Henderson v. Astrue
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Maria Valdez on 9/30/2016: Mailed notice (lp, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
BRIAN HENDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of the U.S. Social
Security Administration, 1
Defendant.
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No. 12 C 7841
Magistrate Judge
Maria Valdez
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Brian Henderson (“Plaintiff”) appeals the decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his Social
Security childhood disability benefits under Title II (“CDB”), and his supplemental
security income benefits under Title XVI (“SSI”) of the Social Security Act (“the
Act”). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc.
No. 8] is granted in part and denied in part, and the matter is remanded to the
Commissioner for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
I.
Procedural History
At age thirty-six, Plaintiff filed CDB and SSI applications on June 8, 2010,
alleging a disability onset date of February 1, 1984, due to depression and epilepsy
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Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for her predecessor, Michael J. Astrue, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(d).
seizures. (R. 169-76, 198.) His initial applications were denied on October 26, 2010,
and again at the reconsideration stage on February 23, 2011. (R. 102-05.) Plaintiff
timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which took
place December 7, 2011. (R. 41-101, 124.) Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with his
attorney and offered testimony. (R. 41-101.) A vocational expert (“VE”) also
appeared and testified. (Id.) On January 26, 2012, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s
applications for CDB and SSI benefits. (R. 19-34.) The Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review on August 8, 2012, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the
final decision of the Commissioner and therefore reviewable by the District Court
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).
(R. 1-3; Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 332 (7th Cir. 1994).
II.
ALJ Decision
On January 26, 2012, the ALJ issued a written determination denying
Plaintiff’s CDB and SSI applications. (R. 19-34.) As an initial matter, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff was born on July 22, 1973, and had not attained the age of twenty-two
as of February 1, 1984, the alleged onset date. (R. 24.) At step one, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff did not engage in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”)
since his alleged onset date of February 1, 1984. (Id.) At step two, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of seizure disorder, bipolar disorder, and
antisocial personal disorder. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically
equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
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P, App’x 1. (R. 25.) Before step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels.
(R. 26.) However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had non-exertional limitations. (Id.)
Plaintiff was unable to work at heights, climb ladders, or frequently negotiate
stairs; should avoid operation of moving or dangerous machinery; and he was not
suited for work that required intense focus and concentration for extended periods.
(Id.) Plaintiff could only have casual interaction with the general public, and have
superficial or casual contact with co-workers; and he would be expected to be off
task six percent of the time, in an eight hour workday. (Id.) At step four, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (R. 32.) Finally, at step five, the
ALJ found that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that
Plaintiff could perform. (Id.) Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could work as
a hand packager, kitchen helper, or cleaner. (R. 33) As a result, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had not been disabled from February 1, 1984, through the date of the
decision, under the Act. And with regard to Plaintiff’s Title II claim, the ALJ
concluded that he had not been under a disability at any time prior to July 21, 1995,
the date he attained the age of twenty-two. (R. 33-34.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The ALJ’s decision must be upheld if it follows the administrative procedure
for determining whether the plaintiff is disabled as set forth in the Act, 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a) and 416.920(a), if it is supported by substantial evidence, and if it is
free of legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence
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that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). Although
we review the ALJ’s decision deferentially, she must nevertheless build a “logical
bridge” between the evidence and her conclusion. Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118,
1121 (7th Cir. 2014). A “minimal[ ] articulat[ion] of her justification” is enough.
Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ made three errors. First, Plaintiff argues that
the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinion evidence. Second, Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ failed to property evaluate his credibility. Third, Plaintiff argues that
the ALJ relied upon flawed VE testimony.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinion of
his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Josip Pasic, M.D., who submitted a Psychiatric/
Psychological Impairment Questionnaire dated June 29, 2011. (R. 425-32.) The
questionnaire states that Plaintiff’s first treatment occurred on September 21, 2010,
and the most recent examination was September 29, 2010. The questionnaire states
that Plaintiff suffers from depression, anxiety, severe mood swings, sleeping
problems, and severe anger problems. He was found to be markedly limited in
numerous area, including understanding and memory, sustained concentration and
persistence, and social interactions, and he was found to be moderately limited in
the area of adaptation. Dr. Pasic concluded that Plaintiff cannot handle drastic
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change in the work setting, does not handle criticism well, and cannot tolerate even
a low stress work setting.
The ALJ stated that Dr. Pasic’s opinion was “not given significant weight,”
(R. 31), but he essentially disregarded it entirely, finding the conclusions to be
“preposterous,” in that they were based on only two visits and contradicted the
intake findings of the first visit. (Id.) Similarly, the ALJ gave no significant weight
to Dr. Pasic’s colleague, La Toya Patterson, M.A., QMHP, who wrote an opinion
letter dated July 6, 2011. (R. 434.) Patterson’s echoed the findings in Dr. Pasic’s
June 29 questionnaire, finding that Plaintiff was unable to accept criticism or
instructions from supervisors, that his symptoms would interfere with everyday
work tasks, and he could not interact appropriately with the general public. The
ALJ found that the limitations described by Patterson were not supported by the
longitudinal record.
The ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Pasic’s and Patterson’s opinions was not supported
by substantial evidence, because it was apparently based on faulty premises. The
primary reason neither opinion merited controlling weight was the ALJ’s belief that
they were based on only a couple of mental health visits. But both Dr. Pasic’s
questionnaire and Patterson’s letter expressly stated that Plaintiff had been treated
with a one-hour weekly individual psychotherapy session and also had monthly
psychiatric sessions. (R. 425, 434.) Elsewhere in the ALJ’s opinion, he alluded to
treatment other than in September 2010, noting that although there were “very few
follow up records after the initial assessments,” he reported doing better in October
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and December 2010. (R. 29.) But other than that brief mention, the ALJ did not
discuss this apparently consistent treatment, which may have formed a longitudinal
record that would support the conclusions of Dr. Pasic and Patterson. If records of
those treatment sessions were missing from the record, the ALJ should have
inquired further rather than just assuming the absence of treatment. See Murphy v.
Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to fully develop the
record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately articulate his
analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see also SSR 96-6p (explaining
that a state reviewer’s opinion may be entitled to greater weight than that of a
treating source if the reviewer’s “opinion is based on a review of a complete case
record”); Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 309 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a
state agency consultant must have the benefit of reviewing the complete case record
before being granted controlling weight).
For the same reason, the ALJ failed to properly analyze the opinions of Dr.
Pasic and Ms. Patterson using the regulatory factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527. The regulations require the ALJ to consider a variety of factors,
including: (1) the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; (2) the
frequency of examination; (3) the physician’s specialty; (4) the types of tests
performed; and (5) the consistency and support for the physician’s opinion. See id.
The ALJ did not perform the analysis at all, and to the extent he may have alluded
to the relevant factors, the ALJ was basing his conclusions on a possibly incorrect
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assumption about the length and nature of Plaintiff’s treatment with those
providers.
Because the case warrants remand for the reasons discussed above, the Court
need not fully discuss the other errors alleged by Plaintiff. The Commissioner,
however, should not assume these issues were omitted from the opinion because no
error was found. Indeed, the Court emphasizes that on remand, special care should
be taken to fully evaluate the medical evidence in the record, including the opinion
of treating physician Dr. Thomas Huggett, M.D., and Plaintiff’s symptoms in light
of SSR 16-3p.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No.
8] is granted in part and denied in part. This matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:
DATE:
___________________________
HON. MARIA VALDEZ
United States Magistrate Judge
September 30, 2016
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