Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority

Filing 66

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Andrea R. Wood on 4/22/2015. Mailed notice(ef, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
GREGORY LEE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
Defendant.

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No. 12-cv-09180
Judge Andrea R. Wood

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Gregory Lee is a former employee of Defendant Chicago Transit Authority
(“CTA”). He alleges that the CTA discriminated against him on the basis of his disability and
retaliated against him for seeking an accommodation for his disability by terminating his
employment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Before the Court is
the CTA’s motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 45.) For the reasons stated below, the
CTA’s motion to dismiss is granted.
BACKGROUND
According to the Second Amended Complaint,1 Lee first became a CTA employee in
September 1988. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 36.) His most recent position there was
Transportation Manager. (Id.) Lee alleges that he suffered a stroke in February 2010 and was
diagnosed with hypertension. (Id. ¶ 7.) He also claims that he suffers from anxiety, depression,
and headaches, all of which are exacerbated by stress. (Id.) To accommodate these medical

1
For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint as true
and draws all permissible inferences in Lee’s favor. See, e.g., Active Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635
F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2011).

conditions, Lee sought reassignment to a different work assignment or location with less stress
than the position he held, but the CTA refused his request. (Id.)
Lee further alleges that he was discharged by the CTA on or about August 31, 2010. (Id. at
6.) He filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) and was subsequently reinstated by the CTA. (Id.) On November 11, 2011, Lee
suffered another stroke at work and “requested an accommodation of a transfer to a different work
environment due to his anxiety, depression, and headaches which then diminished his ability to
concentrate and his memory.” (Id. ¶ 8.) The CTA did not respond to his request. (Id.) Lee then
applied for short-term disability benefits, which were granted effective November 12, 2011 and
continuing through April 30, 2012. (Id. ¶ 9.) Lee claims that he continued to receive benefits
through the short-term disability plan until November 2012. (Id.)
At some point, Lee received a letter dated April 3, 2012 advising him that he was
terminated effective the date of the letter. (Id. ¶ 10.) The Second Amended Complaint does not
say when Lee actually received the letter. However, it does allege that the reason provided for his
termination was “that [his] medical conditions prevented him from returning to his position of
employment.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Lee claims that, according to CTA policies, employees are entitled to “a
period of short-term disability of not less than six months with an additional period being
available up to one year.” (Id. ¶ 12.) In addition, the CTA Pension Plan “provides for a disability
allowance if the employee has received 26 weeks of disability benefits.” (Id.) Lee was terminated
prior to the conclusion of the 26-week period. (Id.)
Based on these allegations, Lee asserts a claim against the CTA under the ADA for
discrimination and failing to accommodate his disability. He identifies his disability as
“hypertension, anxiety and depression, and the results of said conditions; severe headaches, loss

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of concentration, and memory loss” and claims that these conditions prevent him from
“performing regular life functions including his job duties without modification.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Lee
also claims that the CTA retaliated against him for filing his EEOC charge by failing to
accommodate him, failing to review or discuss his accommodation request, disregarding CTA
policies regarding medical leave, “maintaining a practice of releasing employees due to their
medical inability to return to work without regard for the circumstances of the employee,” and
terminating his employment “to deprive him of benefits pursuant to the CTA pension plan.” (Id.
¶¶ 14–15.) With the present motion, the CTA seeks to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint in
its entirety.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). While the complaint need not
include detailed factual allegations, there “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Id. at 555. The plaintiff must “‘plead[] factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 885 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009)). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Additionally, while a pro se complaint “is to
be construed liberally and held to less stringent standards, . . . courts ‘are not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Yates v. John Marshall Sch., No. 08 C

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4127, 2009 WL 1309516, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2009) (quoting Papsan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,
286 (1986)).
I.

Lee’s Discrimination Claim
The ADA was enacted “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the

elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). To
state a claim under the ADA for discrimination, Lee must adequately allege (1) he has a disability
within the meaning of the statute; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions
of his job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) his employer took adverse job
actions against him because of the disability or failed to make reasonable accommodations.
Stevens v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 210 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2000). The ADA defines “disability”
as “(a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities
of an individual; (b) a record of such an impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an
impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
A plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity of working when he is
“‘significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and
abilities.’” Kupstas v. City of Greenwood, 398 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(3)(i)). If a plaintiff does not connect the dots regarding his alleged disability and his
substantial limitations, the facts alleged may not be sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss.
See Abdul-Aziz v. Show Dep’t Inc., No. 09 C 7609, 2010 WL 3516157, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25,
2010) (granting motion to dismiss, in part, because “[p]laintiff does not allege how his ability to
lift his arm has been limited or how that limitation affects his ability to perform the tasks of a
warehouse/dock worker.”).

