Ores v. Jones et al
Filing
81
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: For the reasons stated in the Opinion, Defendants' summary judgment motion 56 is granted and Plaintiff's cross motion 66 is denied. A separate AO-450 judgment shall be entered on the docket. Status hearing of 02/03/2016 is vacated. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice(air, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
GLENN ORES,
Plaintiff,
v.
VILLAGE OF DOLTON
and BOLDEN JONES,
Defendants.
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No. 13 C 01097
Judge Edmond E. Chang
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Sergeant Glenn Ores, a police officer in the Village of Dolton, filed this
Section 1983 suit to challenge a fifteen-day suspension he received from Dolton
Police Chief Bolden Jones.1 Ores believes the suspension violated his procedural due
process rights because he never had an opportunity to challenge it in a hearing.
Defendants, on the other hand, contend that there was no constitutional violation
because Ores entered into an agreement giving up his right to challenge the
suspension. Alternatively, they argue that Ores could have pursued other state law
remedies—which satisfied federal due process—to contest his suspension. Both
parties also dispute whether qualified immunity applies and whether Jones is the
final policymaker for Monell liability. The Court grants Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and denies Ores’s motion: there was no constitutional
1The
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
deprivation because Ores could have challenged his suspension in state court, and
there is no Monell liability because Jones was not a final policymaker.
I. Background
A. May 6 Incident and Investigation
Both parties have moved for summary judgment, so in evaluating Ores’s
motion the Court must draw reasonable inferences in Defendants’ favor, and viceversa on Defendants’ motion. This case began with an incident on May 6, 2011,
when Sergeant Ores was supervising an 11 PM to 7 AM shift at a Dolton nightclub
called Mr. Ricky’s. DSOF ¶ 6; R. 59-1, Defs.’ Exh. 1, Ores Dep. 11:16-12:7.2 At the
end of Ores’s shift, a Dolton police officer named Graham told Ores in the locker
room that there had been a confrontation in the parking lot of Mr. Ricky’s and that
Dolton police officers used force against a woman. DSOF ¶ 6; Ores Dep. 12:5-14:23.
Ores did not take immediate action because he did not witness the incident, nobody
had been arrested that night, and no written complaint had been filed. Id. Ores also
did not immediately investigate because he believed Graham had a tendency to
embellish things. Id. Ores told Graham that he was going on vacation the next day
and that he would follow up on the issue when he returned. Id.
Soon after, Dolton Police Chief Bolden Jones learned about the May 6
incident and either he or another officer, Commander Spigolon, opened an
2Citations
to the record are noted as “R.” followed by the docket number and the
page or paragraph number. Citations to the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements of Fact are
“DSOF” (for Defendants’ Statement of Facts) [R. 58]; “Pl.’s Resp. DSOF” (for Ores’s
Response to Defendants’ Statement of Facts) [R. 65 at 1-14]; “PSOF” (for Ores’s Statement
of Additional Facts) [R. 65 at 15-23]; “Defs.’ Resp. PSOF” (for Defendants’ Response to
Ores’s Statement of Additional Facts) [R. 77].
2
investigation of Ores’s failure to investigate an officer’s use of force. DSOF ¶ 7; R.
59-3, Defs.’ Exh. 3, Jones Dep. 25:5-26:24. Spigolon was in charge of the
investigation and requested that Ores submit a written memorandum (also called,
in Dolton police vernacular, a “to-from”) detailing the events on May 6. DSOF ¶ 8;
R. 65-8, Exh. 8, Spigolon Dep. 15:12-19:19; Ores Dep. 15:6-20. Ores submitted this
memorandum in July 2011, writing that Graham had observed other officers
“hitting a female while on the ground” but that “nobody ever came in to lodge a
complaint.” DSOF ¶ 8; R. 59-9, Pl.’s Exh. 5, 7/18/11 Memo at 2-3. On October 25,
2011, Jones issued Ores a “Notice of Interrogation Pursuant to Formal
Investigation” about this incident and held a formal interrogation on October 27,
2011. DSOF ¶ 9; R. 59-4, Defs.’ Exh. 4, Notice of Interrogation. An interrogation is
different from a hearing before Dolton’s Board of Fire and Police Commissioners
(“the Board”); the former is used to gather facts, while the latter is held to
determine whether a particular punishment is appropriate or whether the accused
is guilty of an alleged rule violation. PSOF ¶¶ 16-17; Kuzas Dep. 47:10-48:13; Jones
Dep. 36:16-19, 42:20-43:11.
The police union, of which Ores was a member, then got involved. DSOF ¶ 3;
Ores Dep. 8:21-9:4. Harry Blaundin, Ores’s union representative, told Ores that
union attorney Robert Kuzas would represent Ores in the disciplinary investigation
and attend the interrogation. DSOF ¶ 3; PSOF ¶ 10-11; Kuzas Dep. 9:18-24. Before
the interrogation, Ores did not know Kuzas; the two met for the first time on the
day of the interrogation. Ores Dep. 24:10-26:18. During the interrogation,
3
Commander Spigolon—through Perry Kendall, counsel for the police department—
questioned Ores in Kuzas’s presence. See generally R. 59-5, Defs.’ Exh. 5,
Interrogation Tr.; Ores Dep. 32:23-33:2. As was typical in these interrogations, Ores
was protected by Garrity rights3 that prevented his statements from being used in
criminal proceedings, because officers can be forced by their employer to answer
questions. Interrogation Tr. 8:13-9:2; Kuzas Dep. 48:14-49:1. Ores could not issue
subpoenas or examine any witnesses in the interrogation, but he was able to answer
questions and explain the circumstances surrounding the May 6 incident. PSOF ¶
20; Kuzas Dep. 50:9-15; Ores Dep. 74:10-75:2.
B. The Negotiation and Agreement
The facts leading up to the interrogation are not in dispute, but the parties
have different versions of the aftermath. According to Defendants, on the day of the
October 27 interrogation or shortly after it, Kuzas met with Jones several times to
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement. Kuzas Dep. 12:22-17:22. Two others
were also present: Rich Haran (another union representative), and an attorney
doing labor work for Dolton. Id. Even though these informal meetings were not
about Ores, the topic of his discipline came up and Jones informed Kuzas that he
was thinking about terminating Ores. Id. Kuzas responded that termination was
too severe and akin to “DEFCON 4” for an officer with an exemplary record and
decades of service.4 Id. After two or three discussions, the two agreed to a fifteen-
3Named
after Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967).
federal government’s defense readiness condition (DEFCON) system actually
rates from least to most serious using a scale from 5 (normal peacetime condition) to 1 (the
most serious), so perhaps Kuzas meant DEFCON-1.
