Musso v. Colvin

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Arlander Keys on 5/22/2014. Mailed notice(tlp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ANTONIO B. MUSSO,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.

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No. 13 C 2036
Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on Antonio Musso’s motion for
summary judgment.

Mr. Musso seeks a remand or reversal of the

Commissioner’s decision to deny his application for Disability
Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income.

The

Commissioner seeks summary judgment affirming the decision to deny
benefits.

For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Musso’s motion [21]

is denied and the case is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Musso previously applied for disability benefits and
was denied after a hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
Denise Martin on March 12, 2010. 1

1

On April 27, 2010, Mr. Musso

Mr. Musso previously filed a disability application in 2007, claiming disability since June 2008 (R.
115, 117-19). Following administrative hearings in 2009 and 2010 (R. 71-122), Plaintiff's prior claim
was denied by an ALJ on March 12, 2010, and upheld by the Appeals Council on May 6, 2011 (R.
12). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.955. The ALJ in Plaintiff's present claim explained that the prior denials
were res judicata regarding Plaintiff's current claim for the period prior to March 13, 2010, and that

applied a second time for disability benefits under Title II and
Title XVI of the Social Security Act, alleging that he became
disabled as of July 8, 2008 due to a seizure disorder, left and
right broken femurs, and head trauma. (R.227, 234).
The Social Security Administration denied his second
application initially and on reconsideration. (R.142).
Thereafter, Mr. Musso requested a hearing before an ALJ, and the
case was assigned to ALJ Patricia Supergan, who held a hearing
on Mr. Musso’s case on September 28, 2011 in Chicago. (R.37-70).
At the hearing, Mr. Musso appeared and was represented by
counsel.
I. Plaintiff’s Hearing Testimony
At the March 12, 2010 hearing, Mr. Musso testified to the
following 2: He was born on July 16, 1969, he is 5’11”, and around
160 pounds. (R.74). He is single and lives with his parents,
Concetta Musso and Masario Musso, and his 18 year old nephew,
Nicky. (R.74-75).

He completed the twelfth grade and is not

currently working. (R.75).

The last time he was employed was at

Tony’s Fire Foods for about two weeks in June of 2009. (R.7576).

His last long-term job was at Home Depot, where for

approximately three years he worked part-time stocking supplies
nothing in her decision re-opened or disturbed the prior ALJ's decision (R. 12). Therefore, Plaintiff's
prior application is not before this Court for judicial review. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,
108 (1977).
2
This prior hearing information is included merely to provide the background personal information on
Mr. Musso.

2

and assisting customers. (R.76-77). Home Depot tried to work
with him, as a “couple months would pass and I’d have a seizure,
then go a few months…have [another] seizure.” (R.77).

Over the

past 15 years, he has worked for Cintas clothing (one month);
Family Craft Builders (one month before he had an accident);
Synergy Service Merchandise (one month until seizure); Fed Ex
(“wasn’t there long”). (R.77-78).
He feels unable to continue working due to his continuous
seizures that have taken a toll on his body, both physically and
mentally.

His cognitive functioning is impaired and he is

unable to multi-task on the job. (R.79). Until he began taking
Keppra in September of 2007, he regularly had about two seizures
every four to five months. Id.

He now has seizures less

frequently, over the past six months he had two, but he also
forgot to take his medication. (R.80).
At the second hearing on September 28, 2011, Mr. Musso
testified to the following:

his last seizure occurred in

September. (R.44). He felt it coming a little bit, then it came
on real quick, the rest is a blank. Id.

He remembers waking up

and realizing something happened, but does not remember his
parents bringing him upstairs to the couch. (R.51).

He had no

energy and just sat in front of the TV for two hours trying to
recuperate, until he forced himself to get up to take a shower.
Id.

He then relapsed and had a second seizure (R.52).

3

He

bruised the area under his eye brows when he had the seizure and
fell (R.50).

He currently has bruising on his body from

previous seizures. (R.52). He had a concussion and went to the
doctor for it in 2009. Id.

He got into an automobile accident

and broke his left femur. (R.53).

He had to have his leg

pinned, which creates pain when he sits. Id. He has to get up
and walk off the pain; he cannot sit longer than half an hour
without pain. Id.
He does not always have a total episode, sometimes he is
able to control the outcome. (R.57). His last seizure occurred
in February, but he was able to “fight it off.” Id. He felt
something coming on; his knees started to buckle, but he was
able to stop it. Id. He took one Dilantin and after 15 minutes,
he was able to walk normal.