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Here, Lee fails to allege how his medical conditions substantially limit his ability to work.
Rather, he simply asserts that he has hypertension, anxiety, and depression, that he has suffered
strokes, and that his conditions result in headaches and loss of concentration and memory. In
response to the CTA’s motion to dismiss, Lee argues that the Second Amended Complaint
“specifically describes both [his] disability and how it effects [sic] major life activities” and that
“concentrating, thinking, and working are all examples of major life activities.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 1,
Dkt. No. 53.) Lee also alleges in the Second Amended Complaint that he “sought a reassignment
to a different work assignment or location with less stress than his current position to
accommodate these medical conditions.” (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 7, Dkt. No. 36.) Yet, as noted by
the CTA, Lee fails to allege what his job duties were, which duties he could perform, and which
duties he could not perform due to his medical condition. Instead, he alleges only that he was
most recently a Transportation Manager.2
Lee also does not satisfy the second requirement for an ADA claim: he has made no
specific allegations regarding how he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of
the job with or without reasonable accommodation. The Second Amended Complaint alleges only
that “[h]e is qualified to perform the essential job functions of his position and other positions of
employment at CTA with accommodation.” (Id. ¶ 4.) This statement is a “legal conclusion
couched as a factual conclusion,” as it merely restates the legal standard for ADA claims. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (internal citation and quotation omitted). It also does not include any detail
regarding Lee’s qualifications, let alone “adequate detail.” EEOC v. United Parcel Service, NO.
09 C 5291, 2010 WL 3700704, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2010).

2
In his response to the motion to dismiss, Lee argues that the CTA knows his job duties because it is his
employer. (Pl.’s Reply at 2, Dkt. No. 53.) Regardless of what information the CTA may have regarding
Lee’s official job duties, as the plaintiff in this lawsuit, Lee has the obligation of pleading the elements of
his claim. That includes pleading what he understands his job duties to have been and which of those
duties he could not perform due to his disability.
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Accordingly, Lee’s claim for discrimination under the ADA must be dismissed.
II.

Lee’s Retaliation Claim
Lee also asserts a claim for unlawful retaliation, alleging that the CTA took adverse

actions against him because he filed an EEOC charge. The Second Amended Complaint is not
altogether clear whether Lee intends to bring his retaliation claim under the ADA or Title VII.
The Second Amended Complaint suggests that he intends to rely upon Title VII, and not the
ADA, for his retaliation claim. However, Title VII only forbids retaliation against someone who
“has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice” by Title VII itself or because
he has “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing” under that statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). And Title VII does not
address discrimination on the basis of disability, which is the only form of discrimination alleged
by Lee in this case. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin). Thus, there appears to be no legal basis for Lee to bring
his retaliation claim under Title VII. See Hammer v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., Inc.,
224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir.2000) (plaintiff cannot establish retaliation when opposing conduct
that is not prohibited by Title VII).
Lee may, however, pursue a claim under the ADA for alleged retaliation in response to his
complaints regarding the CTA’s failure to accommodate his disability. In its briefs in support of
its motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, the CTA appears to assume that Lee brings
his retaliation claim under the ADA and, in light of Lee’s pro se status, this Court will do the
same. See Wyhh v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (pleadings drafted by pro se
litigants are be liberally construed and not held to the same stringent standards as pleadings
prepared by lawyers).

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To state a retaliation claim under the ADA, Lee must allege: (1) that he engaged in a
statutorily protected activity; (2) that he suffered an adverse action; and (3) a causal link between
the protected activity and the adverse action. Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 690 (7th
Cir. 2010). A showing that the adverse action occurred fairly soon after the employee’s protected
expression can be sufficient from which to infer retaliatory motive. Paluck v. Gooding Rubber
Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1009–10 (7th Cir. 2000). That said, Lee cannot simply allege that his
protected activity preceded the adverse action in order to show that the former caused the latter.
Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1179 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussing the logical
fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc). Instead, he must “produce facts which somehow tie the
adverse decision to [his] protected actions.” Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 202 F.3d 913, 918
(7th Cir. 2000). 
In his response to the motion to dismiss, Lee states that his retaliation claim is based on
the CTA’s reaction to an amendment to his initial EEOC charge and that “since the time the
charge was filed until the termination Defendant continued to engage in violations of the ADA.”
(Pl.’s Resp. at 2, Dkt. No. 53.) But the Second Amendment Complaint does not include any
allegations regarding an amendment to the EEOC charge, and a plaintiff may not amend his
complaint through arguments in a response brief. Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d
1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984) (a court’s determination of a motion to dismiss is “limited to the
pleadings.”). Even in his response brief, Lee does not provide any detail regarding the timing of
the amendment to this EEOC charge relative to the timing of the alleged retaliatory conduct or
otherwise connect the amendment to any actions that CTA took against him. Thus, even if the
Court could consider the amendment in connection with the instant motion to dismiss, it would
not save Lee’s retaliation claim.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the CTA’s motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint is granted. The Court finds that the Second Amended Complaint does not adequately
plead a claim for discrimination based on Lee’s disability or retaliation. This does not mean that
there is no version of the facts that Lee could allege to survive a motion to dismiss. And for that
reason, Lee will be provided one final opportunity to amend his complaint to attempt to state a
viable claim. Lee shall have until May 15, 2015 to file a Third Amended Complaint that cures the
deficiencies discussed in this opinion. He is reminded to include in the Third Amended Complaint
all of the facts, including any facts regarding the amendment to his EEOC charge, upon which he
seeks to rely. This will be the final amendment permitted by the Court.

ENTERED:

Dated: April 22, 2015

__________________________
Andrea R. Wood
United States District Judge

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