Cowen v. Astrue
Filing
32
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Arlander Keys on 11/13/2013. (ac, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ELLEN COWEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
,
Commissioner of
Social Security,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 12 C 7548
Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on Ellen Cowen’s motion for
summary judgment.
She seeks a remand or reversal of the
Commissioner’s decision to deny her application for Disability
Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income, arguing that
the Administrative Law Judge’s (1) residual functional capacity
finding is unsupported by substantial evidence; (2) credibility
determination is unsupported by substantial evidence; and (3)
Step 5 determination is unsupported by substantial evidence.
For
the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is denied, and
the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On January 25, 2010, Plaintiff, Ellen Marie Cowen, applied for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) at the age of 41.
She claims to have become disabled as of
October 1, 2005, due to a broken wrist, bipolar disorder as well as
other mental impairments, and diabetes.
(R. at 21.)
was denied initially and upon reconsideration.
Her application
(R. at 21.)
Mrs.
Cowen requested a hearing before an administrative law judge, and the
case was assigned to ALJ Patricia Witkowski Supergan, who held the
requested hearing on September 12, 2011.
(R. at 21).
I. Plaintiff’s Hearing Testimony
At the hearing before the ALJ, Mrs. Cowen appeared along
with her husband, Mr. Steven Cowen, and was represented by
counsel, Mr. Jeremy Blain.
(R. at 44.)
Mr. Blain specified
that the treating physician for Ms. Cowen’s foot, Dr. Serpe, had
not submitted the entirety of his treatment notes; the ALJ
allowed 30 more days for those documents to be received. (R. at
46.)
Mrs. Cowen then testified to the following: she lives in an
apartment with her husband and their two sons, ages 20 and 24.
(R. at 47.)
She completed high school, taking all special
education classes.
She did not obtain any further education or
vocational training beyond high school. (R. at 48.)
possess a driver’s license, but her husband does.
She does not
(R. at 66.)
She smokes a half a pack of cigarettes per day, and has been
doing so for the past twenty years. (R. 67.)
2
She very rarely
drinks alcohol and does not use any drugs.
Id.
She does not use
computers, but does own a cell phone. Id.
With regard to her home life, she completes the household
chores with the assistance of her two sons. (R. at 66.)
eldest son works, but the youngest does not.
Her
Her husband has
been on oxygen “for a while,” she is unsure of exactly how long.
Id.
For leisure, she does not read, but does watch a “little
bit” of television.
(R. at 67.) Her husband cooked dinner the
night before the hearing, and over the weekend she mostly slept
and sat in her chair watching television.
Id.
In addition to
sleeping at night, she on average sleeps three hours during the
day, as well. (R. at 60.)
Her medications, including Ultram,
Clonazepam, and Trazodone, all cause her to feel sleepy.
61.)
(R. at
She sometimes needs assistance with personal care. (R. at
63-64.)
For instance, her husband helps her get undressed
because her shoulders do not go all the way up.
(R. at 64.)
With regard to work history, she previously worked as a bus
driver. (R. at 65.)
She stopped driving the bus because it was
“getting too much for me on my back from the sitting and
bouncing.”
Id.
Afterward, she worked at a pizza factory until
she fell and broke her left wrist badly while on the job. (R. at
49, 66.)
She went through Workman’s Compensation, but after
everything was finalized and she tried to return to her job, she
was denied.
(R. at 66.)
She attempted to procure another job,
3
but was unsuccessful. Id.
She does not believe she could work a
full time job of any sort, even sedentary, at this point; all the
walking, standing, and sitting would be too much for her. (R. at
64.)
With regard to her physical impediments, her main issues
are her right foot, left wrist, and lower back. (R. at 49.)
The
bone in her foot is breaking down due to her diabetes and she has
to wear a boot and use a bone stimulator.
(R. at 51.)
Dr. Serpe
is the treating physician for her foot; she has been seeing him
for about a year.
Id.
She had been wearing the boot about three
months and using the bone stimulator for two. Id. She hopes this
will remedy the issue so that she will not have to pursue
surgery, which Dr. Serpe suggests as a last resort. (R. at 52.)
Her foot causes her to not walk right, and she “knows there’s no
way I could walk for a long time on it.”
Id. After 15 minutes of
walking, she needs a 10 minute resting break before she can walk
again.
(R. at 52.)
painful.
She cannot stand long, as it becomes too
Id.
Even after wrist surgery, her left wrist continues to pain
her, and she cannot bend as much as she can with her right, noninjured wrist. (R. at 53.)
She does not have difficulty holding
things, doing buttons, or the like, however, the pain is what
impedes her.
Id.
She takes Ultram to reduce this pain.
She had not had any treatment on her wrist for two months.
4
Id.
During her last examination Dr. Cola, while examining, pinched
her nerve.
(R. at 54.)
He recommended Ultram for the pain. Id.
There was no suggestion made for physical therapy. Id.
Her back had been gradually bothering her over the past
three years.
(R. at 54.)
It had been “a while” since she had an
MRI of her back, but she had injections administered into it at
the Pain Clinic, which offered some relief.
(R. at 54, 68.) Her
last injection was a year ago, after which she stopped because
there was nothing more she [Dr. Maly] can do for me.”
55.)
(R. at
However, she had an appointment to get another injection in
her back the next week.
(R. at 68.)
She periodically changes
positions -stands, sits, and lays down in order to relive her
back pain.
Id.
During the hearing she stood at one point in
order to relieve her pain. Id. Her pain is not constant, but
comes and goes. Id.
She takes Ultram about every six hours in
order to keep the pain away. (R. at 55-56.) If she did not take
the Ultram, her pain would be constant.
(R. at 56.)
Being in a
seated position is most comfortable, and it is how she spends the
majority of her time.
Id.
After about a half hour of sitting,
however, a pinching pain causes her to need to change positions.
(R. at 56.)
She lies down for an hour, and then returns to
sitting. Id.
She has had diabetes for the past 15 years. (R. at 65.)