When the ALJ stated that his

brother claimed in a letter that Mr. Musso will sometimes just
drift off while he is having a conversation with him, he
confirmed that he will easily lose attention.

He said it is

more of a timing thing, where he is delayed and is not able to
process and respond right after he hears something. (R.58). In a
work setting, other people might find this problematic. (R.5859).

He fears letting people see this side of him, as well as

having an episode in front of others. (R.60-61).
With regard to his daily life, he takes out the garbage and
cleans some dishes (R.45). He has a Facebook account he uses

4

occasionally, and he looks up information on the lap top he
shares with his nieces. Id.

He does not play the computer or

video games, but he occasionally reads magazines.

His parents

cook (R.47). Sometimes he does the laundry, but usually it is
his mother. He has a couple friends he talks to on his cell
phone. He goes out walking by himself to nearby places including
7-Eleven and Walgreens when he gets hungry. (R.53). He quit
smoking roughly two years ago and has not had any alcohol since
that time either. (R.46).
As to his physical issues, his left hip hurts when he sits
and he has to walk off the pain.

Walking is not that difficult,

but he does need to sit down frequently. (R.53).

When he had

his concussion, he injured his neck as well. (R.54).

He has had

seizures at work. He kept working until he was no longer feeling
well. He did not have the motivation and was depressed (R.55).
He has seizures when he forgets his medication, or does
something that has an adverse reaction to the medication, such
as drinking alcohol (R.55-56).

II. Vocational Expert
A vocational expert (“VE”), Grace Gianforte, testified at
the hearing on September 28, 2011.

(R.63).

The VE testified

that she had not discussed the case with the plaintiff, that her
testimony was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational

5

Titles, and that the job descriptions were consistent with the
national economy.

(R.63-64). The VE testified to hearing the

relevant testimony, reviewing the exhibits and consulting the
U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics.

(R.64).

The VE testified that Mr. Musso “worked in retail sales,
like department stores, grocery stores, DOT code 290.477-014,
light, SVP: 3, semi-skilled.” Id.

She also testified that he

worked as a “sales attendant at a home improvement store,
associated with building materials, DOT code 299.677-014, SVP:
3, semi-skilled and heavy in exertion.

There's been some

temporary work with a staffing agency.” Id.

Additionally, the

VE testified that Mr. Musso’s exhibits showed “there was
construction laborer, ding cleanup for three months in ’00,
2000, DOT code 869.687-026, SVP: 2, unskilled and heavy in
exertion.” (R.65).
During the testimony, the ALJ asked the VE to
hypothetically assume an individual of Mr. Musso’s age,
education and work experience, however, the individual had no
exertional limitations, except that he is unable to climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and would need to avoid
concentrated exposure to hazards such as moving machinery or
unprotected heights.

The ALJ then asked the VE would such an

individual be able to perform any of Mr. Musso’s past relevant
work, to which the VE responded that the cleaner/packer and

6

general retail sales jobs are still viable, but the construction
laborer and sales attendant at Home Depot job would be
eliminated, as he would have to climb ladders. (R.65).
The ALJ then altered the hypothetical slightly by
asking the VE to now assume that the same individual had the
residual functional capacity to perform light work, except that
he should not stand or walk for more than two to four hours in
an eight-hour workday; the individual would be unable to climb
ladders, ropes or scaffolds and occasionally climb ramps and
stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; he would need
to avoid extreme temperatures, and hazards; avoid driving motor
vehicles, and the individual could further perform unskilled
work tasks that could be learned in 30 days or by a
demonstration. The VE responded that this individual would not
be able to perform any of Mr. Musso’s past relevant work. (R.6566).
However, the VE testified that at the light level of
exertion with sedentary work, where the individual can stand for
up to two to four hours and can walk or sit the rest of the
time, there is the occupation of office helper, DOT code
239.567-010, SVP: 2, with about 30,000 positions in this region
of the economy. (R.66). Additionally, the VE testified that
there would be sedentary work as an order clerk, in the food and
beverage industry, 209.567-014, SVP:2 (2,000 jobs in the

7

region/3000,000 nationally); and the occupation of addresser,
209.587-010, SVP: 2 (1,200 jobs in this region/12,000
nationally). Id.
The ALJ then asked if the VE were to further limit this
individual to unskilled work tasks that would involve occasional
decision-making, occasional changes in the work setting and jobs
that would not be fast paced or as having strict production
quotas, would there be work available.

The VE responded that

the same jobs would still be available, as the addresser, orderclerk, and office helper jobs are unskilled and they are not
fast paced. (R.67). The VE further expounded, however, that if
this individual were likely to be off task, due to symptoms
associated with seizure disorder, for 25% of an eight-hour
workday, there would be no employment options. Id. Mr. Musso’s
attorney then asked the VE what amount of time could an
individual, as detailed above, be off task and still gainfully
employed.

