Cheung v. Linaweaver et al
Filing
67
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John J. Tharp, Jr on December 10, 2013. Mailed notice (ph, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CURTIS KA KIM CHEUNG,
Petitioner,
v.
C.R. NICKLIN,
Warden, Metropolitan Correctional Center,
Respondent.
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No. 12 C 9500
Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Curtis Ka Kim Cheung is currently being held at the Metropolitan Correctional
Center (“MCC”) pursuant to a Certification of Extraditability and Order of Commitment entered
by Magistrate Judge Sheila Finnegan on October 15, 2012 (“the Extradition Order”). The
Extradition Order authorizes Cheung’s extradition to Hong Kong, where he has been charged
with a number of crimes in connection with an alleged investment fraud scheme. After the
Extradition Order was entered, Cheung filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the Extradition Order. The United States has deferred Cheung’s
extradition pending this Court’s ruling on Cheung’s habeas challenge to the Extradition Order.1
For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
Only a brief summary of the allegations on which the Extradition Order is premised is
necessary to evaluate the petitioner’s arguments. Cheung is a naturalized citizen of the United
States. He arrived in the United States in 1964 from China, attended high school, college and
1
Mr. Cheung did not move for a stay of the Extradition Order pending this Court’s
review of his habeas petition.
graduate school in this country, and for about ten years prior to his arrest in this matter, was
employed as a teacher in Chicago.
On March 7, 2012, the United States filed a complaint, at the request of the government
of Hong Kong,2 seeking an order to extradite Mr. Cheung to Hong Kong pursuant to a bilateral
agreement between the United States and Hong Kong concerning the extradition of fugitive
criminals (“the Agreement”).3 The Extradition complaint alleges that between December 1997
and October 1998, Cheung engaged in an investment fraud scheme in Hong Kong that defrauded
seven investors (all of whom were pilots with Cathay Pacific Airways) of about $3.4 million.
The gist of the claim is that Cheung told investors that he would invest their funds in the global
futures market, from which he claimed to have achieved annual returns that averaged
approximately 250 percent between 1984 and 1996. The victims of the fraud each transferred
funds to a corporate account controlled by Cheung in the Bahamas (the Kwong Fai Limited
account). On receipt of the funds, Kwong Fai Ltd. was supposed to have placed the funds into
Cheung’s private “house account” with “Prudential-Bache” or “Prudential Securities Inc.,”
which he told them was a privileged private account granted by brokerage firms to high net
worth customers. Each of the seven victims entered into a written Investment Trust Agreement
with Kwong Fai Limited and Cheung as their investment manager. None of the victims ever
received any statements or other written confirmation from these brokerage firms indicating how
their funds had been invested; instead, Cheung orally informed the victims that their investments
were doing well and provided a number of the victims with printouts that purported to show the
2
More formally, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic
of China (“HKSAR”).
3
More formally, the “Agreement between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Hong Kong for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders,” signed at
Hong Kong on December 20, 1996.
2
positive status of their investments. In the latter half of 1998, some of the victims became
concerned and asked Cheung to return their investments; Cheung then left Hong Kong in
November 1998 and has not returned. None of the investors ever received any funds back from
Kwong Fai or Cheung.
In June 2011, law enforcement authorities in Hong Kong obtained an arrest warrant for
Cheung predicated on multiple violations of three statues: Theft (18 counts), Evasion of Liability
by Deception (7 counts), and Procuring the Making of an Entry in Certain Records by Deception
(3 counts). Each of these offenses carries a maximum term of ten years imprisonment under
Hong Kong law. In December 2011, Hong Kong requested extradition of Mr. Cheung. The
Extradition complaint was filed in March 2012 and was assigned to Magistrate Judge Finnegan.
After conducting a hearing, Judge Finnegan issued the Extradition Order on October 15, 2012.
Mr. Cheung filed an initial petition for writ of habeas corpus on November 28, 2012, and an
amended petition on December 13, 2012. Also pending are motions to strike and quash the arrest
warrant and dismiss the complaint for extradition (Dkt. 28), to obtain a record of the transcript
and other records of the extradition hearing (Dkt. 36 and 37), to dismiss the extradition
complaint for humanitarian reasons (Dkt. 39), to obtain discovery (Dkt. 40), to proceed in forma
pauperis (Dkt. 41), and for appointment of a public defender (Dkt. 42 and 49). This Court, and
Magistrate Judge Finnegan, have also disposed of a number of other motions Mr. Cheung has
filed while his petition has been pending.4
4
Mr. Cheung is also a defendant in a civil case in this district alleging a similar
investment fraud involving a different victim. Fanslow v. Cheung, No. 1:11-cv-00907, N.D. Ill.