5
She began taking pills for her diabetes 10 years ago, and was put
on insulin a year ago.
Id.
If she doesn’t eat right or stay on
top of her medication, her blood sugar crashes on her and it
takes about a half hour to get back to normal.
(R. at 57-58.)
The diabetes causes her pain in her feet which consistently comes
and goes. (R. at 58.)
She takes Ultram to combat the pain. Id.
Her blood sugar was 190 and that is typical “some days.” (R. at
65.)
With regard to her mental impediments, she is bipolar,
experiences mood swings, and takes medication in order to sleep.
(R. at 50, 58.)
She “can get very depressed very easily or I get
mad very easily.”
(R. at 58.)
When on her medication, she does
not often experience these episodes; however, her medication
makes her sleepy.
(R. at 58-59.)
She experiences mental health
problems about once a month. (R. at 59.)
She has sleep apnea and uses a BIPAP machine in order to
help her sleep. (R. at 60.)
She has asthma, particularly during
the summertime, and combines Symbicort with her air every day in
order to alleviate it. (R. at 61.)
She on average has problems
with her asthma once a month, and will at that time utilize a
nebulizer.
(R. at 61-62.)
her breathing a year ago.
She was last hospitalized because of
(R. at 62.)
With regard to socialization, she occasionally has
difficulty being around people, as they can easily irritate her.
6
(R. at 62.)
At least once or twice a day someone that she knows
gets on her nerves and she yells. (R. at 63.)
She occasionally
has problems concentrating, and will forget what she is doing.
Id.
II. Vocational Expert’s Hearing Testimony
The ALJ also heard testimony from Pamela Tucker, a
Vocational Expert (“VE”) who reviewed Mrs. Cowen’s work record
and exhibit file and heard her testimony before the ALJ.
The VE
testified that Mrs. Cowen’s past work as a bus driver constituted
a medium, semi-skilled, SVP:4; with the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”) listing of 913.463-010. (R. at 71.)
Her next job at the pizza factory is classified as a machine
packer and is a medium, unskilled job with a SVP:2 and DOT
listing of 902.685-078.
The ALJ then asked the VE to assume that a hypothetical
person with the same age, education, and work experience as Ms.
Cowen had the residual functional capacity to perform medium work
as defined in the regulations, and said individual could perform
unskilled work tasks that could be learned by demonstration or in
30 days or less; would such an individual be able to perform any
of Mrs. Cowen’s past relevant work?
(R. at 71.)
The VE
responded that such an individual would be able to perform Mrs.
Cowen’s past work as a machine packer, and that 2,500 of those
positions exist in the Illinois regional economy; 70,000 in the
7
national economy. (R. at 71-72.)
Moreover, the VE testified that
such a person would also be able to work as a kitchen helper
(16,000 regionally/215,000 nationally) or as a packer (8,000
regionally/118,000 nationally).
(R. 72.)
Next, the ALJ posed the following hypothetical to the VE:
assume an individual the claimant’s age, education, and work
experience; could perform only light work as defined in the
regulations; could occasionally climb ramps and stairs but never
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; the individual could occasionally
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; the individual would
need to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, heat,
wetness, humidity, and fumes; and the individual could perform
unskilled work tasks that could be learned by demonstration or in
30 days or less.
(R. at 73.)
The ALJ asked the VE would there
be jobs for such an individual, to which the VE responded
favorably.
She testified that such an individual would be able
to work as an assembler (2,000 regionally/14,000 nationally) or
as a lathe operator (2,200 regionally/21,000 nationally). Id.
The ALJ then asked the VE if she were to limit this
hypothetical individual to the sedentary level of exertion with
all the same postural, environmental limitations, would jobs
still exist.
The VE testified that such a person would be
capable of performing three sedentary, unskilled jobs with a
SVP:2: call out operator (1,200 regionally/35,000 nationally),
8
telephone quotation clerk (900 regionally/10,000 nationally), and
an address clerk (1,000 regionally/70,000 nationally).
(R. at
74.) The VE testified that the number of available positions
would remain the same even if this individual had to rely on a
walking boot.
Id.
However, the VE testified that, if the individual needed to
change position from sitting to standing on an hourly basis for
about five minutes, that would affect the availability of the
positions as follows: the assembler position would decrease to
900 regionally/5,500 nationally; labeler to 1,000 regionally/
9,000 nationally; lathe operator 10 1,000 regionally/8,500
nationally; call out operator 700 regionally/28,000 nationally;
address clerk 500 regionally/34,000 nationally; telephone
quotation clerk 400 regionally/4,000 nationally. (R. at 75.)
The ALJ asked if she were to further limit this individual
to occasional contact with the general public and occasional
interactions with supervisors and co-workers, what affect would
such limitations have on the number of positions and jobs
available.
The VE testified that said limitations would
eliminate the call out operator and the telephone quotation
clerk, but the individual would be able to perform the work of a
medical eye drop assembler with 850 regionally/7,000 nationally
or as a document preparer with 1,200 regionally/43,000
nationally.
(R. at 75.)
9
The VE explained that, with regard to absences, generally a
person cannot miss more than approximately one day per month.
(R. at 76.)
With regard to breaks, the VE testified that
generally a worker gets two fifteen minute breaks, one in the
morning and in the afternoon, as well as a thirty minute lunch
break.
(R. at 76.)
The VE testified that if someone were to
exceed these customary accommodations, it would not be tolerated.
Id.
Finally, Plaintiff’s attorney questioned the VE regarding
the positions available as an eye drop assembler and a document
preparer if the previous hypothetical also included a need to
change positions.
The VE testified that the numbers would then
decrease for the eye assembler position to 450 regionally/3,400
nationally, and for the document preparer to 800 regionally/
22,000 nationally.
(R. at 77.)
Additionally, the VE testified
that, if that hypothetical also included the limitation that the
individual could only use her left hand occasionally to handle
and finger, then all of the positions would be eliminated.
Id.
III. Medical Record
In addition to the testimony of Mrs. Cowen and the VE, the
record before the ALJ includes the medical records of various
treating and non-treating physicians.
