Gupta v. C.O Owens et al
Filing
164
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. The Court grants the summary judgment motions of Krakow 142 , and Owens, the Will County Sheriffs Department, and Will County 153 . The only claim remaining in this suit is the Count III § 1983 excessive force claim against defendants Wittmayer, Janovyak, and Lane. The case is set for a status hearing on February 16, 2016 at 9:30 a.m. Signed by the Honorable Jorge L. Alonso on 2/8/2016. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ASHISH GUPTA,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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CORRECTIONAL OFFICER RANDY )
L. OWENS, WILL COUNTY
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SHERIFF’S OFFICE; OFFICER
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RICKY KRAKOW #7825,
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NAPERVILLE POLICE
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DEPARTMENT; CORRECTIONAL
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OFFICER TODD WITTMAYER, WILL )
COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE;
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CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MIKE
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JANOVYAK, WILL COUNTY
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SHERIFF’S OFFICE;
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CORRECTIONAL OFFICER JAMES )
PATRAS, WILL COUNTY SHERIFF’S )
OFFICE; JOSHUA LANE, WILL
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COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, in their )
individual capacities; WILL COUNTY )
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, and THE
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COUNTY OF WILL,
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Defendants.
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12 C 7855
Judge Jorge L. Alonso
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff sues defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their alleged violations of his
Fourth Amendment rights and for state-law false imprisonment. The case is before the Court on the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56 motions for summary judgment of defendants Krakow,
Owens, Will County,1 and the Will County Sheriff’s Office.2 For the reasons set forth below, the
Court grants the motions.
Local Rule 56.1
Local Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary judgment to provide “a statement of
material facts as to which [he] contends there is no genuine issue.” (Local R. 56.1(a)(3).) It also
requires the opposing party to file “a concise response to the movant’s statement” that includes, “in
the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other
supporting materials relied upon.” (Local R. 56.1(b)(3)(B).) In addition, it states that “[a]ll material
facts set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless
controverted by the statement of the opposing party.” (Local R. 56.1(b)(3)(C).)
Together with their motion for summary judgment, defendants served on plaintiff a “Notice
to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment,” as required by the Court’s Local Rules
and circuit precedent. (See Notice Pro Se Litigant, ECF No. 157.) The notice explained in detail the
requirements of Local Rule 56.1 and warned plaintiff of the consequences of failing to controvert the
facts set forth in the moving parties’ statements. (See id.) Despite the warning, plaintiff did not file
a response to defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements. Accordingly, the Court deems him to have
admitted all of the properly-supported facts defendants assert in those Statements. See Cady v.
Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven pro se litigants must follow rules of civil
1
Plaintiff’s only basis for suing Will County is that it is “the entity responsible to pay any
judgment against the Will County Sheriff’s Office.” (Fifth Am. Compl. ¶ 12.)
2
Defendant Patras was previously dismissed from this suit. (See 10/28/14 Stipulation
Dismissal, ECF. No. 104.) Defendants Wittmayer, Janovyak, and Lane do not seek summary
judgment.
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procedure.”); Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 385 F.3d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 2004) (“We have
emphasized the importance of local rules and have consistently and repeatedly upheld a district
court’s discretion to require strict compliance with its local rules governing summary judgment.”)
(alteration and quotation omitted).
Facts
2010
On July 3, 2010, employees of the Starbucks in the Showplace Shopping Center in Naperville,
Illinois called the Naperville police about a “suspicious/unwanted subject inside the Starbucks.”
(Krakow’s LR 56.1(a) Stmt. ¶¶ 6-7.) The “subject” was plaintiff, and Jessica Bouldin was one of the
Starbucks employees who “witnessed him trespassing.” (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8-9) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff
was arrested and issued a non-traffic complaint and notice to appear for violation of City of
Naperville Ordinance Section 10-2-4-1, Criminal Trespass to Land. (Id. ¶ 6.)
On August 11, 2010, Starbucks served plaintiff with a Notice of Expulsion and Warning
against Trespassing, prohibiting him from returning to the Starbucks in the Showplace Shopping
Center. (Id. ¶ 11.) Bouldin was present when plaintiff was given the no trespassing document. (Id.)
Between plaintiff’s July 3, 2010 arrest and October 1, 2010, Bouldin saw plaintiff in the
Starbucks’ parking lot ten to twelve times. (Krakow’s LR 56.1(a) Stmt. ¶ 22.) “She felt
uncomfortable and unsafe each time she saw him.” (Id.)
On the evening of October 1, 2010, during a break from her work at Starbucks, Bouldin sat
with two friends on a bench outside of the store. (Id. ¶ 12.) She saw plaintiff drive into the
Starbucks parking lot, directly past where she was sitting. (Id.) Plaintiff parked his car and then re-
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parked it twice, each time moving it closer to Bouldin. (Id. ¶ 13.) The last spot was two or three
spaces away from where Bouldin was sitting, and Bouldin would have to pass it to return to work.
(Id.)
