of being hired, when given the adjusted work schedule, Alanis testified herself that none
of her medical ailments required accommodations and that she made no accommodation requests.
Indeed, Alanis testified that her medical conditions did not impede her abilities to perform her job
duties when hired and that she needed an adjusted work schedule so that she could take her son to
school in the mornings. Although Alanis stated in her complaint that she was denied a reduced and
flexible work schedule, the ability to work from home, and a work office with temperature controls,
there is no indication in the record that she requested such accommodations or any explanation
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demonstrating how such accommodations would be pertinent to any of her disabilities. “Upon
receiving an accommodation request, an employer is not required to provide the exact
accommodation requested.” Cloe v. City of Indianapolis, 712 F.3d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 2013).
Instead, the employer is required to engage with the employee in an interactive process to determine
the appropriate accommodation under the circumstances. Id. The record does not support Alanis’
contention that Metra failed to reasonably accommodate her disability or refused to engage in the
interactive process. Accordingly, Metra’s motion for summary judgment on Alanis’
accommodation claim is granted.
3. Retaliation
Metra moves for summary judgment on Alanis’ retaliation claim arguing that she fails to
establish retaliation under either the direct or indirect methods. Metra contends that there is no
causal connection between Alanis’ alleged discrimination complaints and any purported adverse
actions. Alanis alleges that Metra retaliated against her by changing her work schedule because she
complained of discrimination in January 2011. Alanis may proceed under either the direct or
indirect methods of proof to establish a retaliation claim. Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll.
Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 2011). “To establish a case of retaliation under the direct
method of proof, Alanis must show (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she
suffered an adverse action; and (3) a causal connection between the two.” Id. To establish
retaliation under the indirect method of proof, Alanis must show that she “1) engaged in protected
activity; (2) was performing his job satisfactorily; and (3) was singled out for an adverse
employment action that similarly situated employees who did not engage in protected activity did
not suffer.” Id. at 601-602. Once Alanis satisfies her initial burden, the burden then shifts to Metra
to present a non-invidious reason for the adverse employment action. Id. at 602. If Metra meets
this burden, Alanis must then demonstrate that Metra’s proffered reason was pretextual. Id.
The record does not support Alanis’ retaliation claim under either the direct or indirect
methods. Under the direct method, Alanis fails to demonstrate a causal connection between her
complaints of discrimination and the fact that her work schedule was changed to comply with
Metra’s “core hours.” To show causation, Alanis must “provide evidence that her requests for
accommodations were a ‘substantial or motivating factor’” for the adverse action suffered. Cloe,
712 F.3d at 1180 (citing Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 900 (7th Cir. 2012)). Direct admission of
retaliatory motive is the easiest way to show that her requests were a substantial and motivating
factor, but such an admission is rare and did not happen in this case. Id. Alanis may also show
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causation by presenting “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would support the
inference that a retaliatory animus was at work.” Id. Here, the facts presented are insufficient to
meet this standard. Alanis’ bare allegations fail to present a convincing mosaic of retaliatory
animus. Alanis’ retaliation claims also fail under the indirect method. The record is devoid of any
evidence or indication that Alanis was singled out or treated differently from similarly situated
employees. Moreover, Metra maintains that Alanis’ work schedule was changed to properly
comport with the company’s policy. Alanis proffers no evidence that this reason was pretextual.
Accordingly, Metra’s motion for summary judgment as to Alanis’ retaliation claim is granted.
4. FMLA Claims
Lastly, Metra moves for summary judgment on Alanis’ FMLA claims. Metra argues that
Alanis’ FMLA claims should be dismissed because Metra is permitted to require fitness-for-duty
certifications for both continuous and intermittent leave. Metra also argues that under the ADA it is
allowed to require employees to submit to ADA authorized fitness-for-duty exams which may go
beyond what is authorized under the FMLA. Alanis argues that Metra violated her rights under the
FMLA by requiring her to undergo excessive fitness-for-duty examinations. Alanis argues that
under the FMLA, Metra is prohibited from requiring her to get a second opinion from its own
physician to decide whether she actually has an FMLA-qualifying condition.
The FMLA makes available to eligible employees up to twelve weeks of leave during any
twelve-month period for one or more of the following reasons: (1) the birth of the employee’s child;
(2) the placement of a child with the employee for adoption or foster care; (3) the care of the
employee’s child, spouse or parent who has a serious health condition; and (4) the inability of the
employee himself to perform the functions of his position because of a serious health condition. 29
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). However, an employee’s right to return to work after taking FMLA leave is
not unlimited, and the FMLA permits an employer, as a condition of restoring employees who take
FMLA leave, to have a policy that requires all such employees to obtain medical certification from
the employer’s personal health care provider indicating that the employee is able to resume work.
29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(4); see also Harrell v. United States Postal Serv., 445 F.3d 913, 919-920 (7th
Cir. 2006).
Metra claims that it was entitled to require fitness-for-duty exams every 30 days upon
Alanis’ return from intermittent FMLA leave. See 29 CFR § 825.312(f). Alanis does not dispute
that employers are generally entitled to require a fitness-for-duty exam once every 30 days where
reasonable safety concerns exists, but argues that no such concerns existed in her case. The record
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reflects Metra’s stated concern about Alanis’ safety following her sickness or occasional difficulties
breathing or speaking. Alanis complains that communications between Metra’s doctor and her
personal physician went beyond mere clarification of her fitness to return to work as provided for in
the FMLA. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.310(a)-(c). However, the only communication between Metra’s
physician and Alanis’ personal physician, indicates that the physicians discussed a fact already
disclosed in Alanis’ FMLA certification provided by her personal physician: that Alanis’ personal
doctor intended to refer her to psychology for cognitive behavior therapy. Additionally, Alanis fails
to present evidence that Metra’s purported safety concerns were pretextual outside of conclusory
statements to that effect. Accordingly, Metra’s motion for summary judgment as to Alanis’ FMLA
claims is granted.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Metra’s motion for summary judgment is granted in its
entirety. Alanis’ complaint is dismissed in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________
Date: March 31, 2014
____________________________
Sharon Johnson Coleman
United States District Judge

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