10
i. Dr. Mary Belford of Psychiatric Associates
On March 7, 2006, Mrs. Cowen was treated by Mary Belford,
M.D. (R. at 277-79.)
On examination, Dr. Belford found that
Plaintiff was anxious, flat, and sad but used appropriate
judgment and insight, as well as normal abstract reasoning.
at 278.)
(R.
Dr. Belford diagnosed Mrs. Cowen as suffering from
major depressive disorder recurrent; she discussed the benefits
of exercise, the need for her to quit smoking up to two packs of
cigarettes per day, and prescribed Paxil. (R. at 278.)
From
April 18, 2006 to March 13, 2008, Dr. Belford diagnosed Plaintiff
as suffering from recurrent major depressive disorder. (R. 280,
282-84, 286, 288, 290, 292, 296.)
On February 2, 2009, Dr.
Belford clinically assessed Ms. Cowen and found that she was
anxious, flat, evasive; and had a “mild depressed affect”; she
was treated and diagnosed then and on October 28, 2009, with
major depressive disorder recurrent
(R. at 301-02, 311.)
On February 16, 2010, Dr. Belford completed a mental
capacity assessment form diagnosing Mrs. Cowen with major
depression recurrent, and noting that she had marked limitations
understanding and remembering detailed instructions; carrying out
detailed instructions; maintaining attention and concentration
for extended periods; working in coordination with or in
proximity to others without being distracted by them; completing
a normal workweek without interruptions from psychologically
11
based symptoms; performing at a consistent pace with a standard
number and length of rest periods; interacting appropriately with
the general public; accepting instructions and responding
appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and maintaining
socially appropriate behavior and adhering to basic standards of
neatness and cleanliness; responding appropriately to changes in
the work setting; traveling in unfamiliar places or using public
transportation; and setting realistic goals or making plans
independently of others.
(R. 266-69.)
Dr. Belford opined that
Plaintiff would likely need to be absent more than four times a
month. (R. 267.)
From February 24, 2010 to September 14, 2010, Mrs. Cowen was
treated by Dr. Belford and diagnosed as suffering from major
depressive disorder recurrent. (R. at 312-13.) On December 14,
2010, however, Dr. Belford diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from
bipolar II disorder.
(R. at 444-45, 448-49.)
Dr. Belford
stressed the importance of compliance with the agreed upon course
of action with Mrs. Cowen, explaining that untoward health could
result in her not following through. (R. at 445.)
On March 15, 2011, Dr. Belford completed a mental capacity
assessment form. (R. at 490-92.)
Dr. Belford opined that
Plaintiff had moderate limitations remembering locations and
work-like procedures; understanding and remembering detailed
instructions; carrying out detailed instructions; working in
12
coordination with or in proximity to others without being
distracted by them; making simple work-related decisions;
interacting appropriately with the general public; asking simple
questions or requesting assistance; getting along with co-workers
or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral
extremes; being aware of normal hazards and taking appropriate
precautions; and setting realistic goals or making plans
independently of others.
Id.
Mrs. Cowen had marked limitations
maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods;
completing a normal workday and workweek without interruptions
from psychologically based symptoms; performing at a consistent
pace with a standard number and length of rest periods; accepting
instructions and responding appropriately to criticism;
maintaining socially appropriate behavior and adhering to basic
standards of neatness and cleanliness; responding appropriately
to changes in the work setting; and traveling in unfamiliar
places or using public transportation. Id.
Dr. Belford also
opined that Mrs. Cowen would likely still be absent more than
four days a month. (R. at 491.)
Mrs. Cowen was last treated by Dr. Belford on June 14, 2011.
(R. at 503-04.)
She diagnosed her with major depressive
disorder, recurrent episode, in partial or unspecified remission.
(R. at 503.)
Mrs. Cowen had not been having trouble getting her
prescriptions filled, and Dr. Belford recommended no changes to
13
her regimen of Trazodone, Cymbalta, Klonopin, Lamcital, and
Abilify.
Id.
ii. Dr. Maly of the Pain Care Center
Mrs. Cowen was first seen as an outpatient by Jasmine Maly,
M.D. on March 25, 2008.
(R. at 482-84.)
On examination, Dr.
Maly found that Plaintiff experienced pain on the right side of
her thigh and leg when straight leg raising was to 70 degrees;
“[e]xtension [was] . . . painful[;]” and Plaintiff experienced
paraspinal and sacroiliac tenderness. (R. at 483.)
Dr. Maly also
found Plaintiff tested positive on the Gaenslen and Patrick
tests.
Id.
Dr. Maly diagnosed Mrs. Cowen as suffering from
lumbar facet syndrome and believed it to be reasonable to
schedule her for lumbar facet block L3 through S1 on the right
side. Id.
A May 15, 2008 examination by Dr. Maly found that Mrs. Cowen
experienced sacroiliac tenderness and trigger points were
elicited in her lower back. (R. at 478.)
Dr. Maly diagnosed
Plaintiff as suffering from right sacroiliac pain and myofascial
pain.
Id.
From December 9, 2008 to January 23, 2009, Mrs. Cowen
was treated by Dr. Maly.
(R. at 473, 475.)
On examination, Dr.
Maly found that Plaintiff experienced “tenderness in the right
upper shoulder area” and sacroiliac tenderness.
(R. at 473,
476.) She also found the Patrick’s test was positive.
475.)
(R. at
Dr. Maly diagnosed Mrs. Cowen as suffering from right
14
shoulder pain; cervical radiculopathy; bilateral sacroiliac pain;
sacroiliac joint dysfunction; and depression.
(R. at 473, 475.)
On January 30, 2009, an MRI of Mrs. Cowen’s cervical spine
revealed “[m]ild central disc bulging at the C6-C7 level” and
“[n]eural foraminal narrowing on the right mainly due to
osteophyte formation at the C5-C6 level.”
(R. at 470.)