4The
4
day suspension and additional training. Id. Kuzas believed that this agreement
benefited both sides. Id. 19:5-21:14. He knew that formal charges filed against a
police officer with the Board were usually accompanied by a hearing. Id. And Kuzas
believed that if Ores had a Board hearing, there was a substantial chance that he
would be fired because Jones could pursue termination. Id. So Kuzas agreed to a
fifteen-day suspension to “avoid going to a full hearing and taking the possibility of
there being a termination.” Id. 22:7-21. In return, Kuzas—supposedly on Ores’s
behalf—waived a statutory provision that capped the police chief’s unilateral
authority to suspend an officer at five days. Id. Kuzas also waived a Board hearing
and Ores’s ability to challenge Jones’s unilateral suspension. DSOF ¶ 24; Kuzas
Dep. 21:1-14. Although Kuzas believes that Ores was never actually in the same
room for the negotiations with Jones, Kuzas Dep. 18:14-21, Kuzas nevertheless says
that he spoke to Ores several times after the interrogation to tell Ores about the
negotiations, Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 22; Kuzas Dep. 25:5-26:3. Jones remembers that
Ores was present for one of the negotiation meetings. Jones Dep. 64:18-65:5.
Ores, on the other hand, says that he never communicated with Kuzas about
the disciplinary investigation during the time between the interrogation and
receiving his suspension on February 21, 2012. PSOF ¶ 22; Ores Dep. 35:16-37:8.
He claims that there was “radio silence” during this period and that he was never
apprised about any negotiations or potential agreement. Id.
It is undisputed, however, that on February 21, 2012, Jones issued Ores the
formal disciplinary report, which included a fifteen-day suspension without pay and
5
forty hours of supervisory training. Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 25; R. 59-6, Defs.’ Exh. 6,
Formal Disciplinary Report. Although Jones testified in his deposition that he did
not remember Ores’s response to the suspension, Jones Dep. 63:16-21, Jones
previously declared in an affidavit that upon receiving the formal disciplinary
report on February 21, 2012, “Ores expressed that he believed my decision to
impose a 15-day suspension was too harsh.” Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 25 (citing R. 17,
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Exh. A, Jones Aff. at 3). Ores also testified that when Jones
handed him the formal suspension, he “looked at Jones” and said: “really? A 15-day
suspension? … and I said this is – this is severe, I believe was the word I used.”
Ores Dep. 39:2-22. According to Ores, this was the first time he had heard about the
fifteen-day suspension. Id.
C. Union Grievance
On February 29, 2012, eight days after receiving the formal written
suspension, Ores filed a union grievance. R. 59-7, Defs.’ Exh. 7, Ores’s Grievance.
The grievance was signed by Blaundin (Ores’s union representative) and Captain
Dubish, a high-ranking police department official who received the grievance on
behalf of management. Id.; Ores Dep. 43:21-44:5. The “remedy sought” was
“[s]topping Any Further ‘Disciplinary Action’ on this matter and to be paid for the
‘Suspension Days’ served by Sergeant Ores #7.” Ores’s Grievance. When Ores asked
about the grievance a few months later, Blaundin said that Ores should be patient.
Ores Dep. 44:10-15. Sometime after that conversation, in the summer of 2012, Ores
met with Kuzas, Blaundin, and Haran, and asked about the status of his grievance.
6
Id. 46:7-47:21. Kuzas responded that there was nothing he could do. Id. It is
undisputed that Ores never heard anything about his grievance, and that he never
appeared in a grievance hearing. Id. Ores completed his suspension and mandated
training by the end of March 2012. Ores Dep. 42:12-43:1.
D. Procedural Posture
On August 25, 2014, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Ores’s
complaint. The complaint alleged that Jones deprived him of procedural due process
by failing to provide a post-suspension hearing and that Jones acted as a final
“policymaker” when he suspended Ores. R. 37, Mot. to Dismiss Opinion. After
discovery concluded in May 2015, the parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment. R. 56, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.; R. 66, Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Defendants now
argue that Ores received adequate pre-suspension process. R. 57, Defs.’ Br.5 And to
the extent that any post-suspension process was required, Ores either gave up this
right through the agreement between Jones and Kuzas or failed to take advantage
of state remedies—which satisfied federal due process—to challenge his suspension.
Id. Ores, on the other hand, argues that both his pre-suspension interrogation and
lack of post-suspension procedures were constitutionally infirm; furthermore, Ores
maintains that he did not consent to the negotiated agreement and that no
alternative state-law remedies were available. R. 71, Pl.’s Br. and Resp.
5To
avoid overlap, the Court ordered the parties to file four total briefs: “Defs.’ Br.”
(Defendants’ opening motion for summary judgment) [R. 57]; “Pl.’s Br. and Resp.” (Ores’s
combined cross motion for summary judgment and response to Defendants’ motion) [R. 71];
“Defs.’ Reply and Resp.” (Defendants’ combined reply to its own motion and response to
Ores’s cross motion) [R. 76]; “Pl.’s Reply” (Ores’s reply on its own motion) [R. 78].
7
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating
summary judgment motions, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 378 (2007). As noted above, here both parties moved for summary
judgment, so in evaluating Ores’s motion the Court must draw reasonable
inferences in Defendants’ favor, and vice-versa on Defendants’ motion. The Court
may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations, Omnicare,
Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011), and must consider
only evidence that can “be presented in a form that would be admissible in
evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The party seeking summary judgment has the
initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute and that she is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, 605 F.3d 451, 460
(7th Cir. 2010); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Wheeler v.
Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). If this burden is met, the adverse party
must then “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
8
III. Analysis
A. Procedural Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from “depriv[ing] any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.
“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
333 (1976) (citations and quotations omitted). Evaluating procedural due process
claims entails “a two-step process: [t]he first step requires us to determine whether
the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest; the second requires a
determination of what process is due.” Sonnleitner v. York, 304 F.3d 704, 711 (7th
Cir. 2002) (citation and quotations omitted). In this case, the parties do not dispute
that Ores had a property interest in continued employment (apparently as protected
by state and local laws) and that he was deprived of that interest when he was
suspended for fifteen days. Defs.’ Br. at 5; Pl.’s Br. and Resp. at 9. Thus, the only
question is whether Ores was denied due process—that is, what procedures were
due to him and at what time. The Court will analyze the scope of the required
procedures before and after the suspension.
