Kuri v. Szwedo et al

Filing 309

MOTION by Plaintiff Anthony Kuri for judgment as a matter of law (Goodwin, Julie)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION
ANTHONY KURI,
(a.k.a. Ramsey Qurash)
Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13 C 1653
Honorable Edmond E. Chang

PLAINTIFF’S RULE 50 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
NOW COMES the Plaintiff, ANTHONY KURI, by and through his attorneys, and
respectfully submits this motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. The grounds for
Plaintiff’s Motion are as follows:
I.

Standard of Law
Rule 50 authorizes a court to enter judgment as a matter of law against a party if “a

reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that
issue.” FCRP 50(a)(1). Under this standard, the question is simply whether the evidence as a
whole, when combined with all reasonable inferences permissibly drawn from the evidence,
would permit a jury to find for the non-moving party. Hall v. Forest River, Inc., 536 F. 3d 615,
619 (7th Cir. 2008). The standard for granting judgment as a matter of law “mirrors” that for the
granting of summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
(2000). Thus, under Rule 50(a), “the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law,
there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

II.

Due Process
No reasonable jury, after hearing the evidence presented in the case, could find for

Defendants on Plaintiff’s Due Process claim. The crux of Plaintiff’s claim, as emphasized
throughout his case, is that if Defendants obtained Plaintiff’s name in the course of their
investigation and provided that name to the witnesses, Plaintiff wins. The evidence on this score
tips in Plaintiff’s favor and justifies a Rule 50 motion.
The evidence presented to the jury that supports Plaintiff’s position that Wachaa provided
Defendants with Plaintiff’s name prior to their interaction with Russell is as follows: First, no
account of any information obtained from Wachaa is recorded by Defendants Folino or
McDermott (or any Chicago Police Detective) in any police report and neither Defendant could
testify with any credible accuracy as to when their conversation with Wachaa occurred. Yet,
there is no doubt that any conversation that was had between the Detectives and Wachaa was
material and should have been disclosed. Wachaa reported that he was on the phone with Zay
Russell, an eyewitness to the shooting, as the shooting occurred. Defendants testified that they
later determined his account to be a rumor or “word on the street.” Defendants further testified
that they had multiple conversations with Wachaa during the course of their investigation and
that Wachaa was key to getting Russell to cooperate with his statements to the State’s Attorney
and the Grand Jury. Wachaa’s purported account to police officers was disclosed; any
statements that later recanted his original story should have likewise been disclosed to the State
for use by the criminal defendant.
Second, no reasonable jury could conclude that the “word on the street” rumor that
brought Plaintiff’s name to the forefront of the investigation came from anywhere other than
Wachaa and that it was brought up to the Defendants on August 1—before Defendants ever re-

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interviewed Russell. The only explanation presented to the jury as to why Defendants would
have been in possession of Plaintiff’s photograph prior to re-interviewing Russell on August 2,
2009 is because there was a “typo” in Defendant Folino’s Case Supplementary Report. No
reasonable jury could believe that the only typo that occurred in the entire homicide file was
pertaining to the date that the Defendants solved the murder. Simply put, there was no credible
evidence that the August 2 date reflected in Defendant Folino’s Supplementary Report was a
typo and concealing the true source of Plaintiff’s name was a violation of Plaintiff’s Due
Process rights.
Third, it is undisputed that any consideration that Wachaa received for helping
Defendants Folino and McDermott was not disclosed to the State for use by the criminal
defendant.
Last, the Defendants can point to no Chicago Police Report that either supports their
position that there was a typo in the date that they re-interviewed Russell or that contradicts
Plaintiff’s arguments on this date. There has been plenty of testimony that Defendants did not
record Fernandez or Russell’s accounts of the murder when they were interviewed and reinterviewed by these Defendants. Either the Detectives affirmatively made the decision not to
record the witness statements- which is concealment of exculpatory or impeachment evidenceor the Detectives created the reports and in the time period of while the reports sat open they
edited the reports to remove the exculpatory or impeachment evidence. The Defendants have
nothing to rebut this claim because both Defendants admit that they should have taken notes of
pertinent witness interviews during the homicide investigation. The absence of such notes to
record crucial statements, as well as the other evidence offered above, tips the scale in
Plaintiff’s favor for granting a Rule 50 motion on Plaintiff’s Due Process claim.

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III.

Fourth Amendment: Unlawful Detention
No reasonable jury could likewise find for Defendants on Plaintiff’s claim of unlawful

detention.
Here, both Defendants admitted before the jury that Plaintiff was not under arrest during
his detention on August 5, 2009 and there was no probable cause to arrest him or charge him for
murder on that date; he was simply a witness to the shooting. Crucially, the Defendants also
admit that no additional evidence was investigated between the time that the police detained
Plaintiff on August 5 until Plaintiff’s arrest on September 8, 2009. Further, there are no notes or
police reports to counter Plaintiff’s argument and establish even circumstantially that any
additional evidence was investigated and counted towards the probable cause analysis.
Defendants relied on Russell and Fernandez’ identification of Plaintiff to bring him in as a
witness in August and they continued to rely on Russell and Fernandez’ identification of Plaintiff
to arrest Plaintiff and charge him with murder in September. Defendants could articulate no
evidence that changed between the August and September detention; by Defendants own reason
then, no probable cause existed to charge Plaintiff with first degree murder on September 9.
No reasonable juror would believe Defendants’ assertion that probable cause existed to
charge Plaintiff in September because Plaintiff failed to tell the truth during his interrogation.
First, Defendant Folino admitted that he defined the truth during the interrogation. Under
Folino’s definition, Plaintiff was caught in a Catch-22: either he told the truth (that he was not
involved in the murder) and under Folino’s definition he was lying and therefore probable cause
existed; or, he told Folino’s version of the truth (that he was involved in the murder) and
therefore probable cause existed. Despite professing his innocence for 48 hours, Defendants
refused to believe anything other than their version of events. No reasonable jury could rely on

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such an untenable position to find for Defendants on this claim.
In short, no reasonable person could believe that Plaintiff had committed the crime he
was charged with in September of 2009; even the Defendants didn’t believe it because they
didn’t charge Plaintiff just a month prior on the same exact same evidence. Plaintiff’s Rule 50
motion should be granted on this claim.
IV.

Conspiracy to Violate Federal Constitutional Rights and Failure to Intervene
There is no dispute that Defendants Folino and McDermott worked the Patel homicide

together; McDermott confirmed that fact during his testimony and stated that unless it was offhours and one was home, they were partnered together and working on solving the Patel
homicide. If the jury is to find for Plaintiff in that Defendants violated his constitutional rights
during the course of the investigation, it reasonably follows that jury will find for Plaintiff on his
claims of Conspiracy and Failure to Intervene against both Defendants.
WHEREFORE, for all of the reasons stated above, Plaintiff respectfully asks that this
Court grant his Motion for such other relief as this Court may deem just.

Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Julie M. Goodwin
One of Plaintiff’s Attorneys
Jon Loevy
Julie Goodwin
Danielle Hamilton
Joel Feldman
LOEVY & LOEVY
311 N. Aberdeen, 3rd Floor
Chicago, IL 60607
[phone]
[e-mail]

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Julie Goodwin, an attorney, hereby certify that I served the foregoing Plaintiff’s Rule
50 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law on all counsel of record via the Court’s CM / ECF
filing system on October 1, 2018.
/s/ Julie M. Goodwin

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