On
February 6, 2009, Dr. Maly found that Mrs. Cowen experienced
tenderness in the shoulder area; she diagnosed her as suffering
from cervical radiculopathy.
(R. at 469.)
On December 14, 2009, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Maly who
found, “groin tenderness in the medial aspect and mild
allodynia.”
(R. at 465.)
Dr. Maly diagnosed Ms. Cowen as
suffering from “neuropathic pain-right groin-right lower
extremity.”
Id.
iii. Dr. Serpe of the Riverside Medical Center at Peotone
From July 21, 2008 to August 3, 2011, Mrs. Cowen was treated
intermittently by Jason Serpe, D.P.M. (R. at 515-15, 529-34.)
Dr. Serpe diagnosed her as suffering from the
her foot/ankle. (R. at 530, 533-34.)
tenosynovitis of
On May 24, 2009, Dr. Serpe
treated Mrs. Cowen and found that she had no issues with her
toes, no effusion, but that she experienced pain on palpation at
“the lateral aspect of the [right] ankle in the area of the sinus
tarsi joint.”
(R. at 528.)
Dr. Serpe explained to Mrs. Cowen
that she needed to wear the brace ordered in an effort to
15
decrease her instability, and he also discussed the possibility
of physical therapy, to which Mrs. Cowen said she did not think
she had time for.
(R. at 528.)
A couple years later, on March 8, 2010, Mrs. Cowen was again
treated by Dr. Serpe, he found “moderate 1st metatarsophalangeal
joint (“MTP”)] tenderness” and “generalized pain in the area of
the first metatarsal shaft.”
(R. at 525-26.)
On March 23, 2010,
a view of Plaintiff’s right foot revealed “[h]ypertrophic
degenerative changes of talonavicular joint.”
(R. at 522.)
On May 12, 2010, Dr. Serpe found “moderate 1st MTP
tenderness” and “generalized pain in the area of the first
metatarsal.”
(R. at 521.)
Dr. Serpe assessed Mrs. Cowen as
suffering from non-insulin dependent type II diabetes and
neuropathy, idiopathic, peripheral, NOS.
(R. at 521.)
On April 14, 2011, a view of Plaintiff’s foot revealed
“[m]oderate calcaneal spurring” and “[d]egenerative change of
the talonavicular joint.”
(R. at 499.)
On April 20, 2011, Dr.
Serpe found Plaintiff experienced “moderate 1st MTP tenderness.”
(R. at 498.)
Dr. Serpe diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from,
interalia, uncontrolled type II diabetes; diabetes mellitus with
neurologic manifestations; and neuropathy, idiopathic peripheral,
NOS.
(R. at 498.)
On June 8, 2011, Dr. Serpe completed an RFC questionnaire.
(R. at 511-12.)
He diagnosed Mrs. Cowen as suffering from foot
16
pain and tenosynovitis.
(R. at 511.)
Dr. Serpe noted Mrs.
Cowen’s symptoms included experiencing pain in her feet while
walking, he opined that she often experienced symptoms associated
with her impairments that were severe enough to interfere with
the attention and concentration required to perform simple workrelated tasks.
Id.
Moreover, he opined that Plaintiff would
need to recline during the day in excess of two fifteen minute
breaks and a 30-60 minute break; and that she would need to take
unscheduled breaks hourly for 10-15 minutes in an eight-hour
workday.
Id.
Dr. Serpe did not feel, however, that Mrs. Cowen required a
job that permitted her shifting positions at will from sitting,
standing, or walking.
(R. at 511.)
He noted she could likely
walk less than one city block without rest or significant pain;
sit for 60 minutes at one time; stand/walk for 10 minutes at one
time; and stand/walk for 1 hour in an eight-hour workday. Id.
Furthermore, Dr. Serpe opined that plaintiff could occasionally
lift 10 pounds; she would likely be absent more than four times a
month due to her impairments or treatment; and that she was not a
malingerer.
(R. at 512.)
On August 3, 2011, Mrs. Cowen was treated by Dr. Serpe. (R.
at 514-15.)
On examination, Dr. Serpe found that she experienced
“[p]ain on palpation to the first metatarsocuneiform joint right
foot.”
(R. at 514.)
Dr. Serpe diagnosed her as suffering from
17
pain in her joint, ankle and foot, and recommended she stay in
the cam walker.
Id.
He noted that “[c]onsidering her smoking
and current condition,” he did “not think she is a good candidate
for surgical intervention.”
Id. He offered her a second opinion,
to which she declined; he noted she will remain in the boot and
“follow in one month.”
Id.
iv. Dr. Cannonie of Provena St. Mary’s Hospital
Throughout 2009, Mrs. Cowen was treated by Michael Cannonie,
D.O.
(R. at 324-35.)
On July 14, 2009, Mrs. Cowen presented to
Dr. Cannonie to follow-up on her sugar levels.
He noted the
following: “she has been eating [a] very unhealthy diet. She
continues to smoke. She continues to lack any formal exercise.
She does admit to having some chronic back pain and she is
currently taking exceeding doses of Naprosyn beyond her
prescription…”
(R. at 332.)
Dr. Cannonie diagnosed Mrs. Cowen
as suffering from, inter alia, insulin-dependent diabetes,
chronic back pain, “[b]ilateral knee pain . . . most likely due
to degenerative disc disease[;]” depression; and hypertension.
(R. at 324-26, 329-30, 332, 334-35.)
On September 21, 2009, an
x-ray of Plaintiff’s chest revealed “[m]ild degenerative changes
in the thoracic spine.” (R. at 380.)
v. Consultative Examiners
On May 17, 2010, Mrs. Cowen was evaluated by consultative
examiner Sarat Yalamanchili, M.D.
18
(R. at 391-94.)
On
examination, Dr. Yalamanchili found that Plaintiff experienced
mild difficulty walking on her toes; walking on heels; and
hopping on one leg, however, she had no difficulty getting on/off
the exam table; tandem walking; needing the use of an assistive
device; and only minimal issue squatting and arising.
393.)