1. Pre-Deprivation Process
Ores first argues that he was denied a pre-suspension hearing. Pl.’s Br. and
Resp. at 6-8. Defendants, on the other hand, believe that the October 27
interrogation served the purposes of pre-suspension due process, Defs.’ Br. at 6,
which Ores responds was insufficient because he was not allowed to subpoena,
9
confront, or cross-examine witnesses, Pl.’s Br. and Resp. at 8. The Court holds that
the written notice of interrogation that Ores received on October 25 and his
interrogation on October 27 comprised enough process, at that stage, to respond to
the investigation and proposed discipline.
The essential elements of due process include “notice and an opportunity to
respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why
proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement.”
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (citation
omitted). In Loudermill, a seminal case in the law governing public sector
employment, the Supreme Court held that due process “requires some kind of a
hearing prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected
property interest in his employment.” Id. at 542. But “some kind of a hearing”
before the termination does not have to be exhaustive, because “the promise of an
eventual full hearing means that the procedural requirements of the first stage may
be somewhat relaxed.” D’Acquisto v. Washington, 640 F. Supp. 594, 616 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545). The purpose of pre-deprivation process is
to
provide
“an
initial
check
against
mistaken
decisions—essentially,
a
determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges
against the employee are true and support the proposed action.” Loudermill, 470
U.S. at 545-46 (citation omitted). That means that the pre-deprivation procedures
“need not definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge.” Id. at 545.
10
In a later case, the Supreme Court clarified that an employee who was
temporarily suspended without pay (as opposed to fired) was not due a presuspension hearing as long as the employee received a prompt post-suspension
hearing. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997). In Gilbert, an employer
immediately suspended an employee after the state filed felony charges against
him. Id. at 927-928. In deciding that a pre-suspension hearing was not required, the
Court emphasized that “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.” Id. at 930 (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). To determine the scope of constitutionally
required process, the Court applied the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge framework
and balanced “[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest.” Id. at 931 (quoting Mathews,
424 U.S. at 335) (quotations omitted). A pre-suspension hearing was unnecessary in
Gilbert because there was little risk of erroneous deprivation, the factor most
important to the Supreme Court. Id. at 933. Because the state had already arrested
and charged the employee with a felony—and thus established probable cause that
the employee had committed a crime—there was little risk that the employer’s
suspension decision was arbitrary. Id. at 934. Consequently, no additional
procedure was required because the arrest and the filing of charges satisfied the
purpose of pre-suspension process: “to assure that there are reasonable grounds to
11
support the suspension without pay.” Id. at 933-34. Further, although the
employee’s private interest was low because he faced only a temporary suspension,
the state’s interest in immediately suspending potential felons was “significant.” Id.
at 932.
In Ores’s case, the Mathews framework dictates how to evaluate the process
due before his suspension. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 931-32. First, as to the private
interest—even though Ores had an interest in uninterrupted pay and continued
employment, courts must consider the length and finality of the deprivation. Id. at
932. When there is only temporary suspension without pay, the “lost income is
relatively insubstantial” and the deprivation is much less severe than a firing. Id.
As for the Village of Dolton, its interest was admittedly less than what was at stake
in Gilbert, because no felony charges were filed here. But the Village nevertheless
had a significant interest in maintaining public trust and ensuring that its highranking police officers were not indifferent to allegations of serious police
misconduct in their ranks. See id. (state had an “interest in maintaining public
confidence” in police officers who “occupy positions of great public trust and high
public visibility”); Ibarra v. Martin, 143 F.3d 286, 289 (7th Cir. 1998) (the state,
which temporarily suspended an employee accused of sexual misconduct, “has a
significant interest in the integrity of its probation officers”); Kuzas Dep. 12:15-13:3
(calling Ores’s matter a “serious” one).
Finally, as to the risk of erroneous deprivation, “there was nothing like a
grand jury proceeding to assure that the charges were supported by probable cause”
12
like there was in Gilbert, so the Court must “look more closely at the procedures
[Ores] actually received, to see if they adequately protected him against the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of his interest in not being suspended from his job.”
Ibarra, 143 F.3d at 290. The only pre-suspension process that Ores received was the
October 27, 2011 interrogation. Pl.’s Br. 6-8. A review of this interrogation shows
that the risk of erroneous deprivation was low because there were no major factual
disputes about the events underlying Ores’s suspension, including the incident at
Mr. Ricky’s and Ores’s handling of the report of misconduct. See generally
Interrogation Tr. During the interrogation, Ores explained Officer Graham’s report
about an instance of excessive force by other police officers and admitted that he did
not follow up. Id. 17:12-27:17. Ores explained his version of the events, clarified his
reasons for not investigating Officer Graham’s report, and had the chance to add
anything that would be important to the investigation. Id. 36:18-24. The only issue
after the interrogation was what (if any) punishment was appropriate in light of
Ores’s judgment call that he did not need to immediately follow up on Officer
Graham’s report. Thus, the interrogation sufficiently ensured that a suspension
would not be baseless.
Furthermore, Ores received adequate notice of the ongoing investigation and
potential charges against him. Two days before the interrogation, he received a
written notice advising him of the formal investigation into the May 6 incident, and
also informing him of four potential violations of the Dolton Police Department
Rules and Regulations. Notice of Interrogation at 1. These were the same four rules
13
that Ores was ultimately determined to have violated in his formal suspension in
February 2012. Formal Disciplinary Report. The pre-interrogation notice also
informed Ores of his right to counsel at the interrogation and the possibility of
suspension or discharge. Notice of Interrogation at 1-2. The interrogation and notice
were thus constitutionally adequate at this stage because they provided an initial
check against a mistaken suspension. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545.
2. Post-Deprivation Process
Having determined that the notice and interrogation were adequate at the
pre-suspension phase, the next question is whether Ores was entitled to some form
of post-deprivation process. See Chaney v. Suburban Bus Div. of Reg’l Transp.
Auth., 52 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We apply the Mathews analysis to both the
pre-deprivation and post-deprivation phases of [the plaintiff’s] case.”). It is
undisputed that Ores did not go through any post-suspension process with the
police department or Board, whether in the form of a hearing in front of the Board,
union meeting, or otherwise. Defs.’ Br. at 5-8; Pl.’s Br. and Resp. at 8-9. Ores argues
that this violated due process, while Defendants argue that Ores was not due any
process in addition to his pre-suspension interrogation. Id.
