Tratar v. First Federal Savings Bank of Ottawa et al

Filing 10

ENTER MEMORANDUM Order Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 3/13/2013. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ESTATE OF KENNETH W. TRATAR,
Plaintiff,
v.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK OF
OTTAWA, et al.,
Defendants.

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No.

13 C 1562

MEMORANDUM ORDER
This Court has just received, via random reassignment from
the calendar of its colleague Honorable Elaine Bucklo, the
Complaint in this action brought by the Estate of Kenneth Tratar
against First Federal Savings Bank of Ottawa (the “Bank”) and
three of its officers.

Judge Bucklo’s exercise of her privilege

under 28 U.S.C. §294(b) to withdraw from the case is quite
understandable, both in light of its turgid nature (it runs fully
54 pages comprising three counts whose allegations total 235
paragraphs, with a 3/4-inch stack of exhibits attached), but this
Court will resist the strong temptation to do likewise--instead
it turns to some problematic aspects of the pleading.
To begin with, Complaint ¶230 (one of the paragraphs under
the centered heading “Sufficiency of Pleading”) reads:
The Complaint includes short, plain and precise
statements of the basis for relief in accordance with
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc 8(a).
Whoever drafted the Complaint (more on this subject later)
obviously refers there to a document different from the one that

this Court has read, for the Complaint blatantly flouts the
requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 8(a)(2) that it must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Although this Court is

contemporaneously issuing its customary initial scheduling order,
it strikes the Complaint sua sponte--without prejudice, of
course--and it orders that an Amended Complaint conforming to the
cited Rule be filed on or before April 2, 2013 (with a Judge’s
Copy to be delivered to this Court’s chambers in compliance with
this District Court’s LR 5.2(f)).

In the meantime the defendants

must be served with process, but they are not required to respond
to the just-stricken Complaint.
Although the prolix Complaint purports to be prepared (and
bears the signature of) Lauren Tratar as “special
representative/executor” for the estate of her late husband
Kenneth Tratar, it is painfully clear that it was drafted by a
lawyer.

There is no prohibition against a lawyer providing some

degree of assistance to a pro se litigant,1 but it is entirely
inappropriate to employ the practice exhibited here, and that is
particularly so because of the responsibilities imposed by Rule
11(b) and the related provisions of Rule 11(c) on anyone who
files and signs a court document.

1

Accordingly this Court expects

This Court has not looked into, and therefore expresses
no view on, whether an estate’s “special representative/executor”
may proceed pro se rather than through counsel.
2

the responsible lawyer to come out of hiding and sign the
redrafted Complaint.
This memorandum order will eschew any detailed treatment of
the multitude of problematic aspects of the existing Complaint in
light of the complete overhaul that is required.

But the unknown

drafter is particularly cautioned to avoid pleading evidence--one
of the multiple sins of the present pleading.

________________________________________
Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
Date:

March 13, 2013

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