Medrano v. Ghosh et al
Filing
181
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the motion to transfer venue, 159 . The Court grants Director Godinez and Chairperson Miller's motion to dismiss, 141 . The Court denies Wexford and Dr. Tilden's mot ion to dismiss, 134 , with respect to Dr. Tilden, but grants that motion with respect to the respondeat superior claim against Wexford.A status hearing is scheduled for Tuesday, August 18, 2015. At that hearing,the parties should propose a discovery schedule. The proposed schedule should provide for expedited completion of discovery as this case is more than is two-and-a-half years old. The parties should also be prepared to discuss whether they want the case referred to Magistrate Judge Finnegan for a settlement conference. Salvador Godinez and Jackie Miller terminated. Status hearing set for 8/18/2015 at 09:00 AM. Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 7/21/2015:Mailed notice(srn, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSE MEDRANO,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 13 C 84
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.;
PARTHASARATHI GHOSH; ARTHUR FUNK;
LOUIS SCHICKER; CHARLES FASANO;
JACKIE MILLER; SALVADOR GODINEZ;
ANDREW TILDEN; AND RANDY PFISTER,
Judge Thomas M. Durkin
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Jose Medrano, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), alleges that IDOC staff and medical service providers were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
See R. 129. He alleges this violation occurred while he was incarcerated at
Stateville Correctional Center in Crest Hill, Illinois from December 30, 2009
through January 26, 2011, and at Pontiac Correctional Center in Pontiac, Illinois,
since then. See id. Specifically, Medrano has sued IDOC Director, Salvador Godinez;
IDOC Administrative Review Board Chairperson, Jackie Miller; IDOC Agency
Medical Coordinator, Charles Fasano; Pontiac’s Warden, Randy Pfister; the IDOC’s
medical services provider at both Stateville and Pontiac, Wexford Health Sources,
Inc.; doctors employed by Wexford at Stateville, namely Dr. Parthasarathi Ghosh,
Dr. Arthur Funk, and Dr. Louis Schicker; and a doctor employed by Wexford as
Pontiac’s Medical Director, Dr. Andrew Tilden. See id. Wexford and its doctors have
moved to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Central
District of Illinois (where Pontiac is located) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). R. 159.
Wexford and Dr. Tilden, and Director Godinez and Chairperson Miller, have also
moved to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 134; R. 141. For the following reasons, the motion to transfer
is denied, Director Godinez and Chairperson Miller’s motion to dismiss is granted,
and Wexford and Dr. Tilden’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in
part.
Legal Standard
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. See, e.g.,
Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th
Cir. 2009). A complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to
provide defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This standard “demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must “contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “‘A claim has facial
2
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
Mann v. Vogel, 707 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In
applying this standard, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Mann, 707 F.3d at 877.
Background
Medrano was incarcerated at Pontiac through December 29, 2009. R. 129 ¶ 15.
During that time, beginning in 2003, he was given medial furloughs to visit
neurosurgeons and pain specialists at the University of Illinois at Chicago (“UIC”)
regarding “severe pain in his back.” Id. ¶ 17.
On December 30, 2009, Medrano was given another medical furlough to visit
doctors at UIC. Id. ¶¶ 15, 18. As a part of this latest medical furlough, Medrano was
transferred from Pontiac to Stateville (the “Stateville furlough”). Id. ¶ 15. He was
incarcerated at Stateville until he was transferred back to Pontiac on January 26,
2011. Id. During the Stateville furlough, Medrano also received treatment from
specialists at UIC for (1) back pain; (2) right hand and wrist pain; and (3) right
shoulder pain. See id. ¶¶ 18, 39, 46. Medrano alleges that Defendants have been
deliberately indifferent to these three medical conditions.
I.
Back Pain
Medrano alleges that he was initially diagnosed with “certain back-related
conditions” in 2003. R. 129 ¶ 17. Dr. Bergin and Dr. Konstantin Slavin, “[b]oard
certified neurosurgeons at UIC, diagnosed [Medrano] with . . . foraminal stenosis,
3
sciatic nerve involvement, and disk bulge and degenerative joint disease of his spinal
column.” Id.1 Pain specialists at UIC, Dr. Charles Laurito and Dr. O. Fischer,
prescribed naproxen, Neurontin, and hydrocodone to treat Medrano’s back pain. Id.