Neither side is completely right: despite Defendants’ argument to the
contrary, the lack of any post-suspension process would violate procedural due
process because it would deprive Ores of a full opportunity to respond. “The
opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action
should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement.” Loudermill, 470
14
U.S. at 546 (citation omitted). Defendants argue that there was little risk of
erroneous deprivation at this stage given the availability of the pre-suspension
interrogation and the uncontroverted facts about Ores’s behavior. Defs.’ Br. at 6-7.
It might be true that “additional or substitute process was unlikely to shed more
light on the matter” when the evidence against Ores—his failure to follow up on a
misconduct report—was “indisputable.” Luellen v. City of E. Chicago, 350 F.3d 604,
616 (7th Cir. 2003). Having said that, “[e]ven where the facts are clear, the
appropriateness or necessity of the discharge [or suspension] may not be,” so an
employee
should
be
given
a
“meaningful
opportunity”
to
challenge
the
decisionmaker’s discretion. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543. In Luellen, for example,
even though the evidence against the employee was indisputable—the employee
was caught red-handed transporting absentee ballots in his trunk—he was afforded
post-deprivation process in a hearing by Board of Public Safety, which had to
confirm the police chief’s suspension. Luellen, 350 F.3d at 615. The employee also
had ten days to request an investigation by the East Chicago Fire Civil Service
Commission. Id. Similarly, after receiving his suspension, Ores should have had an
opportunity to advocate that a shorter punishment—or none at all—was more
appropriate. And there should have been some mechanism to challenge the
unilateral decision of a single decisionmaker, Chief Jones. See Cholewin v. City of
Evanston, 899 F.2d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 1990) (plaintiff’s case was presented to and
decided by an independent committee comprised of workers’ compensation experts
who were not part of the police department). So even though Ores was able to
15
provide his version of the events at the interrogation, he did not have an
opportunity to challenge the propriety of a fifteen-day suspension. See generally
Interrogation Tr.
To be sure, Ores’s interest was relatively low, given the duration of his
temporary suspension. See supra Section III(A)(1). But the government’s interest in
reduced procedures was also relatively low at this point; unlike the pre-suspension
period, where some pressing circumstances might allow the state to skimp on the
procedures, see Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 929, there were no similar circumstances
preventing prompt post-suspension procedures here. Furthermore, Defendants have
cited no in-Circuit cases supporting their argument that no post-deprivation process
was due in these circumstances. Defs.’ Br. at 6-8. In sum, Ores’s pre-suspension
interrogation was not a full opportunity to be heard and an insufficient means to
review his imposed punishment.
B. Adequacy of State Post-Suspension Procedures
But the analysis is not over yet. Even though Ores was constitutionally
entitled to receive some form of post-deprivation process, the question now is
whether any post-deprivation remedies were available, regardless of whether Ores
actually took advantage of them. In other words, because “[t]he whole idea of a
procedural due process claim is that the plaintiff is suing because the state failed to
provide adequate remedies,” it follows that “no due process violation has occurred
when adequate state remedies exist.” Veterans Legal Def. Fund v. Schwartz, 330
F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2003). When a plaintiff argues that state officials acted in a
16
random and unauthorized manner to deprive her of due process, she must also
“avail[] [herself] of state post-deprivation remedies” or explain why those remedies
are inadequate. LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Vill. of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 943 (7th
Cir. 2010). Here, Ores argues that Jones exceeded his statutory authority by
imposing a fifteen-day suspension when he was only authorized to impose
suspensions of no more than five days, and that Jones deprived Ores of a chance to
review this decision. Pl.’s Br. and Resp. at 8-10. As explained earlier, no additional
pre-deprivation process was necessary, and because this type of behavior—namely,
“misconduct in failing to follow the requirements of existing law”—“is inherently
unpredictable, the state’s obligation under the Due Process Clause is to provide
sufficient remedies after its occurrence … .” Michalowicz v. Vill. of Bedford Park,
528 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 2008). “Accordingly, [the plaintiff’s] claim can stand only
if Illinois law provides insufficient remedies for the violation he alleges.” Id.
Defendants argue that Ores could have appealed his suspension to the Board
of Fire and Police Commissioners or filed a union grievance. Defs.’ Br. at 12-13. The
defense also argues that a variety of state-court actions were available, including a
common law writ of certiorari, mandamus, injunction, declaratory judgment, and a
Wage Payment and Collection Act claim under 820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. Id. at 10-12.
Ores responds that each of these actions was either unavailable or inadequate. Pl.’s
Br. and Resp. at 9-16. Ores is right as to some of the proposed procedures, but
ultimately the Court concludes that state-court process—in the form of mandamus,
injunctive relief, and declaratory judgment actions—was available to Ores. So there
17
was no procedural due process violation because the state provided adequate
remedies to challenge his suspension.
1. Appeal to the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners
Defendants previously argued in their motion to dismiss that Ores could have
appealed Jones’s decision to the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, and they
continue to maintain this position. See Mot. to Dismiss Opinion at 5; Defs.’ Br. at
12. To determine whether this option was available, it will be helpful to review the
relevant statutory framework governing the police department’s employment
decisions. Id. at 5-9. The Village of Dolton was subject to the Illinois Fire and Police
Commission Act, 65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-1 et seq. DSOF ¶ 4; R. 65-2, Exh. 2, Dolton Fire
and Police Rules § 9(a) (“Discharge from office, or suspension from service in the
Fire or Police Department shall be in compliance with the Fire and Police
Commissioners Act … .”). When adopted by a municipality, the Act protects police
officers from removal or discharge except for “cause, upon written charges, and after
an opportunity to be heard … .” 65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-17 ¶ 1. The Act, however, does
authorize municipal police chiefs to suspend officers without pay for up to five days,
and then provides for a hearing afterwards:
Nothing in this Section shall be construed to prevent … the chief of the
police department from suspending without pay a member of his
department for a period of not more than 5 calendar days, but he shall
notify the board in writing of such suspension. The hearing shall be as
hereinafter provided, unless the employer and the labor organization
representing the person have negotiated an alternative or
supplemental form of due process … .