(Zagel, J.). That case has been stayed due to the pending extradition proceedings.
3
II.
ANALYSIS
Although Cheung’s amended petition purports to assert 13 grounds justifying issuance of
the writ,5 those grounds can, for the most part, be grouped into four categories. First, Grounds
One, Two, and Three assert that Cheung is not guilty of the charges set forth in the Hong Kong
indictment; these arguments can also be construed as arguments that there is not probable cause
to believe that he committed the crimes charged. Second, in Grounds Four and Thirteen, Cheung
argues that he should not be extradited for humanitarian and health reasons. In Grounds Five,
Six, and Eight, he appears to claim for various reasons that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel. Grounds Seven and Eleven essentially assert that Cheung should not be extradited
because the crimes for which he is charged in Hong Kong are not extraditable under the
Agreement because they are not “identical” to crimes in the United States, have no statutes of
limitation, and are too old. The remaining grounds do not appear to have any common element
and will be discussed individually.
A. Scope and Standard of Review
Review of Cheung’s asserted grounds for the writ must be informed by an understanding
of the limited scope of review of extradition rulings. This is not a direct appeal; extradition
rulings cannot be appealed directly and may be reviewed only by way of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir.
1999); In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237, 1240 (7th Cir.1980) (citing Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S.
364, 369 (1920)). As habeas corpus is “not a means for rehearing what the magistrate has
decided,” habeas review of an extradition ruling is limited to three issues: (1) whether the
magistrate judge had jurisdiction; (2) whether the offense charged is extraditable under the
5
A fourteenth ground merely purports to reserve the right to present still more grounds at
some future date.
4
relevant treaty; and (3) whether the evidence presented established probable cause to extradite. In
re Assarsson, 635 F.2d at 1240 (citing Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)); see also
Sacirbey v. Guccione, 589 F.3d 52, 63 (2d Cir.2 009). In the extradition context, probable cause
is defined as “evidence that would support a reasonable belief that [the petitioner] was guilty of
the crime charged.” Lindstrom v. Gilkey, No. 98 C 5191, 1999 WL 342320, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May
14, 1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A magistrate judge's finding of
probable cause to support extradition will be upheld if “there is any competent evidence to
support her finding.” Bovio v. United States, 989 F.2d 255, 258 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Assarsson,
635 F.2d at 1246). This limited scope of review is commensurate with the limited scope of
inquiry in the extradition hearing itself. An extradition hearing is not a plenary trial at which
guilt or innocence is decided; rather, it is in the nature of a preliminary examination to determine
whether probable cause exists to hold the fugitive for trial in the requesting country. Collins v.
Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (providing for extradition hearings).
B. Innocence and Sufficiency of the Evidence
The first three grounds of Cheung’s petition assert that he did not commit the crimes with
which he has been charged. An extradition hearing, however, is not a trial, and the Magistrate
Judge did not make a finding of guilt or innocence. Rather, the function of the judicial officer in
an extradition hearing is to assess whether there is probable cause to believe that the detainee
committed the offense(s) charged. As noted above, a finding of probable cause requires only
evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the petitioner is guilty. And a review of
such a finding on habeas corpus is limited to assessing “whether there was any evidence”
warranting the original finding. Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925) (emphasis
added). Thus, to the extent that he seeks release by asserting his innocence, Mr. Cheung’s
5
arguments are not cognizable; it is not the role of the extradition court, or the habeas court, to
determine guilt or innocence on the pending charges.
To the extent that Mr. Cheung is arguing that the evidence submitted in support of his
extradition was insufficient to establish probable cause to believe that he committed the offenses
charged, his argument is cognizable but plainly lacks merit. The United States submitted, on
behalf of the government of Hong Kong, ample evidence to support the charges pending against
Mr. Cheung.6 That evidence included, inter alia, summaries of the statements provided to Hong
Kong law enforcement officials by each of the seven victims of the alleged fraud, each of whom
related accounts of their dealings with Cheung that are consistent with the allegations of the
extradition complaint and each of which ends with the disappearance of both Mr. Cheung and the
funds they invested. Another witness, Hendrik Van Keulen, an intermediary who introduced
Cheung to some of the victims, provided a statement reporting that Cheung confessed to him in
January 1999 that he had not invested the victims’ money at Prudential or any other brokerage as
he had represented he would do. Representatives of Prudential also provided statements and
evidence showing that there were no sizeable transfers of money in and out of Cheung’s two
accounts with the bank. There is also evidence from another bank (Hang Seng Bank Limited, or
“HSBL”) indicating that during the period in question, there were 28 deposits, totaling more than
$3.2 million, directly from Kwong Fai Limited into Cheung’s personal account at HSBL. There
is more, but this summary suffices to show that there was more than a sufficient basis to support
Judge Finnegan’s finding of probable cause. Accordingly, Grounds One, Two, and Three do not
support a grant of the petition.
