Napoles v. Johnson

Filing 88

ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 2/20/2015: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 83 is granted. Counts II and III of the Third Amended Complaint are dismissed without prejudice. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CRISTIAN NAPOLES,
Plaintiff,

No. 12 CV 10220

v.

Judge Manish S. Shah

DAVID JOHNSON, SR., individually
and as father and next friend of
DAVID JOHNSON, JR., a minor,
Defendants.
ORDER
Defendant’s motion to dismiss, [83], is granted. Counts II and III of the Third
Amended Complaint are dismissed, as the complaint contains no allegations
supporting an inference of willful and wanton conduct, whether intentional or
reckless in nature.
STATEMENT
In his Third Amended Complaint, [80],1 Cristian Napoles alleges that he was
physically injured by David Johnson, Jr., a minor. Napoles brings against Johnson
(through Johnson’s father and next friend, David Johnson, Sr.), three claims under
Illinois common law: negligence (Count I), willful and wanton misconduct (Count II),
and reckless and negligent conduct (Count III).2 Defendants move to dismiss Counts
II and III of the current complaint.
The Facts
Napoles alleges that on October 31, 2011, both he and Johnson, Jr. were at or
near the intersection of 156th Street and Price Avenue in Calumet City, Illinois. See
[80] ¶¶ 6–7. According to Napoles, Johnson at that time acted in a negligent manner,
Citations to the record are designated by the document number as reflected on the district
court’s docket, enclosed in brackets; referenced page numbers are from the CM/ECF header
placed at the top of filings.
1

The district court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See May
8, 2013 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Kendall, J.), [34] at 3–5.

2

and as a result “caused physical injuries” to Napoles. See id. ¶¶ 8–9. Napoles also
alleges that Johnson acted “in a willful and wanton manner,” id. ¶ 12, and “in a
reckless manner,” id. ¶ 15.
Johnson’s Motion to Dismiss
Johnson moves to dismiss Counts II (willful and wanton misconduct) and III
(reckless and negligent conduct) of Napoles’s Third Amended Complaint under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally [83]. According to
Johnson, Count II is insufficiently pleaded, see id. at 3–4, and Count III fails as a
matter of law because no such cause of action exists in Illinois, see id. at 4–5.
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a claim for
relief contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” The complaint need not set forth detailed factual allegations, see
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted), but it
must present enough factual matter, accepted as true, that the claim to relief is
plausible on its face, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
district court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722
F.3d 939, 946 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
To demonstrate willful and wanton conduct in Illinois, the plaintiff must first
establish the elements for a basic negligence claim: existence of a duty, breach of that
duty, and injury proximately caused by the breach. See Doe-2 v. McLean Cnty. Unit
Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Directors, 593 F.3d 507, 514 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Krywin v. Chi.
Transit Auth., 391 Ill.App.3d 663 (2009)). In addition, the plaintiff must show that
the defendant’s breach of duty was more than just a negligent breach. See id.
Conduct is willful and wanton only if the defendant intended his actions to cause
harm, or if his actions exhibited “indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety
of others.” Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Burke v. 12
Rothschild’s Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill.2d 429 (1992); Loitz v. Remington Arms Co.,
Inc., 138 Ill.2d 404 (1990)); see also Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill.2d 213,
238 (2007) (discussing Burke, 148 Ill.2d at 451); Pfister v. Shusta, 167 Ill.2d 417, 421
(1995) (citing Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill.2d 267, 273 (1994); Illinois Pattern
Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 14.01 (3d ed. 1993)).
The allegations in Napoles’s Third Amended Complaint—even when viewed in
his favor—do not adequately suggest that Johnson intended to harm Napoles, or that
Johnson acted with any indifference to or with conscious disregard for Napoles’s
safety. All that is known is that Johnson purportedly injured Napoles. No facts are
2

asserted concerning how Johnson supposedly caused such an injury, what the injury
was, or any other circumstances surrounding the harm that Napoles claims to have
suffered. The only statement pertaining to Johnson’s alleged willful and wanton
conduct is Napoles’s assertion that Johnson “acted in a willful and wanton manner,”
[80] ¶ 12. This is not a statement of fact; it is a recitation of what Napoles must
demonstrate with factual allegations that are otherwise missing. “Threadbare
recitals of . . . a cause of action” are insufficient to satisfy the notice-pleading
requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Napoles argues that his allegations of willful and wanton conduct are
adequate because there is a “thin line” between willful and wanton acts and those
that are merely negligent, see [85] at 2 (citing Ziarko, 161 Ill.2d 267), and defendant
here “has no quarrel with the factual allegations” supporting Napoles’s negligence
claim (Count I), see id. at 1. While it is certainly true that factual allegations
indicating negligence may also tend to show willful and wanton behavior—that is,
facts demonstrating a breach of duty may also show an intent to harm the plaintiff or
a conscious disregard for his safety—the problem with Napoles’s argument here is
that his complaint contains no such allegations. The facts as currently alleged are
minimal to the extreme. No inference of an intent to harm, or of a conscious disregard
for Napoles’s safety, can plausibly be drawn from the statement that Johnson
physically injured Napoles at a particular intersection in Calumet City, on a
particular date. And it is of no moment that Johnson has not also moved to dismiss
Napoles’s negligence claim. Even if Johnson understood from the face of the
complaint what plaintiff’s negligence claim entailed, this does not mean that Johnson
necessarily received adequate notice of what Napoles meant by “willful and wanton
conduct.” The “thin line” of which Napoles speaks is not so thin as to be nonexistent.
Willful and wanton behavior may in some cases “be only degrees more than ordinary
negligence,” Pfister, 167 Ill.2d at 422 (citation omitted), but even a small difference is
greater than no difference at all.
Napoles has not included in his Third Amended Complaint any facts
reasonably suggesting that Johnson acted in a willful and wanton manner, and the
bare assertion that he did so is not enough to withstand Johnson’s motion to dismiss.
Defendant’s motion is therefore granted as to Count II of the current complaint.
Johnson also moves to dismiss Count III of the complaint, which alleges that
Johnson engaged in reckless and negligent conduct. See [80] ¶¶ 14–16. Johnson
argues that this claim cannot proceed as a matter of law, because Illinois does not
recognize such a cause of action. This claim, says Johnson, is merely redundant of the
negligence and willful-and-wanton-conduct claims discussed above. See [83] at 4–5.
Defendant is correct that alleging recklessness is simply another way of alleging
3

willful and wanton conduct. See Murray, 224 Ill.2d at 236 (discussing a “reckless
disregard for the safety of others”) (citation omitted); Ziarko, 161 Ill.2d at 274
(stating that “reckless” actions may qualify as willful and wanton behavior)
(plurality opinion). Napoles does not add in Count III any factual allegations
supporting this theory: the assertion that Johnson “acted in a reckless manner,” [80]
¶ 15, is merely a legal conclusion. This count, too, is therefore dismissed.
The motion to dismiss Counts II and III is granted. Both counts are dismissed
without prejudice.
ENTER:
Date: 2/20/15
Manish S. Shah
U.S. District Judge

4