18
Id. ¶ 5 (emphasis added). Thus, under the Act, any suspension of up to five calendar
days triggers a hearing in front of the Board, unless the employer and the officer
(through the officer’s union) agree to some alternative form of due process. Id. In
explaining the appeals hearing, the Act then states: “Any policeman . . . so
suspended may appeal to the board of fire and police commissioners for a review of
the suspension within 5 calendar days after such suspension … .” Id. ¶ 6 (emphasis
added). After evaluating an appeal, the Board may: (1) “sustain the action of the
chief of the department”; (2) “reverse it with instructions that the man receive his
pay for the period involved”; (3) “suspend the officer for an additional period of not
more than 30 days”; or (4) “discharge him, depending upon the facts presented.” Id.
The Village of Dolton’s rules on officer suspensions track the requirements of the
Act: “[t]he board may suspend any member of the Fire or Police Department … not
to exceed thirty (30) days,” but “[t]he Chiefs of the Fire and Police Department shall
have the right to suspend any officer … for a period not to exceed five (5) days … .”
Dolton Fire and Police Rules § 8(a)-(b).
The Act and local rules both make clear that Jones exceeded his authority
when he issued the fifteen-day suspension because “the Board has the sole authority
to discharge or to suspend without pay for a period not exceeding 30 days.” Wilson
v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs of City of Markham, 563 N.E.2d 941, 944 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990) (emphasis added). See also Nitschneider v. Miller, 821 F. Supp. 1258, 1261
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (“While the Chief may act on his own to suspend an officer, he is
limited to imposing suspensions of five days or less, and an officer may appeal his
19
suspension to the Board.”); Le Desma v. Vill. of Burr Ridge Fire & Police Comm’n,
377 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (“When a municipality becomes subject to
the provisions of the board of fire and police commissioners division of the Illinois
Municipal Code … the commissioners … have exclusive jurisdiction to consider
charges against a police officer which might subject him to discharge or suspension
exceeding five days”). And Jones was aware of this rule. Jones Dep. 38:22-39:2 (“Q.
And how long did you have the authority to suspend an officer for as chief? A.
Talking about the amount of days? Q. Yes. A. Five days.”).
Defendants nevertheless believe that Ores could have appealed this
unauthorized suspension to the Board because the Board would have exercised
jurisdiction. Defs.’ Br. at 10. The Court previously explained that this did not
appear possible on the face of the Act. Mot. to Dismiss Opinion at 7. The appeals
provision in paragraph six of the Act states that any officer “so suspended” may
appeal—referring back to the suspensions of up to five days in the prior paragraph.
65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-17 ¶¶ 5-6. The statutory text provides no review of any other type
of suspension because “if the suspension exceeds five days … the appeal provision in
the Code is not even triggered.” Mot. to Dismiss Opinion at 7. The absence of review
is surprising given that “[p]ursuant to the Illinois municipal code, any disciplinary
action in excess of a five-day suspension can only be issued by the Board after a
hearing.” Bradford v. Vill. of Lombard, 2012 WL 1655966, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 10,
2012) (citing 65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-17). The lack of review also “seems odd because one
would think that a suspension of unauthorized length ought to be appealable
20
(without resorting to a federal due-process claim), but that is not how the statute
reads.” Mot. to Dismiss Opinion at 7.
The Court previously explained, however, that fact discovery might reveal
that despite the statutory text, Board actually does hear appeals of unauthorized
suspensions and that officers are aware of this option. Id. That factual scenario
would leave open the possibility that the process was indeed available, even if not
dictated by the Act. The Court invited Defendants to present evidence that an
appeal to the Board is, in fact, an available post-deprivation remedy in these
circumstances. Id. But after discovery, Defendants again have not pointed to
anything from the record suggesting that such an appeal was available despite the
contrary statutory text. Their only argument is that Ores should have tried to
request a hearing because “[i]t is entirely speculative how the [Board] would have
responded to an appeal.” Defs.’ Br. at 12. But this speculation is not enough. Ores
has met his burden on summary judgment when he showed that an appeal was not
available based on the clear statutory text, and Defendants have not presented any
evidence to the contrary. The Court holds, therefore, that an appeal to the Board
was an unavailable route for Ores to challenge his fifteen-day suspension.
2. Union Grievance
Similarly, Defendants argue that a union grievance was also available to
Ores. Defs.’ Br. at 13. (Remember that the Act authorizes police and fire
departments to negotiate post-suspension hearing procedures as part of a labor
agreement.) But again, Defendants have not pointed to anything in the record
21
suggesting that this remedy was actually available. In fact, the union’s grievance
procedures explicitly state that “disciplinary matters resulting from discipline
imposed by the Chief of Police for all matters up to and including suspensions of up
to five (5) days may be grieved pursuant to the provisions of this Article.” R. 59-11,
Pl.’s Exh. 10, Grievance Procedure § 6.1 (emphasis added). The union grievance
form (that Ores submitted on February 29, 2012) also cites and repeats this rule.
Ores’s Grievance (quoting § 6.1 that “disciplinary matters resulting from discipline
imposed by the Chief of Police for all matters up to and including suspensions of up
to five (5) days may be grieved pursuant to the provision of this Article.”). Again,
Ores has demonstrated that a union grievance was not an available route, and
Defendants have not pointed to any evidence showing that a grievance would have
been considered.
3. Writ of Certiorari
Next, Defendants argue that a variety of state court actions were available to
Ores. Defs.’ Br. at 11-12. The Court will first address the common law writ of
certiorari, which it turns out was not an available vehicle to challenge Ores’s
suspension. Defs.’ Br. at 11-12.
“The common law writ of certiorari was developed to provide a means
whereby a petitioner who was without avenue of appeal or direct review could
obtain limited review over action by a court or other tribunal exercising quasijudicial functions.” Stratton v. Wenona Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 1, 551 N.E.2d 640, 645
(Ill. 1990) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). When no statute provides for
22
judicial review, a writ of certiorari is an alternative mechanism to challenge “a
decision by an inferior court or tribunal where that body has acted without
jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction or where it is shown that the court or tribunal
did not follow the essential procedural requirements applicable to the cases before
it.” Rochon v. Rodriguez, 689 N.E.2d 288, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (citation omitted).
Because the writ’s purpose “is to have the entire record of an inferior tribunal
brought before a reviewing court to determine, from the record alone, whether that
body acted in accordance with applicable law,” the writ cannot be used to challenge
an action by a single decisionmaker, who does not count as a tribunal with quasijudicial functions and who does not maintain a decisionmaking record. Id. (holding
that a police superintendent’s decision to discipline officers was not a judicial or
quasi-judicial act); see also Allgood v. City of Chicago, 2006 WL 2682302, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 18, 2006) (same). Just so in this case, where Chief Jones was neither a
court nor a judicial tribunal whose decision was subject to review through a writ of
certiorari.