6
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to extradition proceedings. Bovio, 989 F.2d
at 259 & n.3.
6
C. Humanitarian and Health Issues
Cheung also argues, in Grounds Four and Thirteen, that he should not be extradited
because he fears for his life if returned to Hong Kong,7 and because he is elderly and his health is
deteriorating.8 These humanitarian concerns, however, do not provide a basis to grant a writ of
habeas corpus. See, e.g., Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2006) (denying habeas
request premised on fear of torture following rendition); In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d at 1240.
Indeed, “[w]hen the Executive seeks extradition pursuant to a request from a foreign nation, the
Judiciary does not inquire into the treatment or procedures the extradited citizen or alien will
receive in that country.” Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Under the
traditional doctrine of “non-inquiry,” such humanitarian considerations are within the purview of
the executive branch and generally should not be addressed by the courts in deciding whether a
petitioner is extraditable. Hoxha, 465 F.3d at 563. The non-inquiry principle serves interests of
international comity by relegating to political actors the sensitive foreign policy judgments that
are often involved in the question of whether to refuse an extradition request. Id. It is, therefore,
“the function of the Secretary of State to determine whether extradition should be denied on
humanitarian grounds.” Kiyemba, 561 F.3d at 518. Following entry of the Extradition Order,
Cheung’s attorney during the extradition hearing submitted Cheung’s concerns to the Secretary
7
In his petition, Mr. Cheung asserts that he has been kidnapped on three prior occasions,
in both the United States and Spain; the petition fails to explain these incidents or why there is
reason to fear that he is more susceptible to them if extradited to Hong Kong. Cheung also
expresses concern that he will be subject to persecution by Chinese authorities because he
escaped from China with other refugees in 1964. He also maintains in a supplemental motion
(Dkt. 39) that he will be transferred by the HKSAR authorities to “Communist China,” where he
will be subject to the death penalty for his crimes because his family formerly owned a bank
seized during the Cultural Revolution.
8
While this petition has been pending, Mr. Cheung filed a motion for bond predicated
upon his deteriorating health. The motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Finnegan, who
denied the motion following a hearing, concluding that Mr. Cheung’s health issues are not severe
and are being addressed by the MCC. Dkt. 63.
7
of State (see letter from S. Frankel to T. Heinemann, U.S. Dept. of State, included in the
petition); it is the Secretary’s prerogative to decide whether those concerns merit invocation of
the Agreement’s provisions relating to refusal of an extradition request based on humanitarian
concerns. See Agreement, Article 7 (“Humanitarian Considerations,” authorizing the Executive
to refuse extradition “when such surrender is likely to entail exceptionally serious consequences
related to age or health”). Mr. Cheung’s concerns regarding his safety and health do not provide
a basis for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In Grounds Five, Six, and Eight, Mr. Cheung appears to advance claims that his attorney
during the extradition hearing provided ineffective assistance of counsel.9 The short response to
these claims is that, because it is not itself a criminal proceeding, Mr. Cheung has no right to
counsel in an extradition hearing. See DeSilva, 181 F.3d at 868-69. “Only in criminal cases, and
only as an offshoot of the Sixth Amendment, does the incompetence of a privately selected
lawyer undermine the validity of the decision.” Id. at 869 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 342-45 (1980)). So, even assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Cheung received ineffective
assistance from the private attorney or attorneys he retained, those shortcomings would not
provide a basis to grant a writ of habeas corpus.
9
Ground Five generally asserts that the private attorney that Mr. Cheung retained did not
adequately prepare for the extradition hearing and did not present evidence at the hearing on the
petitioner’s behalf. Ground Six appears to be a request for “a second hearing and motion to
dismiss” based on unspecified ineffective assistance of counsel. Ground Eight is difficult to
decipher; it asserts that unidentified “Lawyers...informed and threatened [him] not to pursue the
Kidnappers [a reference to the same kidnappers who kidnapped him on three prior occasions?—
see n.7, supra] because that would be obstruction of justice ...”
8
E. Arguments Relating to the Offenses Charged
Read liberally, Grounds Seven and Eleven assert (albeit without explanation) that Mr.
Cheung cannot be extradited on the offenses charged in Hong Kong because those crimes do not
satisfy the requirements of the Agreement. So understood, this is one of the few bases on which
habeas review of an extradition order is appropriate. The result, however, is the same: Mr.
