Mister v. County of Cook et al
Filing
110
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: Signed by the Honorable John W. Darrah on 10/22/2015. Mailed notice. (sxn, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RUFUS MISTER,
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Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS DART et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 13-cv-1578
Judge John W. Darrah
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Rufus Mister filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
Defendants Thomas Dart, Scott Bratlien, Katina Bonaparte, Mennellaramonda Austin, and the
County of Cook acted with deliberate indifference to his health and safety by failing to provide
him with adequate medical treatment and equipment, in violation of the Fourteenth and Eighth
Amendments to the Constitution. On July 10, 2015, Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment of Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56. For the
reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.
LOCAL RULE 56.1
Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the moving party to provide “a statement of
material facts as to which the party contends there is no genuine issue for trial.” Ammons v.
Aramark Uniform Servs., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004). Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires the
nonmoving party to admit or deny every factual statement proffered by the moving party and to
concisely designate any material facts that establish a genuine dispute for trial. See Schrott v.
Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005). Pursuant to Local Rule
56.1(b)(3)(C), the nonmovant may submit additional statements of material facts that “require
the denial of summary judgment.” Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) further permits the nonmovant to
submit a statement “of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment. . . .”
To the extent that a response to a statement of material fact provides only extraneous or
argumentative information, this response will not constitute a proper denial of the fact, and the
fact is admitted. See Graziano v. Vill. of Oak Park, 401 F.Supp.2d 918, 936 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
Similarly, to the extent that a statement of fact contains a legal conclusion or otherwise
unsupported statement, including a fact that relies upon inadmissible hearsay, such a fact is
disregarded. Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 1997).
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the parties' statements of undisputed material facts
submitted in accordance with Local Rule 56.1.
Plaintiff is a wheelchair-bound paraplegic. (Dkt. 90 ¶ 6.) He was detained at the
Cook County Jail (the “Jail”) as a pretrial detainee from September 2011 until October 2013.
(Dkt. 90 ¶ 2.) While a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff was housed in Cermak Health Services.
(Dkt. 90 ¶ 3.) Upon intake, Plaintiff signed a Cook County Jail History Card that authorizes the
Jail to handle the inmate’s trust account and acknowledges receipt of the Inmates Rules and
Regulations. (Dkt. 90 ¶ 8.) The Jail has an established grievance procedure that is available to
all inmates and is set forth in the Inmates Rules and Regulations. (Dkt. 90 ¶ 10.) Upon receipt
of a grievance, the Cook County Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s Office”) determines whether the
grievance is sustained or not-sustained and assigns a remedy, if no exceptions apply. (Dkt. 103
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¶ 4.) The Sheriff’s Office’s policy is to make this determination within 15 days. (Dkt. 103 Resp.
¶ 4.) Some grievance forms are processed as a “request” as a way to resolve the issue described
on the form. (Dkt. 90 ¶ 16.) If there has been no response to the request or the response is
deemed unsatisfactory, the inmate can resubmit the grievance after 15 days to obtain a Control
Number. (Dkt. 90 ¶ 17.) After receiving a response to a grievance, an inmate can appeal the
decision within 14 days of receiving that response. (Dkt. 90 ¶ 17.) In order for an inmate to
fully exhaust his administrative remedies, he must submit an appeal of the response to his
grievance. (Dkt. 90 ¶ 11.) A pretrial detainee cannot appeal requests. (Dkt. 103 ¶ 8.)
Plaintiff filed several grievances throughout his detainment in the Jail. (Dkt. 90.) He
filed his Complaint on February 28, 2013, while he was incarcerated. (Dkt. 1.) He is no longer a
detainee at Cook County Jail. (Dkt. 103 ¶ 1.) On July 10, 2015, Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment of Plaintiff’s claim. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is
granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted where the “pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving
party is responsible for informing the Court of what in the record or affidavits demonstrates the
absence of a triable issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the face of the
pleadings, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file to
demonstrate, through specific evidence, that there is still a genuine issue of material fact.
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Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–27; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254 - 56; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (Matsushita). “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find” for the nonmovant. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (Anderson).
Disputed facts are material when they might affect the outcome of the suit. First Ind.
Bank v. Baker, 957 F.2d 506, 507 - 08 (7th Cir. 1992). When reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, a court must view all inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 411 U.S. at 247 - 48; Popovits v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,
185 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 1999). However, a metaphysical doubt will not suffice. Matsushita,
475 U.S. at 586. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative or is no
more than a scintilla, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 411 U.S. at 249 - 250.
ANALYSIS
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The PLRA requires an inmate to comply with the applicable procedural rules of a prison’s
grievance system to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 95 (2006). This is true even if exhaustion is impossible because it is too late to pursue
administrative remedies. Fluker v. Cnty. of Kankakee, 741 F.3d 787, 791 (7th Cir. 2013). It is
undisputed that Plaintiff failed to submit appeals of the Sheriff’s Office’s responses to his
grievances.
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Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ delay in responding to Plaintiff’s grievances made the
administrative process unavailable to him, as they only responded to one grievance within 15
days. While there is a time period within which an inmate must appeal a grievance, there is
nothing in the Jail’s grievance procedure that states that the availability for appeal depends on
when Plaintiff receives a response. Plaintiff fails to explain how Defendants’ untimely responses
prevented him from appealing and exhausting his administrative remedies. Plaintiff also cites to
two cases to support his argument that the administrative process was unavailable to him:
Hurst v. Hantke, 634 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2011); and Brengettcy v. Horton, 423 F.3d 674 (7th Cir.
2005). Both cases are inapposite and not persuasive. In Hurst, the Seventh Circuit held that an
administrative remedy is not available if essential elements of the procedure for obtaining it are
concealed. In that case, the essential element was a “secret supplement” to the state’s
administrative code requiring that claims of good cause for an untimely filing be accompanied by
evidence. Plaintiff makes no such claim here. Brengettcy is similarly inapplicable. The plaintiff
in Brengettcy alleged that there was no response to his grievances and that without a decision to
appeal, he had done everything possible to exhaust his administrative remedies. In this case,
Plaintiff received responses to all relevant grievances prior to filing his Complaint except for his
two most recent grievances, one of which was filed two days before he filed this suit, the other
was filed on April 16, 2013.
Plaintiff further contends that he could not appeal his February 26, 2013 grievance
because it was processed as a request. The Jail’s grievance procedure states that if there has been
no response to the request or the response is deemed unsatisfactory, the inmate can resubmit the
grievance after 15 days to obtain a Control Number. Plaintiff did not resubmit his request.
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Finally, Plaintiff suggests that Defendants waived their right to argue that Plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to file a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff provides no
support for this argument, and it is unpersuasive.
Plaintiff fails to assert a genuine issue of material fact such that summary judgment is
inappropriate. As there are no disputed factual questions that bear Plaintiff’s exhaustion of his
administrative remedies, a Pavey hearing is unnecessary and will not be granted. Wagoner v.
Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir, 2014).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [91] is
granted.
Date: October 22, 2015
______________________________
JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Court Judge
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