4. Wage Payment and Collection Act
Ores is also right that the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820
ILCS 115/1 et seq., would have been an inadequate remedy. Pl.’s Br. and Resp. at
15-16. The IWPCA requires employers to honor the terms of their agreements with
employees by paying all earned wages. 820 ILCS 115/3. The employer must provide
“any compensation owed an employee … pursuant to an employment contract or
agreement between the 2 parties, whether the amount is determined on a time,
23
task, piece, or any other basis of calculation.” 820 ILCS 115/2. Although Ores could
have sued under this statute to recover backpay during his suspension, this remedy
would have been inadequate because “Ores is not [only] claiming the wrongful
withholding of employee benefits, but [also] that the entire suspension was
unwarranted, including a disciplinary notice in his employment file.” Pl.’s Br. and
Resp. at 15-16. It would be the Board that could provide that sort of prospective
relief—that is, getting rid of the disciplinary notice—and a state court could not
have used relied on the IWPCA to do so.
In response, Defendants cite Burton v. Sheahan, 2001 WL 563777 (N.D. Ill.
May 22, 2001), where the court held that the plaintiff could have pursued an
IWPCA claim. Defs.’ Br. at 11. But that case is distinguishable because backpay
would have fully remedied that plaintiff’s harm. There, a correctional officer was
suspended without pay for eighteen months as he waited for a decision by the Merit
Board, which finally issued a four-month suspension. Id. at *1. Because the officer
served fourteen months over and beyond his actual suspension time, he sued under
the IWPCA to recover backpay. Id. at *2. The officer was not, however, directly
challenging the sheriff’s original decision to suspend him without pay, the eighteenmonth wait, or the Merit Board’s final ruling that he should be suspended for four
months for violating department rules. Id. Although a backpay award would have
been adequate to remedy that particular plaintiff’s harm—loss of wages during the
fourteen month waiting period—here Ores is seeking more than backpay. The
24
IWPCA, therefore, would have been an improper vehicle for Ores to challenge Chief
Jones’s suspension authority.
5. Mandamus
The Defendants’ final three proposals—mandamus, declaratory relief, and
injunction—are sound.
Defs.’ Br. 11-12. First, mandamus “is an extraordinary
remedy to enforce, as a matter of right, the performance of official duties by a public
officer where no exercise of discretion on his part is involved.” Lewis E. v. Spagnolo,
710 N.E.2d 798, 813 (Ill. 1999) (citation and quotations omitted). Mandamus can
“compel a public official to perform a purely ministerial duty” and “will be awarded
only if a plaintiff establishes a clear, affirmative right to relief, a clear duty of the
public official to act, and a clear authority in the public official to comply with the
writ.” People ex rel. Ryan v. Roe, 778 N.E.2d 701, 703 (Ill. 2002) (citations omitted).
In contrast, mandamus is not available “to direct a public official or body to reach a
particular decision or to exercise its discretion in a particular manner, even if the
judgment or discretion has been erroneously exercised.” Rochon, 689 N.E.2d at 291.
For example, in Rochon, mandamus was not available to probationary police officers
who were fired after missing too many basic training classes because the officers
could “not establish[] a clear right to be reinstated.” Id. at 292. But mandamus was
available in another case where an officer “ha[d] shown that he was automatically
entitled to one of the two promotions that were actually given since only his name
and that of [another officer] were properly on the eligibility list.” Hoffman v. Bd. of
Fire & Police Comm’rs of City of Naperville, 529 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
25
Mandamus was proper because “[u]nder the Board Rules, there was no discretion
left in the promotion process.” Id.
In this case, mandamus was available because, as explained earlier, Chief
Jones exceeded his statutory authority in suspending Jones for fifteen days. See
supra Section III(B)(1). “Pursuant to the Illinois municipal code, any disciplinary
action in excess of a five-day suspension can only be issued by the Board after a
hearing. 65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-17. In other words, [the police chief] could not have
terminated [the police officer’s] employment” or suspended him for more than five
days because “only the Board could take such action.” Bradford v. Vill. of Lombard,
2012 WL 1655966, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2012). Ores had a clear, affirmative right
to relief because Chief Jones’s unilateral fifteen-day suspension was without legal
authority, and Ores could have requested backpay, a hearing, or formal filing of
charges with the Board. See, e.g., Genius v. Cty. of Cook, 2011 WL 9558925, *17 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2011) (plaintiff could have brought mandamus action when the “District
was without authority to suspend [plaintiff] for more than 30 days without filing
written charges before the Civil Service Commission and providing him with an
opportunity to be heard in his own defense.”); Szewczyk v. Bd. of Fire & Police
Comm’rs of Vill. of Richmond, 885 N.E.2d 1106, 1114 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“denial of
a hearing is properly remedied through mandamus” when police officer was
terminated without a hearing as required by the Police and Fire Commissioners
Act); Chriswell v. Rosewell, 388 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (mandamus was
proper because the chief probation officer, who indefinitely suspended the probation
26
officer, was only statutorily authorized to issue suspensions for thirty days or less
and only if notice of charges and hearing were provided).
Ores argues that mandamus was unavailable because he “is challenging …
[Jones’s] decision to discipline him at all, which is a discretionary decision.” Pl.’s Br.
and Resp. at 15. But as the cases cited above demonstrate, a police chief’s decision
to suspend an officer for more than five days is not discretionary because the chief
does not have the authority to initiate that suspension in the first place. To be sure,
if Jones had suspended Ores for five days or less, then Ores could not have used
mandamus to challenge Jones’s discretion to suspend. See Rochon, 689 N.E.2d at
291 (“the trial court could not use mandamus to direct the superintendent to
exercise his discretion” not to terminate officers for missing class). But if that had
happened, then Ores would have a process available to him—the Act specifically
provides, as discussed earlier, an appeal to the Board in that circumstance. In any
event, mandamus was available to challenge what actually did happen here, so
Ores’s due-process claim fails.
6. Declaratory Judgment and Injunction
Lastly, declaratory judgment and injunction actions were also available to
Ores. Defs.’ Br. at 11-12. Like mandamus, both of these state-court actions can be
used to challenge “the period of suspension where the suspending officer is without
authority” or “exerts [power] in a manner in contravention of statute.” Fruhling v.
