Illinois League of Advocates for the Developmental et al v. Illinois Department of Human Services et al

Filing 135

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 7/18/2013. Mailed notice(meg, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
)
ILLINOIS LEAGUE OF ADVOCATES
)
FOR THE DEVELOPMENTALLY,
)
DISABLED, et al.
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
Case No. 13 C 1300
v.
)
)
Judge Marvin E. Aspen
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN )
SERVICES, MICHELLE R.B. SADDLER, )
in her official capacity as Secretary of the )
Illinois Department of Human Services,
)
KEVIN CASEY, in his official capacity as )
Director of Developmental Disabilities of )
the Illinois Department of Human
)
Resources, and COMMUNITY
)
RESOURCE ALLIANCE,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Court Judge:
Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 8) is currently pending, and a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) is in place (Dkt. No. 90). This order addresses an issue that
the parties raised with respect to the scope of the TRO.
BACKGROUND
We assume familiarity with the background of this case and only discuss those facts that
are pertinent to the present motion. Plaintiffs are seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the
closure of Murray Developmental Center (“Murray”), one of several state operated
developmental centers (“SODC”) in Illinois that provide care for developmentally disabled
residents. (Dkt. No. 9 at 2–3.) In the related second amended complaint (“SAC”), Plaintiffs

allege that Defendants are transferring residents of SODCs, without their consent, into
community integrated living arrangements (“CILA”) that are unsuitable for their needs. (SAC
¶ 3.) Plaintiffs bring claims under the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101–81, and various other federal statutes, on behalf of a class defined as “[a]ll severe and
profound developmentally delayed adult individuals who reside presently, or resided in the past,
in [an SODC] at any time since January 1, 2011, or at any time during this litigation, who oppose
any transfer from their SODC to a community housing setting.” (Id. ¶¶ 10–22, 42.)
On June 12, 2013, we granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO to prevent the transfer of
residents out of Murray while the motion for preliminary injunction is pending. (Dkt. No. 90.)
We also issued an opinion identifying certain claims as unripe, thus removing them from this
case for lack of jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 98.) The parties subsequently asked for clarification on a
specific issue that our TRO did not directly address. (Dkt. No. 102, 105.) Certain residents of
Murray are wards of the Office of the State Guardian (“OSG”), which has consented to the
transfer of at least some of its wards into CILAs. Plaintiffs argue that the OSG is not acting in
the best interests of its wards, and as an arm of the state, has a conflict of interest in the present
suit. (Dkt. No. 105 at 2–3.) We held that the “probate exception,” as explained in Struck v.
Cook County Public Guardian, prevents us from assuming authority over the OSG wards and
declaring the consent of the OSG invalid. (Dkt. 112 at 2–3.) See Struck, 508 F.3d 858, 858–60;
see also M.G.S. ex rel. Sykes v. Toerpe, No. 11 C 07934, 2012 WL 3235240, at *1–3 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 6, 2012). But mindful of the fact that the parties had not briefed the issue of the probate
exception, we gave them the opportunity to file a supplemental response and reply. (Dkt. No.
112 at 3.) This opinion addresses those additional briefs.

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I.

The extent of the probate exception under Marshall v. Marshall
The issue presently before us is whether the probate exception to federal jurisdiction