Bouldin said she was scared and thought plaintiff was trying to harass her because she was
a witness in the trespass case against him. (Id. ¶ 14.) Bouldin asked the Starbucks manager to call
911. (Id. ¶ 15.) Then, without ever having left his car, plaintiff left the parking lot, driving “real
slow” next to the bench where Bouldin was sitting. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 18) (quotation omitted).
Defendant Krakow responded to the 911 call and spoke to Bouldin. (Id. ¶ 16.) Bouldin told
him what she had seen, and said she assumed plaintiff had seen her and that was why he moved his
car closer to the bench. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) Bouldin told Krakow that “she was concerned for her
safety[,] . . . and that she had been involved in a prior incident with [plaintiff] and was a witness in
that case,” which was still pending. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 21) (citations omitted). Krakow said Bouldin also
told him that plaintiff had taken a picture of her with his cell phone. (Id. ¶ 20.)
Krakow contacted plaintiff, who agreed to meet Krakow at a 7-Eleven in the area that night.
(Id. ¶ 24.) “As a result of his actions in the parking lot the night of October 1, 2010, and his
interaction with . . . Bouldin,” Krakow arrested plaintiff at the 7-Eleven for disorderly conduct. (Id.
¶¶ 24, 28.)
After arresting plaintiff, Krakow searched him, found his cell phone, and kept it “as having
possible photographic evidence that [plaintiff] was at Starbucks on October 1, 2010.” (Id. ¶ 26.)
The next day, defendant Owens was working as a correctional officer at the Will County
Adult Detention Center. (Owens’ LR 56.1(a) Stmt. ¶¶ 4, 15-16.) At around 11:00 a.m., Owens took
plaintiff from a group cell to a room for fingerprinting and then to a booking window to complete
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his discharge paperwork. (Id. ¶ 21.) While at the booking window, plaintiff questioned booking
personnel about the necessity of signing some of the paperwork, and then got into an argument with
Owens. (Id. ¶ 22.) During the argument, plaintiff raised his right hand, in which he was holding a
pen, pointed at Owens, and called Owens a “thug with a badge.” (Id.) (quotation omitted). Owens
grabbed plaintiff’s right hand, knocked the pen out of it, put plaintiff’s right arm in a rear wristlock,
and, with the help of correctional officer Mario Calderon, walked plaintiff to an isolation holding
cell. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.)
When they got to the holding cell, plaintiff was placed chest first against the wall adjacent
to the cell while Calderon opened the cell door. (Id. ¶ 25.) When the door was open, plaintiff was
walked into the cell and placed on his knees with his chest against a cell wall. (Id. ¶ 26.) At that
point, correctional officer Carter joined Owens and Calderon in the holding cell. (Id. ¶ 28.)
As the officers started to leave the cell, plaintiff started to stand up and turned his body
toward the cell door. (Id. ¶ 29.) Carter then put plaintiff chest first against the cell wall and then
on the cell floor. (Id. ¶ 30.) Owens stood above plaintiff near plaintiff’s legs. (Id. ¶ 32.) Calderon
and Carter pulled plaintiff’s arms from underneath his body and put them behind his back to keep
plaintiff from getting up or moving around when the officers again tried to leave the cell. (Id. ¶ 34.)
When the officers tried to leave the second time, the cell door to the booking area became
stuck, forcing the officers to use another cell door, which opened into a sally port. (Id. ¶ 35.) While
the officers waited for that door to be opened and walked through it, Carter pointed the laser of his
Taser gun at the cell floor next to plaintiff’s head to keep him from moving. (Id. ¶ 36.) The officers
left the cell without further incident. (Id. ¶ 38.)
5
2012
On August 15, 2012, plaintiff was arrested for an unspecified offense. The next day, he
attended court at 1:30 p.m., but his mittimus and bond information, which must be physically picked
up by correctional officers after court adjourns and taken back to the detention facility, were not
received and entered into the Will County Adult Detention Center’s database until 4:49 p.m.
(Owens’ LR 56.1(a) Stmt. ¶¶ 46, 48.) Once the bond information was received, the Detention
Center began the administrative release process whish usually takes two to three hours to complete
and which includes a computer search for new warrants, locating and returning money and personal
effects to the detainee, preparing documents telling the detainee about his next court appearance,
verifying the detainee’s identity, and reviewing the release paperwork for errors. (Id. ¶¶ 49-50.)
On this date, plaintiff was detained for fifty-four minutes after his bond was posted. (Id. ¶ 46.)
On August 27, 2012, plaintiff was arrested again, appeared in Will County Circuit Court, and
was remanded to the custody of the Will County Sheriff’s Office at 12:31 p.m. (Id. ¶ 47.) It took
until 4:37 p.m. for plaintiff to get transported to the Detention Facility and complete the booking
process and for staff to enter plaintiff’s bond information into the database. (Id.) Once that
information was received, the administrative release process began, and it was completed an hour
and twenty minutes after plaintiff’s bond was posted. (Id.)