Champaign Cty., 420 N.E.2d 1066, 1069 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). In Fruhling, a deputy
sheriff brought a declaratory judgment action for backpay and reinstatement when
27
his suspension and termination by the sheriff were “without legal authority and
therefore void.” Id. Although the municipality’s rules required the sheriff to file
charges with the Merit Commission for any suspension over thirty days, “[i]t [was]
unquestioned that the sheriff followed none of the above regulations when he
unilaterally suspended and subsequently terminated plaintiff’s employment. The
sheriff’s failure to comply with procedural rules of the Merit Commission [was] a
jurisdictional question which renders his actions void.” Id. at 1070. A declaratory
judgment action, therefore, was a proper vehicle to challenge the sheriff’s unlawful
and unilateral action. Id. The same is true of an action for injunctive relief, which
will “be granted against public officials [if] such acts are outside their authority or
are unlawful.” Sherman v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs of City of Highland, 445
N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (citation omitted) (police officers properly sought to
enjoin the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners from holding a hearing on their
pending charges when the Board failed to set a hearing within thirty days, as
required by the Illinois Fire and Police Commissioners Act). Like Fruhling and
Sherman, Ores is also asserting that Jones acted without legal authority and in
contravention of statute in issuing the fifteen-day suspension.
Citing Sherman, Ores argues that an injunction was unavailable because it
can only be used to challenge the decision of an administrative agency, and not a
single decisonmaker like Jones. Pl.’s Br. and Resp. at 16. But this is too broad a
reading of Sherman, which states that injunctions are available “against public
officials.” 445 N.E.2d at 6. And countless Illinois state-court actions are brought for
28
injunctive relief against all manner of defendants, including individuals,
corporations, and other entities that are not administrative agencies. So, in addition
to mandamus, Ores had two other state-court vehicles by which to challenge the
fifteen-day suspension. The availability of state-law relief means that Ores did not
suffer a procedural due process violation.
C. Qualified Immunity
For the sake of completeness, the Court will also address qualified immunity
even though it has already held that Chief Jones committed no constitutional
violation because state-law mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief were
available to Ores.
Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citations omitted). “Qualified immunity
balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable
when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield public officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Put another way, the general
purpose of qualified immunity is to allow government officials to “reasonably …
anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.” Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (citation and quotations omitted). In the twopart qualified immunity analysis, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant
29
violated her constitutional rights; and (2) “[t]he contours of the right [were]
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.” Lee v. Young, 533 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations and
quotations omitted).
For the sake of discussion, assume that no state-law remedies were available
to Ores. In that scenario, there would have been a constitutional violation when
Jones unilaterally suspended Ores for fifteen days without providing any sort of
post-deprivation process “unless the officer consented to the proposed suspension.”
Mot. to Dismiss Opinion at 10-11 (emphasis added); see supra Section III(A)(2).
Thus, the qualified immunity question would have been the following: would a
reasonable police chief in Jones’s position have known that he had the authority—
that is, the officer’s consent—to enter into a negotiated discipline waiving postdeprivation due process? The answer to this question is no, because the undisputed
record shows that a reasonable officer in Jones’s circumstances should have known
that Ores did not consent to the deal negotiated by Kuzas.
The Court first notes that Jones admitted that he lacked the authority to
suspend Ores for fifteen days, without any referral to the Board, unless Ores agreed
to the discipline: “I knew that as the Chief of Police, I could not impose more than a
5-day suspension pursuant to Illinois statute, unless the officer, after union
representation, consented to the resolution proposed.” Jones Aff. at 4. So consent
would be crucial. The record evidence establishes that a reasonable officer in Jones’s
position should have discovered that Ores was in the dark about the agreement as
30
soon as Jones notified Ores of the discipline on February 21, 2012. It is true that a
reasonable jury could find that Jones initially believed—during his negotiations
with Kuzas—that Kuzas had the authority to make this agreement on behalf of
Ores and thus that Jones could impose the suspension based on the deal. The union
had appointed Kuzas to represent Ores, and Kuzas went to the interrogation with
Ores. Kuzas Dep. 9:18-24. After the interrogation, Kuzas spoke with Jones several
times about Ores’s case and expressed Kuzas’s concerns, apparently on Ores’s
behalf, about imposing too harsh a punishment. Kuzas Dep. 13:6-17:22. So it was
reasonable for Jones to believe that Kuzas was representing Ores’s views during
these discussions. Jones also believed that there was a provision in the collective
bargaining agreement allowing him to suspend for over five days in the case of a
mutual agreement. Id. 61:7-14. And in the past, Jones had made similar
agreements with two other officers who had had agreed to suspensions of over five
days. Id. 78:19-79:15 (citing Jones Aff. at 4). All these factors led Jones to
reasonably believe that Ores had consented to the fifteen-day suspension—at first.
Nevertheless, an officer in Jones’s position should have realized that Ores
had not consented to the agreement (and in fact, had not even known about it) as
soon as Jones gave Ores the formal disciplinary report on February 21, 2012, and no
reasonable jury could find otherwise. Although Jones testified in his deposition that
he did not remember Ores’s response to the issuance of the suspension, Jones did
write in his affidavit that “Ores expressed that he believed my decision to impose a
15-day suspension was too harsh.” Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 25; Jones Dep. 63:16-21
31
(citing Jones Aff. at 3).6 For his part, Ores testified that when Jones handed him the
formal suspension, he “looked at Jones” and said: “really? A 15-day suspension? …
and I said this is—this is severe, I believe was the word I used.” Ores Dep. 39:2-22.
Defendants do not dispute Ores’s response or offer any evidence to controvert Ores’s
surprise at learning about his suspension. Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 25. Ores’s response
should have alerted Jones that Ores had not actually agreed to the suspension.
Plus, at this point, a reasonable officer in Jones’s position would have recognized
other facts demonstrating Ores’s lack of consent—for one, Jones never obtained a
written signoff from Ores acknowledging that he accepted and understood the
fifteen-day suspension. Jones Dep. 78:19-79:7 (citing Jones Aff. at 4). Nor had Jones
ever asked Ores whether he would agree to a fifteen-day suspension. Id. 61:19-21.
Finally, Defendants even admit that the first time Ores found out about the fifteenday suspension was on February 20, 2012—the day before he received it—when he
saw it sitting on Spigolon’s desk and heard rumors from other officers. Defs.’ Resp.