During his Stateville furlough, on February 17, 2010, Medrano returned to
UIC and Dr. Laurito gave Medrano a transforaminal epidural steroid injection.2 Id. ¶
18. Medrano’s pain worsened after receiving the epidural steroid injection. Id. ¶ 19.
On July 19, 2010, Dr. Slavin recommended that Medrano receive more steroid
injections because oftentimes when the first steroid injection is ineffective, further
injections are helpful at reducing pain. Id. Dr. Slavin also recommended adding oral
Tramadol (a pain killer) to his prescriptions for his back pain. Id.
On January 5, 2011, Dr. Ghosh physically examined Medrano at Stateville.
Id. ¶ 21. Dr. Ghosh told Medrano he would not receive any further epidural steroid
injections because his back condition did not require them and they were too costly.
Id. Medrano alleges that Dr. Ghosh told Dr. Funk, who then informed IDOC Agency
Medical Coordinator, Charles Fasano, that epidural steroid injections were
ineffective in alleviating Medrano’s back pain. Id.
1
Medrano’s complaint does not provide Dr. Bergin’s full name.
An “epidural steroid injection,” is a procedure in which “steroid medicine [is]
injected, under x-ray guidance, into the right spot” in a patient’s spine. See USC
Center for Spinal Surgery, Treatment Options, http://www.uscspine.com/
treatment/steroid-injections.cfm (last visited July 21, 2015). “A transforaminal
[epidural steroid injection] means the injection is placed slightly to one side of the
spine, and the medicine is injected near the ruptured disc and inflamed spinal nerve.
A caudal [epidural steroid injection] is performed by placing the needle near the
tailbone, and injecting the medicine into the region of the sacral nerves and lower
lumbar spinal nerves. See id.
2
4
Upon his return to Pontiac, Medrano alleges that he was treated by “Dr. Tilden
or by other back care providers,” but that they failed to ensure that he “received
necessary medical treatment, including the full extent of treatment recommended by
Dr. Slavin.” R. 129 ¶ 63. Despite this alleged deliberate indifference, Medrano did
receive a caudal epidural steroid injection at Pontiac on February 25, 2011. Id. ¶ 23.
That injection was the last Medrano received and his back pain has remained “severe
and debilitating.” Id.
II.
Right Hand and Wrist Pain
Medrano alleges that he has suffered from severe pain and numbness in his
right hand and wrist leading up to his right arm and shoulder since 2003. Id. ¶ 34.
Prior to his Stateville furlough, on May 12, 2009, Andrew Offerman, an occupational
therapist at a hospital in Pontiac, Illinois, prescribed a Kevlar wrist brace to hold
Medrano’s wrist at a 15-20 degree angle at night. Id. ¶ 36.
Several months later on December 31, 2009, at the beginning of his Stateville
furlough, Medrano told Dr. Ghosh that he had been prescribed a Kevlar brace.
Id. ¶ 37. Dr. Ghosh, however, told Medrano he would not receive a Kevlar brace
because it was too expensive and he would receive an elastic brace instead. Id.
Medrano alleges that he told Dr. Ghosh that the the elastic brace was ineffective in
holding his wrist at a 15-20 degree angle. Id. ¶ 38. Medrano never received a Kevlar
brace. Id.
The pain in Medrano’s hand and wrist worsened. Id. ¶ 39. On July 19, 2010, a
UIC pain specialist prescribed Tramadol and physical therapy for Medrano. Id. In
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late December 2010 or early January 2011, Medrano asked Dr. Ghosh, Dr. Funk, Dr.
Schicker, and Fasano to give him physical therapy and a Kevlar brace, but he did not
receive either. Id. ¶ 41. Medrano alleges that his pain grew worse because he never
received a Kevlar brace or physical therapy. Id. ¶ 40.
III.
Right Shoulder Pain
During Medrano’s Stateville furlough, on December 31, 2009, Dr. Benjamin
Goldberg, an orthopedic specialist at UIC, diagnosed Medrano with a labrum tear
and a cyst in his right shoulder. Id. ¶ 46. On October 4, 2010, Dr. Goldberg performed
surgery on Medrano’s right shoulder for adhesive capsulitis with bursitis. Id. On
October 18, 2010, Medrano visited Dr. Goldberg at UIC for a follow-up visit where Dr.