(R. at
Dr. Yalamanchili noted that Mrs. Cowen’s “symptomatology
consists of fluctuating blood sugar.” (R. at 394.)
During her
clinical exam, he assessed that her “ranges of motion of all
extremities are normal, including lumbar spine and straight leg
raising test. Patient’s gait was steady with no need for any cane
during gait examination. Cardio pulmonary examination is
compensated at the present time.”
Id.
He diagnosed Mrs. Cowen
as suffering from type two diabetes; depression; obesity; panic
attack; and anxiety disorder.
Id.
On May 25, 2010, Mrs. Cowen was evaluated by consultative
examiner Erwin J. Baukus, Ph. D., for a psychological
examination.
(R. at 398-402.)
On examination, Dr. Baukus found
that her mood “was mildly depressed[;]” “[s]he was unable to
repeat 5 digits backwards[;]” she “had difficulty in Serial
7’s[;]” and her judgment was found to be “inadequate with the
‘fire in the theater’ question stating that she would ‘Scream.’”
(R. at 401-02.)
Mrs. Cowen reported to Dr. Baukus that she could
not find her Cymbalta so she brought her husband’s, as he takes
the same thing.
(R. at 398.)
Dr. Baukus noted that her being
19
unable to find one of her medications “ raises the question of
compliance.” “The number of doses remaining in some medications
is not consistent with fill dates and dose prescribed, giving
further concern about lack of consistent compliance.”
Id. He
diagnosed Mrs. Cowen as suffering from dysthymic disorder; panic
disorder without agoraphobia; and
generalized anxiety.
(R. at 402.)
On June 23, 2010, State agency review physician Kirk
Boyenga, Ph. D., completed a psychiatric review technique form
and a mental RFC assessment form.
(R. at 411-28.)
Dr. Boyenga
diagnosed Mrs. Cowen as suffering from “major depression vs.
dysthymia vs. partial remission with [prescription;]” and mixed
anxiety disorders.
(R. at 414, 416.)
Dr. Boyenga opined that
Plaintiff had moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration,
persistence, or pace; no episodes of decompensation; and mild
restriction of activities of daily living and maintaining social
functioning.
(R. at 421.)
He found Mrs. Cowen moderately
limited in her abilities to maintain attention and concentration
for extended periods; complete a normal workday and workweek
without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to
perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and
length of rest periods; interact appropriately with the general
public; and respond appropriately to changes in the work setting.
20
(R. at 425-26.)
Finally, Dr. Boyenga concluded that on
examination, Mrs. Cowen is:
fully oriented and free of thought disorder or
serious memory problem. She can also care for 2
disabled sons, do chores, make purchases and pursue
hobbies. Claimant is capable of performing simple
tasks. Social skills are impaired, but allow settings
with reduced interpersonal contact. Claimant is able
to retain friendships and get along with family.
Adaptation abilities are also limited, but allow
routine, repetitive tasks. Claimant is able to follow
directions and leave home alone.
R. at 427.)
IV. ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ issued her decision on November 7, 2011, finding
that, based on Mrs. Cowen’s application for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits, she was not
disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security
Act. Additionally, based on her application for supplemental
security income, she was not disabled under section
1614(a)(3)(A).
(R. at 36.)
The ALJ applied the five-step
sequential analysis as required by the Act, under 20 C.F.R.
404.1520(a).
At step one, the ALJ determined that Mrs. Cowen had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 1, 2005
(the alleged onset date).
(R. at 12.)
At step two, the ALJ determined that Mrs. Cowen had several
severe impairments: diabetes mellitus with neuropathy, obesity,
depression, anxiety, tenosynovitis of the right foot,
21
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine.
(R.
at 23.)
At step three, the ALJ determined that Mrs. Cowen did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled one of the listed impairments from 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1525
and 404.1526).
(R. at 24.)
She noted that “[d]espite having
more recent problems with her right foot and wearing a boot for
the past few months, there was no support from the medical
evidence that claimant could not ambulate. Therefore, when
examining the claimant’s obesity in conjunction with the
claimant’s other severe impairments, I find that none of the
above listings have been met or equaled.” And that the “severity
of the claimant’s mental impairments, considered singly and in
combination, do not meet or medically equal the criteria of
listing 12.04 and 12.06.”
(R. at 24.)
At step four, the ALJ concluded that, although Mrs. Cowen
was not capable of performing her past work as a bus driver or
machine packer, she had the RFC “to perform less than the full
range of sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR §§ 404.1567(a) and
416.967(a).
She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs but
never ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She can occasionally balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. She must avoid concentrated
exposure to extreme cold and heat, wetness, humidity and fumes.
22
She is limited to unskilled work tasks that can be learned by
demonstration or in 30 days or less. (R. at 26.)
In making her decision, the ALJ noted that she considered
all of Mrs. Cowen’s symptoms, and the extent to which the
symptoms could reasonably be accepted as consistent with the
objective medical evidence and other evidence, as required under
20 C.F.R. 404.1529 and 416.929, as well as SSR’s 96-4p and 96-7p.
Id.
Additionally, the ALJ considered opinion evidence in
accordance with 20 C.F.R. 404.1527 and 416.927, and SSR’s 96-2p,
96-5p, 96-6p, and 96-3p.
Id.
Next, the ALJ summarized Mrs.
Cowen’s testimony and medical record and stated:
I have given the claimant the benefit of the
doubt and considered her intermittent physical
complaints of pain combined with her obesity and
mental health symptoms and limited her to
sedentary work. I find that the sedentary
exertional level is more consistent with the
overall medical evidence and combination of
mental and physical conditions.
(R. at 33.)
At step five, the ALJ determined that, based on Mrs. Cowen’s
age (which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44),
education, work experience, RFC, and the VE’s testimony, “there
are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant can perform...” (R. at 34.)
The ALJ
determined that Mrs. Cowen would be able to work as a callout
operator (1,200 regionally/35,000 nationally), telephone quote
23
clerk (900 regionally/10,000 nationally) or addresser clerk
(1,000 regionally/70,000 nationally).