PSOF ¶ 27; Ores Dep. 39:2-22. And Ores told Jones (again, based on Ores’s
undisputed testimony) that finding out about his suspension in this manner was
6Jones’s
lack of memory at his deposition on this point—Ores’s response to receiving
his formal disciplinary report—does not create a factual dispute. First, the defense of course
adopts Jones’s affidavit. Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 25. Furthermore, in circumstances like this
one, “[a] statement of ‘I don’t recall,’ suggests a ‘mere possibility’ of a dispute, which [does]
not satisfy the requirements of Rule 56.” Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 2003 WL
21067091, at *12 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 15, 2003) (citing Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105
(7th Cir. 1983)). It is true that there are circumstances where a witness’s lack of memory
could create a genuine issue of fact, because the circumstances dictate interpreting (or at
least allowing a reasonable jury to interpret) the “I don’t recall” statement as the equivalent
of “It did not happen because I would have remembered that.” But here, given all of the
other evidence of Ores’s surprise about the suspension, Jones’s failure to remember is not
affirmative evidence that Ores did not respond in this way.
32
“unprofessional.” Id. If Ores had consented to the agreement between Kuzas and
Jones, then he would have known about his suspension long before he saw it on
Spigolon’s desk. There is no dispute in the record, then, that Ores did not know
about the agreement, and that by February 21, 2012, Jones should have been aware
of Ores’s lack of consent.7
Consequently, while it was reasonable for Jones to initially believe that he
had the authority to negotiate an agreement about Ores with Kuzas, the record
shows that this belief became unreasonable as soon as Jones issued the formal
suspension to Ores in February 2012, when Ores expressed surprise.8 As a result,
had the Court held that there was a constitutional violation, qualified immunity
would not have protected Jones because a reasonable officer in his position should
have known that Ores’s lack of consent deprived Jones of the authority to suspend
Ores for fifteen days.9
7Although
Ores also seems to challenge that Jones and Kuzas actually arrived at an
agreement between the two of them, Pl.’s Br. and Resp. at 12-13, there is no genuine
dispute as to this issue. Both Jones and Kuzas testified that they engaged in negotiations
and came up with an agreement. Jones Dep. 58:13-64:22; Kuzas Dep. 13:15-23:15. Ores’s
evidence, such as his surprise when he received the formal disciplinary report, goes to
Ores’s knowledge of and consent to the agreement, and not to its actual existence as
between Jones and Kuzas. Pl.’s Br. and Resp. at 13.
8For the same reasons, the Court rejects Defendants’ arguments as to liability (in
addition to qualified immunity) that Ores waived his right to post-suspension procedures
through the agreement between Kuzas and Jones. Defs.’ Br. at 8-9. But this determination
does not affect the Court’s holding that there was no constitutional violation because other
state-court remedies were available. See supra Section III(B).
9Defendants also argue that Kuzas had apparent authority to negotiate the
agreement on Ores’s behalf. Defs.’ Br. at 8-9. But this argument also fails. “Apparent
authority arises when a principal creates, by its words or conduct, the reasonable
impression in a third party that the agent has the authority to perform a certain act on its
behalf.” N. Trust Co. v. St. Francis Hosp., 522 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). As the
Court previously explained, Ores’s response to the suspension in February 2012 should
have alerted Jones that Ores did not give Kuzas the authority to negotiate on his behalf.
33
D. Monell Liability
Even though the Court has already decided that Chief Jones did not commit
a procedural due process violation, and even though that liability would be a
necessary premise for Monell liability against the Village of Dolton, the Court will
address (again, for the sake of completeness) the parties’ remaining arguments on
Dolton’s liability. The Court grants Dolton’s motion for summary judgment on
municipal liability for the separate reason that Chief Jones was not a final
policymaker, for Monell purposes, for the imposed suspension.
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very person who … subjects
… any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured … .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis
added). In Monell, the Supreme Court held that local governmental entities are
“persons” under Section 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658, 689 (1978). To establish municipal liability—that is, a government policy
or custom that violates a plaintiff’s rights—a plaintiff can show “an express policy
causing the loss, a widespread practice constituting custom or usage that caused the
loss, or causation of the loss by a person with final policymaking authority.”
Kujawski v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Bartholomew Cty., Ind., 183 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir.
1999) (citation omitted). Only the third option is at issue in this case, and the
parties dispute whether Jones is a person with final policymaking authority. Defs.’
Br. at 14; Pl.’s Br. and Resp. at 16-17.
34
A final policymaker has “authority to adopt rules for the conduct of
government.” Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 1992). This official “has
final authority in the sense that there is no higher authority” and cannot be a
person whose “actions are constrained by rules and policies of a higher power.”
Kasak v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 563 F. Supp. 2d 864, 881 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (citations
omitted). Federal courts evaluate state and local law in order to evaluate who
counts as a final policymaker. Kujawski, 183 F.3d at 737. In this case, Chief Jones
was not a final policymaker because his actions were constrained by the Board, as
explained earlier in the Opinion. See supra Section III(B)(1). Because the Village of
Dolton has adopted the Illinois Fire and Police Commission Act, “the Board of Police
Commissioners has final policymaking authority with regard to police department
employment decisions.” Graham v. Vill. of Dolton, 2011 WL 43026, *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
6, 2011) (citing 65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-1); see also Kasak, 563 F. Supp. 2d 882 (“Village
ordinances make clear that the final authority with respect to an employee’s
disciplinary action rests with the Village Board, not the police chief.”). And “[w]hile
the Chief may act on his own to suspend an officer, he is limited to imposing
suspensions of five days or less, and an officer may appeal his suspension to the
Board.” Nitschneider, 821 F. Supp. at 1261. Thus, Chief Jones “is not the final
policymaker regarding employee discipline and discharge, nor does he shape the
employment policy for the Department.” Id.10 This is a separate and independent
ground for concluding that there is no municipal liability against Dolton.
10As
a final note, Ores also moves to strike multiple portions of Defendants’
statement of facts, Defendants’ response to Ores’s statement of facts, and Defendants’
35
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
R. 56, is granted, and Ores’s cross motion for summary judgment, R. 66, is denied.
ENTERED:
s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: December 23, 2015
summary judgment brief. See, e.g., Pl.’s Resp. DSOF; Pl.’s Br. and Resp. at 5-6; Pl.’s Reply
at 2-4. This motion is denied because Defendants substantially complied with the local
rules, citing to the record in their Rule 56.1 statements and to the Rule 56.1 statements in
their briefs. Furthermore, Defendants did not impermissibly add additional facts to their
responses to Ores’s Rule 56.1 statements but rather cited facts substantiating their
disagreement with Ores’s version of the events.
36
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