Goldberg recommended that he engage in physical therapy that focused on aggressive
range of motion exercises. Id. ¶ 47.
Medrano began physical therapy at Stateville a week after his October 4, 2010
appointment with Dr. Goldberg. Id. ¶ 48. Two months into therapy, Medrano’s
shoulder pain worsened, and his physical therapist, Paul Humphries, concluded that
physical therapy was ineffective for Medrano and if continued, would be harmful to
his shoulder. Id. Humphries told Dr. Ghosh, Dr. Funk, and Fasano that he thought
physical therapy was ineffective for Medrano and he should see Dr. Goldberg at UIC
for follow-up care and further consultation. Id. Medrano alleges that Dr. Ghosh, Dr.
Funk, and Fasano refused to allow him to return to UIC to meet with Dr. Goldberg.
Id. ¶ 49.
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IV.
Medrano’s Grievance History
Upon his return to Pontiac, Medrano filed a grievance with the IDOC dated
February 24, 2011. See R. 129-3. In the grievance Medrano claimed that the doctors
at Stateville and IDOC officials “refused and failed to comply with the Orthopedic
specialist, the Pain clinic specialist, and the neurosurgeon’s prescribed treatment.”
Id. at 3. Specifically, Medrano complained that he had not received the Kevlar brace,
occupational therapy, follow-up treatment for his shoulder, and steroid injections that
he had been prescribed. Id. at 2-4.
Medrano did not receive a response to his February 24 grievance, so he wrote a
letter to the IDOC Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) asking for a response. R.
129 ¶ 24. Having received no response to his grievance or ARB letter, Medrano wrote
letters to ARB Chairperson, Jackie Miller, dated June 2, July 16, and September 5,
2011, seeking a response. Id. ¶¶ 25-27. Medrano also wrote a letter to “Ms. T.
Anderson” at ARB, dated October 13, 2011. Id. ¶ 28. Having received no response to
his grievance or letters to the ARB, Medrano wrote two formal complaint letters to
IDOC Director Godinez, dated November 28 and December 26, 2011, asking for a
response to his grievance and ARB letters. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. As of September 3, 2014,
when Medrano filed his Fourth Amended Complaint, he had not received a formal
response to his February 24, 2011 grievance. Id. ¶ 33.
Medrano alleges that the pain in his right shoulder and right hand and wrist
has worsened, id. ¶¶ 44, 52, and that his back pain has remained “severe and
debilitating.” Id. ¶ 23. Medrano has not received a steroid injection since February
7
25, 2011. Id. In addition to seeking damages for Defendants’ alleged deliberate
indifference, Medrano seeks the following injunctive relief: (1) further treatment
from Dr. Slavin at UIC; (2) provision of a Kevlar brace that will hold his wrist at a
15-20 degree angle and physical therapy for his wrist; (3) further treatment from
Dr. Goldberg for his right shoulder pain; and (4) an injunction preventing
Defendants from impeding Medrano from receiving such medical care. Id. at 27-31.
Analysis
I.
Venue
Wexford and its doctors (Dr. Tilden, Dr. Ghosh, Dr. Funk) seek to have this
case transferred to the Central District of Illinois, where Pontiac is located,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). R. 159. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought” for “the convenience of the parties and witnesses” and “in the interest
of justice.” The statute “is intended to place discretion in the district court to
adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case
consideration of convenience and fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S. 22, 29 (1988). “The statute permits a ‘flexible and individualized analysis’ and
affords district courts the opportunity to look beyond a narrow or rigid set of
considerations in their determinations.” Research Automation, Inc. v. SchraderBridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Stewart, 487 U.S. at
29).
8
“With respect to the convenience evaluation, courts generally consider the
availability of and access to witnesses, and each party’s access to and distance from
resources in each forum.” Research Automation, 626 F.3d at 978. “Other related
factors include the location of material events and the relative ease of access to
sources of proof.” Id.