(R. at 35.)
Mrs. Cowen requested review by the Appeals Council, but was
denied on July 23, 2012.
Thus, the ALJ’s decision became the
final decision of the Commissioner.
Mrs. Cowen filed a complaint
with this court on September 21, 2012, seeking a review of the
decision.
The parties consented to exercise of jurisdiction by a
magistrate judge on November 9, 2012.
Thereafter, cross-motions
for summary judgment were filed.
This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Mrs. Cowen asks the Court to
reverse the Commissioner’s decision denying her benefits, or to
remand the matter for further proceedings; the Commissioner seeks
summary judgment affirming the agency’s decision.
Standard of Disability Adjudication
An individual claiming a need for DBI or SSI must prove that
he has a disability under the terms of the SSA.
In determining
whether an individual is eligible for benefits, the social
security regulations require a sequential five-step analysis.
First, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is currently
employed; second, a determination must be made as to whether the
claimant has a severe impairment; third, the ALJ must determine
if the impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed
by the Commissioner in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;
fourth, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC, and must
24
evaluate whether the claimant can perform his/her past relevant
work, and fifth; the ALJ must decide whether the claimant is
capable of performing work in the national economy.
Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir.1995).
Knight v.
At steps one through
four, the claimant bears the burden of proof; at step five, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner.
Id.
Standard of Review
A district court reviewing an ALJ’s decision must affirm if
the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free
from legal error.
42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); Steele v. Barnhart, 290
F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
Substantial evidence is “more
than a mere scintilla”; rather, it is “such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct.
1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).
In reviewing an ALJ’s decision for
substantial evidence, the Court may not “displace the ALJ’s
judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence or making credibility
determinations.”
Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th
Cir.2007) (citing Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir.
2003)).
Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to
differ, the responsibility for determining whether a claimant is
disabled falls upon the Commissioner, not the courts.
Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir.1990).
25
Herr v.
An ALJ must articulate her analysis by building an accurate
and logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusions, so that
the Court may afford the claimant meaningful review of the SSA’s
ultimate findings.
Steele, 290 F.3d at 941.
It is not enough
that the record contains evidence to support the ALJ’s decision;
if the ALJ does not rationally articulate the grounds for that
decision, or if the decision is insufficiently articulated, so as
to prevent meaningful review, the Court must remand.
Id.
Discussion
Mrs. Cowen argues that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed
or remanded because the residual functional capacity finding is
unsupported by substantial evidence; the credibility
determination is unsupported by substantial evidence; and the
Step 5 determination is unsupported by substantial evidence.
The
Court will address each complaint in turn.
I. The ALJ’s RFC Finding
Mrs. Cowen argues that the ALJ erred by affording only “some
weight” to her treating physicians, as well as by failing to
reconcile the State agency review physician, Dr.Boyenga’s,
opinion with her RFC determination.
Mrs. Cowen asserts that Dr.
Serpe’s and Dr. Belford’s opinions should have been afforded
greater weight because their opinions were consistent with
substantial evidence in the record, and that “[a] treating
physician's opinion regarding the nature and severity of a
26
medical condition is entitled to controlling weight if supported
by the medical findings and consistent with substantial evidence
in the record.” Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 503 (7th Cir.
2004).
The ALJ found that Mrs. Cowen had the RFC to perform less
than the full range of sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1567(a) (R. at 26.), with additional postural and exposure
limitations.
Further, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was
limited to unskilled work tasks that could be learned by
demonstration, or in 30 days or less. Id.
The regulations
provide that a claimant’s RFC is assessed “based on all of the
relevant medical and other evidence” of record, 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(3), and the final responsibility for determining a
claimant’s RFC is reserved to the Commissioner, 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(e)(2).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in giving only “some
weight” to the opinions of treating physicians Drs. Serpe and
Belford.
However, a treating physician’s opinion may merit
“controlling” weight only if it is both “well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.”
20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2); see also Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 875 (7th
27
Cir. 2010). The Seventh Circuit has “disapproved any mechanical
rule that the views of a treating physician prevail.” Peabody
Coal Co. v. McCandless, 255 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 2001).
The Court finds that herein, the ALJ thoroughly examined the
evidence of record and reasonably determined that Drs. Serpe and
Belford’s opinions were entitled to only “some weight.” (R. at.
33.)
The ALJ points out that Dr. Serpe’s opinion was largely
consistent with a finding that Plaintiff was capable of sedentary
work: he indicated that Plaintiff could sit for 60 minutes at one
time and eight hours during an eight-hour workday; she could
stand/walk for ten minutes at a time and for a total of one hour
in an eight hour workday; and she was capable of lifting and
carrying ten pounds occasionally (R. at 511-12.) As defined in
the regulations, sedentary work involves lifting no more than ten
pounds at one time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles
like files, ledgers, and small tools.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).
It also requires sitting with occasional walking or standing.
Id.
The Court finds that Dr. Serpe’s evaluation of Mrs. Cowen
puts her within the bounds of sedentary work and fits well with
the ALJ’s RFC determination that Plaintiff could perform less
than the full range of sedentary work due to postural and
exposure limitations.
28
Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ failed to reasonably
weigh Dr. Belford’s opinion is equally without merit.
After a review of all of the medical evidence regarding
Plaintiff’s mental condition, the ALJ concluded that the opinion
of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Belford, was only
entitled to “some weight” (R. at 33.)
Dr. Belford completed two
Mental Capacity Assessments – one on February 16, 2010 and the
other on March 15, 2011 (R. at 266-68, 490-92.)
The two
assessments were largely the same with some improvement noted in
the 2011 opinion.
Dr. Belford opined that Plaintiff had a few
marked limitations in the areas of understanding and memory,
sustained concentration and persistence, social interaction, and
adaptation (R. at 490-92.)
She also stated that Plaintiff would
miss more than four days of work a month.
(R. at 491.)