Cheung is not entitled to relief.
Article 2 of the Agreement provides, in relevant part, that:
Surrender of fugitive offenders shall be granted for an offence
coming within any of the following descriptions of offences in so
far as it is according to the laws of both Parties punishable by
imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one year, or
by a more severe penalty ... (x) Obtaining property or pecuniary
advantage by deception; theft; robbery; burglary, housebreaking,
or similar offences; unlawful handling or receiving of property;
false accounting; embezzlement; any other offence in respect of
property involving fraud ... [and] (xxxvi) Any other offence which
is punishable under the laws of both Parties by imprisonment or
other form of detention for more than one year, or by a more
severe penalty, unless surrender for such offence is prohibited by
the laws of the requested Party.
In short, under the Agreement, any offense that is a felony (that is, punishable by more than one
year of imprisonment) under the laws of both Hong Kong and the United States and (i) involves
theft or fraud (among other forms of conduct) or (ii) is not affirmatively barred as a ground for
extradition under the laws of the country requested to provide extradition, is extraditable.
Plainly, this broad scope includes the offenses for which Mr. Cheung has been charged in
Hong Kong, all of which carry possible sentences of up to ten years’ imprisonment and all of
which involve a species of theft and/or fraud. See generally Dkt. 31 at 3-35 and Dkt. 31-1 at 1-8.
Eighteen of the 28 charges Mr. Cheung faces are alleged violations of the Hong Kong theft
ordinance, Chapter 210, Section 2, which provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person commits
9
theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of
permanently depriving the other of it.” Seven charges allege violations of Section 18B of the
theft ordinance, which reaches conduct “where a person by any deception (whether or not such
deception was the sole or main inducement) . . . (b) dishonestly induces [a] creditor or any
person claiming payment on behalf of [a] creditor to wait for payment . . . or to forgo payment.”
And the last three charges Mr. Cheung faces allege violations of Section 18D(1) of the theft
ordinance, which makes it a crime to procure, “dishonestly, with a view to gain for [oneself] or
another or with intent to cause loss to another, by any deception . . . the making . . . of an entry in
a record of a bank.” There can be no reasonable argument that these offenses are not within the
ambit of Article 2 of the Agreement.
Nor can there be any dispute that the offenses with which Mr. Cheung has been charged
have counterparts under federal and state criminal laws in the United States. The Government
points, in the first instance, to the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, which, like each
of the Hong Kong statutes that Mr. Cheung is accused of violating, criminalizes “any scheme or
artifice to defraud or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.” As such, the mail fraud statute could substitute for all of the Hong
Kong offenses with which Mr. Cheung is charged, to the extent that they involve “deception.”
Moreover, “theft” or “embezzlement,” even without deception, constitutes a felony crime under
the laws of virtually any jurisdiction within the United States.10 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 661 (theft
within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; property valued in excess
10
Dual criminality is based on an assessment of both federal and state law. See Wright v.
Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58 (1903) (rejecting argument that the language of the treaty, “made
criminal by the laws of both countries,” should be interpreted as limiting its scope to federal law
and eliminating consideration of state laws); Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914, 918 (2d Cir.
1981); In re Ortiz, 444 F. Supp. 2d 876, 883 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
10
of $1,000 classified as felony);11 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1) and (b)(4) (felony theft under Illinois
law where value of property taken exceeds $500).12
The conduct for which Mr. Cheung has been charged, then, is chargeable as various
felony offenses in both Hong Kong and the United States and therefor satisfies the requirements
for extradition set forth in Article 2 of the Agreement. To the extent that Mr. Cheung argues that
the offenses charged must be “identical” to offenses defined under domestic law, Article 2
imposes no such requirement. To the contrary, it states expressly that “[a]n offence shall fall
within the description of offences in this Article ... (a) whether or not the laws of the Parties
place the offence within the same category of offences or describe the offence by the same
terminology.” Agreement, Article 2(4). See also Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922)
(the requirement of dual criminality “does not require that the name by which the crime is
described in the two countries be the same; nor that the scope of liability shall be coextensive, or,
in other respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular act charged is
criminal in both jurisdictions.”).
And finally with respect to these claims, the fact that there is no limitations period
applicable to the Hong Kong statutes does not provide a basis to issue the writ. The Agreement
does not require that extradition occur within any limitations period. Absent such a provision,
delay in seeking extradition “may be relevant to the Secretary of State’s final determination as to
11
In relevant part: “Whoever ... takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin,
any personal property of another [with value greater than $1,000] shall be punished by a fine ...
or imprisonment for not more than five years ...” Conduct prohibited by the statute includes the
taking or conversion to one’s own use of money or property of another. See, e.g., United States v.
Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1994).
12
Under Illinois law, “a person commits theft when he or she knowingly ... (1) Obtains or
exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner”; deception or fraud is not required. See,
e.g., People v. Day, 2011 Il App (2d) 091358 (2d Dist. Aug. 30, 2011) (noting distinction
between “theft” under § 16-1(a)(1) and “theft by deception” under § 16-1(a)(2).
11
whether extradition may go forward,” but it is not a basis on which a court may deny extradition.
Kamrin v. United States, 725 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 1984). Nor does delay deny the petitioner
due process under the Constitution. Insofar as the actions of the United States are at issue, due
process may apply, see Matter of Burk, 737 F.2d 1477, 1485 (7th Cir. 1984), but responsibility
for the delay in prosecuting Mr. Cheung does not lay with the United States. The conduct of the
United States in this matter is only to act pursuant to treaty obligations as extraditer, not
prosecutor, and as such it “implicat[es] different standards of conduct vis-à-vis a criminal
accused.” Id. at 1486. The government’s facilitation of an extradition request for a prosecution
that would be untimely under American law does not give rise to a due process claim against the
United States even where there has been a substantial delay in prosecution by the requesting
state. See id. at 1486-87 (rejecting due process claim based on United States agreement to
extradite defendant after more than 17 year delay in consideration of prior requests pursuant to
different agreements with requesting state).
And insofar as Cheung seeks to impose on the Government of Hong Kong the due
process requirements of the Fifth Amendment, it suffices to say that rights to due process under
American law do not extend extraterritorially. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901). See also
Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972) (citing
Neely):
[A] surrender of an American citizen required by treaty for
purposes of a foreign criminal proceeding is unimpaired by an
absence in the foreign judicial system of safeguards in all respects
equivalent to those constitutionally enjoined upon American trials.
See also, e.g., Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509, 513-14 (7th Cir. 1988) (requesting state’s
compliance with panoply of Fifth Amendment rights not a basis to challenge extradition); Matter
of Burt, 737 F.2d at 1485 n.11.
12
Accordingly, the absence of any statute of limitations with respect to the Hong Kong
charges does not provide Mr. Cheung a basis for release.
F. Other Arguments
Mr. Cheung offers several other purported grounds for release that merit little discussion.
In Ground Nine, Mr. Cheung asserts that the Extradition complaint is not signed. Review
of the docket, however, shows that the complaint is signed by Assistant United States Attorney
Stephanie M. Zimdahl and Magistrate Judge Finnegan. R. 3.
In Grounds Seven and Ten, Mr. Cheung states that the birthdate of the individual
identified in the extradition request is not his birthdate,13 but he did not dispute his identity
during the Extradition hearing at which Magistrate Judge Finnegan expressly found him to be the
individual identified in the request. Further, with the exception of these two unadorned
statements, the entire tenor of Mr. Cheung’s petition acknowledges that he is the same Curtis Ka
Kim Cheung referred to by the witnesses; the factual gist of his petition is not that the authorities
have the wrong man but that he did not defraud or steal from any of the complaining witnesses in
the course of managing their investments.
Finally, Cheung argues that he is entitled to bail and house arrest in lieu of incarceration
at the MCC. There is, however, no right to “bail” in an extradition proceeding, Sahagian, 864
F.2d at 514, and denial of bail—temporary and conditional release—would not in any event
constitute a basis for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus—permanent release. There may be
“special circumstances” that justify bail in a habeas proceeding, and Mr. Cheung appears to
assert that his declining health qualifies. As noted at the outset of this opinion, however,
Magistrate Judge Finnegan has recently held a hearing on Mr. Cheung’s health related claims
13
According to the Extradition Order, Cheung’s date of birth is May 26, 1946. His
petition does not set forth the purportedly correct date.
13
and denied his motion for release on that basis (and she previously denied his motion for bail).
Those orders were appealable—see, e.g., Grune v. Coughlin, 913 F.2d 41, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1990);
Cherek v. United States, 767 F.2d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 1985)—but Mr. Cheung did not appeal
them, forfeiting review. He has not shown that there are special circumstances that warrant his
release pending extradition and, with the issuance of this opinion, there is no need for further
delay with respect to action by the Secretary of State with regard to the extradition request.
*
*
*
For the reasons set forth above, the petition for habeas corpus is denied.14
Entered: December 10, 2013
____________________________________
John J. Tharp, Jr.
United States District Judge
14
No Certificate of Appealability is required because “such certificates are not required
in habeas corpus cases brought solely under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Lindstrom v. Graber, 203 F.3d
470, 473 (7th Cir. 2000).
14
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