“The ‘interests of justice’ is a separate element of the transfer analysis that
relates to the efficient administration of the court system.” Id. “For this element,
courts look to factors including docket congestion and likely speed to trial in the
transferor and potential transferee forums; each court’s relative familiarity with the
relevant law; the respective desirability of resolving controversies in each locale;
and the relationship of each community to the controversy.” Id. (internal citations
omitted). “The interest of justice may be determinative, warranting transfer or its
denial even where the convenience of the parties and witnesses points toward the
opposite result.” Id.
With respect to the “location of material events,” Wexford and its doctors
argue that transfer is appropriate because Medrano’s claims are “predicated
primarily” on his stay at Pontiac, where he currently resides. R. 160 at 1. The Court
disagrees with this contention. Medrano’s complaints stem from treatment he
received at UIC during his Stateville furlough, and the alleged decision by the
Stateville doctors not to comply with the prescriptions and other directions of the
UIC doctors. Of course, Medrano alleges that he continues to suffer from this lack of
9
treatment at Pontiac. But this is not a basis to conclude that Pontiac is any more
the “location of material events” than Stateville.
Moreover, with respect to the location of the parties, Medrano has sued three
doctors who treated him at Stateville compared to only Dr. Tilden from Pontiac.
Wexford itself provides medical services at both Pontiac and Stateville. Warden
Pfister is located in Pontiac, but Medrano has only sued him in order to obtain
injunctive relief, and he will not be deposed. Medrano’s counsel has represented
that they will depose Dr. Tilden in Pontiac. See R. 170 at 5. The other defendants
who have not moved for transfer are all IDOC officials who are frequently
defendants in this District. Thus, the location of the parties does not counsel in
favor of transfer.
Access to “sources of proof” also does not counsel in favor of transfer. Wexford
and its doctors argue that “the non-party witnesses that possess the majority of
relevant information as it pertains to liability work and reside in the Central
District,” R. 160 at 8, and “[r]ecords regarding [Medrano’s] incarceration at Pontiac .
. . are kept at Pontiac.” Id. at 10. There is no indication in Medrano’s complaint, or
in Wexford and its doctors’ motion, as to who these non-party witnesses might be,
and it is not certain that any such witnesses will be relevant to this case. In any
event, to the extent non-party witnesses from Pontiac are relevant, Medrano’s
counsel has represented that “they will likely be deposed in Pontiac and their
depositions will be used at trial.” R. 170 at 4. Moreover, the other non-party
witnesses—i.e., the UIC doctors who provided the treatment that is at the heart of
10
Medrano’s claims—are located in this District. Additionally, the parties are already
in possession of all the relevant documentary evidence in the record. The Central
District is no more convenient than this District with respect to access to sources of
proof.
The movants also argue that the “interests of justice” counsel in favor of
transfer to Pontiac because there “is an inherent unfairness of burdening citizens in
the Northern District with jury duty for a case where the majority of relief
requested (especially the requested injunctive relief) arises out of occurrences
primarily in an unrelated forum.” R. 160 at 12. But as noted above, a significant
portion of the material events occurred in this District, negating any potential
unfairness. Furthermore, other factors relevant to the “interests of justice,” such as
docket congestion, speed to trial, and the courts’ familiarity with the relevant law,
are neutral in this instance.
Therefore, the motion by Wexford and its doctors to transfer the case to the
Central District of Illinois is denied.
II.
Motions to Dismiss
In Counts I, II, and III, Medrano alleges that Defendants violated his civil
rights because they knew of his serious medical conditions, “and took no steps to
enable [Medrano] to receive [the] treatment [he required].” See R. 129 ¶¶ 53-95.
“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment when they display deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners.” Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2008). To establish
11
a deliberate indifference claim under this standard premised upon inadequate
medical treatment, a plaintiff must show (1) that the plaintiff suffered an
objectively serious risk of harm, and (2) that the defendant acted with a subjectively
culpable state of mind in acting or failing to act in disregard of that risk. Roe v.
Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011).
A.