The ALJ reviewed these opinions, gave them some weight, and,
as a result, limited Mrs. Cowen to unskilled work tasks that
could be learned by demonstration in 30 days or less (R. at 33.)
She gave specific reasons for weighing Dr. Belford’s opinions
this way, noting that Plaintiff had family and situational
stressors, but that the record showed that Plaintiff’s mental
health condition improved with both medications and counseling
(R. at 33.)
For example, when Plaintiff was taking her
medications as prescribed, she found that she was more in control
29
of her emotions, was able to get more sleep, had less depression
and anxiety, had better moods, was able to control her
irritability and temper, and had better relationships with her
children and husband (R. at 284-85, 288-91, 297-300, 303-07, 31213, 505-06.)
Moreover, the ALJ pointed to the fact that Dr.
Belford’s treatment records noted that Plaintiff completed normal
daily activities and expressed frustration that she was the only
one in her household who took responsibility for these tasks (Tr.
30, 295).
The ALJ explained that there was no indication in any
treatment notes that Plaintiff was incapable of working and that
both she and her husband reported that she did not have any
trouble getting along with other people (R. at 30, 33, 214-15,
227, 400-01.)
Plaintiff contends that several other doctors diagnosed Mrs.
Cowen with depression and anxiety disorders.
Pl’s brief. at 11.
However, a mere diagnosis does not lend support to a finding of
disability.
1985).
Orlando v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 209, 214 (7th Cir.
Further, the records that Plaintiff cites all discuss how
Plaintiff’s mental symptoms were under control when she took her
medication.
For example, Dr. Yalamanchili diagnosed Plaintiff
with depression, panic attacks, and anxiety disorder, yet found
that she had a normal mental status and that she stated during
her exam that her depression and anxiety disorder were better
30
with medication.
(R. at 391, 394.)
Similarly, Dr. Maly noted
that Mrs. Cowen was being treated for depression, but noted that
she thought that her depression was under control (R. at 473.)
And, although the ALJ found Dr. Belford’s opinions to be too
restrictive and unsupported by the evidence, she took them into
consideration when determining Plaintiff’s RFC, limiting Mrs.
Cowen to unskilled work tasks that could be learned by
demonstration or in 30 days or less (R. at 33.)
Lastly, Mrs. Cowen argues that the ALJ afforded
“considerable weight” to the opinions of Dr. Boyenga, a state
agency examining psychiatrist, yet failed to reconcile his
opinion with the RFC determination.
Pl’s brief. at 12.
Dr.
Boyenga determined that Plaintiff was capable of routine,
repetitive tasks and could follow directions.
(R. at 34.)
The
regulations instruct that state agency consultants are “highly
qualified physicians and psychologists who are also experts in
Social Security disability evaluation.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(e)(2)(I).
The Seventh Circuit has held that reliance on
such physicians is appropriate because “[t]he fact that these
[reviewing] physicians reviewed the entire record strengthens the
weight of their conclusions.”
Flener ex rel. Flener v. Barnhart,
361 F.3d 442, 448 (7th Cir. 2004).
The ALJ gave Dr. Boyenga’s
opinion considerable weight because it was consistent with the
31
record as a whole (R. at 34.)
Dr. Boyenga noted that Mrs. Cowen improved with treatment;
was fully oriented and free of thought disorder or serious memory
problem; that she cared for two disabled sons, took care of her
home, and pursued hobbies; and that her social skills were
impaired, but that she was able to retain friendships and get
along with her family.
(R. at 411, 414, 416, 427.)
Dr. Boyenga
both reviewed the record and examined Mrs. Cowen, and the ALJ
considered his opinion’s support and consistency in light of the
whole record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3), (4).
Mrs. Cowen argues that the ALJ erred by not accounting for
the social functioning limitations in Dr. Boyenga’s opinion.
Pl.’s brief at 12.
The Court agrees that the ALJ’s RFC does not
contain an explicit social functioning limitation; however, the
ALJ did not adopt Dr. Boyenga’s opinion fully.
it “considerable” weight (R. at
34.)
Rather, she gave
The Court finds the ALJ to
have reasonably considered Plaintiff’s ability to interact with
others in her decision.
At the hearing, the ALJ included social
functioning limitations in her hypothetical questions to the
vocational expert that were more restrictive than the limitations
suggested by Dr. Boyenga even. (R. at 75.)
The ALJ asked the
vocational expert to describe the jobs available to someone with
Plaintiff’s RFC who had the further limitations of only having
32
occasional contact with the general public, supervisors, and coworkers.
Id.
The vocational expert maintained that even with
these restrictions there were a significant number of jobs in the
national economy available.
(R. at 75-76.)
Thus, even if the
ALJ committed error by not explicitly articulating a social
functioning limitation in her RFC finding, that error was
harmless.
Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2000)
(affirming ALJ’s decision despite errors because none of the
errors ultimately impacted the outcome).
The Court finds that the ALJ had a substantial amount of
evidence to find Mrs. Cowen not disabled, including multiple
medical opinions, treatment and examination notes, objective
medical evidence, as well as Plaintiff’s daily activities and
record of spotty compliance.
Plaintiff’s arguments fail to
overcome the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s assessment
of the record.
The ALJ built an accurate and logical bridge from
the evidence to her conclusion, and, thus, the Court must affirm
her decision.
II. The ALJ’s Credibility Determination
Next, Mrs. Cowen challenges the ALJ’s finding that her
complaints of debilitating limitations were not fully credible,
mainly arguing that the ALJ erroneously identified
33
inconsistencies between her limitations and her activities of
daily living. Pl’s brief at 13.
Because an ALJ is in the best position to assess the
credibility of a claimant, a court will afford the ALJ’s
credibility assessment special deference, and will only find
against the credibility assessment where it is “patently wrong.”
Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000).
An ALJ’s
credibility assessment is “patently wrong” where it “lacks any
explanation or support.”
Cir.2008).
Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th
In making this assessment, a court will not “nitpick
the ALJ’s opinion for inconsistencies” but rather “give it a
commonsensical reading.”
Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160
(7th Cir.2010).