The VE responded that individuals performing

unskilled work are expected to always be on task outside of
their normal breaks. Id.

III. Medical Record
In addition to the testimony of Mr. Musso, and the
testimony of the VE, the record before the ALJ also included

8

medical records from his past filing as well as his recent
medical history.
Issues relating to his head and body injuries include:
-May 2007 seizure at home, fell to the floor, striking his head.
The next day he was stumbling and complaining of headaches.
(R.587,851,853,905,907). CT of the head May 21, 2007. Impression
was bilateral subfrontal hemorrhagic contusions and a nondisplaced left suboccipital calvarial fracture extending into
the left skull base (R.422-423). The hemorrhage was not
advancing. CT performed the next day re-demonstrated the left
occipital fracture, and stated the bifrontal hemorrhagic
contusions were unchanged and no new hemorrhages were seen
(R.424,856). May 23, 2007, he still had a severe headache.
(R.605). Cervical CT revealed degenerative changes at C6-C7 (R.
421).
--June 30, 2007, Mr. Musso had a motor vehicle collision
resulting in a left femoral neck fracture (R.430). Dr. Michael
Sturgill stated he presented with a total loss of consciousness,
and a cervical spine fracture, but was stabled and cleared for
surgery. (R. 492). Cervical CT June 30, 2007 due to neck pain
revealed an hemongioma in the anterior left lateral aspect of C7
with a cortical interruption highly suspicious of an acute
fracture, and degenerative changes. (R.437,484).

9

--An X-ray June 30, 2007 due to leg pain post the motor vehicle
accident revealed a mildly impacted, angulated left femoral neck
fracture. (R.453,481). The fracture was comminuted at the neck.
Internal fixation was performed, using three screws (R.461, 475).
--An EEG performed July 5, 2007 was interpreted as moderately
abnormal because of intermittent bitemporal delta slow waves and
sharp waves. Impression also stated the record was consistent
with an interictal or postictal state (R.450,471).
--October 30, 2007, Dr. Franco Campanella of Neurological
Associates wrote about his May 2007 assessment of Mr. Musso to
Dr. Stevia. (R.990) Dr. Campanella opined that a perinatal
injury may have been the etiology of his seizures. He noted that
he presented to him after a fall from a seizure which resulted
in a suboccipital fracture and bifrontal hemorraghic contusions.
He also explained to Dr. Stevia that Mr. Musso is “very
noncompliant with his medication.”

Id. He noted that Mr. Musso

did not have surgery after the fall, yet seemed to be getting
much better. His physical examination revealed him to be “awake,
alert, and oriented times three”…except for the fact that he has
been very noncompliant with his medication.” Id. Finally, Dr.
Campanella noted that Mr. Musso:
openly admits that he keeps stopping his
Keppra because he has difficulty affording it.
I offered him several other options, however
he knows that Keppra is going to go generic
and would like to stay with it. I also offered

10

him some samples and I made a pact with him
that he will continue the medication for the
time being. He feels as though he takes
Dialntin 200 mgs twice a day and Keppra 500
mgs twice a day that his seizures are at bay.
(R. 990)

--Dr. Suman Setia noted on May 29, 2008, that Mr. Musso had been
doing fine since his last hospitalization in May of 2007 (due to
a fall after a seizure) until last night when he was walking
down the street a block from his home, had tonic-clonic seizure
activity, fell, struck his head to the ground, and lost
consciousness. He was taken to the ER by EMS and was not able to
call his family until the following morning (R,615,915).
--X-ray revealed an acute right femoral neck fracture with
partial coxa vara deformity (R.807,859,860,894)
--CT of the head, performed May 28, 2008 without contrast due to
head injury and seizure revealed old left suboccipial skull
fracture and a right frontal scalp hematoma (R.811). Cervical CT
revealed reversal of the normal lordotic curve, evidence of old
interosseous disc herniation at C7, unchanged from prior exam,
but new changes of disc space narrowing at C5-6 and C6-7 with
generalized degenerative changes and mild facet joint
arthropathy (R.892,952).
--May 30, 2008, Dr. Steven Chandler performed percutaneous
pinning of the right hip for reduction of Garden-II fracture of