Personal Involvement and Supervisory Liability
The subjective element of a deliberate indifference claim cannot be premised
upon a theory of respondeat superior. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 757 (7th
Cir. 2011). Instead, a plaintiff’s allegations against a prison official can only satisfy
“the personal responsibility requirement of section 1983 if the conduct causing the
constitutional deprivation occurs at [the official’s] direction or with his knowledge
and consent.” Id. “That is, [the official] must know about the conduct and facilitate
it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.” Id. “In short, some causal connection
or affirmative link between the action complained about and the official sued is
necessary for § 1983 recovery.” Id. Thus, although a prison official “is entitled to
relegate to the prison’s medical staff the provision of good medical care,” Burks v.
Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009), “nonmedical officials can be chargeable
with . . . deliberate indifference where they have a reason to believe (or actual
knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a
prisoner.” Arnett, 658 F.3d at 755.
1.
Director Godinez and Chairperson Miller
Medrano only alleges that Director Godinez and Chairperson Miller had
12
notice of his medical conditions and treatment from the grievances he filed and
letters he sent. He does not allege that Director Godinez or Chairperson Miller took
any action that prevented Medrano from receiving adequate medical care. Absent
allegations of such causal conduct, Medrano’s allegations are insufficient to state a
claim. See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he alleged
mishandling of Owens’s grievances by persons who otherwise did not cause or
participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.”); see also George v. Smith,
507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative
complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation.”); Neely v. Randle, 2013 WL
3321451, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2013) (“If there is ‘no personal involvement by the
warden [in an inmate’s medical care] outside the grievance process,’ that is
insufficient to state a claim against the warden.” (quoting Gevas v. Mitchell, 492
Fed. App’x 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2012))).
For written notice to prison administrators to form the basis of a deliberate
indifference claim, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the communication, in its
content and manner of transmission, gave the prison official sufficient notice to
alert him or her to an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Arnett, 658 F.3d at
755. Medrano cannot make such an allegation here. Rather, Medrano alleges he
received regular appointments with doctors, a number of medical tests, and
medication prescriptions in an attempt to address his medical conditions. It may be
that Medrano has sufficiently alleged that some of this treatment fell below a
constitutionally adequate level. That question is not at issue on this motion. But in
13
the absence of allegations that Medrano was “completely ignored by medical staff,”
Arnett, 658 F.3d at 756, Director Godinez and Chairperson Miller were entitled to
rely on the medical judgments supporting the treatments Medrano alleges he
received. See id. (“If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . . a nonmedical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in
capable hands.”). The Seventh Circuit has affirmed district court dismissals of
similar allegations. See Adams v. Durai, 153 Fed. App’x 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“An administrator does not become responsible for a doctor’s exercise of medical
judgment simply by virtue of reviewing an inmate grievance, and that is all [the
plaintiff] alleges here.”); Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2005) (“We
do not think [the prison official’s] failure to take further action once he had referred
the matter to the medical providers can be viewed as deliberate indifference.”).3
Accordingly, Medrano’s claims against Director Godinez and Chairperson Miller are
dismissed.
See also Brown v. Wexford Health Sources., 2014 WL 257552, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
23, 2014) (“[The Warden’s] refusal to consider two emergency grievances as
emergencies, which is all Plaintiff’s complaint alleges even under a liberal
construction, by itself, does not indicate that [the Warden] caused or participated in
Plaintiff’s alleged inadequate medical care and does not state a claim.”); Foster v.
Ghosh, 2013 WL 3790905, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2013) (“[The Warden] is not liable
under the doctrine of deliberate indifference for simply serving in his administrative
role at the Stateville Correctional Center.”); cf. Jones v. Drew, 221 Fed. App’x 450,
454 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming a grant of summary judgment because “[a]lthough
[the plaintiff] mailed a complaint to [the Warden] and filed a grievance at [the
prison] describing his frustration with his treatment, there is no evidence that [the
Warden] personally received or read these communications since he delegated the
review of prisoner complaints to others within his office.”); Johnson v. Snyder, 444
F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming a grant of summary judgment because
“[t]he fact that [the plaintiff] sent a letter or letters to [the IDOC Director] is
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding defendant Snyder.”).
3
14
2.