prevents us from hearing challenges to the OSG’s consent to have its wards transferred out of
Murray. Plaintiffs begin by pointing to Marshall v. Marshall, in which the Supreme Court
clarified the scope of the probate exception. 547 U.S. 293, 310–12, 126 S. Ct. 1735, 1747–48
(2006). The Supreme Court held that the federal court “may not exercise its jurisdiction to
disturb or affect the possession of property in the custody of a state court,” but it may “adjudicate
rights in such property where the final judgment does not interfere with the state court’s
possession save to the extent that the state court is bound by the judgment to recognize the right
adjudicated by the federal court.” Id. at 310; 126 S. Ct at 1747 (quoting Markham v. Allen, 326
U.S. 490, 494, 66 S. Ct. 296, 298 (1946)). It further explained that “we comprehend the
‘interference’ language in Markham as essentially a reiteration of the general principle that,
when one court is exercising in rem jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not assume in rem
jurisdiction over the same res.” Id. at 311; 126 S. Ct at 1748.
In Struck, the Seventh Circuit explained that this general principle applies equally to
people over whom the state has assumed guardianship. 508 F.3d 858, 860 (“The res—the
plaintiff’s mother—is in the control of the guardian appointed by the state court . . .”); see also
M.G.S., 2012 WL 3235240, at *3 (“. . . M.G.S. is a person in the control of the Probate Division
of the Circuit Court of Cook County; as unappealing as it sounds applied to a living person, she
is the res in an in-rem proceeding—the contested guardianship case.”).
Plaintiffs argue that the probate exception, as defined in Marshall, does not prohibit us
from exercising jurisdiction over the OSG wards, because we are adjudicating a federal right to

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which the state court must adhere. (Dkt. No. 116 at 2–3.) According to Plaintiffs, the relief they
seek in this case “does not impinge on any state-controlled adjudication of the ward, ‘save to the
extent that the state court is bound by the judgment to recognize the right adjudicated by the
federal court’ to protect the wards from an ADA violation.” (Id. at 3 (quoting Marshall, 547 U.S.
at 310, 126 S. Ct at 1747).)
The problem with Plaintiffs’ argument is that it assumes the OSG wards are potential
class members with federal rights at stake in this case. Plaintiffs’ federal claims and the
definition of their proposed class are both premised on the Murray residents’ lack of consent.
(Dkt. No. ¶¶ 4, 42.) Where a resident consents to the transfer, through his or her legal guardian,
there is no basis for a federal discrimination claim, and that resident is not a potential class
member. Indeed, it would violate the ADA to keep a resident in Murray who is willing and able
to live in a community-integrated setting. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581,
598–603, 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2185–88 (1999).
Therefore, the question is not whether the adjudication of the federal claims interferes
with state court control of OSG wards residing at Murray. The OSG, as legal guardian of those
residents, has consented to the transfers, so there is no federal claim to adjudicate on their behalf.
Instead, the issue facing us is whether we can decide as a preliminary matter that the consent of
the OSG is defective or invalid, thus opening the door for Plaintiffs to bring federal
discrimination claims on behalf of the OSG wards.
Unless we make that determination, there is no federal right to adjudicate. And it is
precisely that determination that the probate exception prohibits. Reversing or invalidating the
consent of the OSG is an exercise of judicial authority no different than removing the wards

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from the custody of the OSG. In either case, we are substituting our own authority and judgment
for the authority and judgment of the state-appointed guardian. “That is the sort of maneuver
that the probate/domestic relations exception is intended to prevent.” Struck, 508 F.3d at 860.
Our holding on this issue in no way diminishes the extreme vulnerability of the Murray
residents, and we express no opinion whatsoever on whether the OSG is faithfully executing her
duty to act in the best interests of the wards. But a federal court does not have the authority to
address that question. If Plaintiffs believe that the OSG is not acting in its wards’ best interests,
they must seek relief in the state court that supervises the OSG. Absent a state-court
adjudication removing the authority of the OSG, the consent of the OSG to the transfer of its
wards precludes the present federal discrimination claims arising out of that transfer.
II.

The applicability of Struck and M.G.S.
Plaintiffs argue next that Struck and M.G.S. are distinguishable from the present case, but

in light of our foregoing analysis, their arguments are unpersuasive. Plaintiffs point out that this
case involves class-wide adjudication of a federal right, rather than a challenge to the
guardianship of a single ward. (Dkt. No 116 at 4–5.) They also suggest a number of factors we
should consider in choosing to exercise jurisdiction: (1) the application of federal law is within
the specific expertise of the federal courts; (2) sending OSG wards to state court would split the
class and create duplicative “dual-track” litigation in state and federal court; (3) Plaintiffs are not
seeking review of the state court decision to appoint the guardian; (4) the case does not eliminate
the state court’s jurisdiction over the OSG residents, and (5) requiring the OSG wards to seeks
relief in state court would cause irreparable harm. (Id. at 5–8.) None of these arguments have
merit.

