Outley v. City Of Chicago et al
OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/31/2017: Defendants' motion to dismiss in part the fourth amended complaint 127 is granted. The City of Chicago is directed to answer counts I and II (limited to conduct that occur red later than December 17, 2011), count III, and count IV (limited to conduct that occurred later than February 28, 2011). Individual defendants are directed to answer counts III and IV (count IV is limited to conduct that occurred later than February 28, 2011). Status hearing is set for 6/13/2017 at 11:00 AM.Mailed notice(mad, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CITY OF CHICAGO, PAUL MAZUR,
Individually, ALAN STARK, Deputy
Commissioner of the Department of Water )
and Individually, and THOMAS POWERS, )
Commissioner of the Department of Water )
Case No. 13 C 1583
Judge Joan H. Lefkow
Magistrate Judge Daniel G. Martin
OPINION AND ORDER
Michael Outley’s fourth amended complaint against the City of Chicago and individual
officials of its Department of Water alleges discrimination on the basis of race, as well as
retaliation, in violation of Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, respectively
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. and 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. 1 He also asserts
The court applies the well-established legal principles for assessing a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); Bell
Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (holding that although a
complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do; also, factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all
the allegations in the complaint are true). In making this determination, the complaint is construed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true the well-pleaded allegations, and drawing all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.
a claim of negligent supervision in violation of Illinois law. 2 Defendants move to dismiss parts of
the fourth amended complaint on the bases that Outley has failed to state a valid Title VI claim,
his negligent supervision claim is barred by Illinois law, and certain of his claims are timebarred. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted. 3
The court described the factual background in its Opinion and Order of March 10, 2015
(Order) (dkt. 71) and will not repeat it here. Where the fourth amended complaint has added
additional allegations that bear on the motion to dismiss, they will be discussed as necessary.
The Title VI Claim
Title VI prohibits unlawful discrimination in all federally-assisted programs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d. Outley alleges that the City is a recipient of federal assistance in a variety of public
programs and it has discriminated against African-American employees in the Water Department
(as alleged in support of his Title VII claims); therefore, the City has violated Title VI. (Dkt. 118
¶¶ 67–81.) Outley fails to recognize that Title VI is not “another way to reach discrimination in
employment practices.” Ahern v. Board of Educ., 133 F.3d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1998). To the
contrary, “Title VI [provides no] judicial remedy for employment discrimination by institutions
receiving federal funds unless (1) providing employment is a primary objective of the federal
The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C.
In response to the motion, Outley has voluntarily withdrawn other claims he asserted in the
fourth amended complaint: (a) those against the individual defendants under Title VI, Title VII, and for
negligent supervision; (b) his “intentional misconduct” claim; (c) his equal protection claim to the extent
it invokes retaliation; and (d) his claim for punitive damages against the City, leaving still at issue only
the claims addressed within.
aid, or (2) discrimination in employment necessarily causes discrimination against the primary
beneficiaries of the federal aid.” Id. at 978 (quoting Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center,
Inc., 590 F.2d 87, 89 (4th Cir. 1978). 4 Neither of these exceptions is apparent within the fourth
amended complaint. At least, Outley has not alleged any logical connection between his
employment situation and the primary objectives or beneficiaries of any of the City’s federallyassisted programs. See Commodari v. Long Island Univ., 89 F. Supp. 2d 353, 378 (E.D.N.Y.
2000). Rather, Outley is asserting a straightforward claim explicitly authorized by Title VII of
the same civil rights act. The Title VI claim is, at best, superfluous in any event, as he could
receive no further relief than is available via his Title VII and § 1981 claims.
Therefore, count V must be dismissed.
The Negligent Supervision Claim
Outley’s negligent supervision claim arises from his allegations of race discrimination
including failure to promote, disparate treatment, and retaliatory harassment. 5 (Dkt 118 ¶¶ 82–
88.) The City argues that this claim should be dismissed because (1) it is barred by § 2-201 of the
Illinois Tort Immunity Act (TIA), see 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/2-201; (2) the court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over the claim pursuant to the exclusivity provision in the Illinois Human
Rights Act (IHRA), see 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-111(D); or (3) it is preempted by the Illinois
Workers’ Compensation Act (IWCA), see 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 305/5(a). Because the argument
that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the IHRA is dispositive, the court does not
address the other arguments.