Discussion
To prevail on a summary judgment motion, “the movant [must] show[] that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). At this stage, the Court does not weigh evidence or determine the truth of the
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matters asserted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court views all
evidence and draws all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Michas v. Health Cost Controls
of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the
record as a whole establishes that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Id.
In Count I of the fifth amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that Owens used excessive force
against him during his October 2010 detention. To defeat Owens’ motion on this claim, plaintiff
must offer evidence that suggests Owens “purposely or knowingly” used “objectively unreasonable”
force against him. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). Plaintiff has offered no
such evidence, and the record reveals none. Accordingly, the Court grants Owens’ motion for
summary judgment on Count I.
In Count II, plaintiff alleges that Krakow unlawfully arrested him on October 1, 2010. To
defeat Krakow’s motion on this claim, plaintiff must offer evidence that suggests Krakow did not
have probable cause to arrest plaintiff. Jackson v. Parker, 627 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2010).
“Probable cause exists if an officer reasonably believes, in light of the facts known to him at the
time, that a suspect had committed or was committing an offense,” even if “it is not the crime with
which the officer[] initially charge[s] the suspect.” Id. at 638-39 (quotations omitted). Moreover,
if Krakow did not have probable cause, “but a reasonable officer could have mistakenly believed
that probable cause existed,” he is entitled to qualified immunity on the arrest claim. Humphrey v.
Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998).
The record shows that, when Krakow arrested plaintiff, he knew that: (1) Starbucks had
previously given plaintiff a notice against trespassing; (2) Bouldin saw plaintiff drive into the
Starbucks parking lot, directly past where she was sitting, and then re-park his car twice so that it
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was closer to her; (3) when he was parked in the Starbucks lot, plaintiff took a picture of Bouldin
with his cell phone; and (4) Bouldin was concerned for her safety because she was a witness in a
pending criminal case against plaintiff. These facts are sufficient to give Krakow probable cause
or arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff for disorderly conduct. See City of Naperville
Municipal Code § 10-2-1-1(2) (“A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly: . . .
[d]oes or makes any unreasonable or offensive act, utterance, gesture or display which, under the
circumstances, creates a clear and present danger of a breach of peace or imminent threat of
violence.”). Thus, the Court grants Krakow’s motion for summary judgment on the false arrest
claim.
In Count II, plaintiff also alleges that Krakow illegally searched him and seized his cell
phone following the arrest. The Supreme Court has held, however, that it is lawful for a police
officer to conduct a warrantless search of “[an] arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate
control,” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (quotation omitted), and “to search for and seize
any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction,” Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), abrogated on other grounds, Davis v. United States, 564
U.S. 229 (2011). The record shows that is what Krakow did. Therefore, the Court grants his motion
for summary judgment on plaintiff’s search and seizure claim.
In Count IV,3 plaintiff seeks to hold the Will County Sheriff’s Office liable for the nonmoving defendants’ alleged use of excessive force.4 A municipal entity like the Sheriff’s Office can
3
Count III is only asserted against the non-moving defendants.
4
Plaintiff’s claim that the Sheriff’s Office is liable for Owens’ use of excessive force fails
because, as discussed above, the record does not suggest that Owens used such force against
plaintiff.
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be held liable under § 1983 only if the alleged constitutional violation was the result of one of its
policies or practices; that is, an express policy, a practice with the force of law, or action by a final
policymaker. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978);
McCormick v. City of Chi., 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff offers no evidence that
suggests any such policy existed. Accordingly, the Court grants the Sheriff’s Office’s motion for
summary judgment.
In Count V, plaintiff alleges a state-law claim for false imprisonment against the Will County
Sheriff’s Office for its detention of him after his bond had been posted. “[T]o succeed on [such] a
claim . . . , a plaintiff must show that he was restrained unreasonably . . . .” Reynolds v. Menard,
Inc., 850 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). Plaintiff has made no such showing. On the
contrary, the record shows that the Sheriff’s Office release process after bond is posted generally
takes two to three hours and includes physically receiving the detainee’s mittimus and bond
information from the court after it has adjourned, conducting a computer search for new warrants,
locating and returning the detainee’s money and personal effects, preparing documents regarding
the detainee’s next court appearance, verifying the detainee’s identity, and reviewing the release
paperwork for errors. The record also establishes that plaintiff was detained for fifty-four minutes
after his bond was posted on August 16, 2012, and an hour and twenty minutes after his bond was
posted on August 27, 2012. (Id. ¶ 46.) Given the tasks that must be accomplished before a detainee
is released on bond, the amount of time that the process usually takes, and the fact that plaintiff’s
releases were processed in a fraction of the usual time, the Court finds that there is no triable fact
issue as to the reasonableness of plaintiff’s post-bond detentions.
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Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants the summary judgment motions of Krakow
[142], and Owens, the Will County Sheriff’s Department, and Will County [153]. The only claim
remaining in this suit is the Count III § 1983 excessive force claim against defendants Wittmayer,
Janovyak, and Lane. The case is set for a status hearing on February 16, 2016 at 9:30 a.m.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: February 8, 2016
__________________________________
HON. JORGE L. ALONSO
United States District Judge
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