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As we explained above, both the class definition and the federal discrimination claims
depend on a lack of consent. As long as the OSG consents to the transfer of its wards, those
wards are not potential class members and they have no federal discrimination claim. Therefore
it is irrelevant, with respect to the OSG wards, that the application of federal statutes is within
our expertise. Their consent precludes the federal discrimination claim. For the same reason,
our decision does not create “dual-track” litigation. We are not splitting the class and sending
part of it to state court. The consent of the OSG removes its wards from the potential class.
The OSG wards only become potential class members with federal discrimination claims
if we decide as an initial matter that the OSG’s consent is invalid. Plaintiff’s remaining three
arguments aim to show that invalidating the OSG’s consent does not actually amount to
“interference” with state court authority over the OSG wards. These arguments are equally
unpersuasive.
First, Plaintiffs’ claim that they are not seeking review of a state-court decision to appoint
the state guardian. (Id. at 6–7.) That is true, but it relates more to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
(which prohibits appellate review of state court decisions by federal district courts) than the
probate exception. The question here is not whether we are reviewing a state court decision, but
whether we are interfering with the state’s control of its ward. In Struck, the plaintiff claimed
constitutional violations related to the state guardian’s treatment of his mother. 508 F.3d at 858.
The court held that “decisions concerning the plaintiff’s right of access to his mother and to her
assets, her records, and her mail are at the heart of the guardian’s responsibilities and are
supervised by the court that appointed him.” Id. at 860.

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In other words, the federal court would not adjudicate a constitutional claim that required
evaluating or assuming authority over the decisions of a state-appointed guardian. Similarly
here, the OSG’s decision whether to consent to its wards’ placement in a community-integrated
setting is “at the heart of the guardian’s responsibilities.” Id. Plaintiffs’ federal statutory claims
require us to hold that the OSG is doing its job improperly by providing that consent. In that
respect, this case is no different that Struck. If the state guardian is failing to adequately perform
its responsibilities, the state court who appointed it must resolve that issue, even if the alleged
failure may give rise to a claim under federal laws.
Plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish this case—that “Plaintiffs’ sought remedy only affects
the OSG to the extent that it consents to the State’s unlawful policy”—is entirely circular. The
State’s policy is only allegedly unlawful to the extent that the residents do not consent. Plaintiffs
are essentially arguing that the OSG’s consent is invalid because the policy is unlawful, and the
policy is unlawful because the residents do not consent. That line of reasoning is only possible if
we begin with the premise that the OSG does not actually represent the residents. As should be
abundantly clear at this point, we have do not the authority to invalidate, even implicitly, the
OSG’s representation of its wards.
Plaintiffs’ last two points do not require extensive analysis. Plaintiffs state that they do
not seek to eliminate the state court’s jurisdiction over the OSG residents. But as we explained
earlier, ignoring or overriding the OSG’s decision regarding the residential placement of its
wards would be impermissible interference with the State’s authority, even if we do not entirely
remove the ward from the OSG’s guardianship. Finally, Plaintiffs state that sending this matter
to state court would cause irreparable harm to OSG wards. But the risk of harm to the parties

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before us does not define the limits of our jurisdiction. If we have no power to take a particular
judicial action, the parties must seek relief in the appropriate forum.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we hold that we lack jurisdiction to invalidate or
overrule the consent of the OSG with respect to the transfer of its wards at Murray. If the OSG
provides written consent to transfer its wards, Defendants may do so without violating the terms
of the TRO. It is so ordered.

________________________________
Honorable Marvin E. Aspen
U.S. District Court Judge
Date: July 18, 2013

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