Trageser’s source for this statement is 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(c)(1) and (3) regarding employment practices in
federally assisted programs.
Outley also voluntarily withdrew this claim against the individually-named defendants, so this
discussion pertains only to the City.
Section 8-111(D) of the IHRA states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, no
court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation other
than as set forth in this Act.” Therefore, if Outley’s negligent supervision claim seeks redress for
a “civil rights violation” as defined by the IHRA, 6 before he can bring the claim in court, he must
satisfy the administrative procedures set forth in the Act, which he does not allege that he has
done. Garcia v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 360 F.3d 630, 640 (7th Cir.2004) (“[T]he Act also
limits the jurisdiction of Illinois courts, mandating that any party seeking to pursue a civil-rights
claim in Illinois must first exhaust administrative remedies under the Act . . . .”); see also
Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 458–59 (7th Cir.1994).
A claim for negligent supervision falls within the bounds of the IHRA where “the IHRA
‘furnish[es] the legal duty that the defendant was alleged to have breached.’” Bannon v. Univ. of
Chicago, 503 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d
593, 604 (7th Cir. 2006)) (alteration in original). Because Outley’s allegations of negligent
supervision are based entirely on the City’s duty to protect him from racial discrimination and
retaliation, he cannot “establish the necessary elements of the tort independent of any legal duties
created by the [IHRA],” Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21, 24, 177 Ill.2d 511, 227 Ill. Dec.
98 (1997), and, therefore, his claim is preempted by that Act and must be dismissed.
The Time-Barred Claims
Outley has alleged discriminatory employment practices by defendants reaching back to
at least 2010. (See dkt. 118 ¶¶ 19–25.) The City argues that the court has already determined that
his claims under Title VII for failure to promote are time-barred to the extent they arose before
Section 2-102(A) of the IHRA states that it is a civil rights violation for “any employer to . . .
act with respect to . . . promotion, . . . discipline, tenure or terms, privileges or conditions of employment
on the basis of unlawful discrimination,” which term is defined in § 1-103(Q) as including
“discrimination against a person because of his or her race.”
December 17, 2011; and his claims under § 1983 are time-barred to the extent they arose before
February 28, 2011.
The City is correct. The fourth amended complaint realleges discriminatory acts
occurring before dates determined to be time-barred in the court’s previous Order. Although
some of these allegations may relate to relevant evidence, Outley explicitly challenges the
court’s ruling, long after a motion to reconsider would be appropriate. Nevertheless, the court
exercises its discretion to consider Outley’s argument as if it were such a motion, which may be
granted “when there has been a significant change in the law or facts since the parties presented
the issue to the court, when the court misunderstands a party’s arguments, or when the court
overreaches by deciding an issue not properly before it.” United States v. Ligas, 549 F.3d 497,
501 (7th Cir. 2008).
Outley does not argue that there has been any change in the law or facts since the Order,
nor does he argue that the court misunderstood the arguments or overreached by deciding the
time-bar issue. Rather, he makes the same argument that he made in opposition to the earlier
motion to dismiss, namely, that he has alleged a continuing violation of both Title VII and
§ 1983. (Dkt. 140 at 2–6.) The court rejected this argument because counts I and IV are both
based entirely on Outley’s assertion that defendants have denied him promotion on multiple
occasions on account of his race, each of which is a discrete act that “starts a new clock for filing
charges.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 730 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002)).
Because a motion for reconsideration “is not an appropriate forum for rehashing previously
rejected arguments,” Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal citation
omitted), the court declines to alter its holding regarding the timeliness of Outley’s failure to
promote and § 1983 claims.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss in part the fourth amended complaint is granted. The City
of Chicago is directed to answer counts I and II (limited to conduct that occurred later than
December 17, 2011), count III, and count IV (limited to conduct that occurred later than
February 28, 2011). Individual defendants are directed to answer counts III and IV (count IV is
limited to conduct that occurred later than February 28, 2011).
This case is scheduled for a status hearing on June 13, 2017.
Date: May 31, 2017
U.S. District Judge Joan H. Lefkow
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