A “commonsensical” reading shows that the ALJ gave many
reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s allegations of disability,
including the fact that Plaintiff’s allegations were inconsistent
with the medical evidence, her daily activities, and her
unremarkable physical and mental examinations.
(R. at 31.)
In
addition, substantial evidence of Plaintiff’s non-compliant
behavior undermines her credibility and her allegations that she
is unable to work (R. 30-33.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by focusing too heavily
on her daily activities in finding her not credible, and that she
34
improperly weighed those activities since they were not
equivalent to full-time work.
However, while courts have
questioned whether some daily activities really indicate that a
claimant is unable to work outside of the house, an ALJ is
allowed, and obligated by the regulations, to consider whether a
claimant’s daily activities are inconsistent with her stated
ability to work. See Oakes v. Astrue, 258 F. App’x 38, 43 (7th
Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)).
Herein, the ALJ reasonably
pointed out that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living were
“inconsistent with her severe complaints.” (R. at 32.)
The ALJ
noted that Mrs. Cowen cared for her mentally impaired sons and
ill husband, took care of financial matters, and performed
household chores (R. 25, 32.)
These activities were inconsistent
with Plaintiff’s allegations of poor concentration and her claims
that she did not do much all day.
Mrs. Cowen counters the ALJ’s
reasoning by pointing out that the “differences between
activities of daily living and activities in a full-time job are
that a person has more flexibility in scheduling the former than
the latter, can get help from other persons . . ., and is not
held to a minimum standard of performance, as she would be by an
employer.”
2012).
Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir.
While true, Plaintiff’s activities of daily living were
not the only thing the ALJ considered in determining that
Plaintiff was not entirely credible.
35
Critically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s history of noncompliance with doctor’s orders and her huge gaps in seeking
treatment additionally belie her claims that her impairments are
disabling. Ehrhart, 969 F.2d at 538 (“The Secretary may not find
total disability when a claimant inexcusably refuses to follow a
prescribed course of medical treatment that would eliminate his
total disability.”) (citations omitted).
Specifically, Plaintiff
failed to wear the diabetic shoe that was recommended by her
treating podiatrist for years, refused to undergo physical
therapy, and consistently ran out of her medications and failed
to take them as prescribed (R. at 272-83, 297-98, 308-11, 398,
444-46, 518-19, 527-32.)
treatment record.
Mrs. Cowen also had large gaps in her
While she complained of pain, she went many
months without seeking any treatment (R. at 466, 468, 475, 47977, 518-21, 525-28, 533-34.)
The Court finds that substantial evidence exists that could
reasonably indicate to the ALJ that Plaintiff’s symptoms were
controlled and that she did not need advanced treatment (R. at
28-29.)
See Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 644 (7th Cir. 1987)
(where claimant sought only routine care for a six month period,
it was suggestive of no serious medical difficulties during that
period).
The ALJ’s credibility determination was in no form
“patently wrong,” and therefore the Court must give deference and
36
support to her finding.
III. The ALJ’s Step Five Assessment
Finally, Mrs. Cowen argues that the ALJ’s Step 5
determination is unsupported by substantial evidence because the
ALJ failed to consider all of her limitations, and, therefore,
asked the VE an incomplete hypothetical question.
She asserts
that the hypothetical posed did not include Dr. Boyenga’s opinion
of her limited social skills, nor did it include Drs. Serpe or
Belford’s opinion of her marked limitations.
Defendant contends
that only the limitations supported by the medical record need be
included, and that although the ALJ declined later to include
some limitations in her RFC, she questioned the vocational expert
as to all of her limitations.
“Hypothetical questions posed to vocational experts
ordinarily must include all limitations supported by medical
evidence in the record.” Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 942
(7th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff’s underscoring of this rule is
appropriate, albeit misplaced, as the Court finds that the
medical evidence did not fully support the opinions of Drs. Serpe
and Belford.
Thus, the fact that the ALJ did not include every
limitation that those doctors suggested in her hypotheticals was
not error.
37
Moreover, the Court finds that, although she decided on not
including such limitations in her final determination of
Plaintiff’s RFC, she still questioned the vocational expert as to
whether the number of jobs would change if an individual was
limited to “occasional contact with the general public and
occasional interactions with supervisors and co-workers,” an
accommodation Dr. Boyenga noted. (R. at 75.)
The vocational
expert concluded that Mrs. Cowen could still do one of the jobs
that the ALJ specifically listed in her decision at Step Five (an
addresser clerk) and further stated that there were an additional
50,000 jobs nationally that a claimant with these limitations
could perform (R. at 35, 75-76).
Further, the ALJ included the unscheduled and excess break
times and absences that were included in both Drs. Serpe and
Belford’s opinions when questioning the vocational expert (R. at
76.)
Lastly, the ALJ referenced Dr. Belford’s opinion that
Plaintiff had limited attention and concentration in her
hypothetical by limiting Plaintiff to unskilled work that could
be learned by demonstration or in 30 days or less (Tr. 71).
The
Court finds that the ALJ’s step 5 determination was supported by
substantial evidence, no harm occurred by her not addressing
every limitation, and that her final RFC determination fits
accordingly with her step 5 determination.
38
The ultimate question before the Court is whether the ALJ
reasonably weighed the evidence presented to her.
The
Commissioner is responsible for weighing the evidence and making
independent findings of fact; as such, a reviewing court may not
decide the facts anew, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute its
own judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Butera v. Apfel, 173
F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d
300, 305 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Mrs. Cowen’s complaint does not show
that the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence was unreasonable or
that she ignored material evidence.
Accordingly, the Court finds
that the ALJ’s decision, which reasonably accounted for
Plaintiff’s impairments, was supported by substantial evidence.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants the
Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment [#27], and denies Mrs.
Cowen’s motion for summary judgment [#19].
The decision of the
Commissioner is affirmed.
Date: November 13, 2013
E N T E R E D:
_________________________________
MAGISTRATE JUDGE ARLANDER KEYS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
39
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