Dr. Tilden
Medrano alleges that Dr. Tilden was Pontiac’s Medical Director, and in that
role “had primary care, management and administrative responsibilities at Pontiac,
including [Medrano’s] treatment and care.” R. 129 ¶ 10. Medrano alleges further
that after he “returned to Pontiac, [he] was seen by . . . Dr. Tilden or by other back
care providers whose recommendations and treatment were approved and
supervised by [Dr.] Tilden.” Id. ¶ 63. Medrano claims that his “medical records
indicated the deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical need, specifically, his
‘back condition’ . . . . [but] Dr. Tilden failed to act on that information by ensuring
[Medrano] received necessary medical treatment, including the full extent of
treatment recommended by Dr. Slavin.” Id.
Dr. Tilden argues that “[h]aving access to [a patient’s] medical chart by
virtue of one’s position as a prison doctor does not impute deliberate indifference on
the part of physicians not involved in a patient’s treatment decisions.” R. 135 at 5. It
is true that respondeat superior liability is not available for a claim under § 1983.
Medrano, however, does not use the mere fact of Dr. Tilden’s title to establish his
liability. Rather, Medrano alleges that he received inadequate care at Pontiac when
he failed to receive the treatment prescribed by the UIC doctors. Medrano argues
that Dr. Tilden had knowledge of this inadequate treatment due to his supervisory
positions as Medical Director. In this way, Medrano’s allegation is quite different
from the allegations against Director Godinez and Chairperson Miller, which the
Court has already dismissed. Dr. Tilden is not merely responsible for prison
15
administration generally, but is responsible for medical care in particular. This
allegation is enough for the Court to infer that Dr. Tilden knew about any
inadequate care Medrano received and did nothing to remedy the situation. This is
sufficient to state a claim against him based on Medrano’s accompanying allegation
that he has not received the treatment prescribed by the UIC doctors.
B.
Respondeat Superior Liability for Wexford
Medrano alleges that Wexford is liable for his injuries both directly through
its policies and practices, R. 129 ¶ 66, and on the basis of respondeat superior. Id. ¶¶
65, 79, 93. Wexford has moved to dismiss the claims against it to the extent they are
based on a respondeat superior theory. Medrano, of course, concedes that “under the
current state of the law, a cause of action against Wexford based solely on
respondeat superior cannot be maintained.” R. 156 at 9; see also Shields v. Ill. Dep’t
of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 796 (7th Cir. 2014). Medrano, however, urges the
Court to deny Wexford’s motion to dismiss the respondeat superior claim on the
basis of the reasoning expressed in Shields v. Illinois Department of Corrections, in
which the Seventh Circuit questioned the rationale expressed in precedential case
law for prohibiting respondeat superior liability for corporations under § 1983. R.
156 at 9-10 (citing 746 F.3d at 789-97).
Despite the Shields panel’s reasoning, this Court is bound to follow existing
precedent. See Reiser v. Residential Funding Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir.
2004) (“[D]ecisions of a superior court are authoritative on inferior courts. Just as
the court of appeals must follow decisions of the Supreme Court whether or not we
16
agree with them, so district judges must follow the decisions of this court whether
or not they agree.”). The Seventh Circuit was clear that the law of this Circuit “still
extends Monell [and its prohibition on respondeat superior liability] from
municipalities to private corporations.” Shields, 746 F.3d at 796. And shortly after
its decision in Shields, the Seventh Circuit indicated it would not apply respondeat
superior liability under § 1983 to corporations until an “intervening on-point
Supreme Court decision” requires it. Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617, 640 (7th Cir.
2014), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied (Sept. 9, 2014). Thus, Medrano’s
claim against Wexford based on respondeat superior must be dismissed.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the motion to transfer venue, R.
159. The Court grants Director Godinez and Chairperson Miller’s motion to dismiss,
R. 141. The Court denies Wexford and Dr. Tilden’s motion to dismiss, R, 134, with
respect to Dr. Tilden, but grants that motion with respect to the respondeat superior
claim against Wexford.
A status hearing is scheduled for Tuesday, August 18, 2015. At that hearing,
the parties should propose a discovery schedule. The proposed schedule should
provide for expedited completion of discovery as this case is more than is two-and-ahalf years old. The parties should also be prepared to discuss whether they want the
case referred to Magistrate Judge Finnegan for a settlement conference.
17
ENTERED:
______________________________
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: July 21, 2015
18
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