11

the right femoral neck. (R.638,839,924). Dr Setia described this
as open reduction-internal fixation (R.914). Mr. Musso also saw
Dr. Campanella of neurology on May 30, 2008. He noted that Mr.
Musso presented with a tonic-clonic seizure and stated that he
had not taken his Keppra for several days because he “ran out”.
(R.918). Dr. Campanella noted that Mr. Musso did this same thing
four months ago and had the same tonic-clonic seizure. Id. He
increased his Keppra to 750 mg b.i.d (R.618, 918).
--June 16, 2008, Mr. Musso reported tightness in his right thigh
and groin which feels like a Charlie horse. He reported
difficulty with sit to stand transitions and that it was
uncomfortable to get moving after sitting for a while. He walked
with a limp. He was referred to physical therapy and found fit
for work with restrictions (R.902-904).
--He had two seizures on July 9, 2008. He had been drinking
alcohol for 2 days and had not taken Keppra for 2-3 days. He
felt tired (R.650,955). On September 9, 2009, Dr. Campanella
noted that for the last seven months Mr. Musso has been
complying with his medication and has not had any seizures.
(R.986). However, he was involved in a motor-vehicle accident
while he was a pedestrian. He flipped over a car and hurt his
arm on the right side, had some bone chipping in his wrist, and
discomfort in his shoulders but otherwise okay. (R.986,1342).

12

In a Function Report dated July 10, 2010, his father,
Rosario Musso, stated he doesn’t feel good and usually lies on
the sofa, watching TV. He is agitated, anxious, and has trouble
sleeping. He easily loses his temper. He needs reminders after
his seizures. He cannot handle a savings or checking account, or
money orders, because of concentration difficulties. He has
difficulty understanding and following instructions. His brain
has been through a lot and his focus is weak (R.289-294).
In a seizure description form dated July 10, 2010, his
father explained he has had seizures, more than once per month,
since age 8. He loses his balance and falls. He loses
consciousness; they last 1-2 hours; he trembles, jerks his arms,
and has head movements. When he wakes up he is restless and
wants to move around (R.301).
In a Seizure description form dated July 10, 2010, his
mother, Concetta Musso, stated she witnessed about 2-3 seizures
per month since he was 8. His head moves from side to side and
he falls. He hits his head. His whole body shakes and he bites
his tongue. He has hurt his head, back, and hip when he falls
(R.300). In a Seizure description of July 10, 2010, his friend,
Maria, corroborated the above. She witnessed 3 seizures that
year (R.299).
A letter dated September 14, 2011 from his brother, Gino
Musso, and signed by his parents, states he has witnessed dozens

13

of seizures. He loses consciousness, falls and his body
convulses violently. His breathing seems to stop and sometimes
he foams at the mouth and loses control of bodily functions.
Gino stated that on many occasions, he has “drifted off”,
sometimes slightly and sometimes severely. For example, when
asked to change the TV channel, he has gone to the laundry room
and turned the dial on the washer, and shortly thereafter he had
a seizure. Other observations include rapid blinking, fatigue,
forgetfulness, severe bouts of anger, loss of equilibrium, and
mis-stepping (R.351).
IV. ALJ Decision
On October 26, 2011, the ALJ issued a fully unfavorable
decision, finding that Mr. Musso was not disabled under section
1614(a)(3)(A) of the social security act.

(R.23).

The ALJ

applied the five-step sequential analysis as required by the
Act, under 20 C.F.R. 416.920(g).
The ALJ found that Mr. Musso’s seizure disorder was a
severe impairment to his past relevant work. (R.22). However,
the ALJ found an insufficient amount of evidence in order to
find Mr. Musso disabled.

(R.22-23).

At step one, the ALJ determined that, although Mr. Musso
worked after his alleged disability onset date, July 8, 2008,
the level did not amount to substantial gainful activity.
(R.14).

14

At step two, the ALJ determined that Mr. Musso’s seizure
disorder causes more than a minimal limitation to his ability to
work, and, therefore, is a severe impairment.

(R.15).

The

ALJ

found his femur fracture to be a non-severe physical impairment,
explaining that the record does not reflect any treatment for
this condition during the relevant time period of March 13, 2010,
onwards.

Also, the State agency expert did not impose any

limitations in the claimant's residual functional capacity
assessment due to this condition. Id. The ALJ stated that she
gave that opinion great weight as it was consistent with, and
supported by, the objective evidence in this matter.

She also

noted that the claimant reported that he walks frequently, and
she felt that tends to show that this condition does not cause
any more than minimal physical limitations.

Id.

Regarding Mr. Musso’s medically determinable mental
impairment of depression, the ALJ found that it does not cause
more than minimal limitation in the claimant's ability to
perform basic mental work activities and is, therefore, nonsevere.

T h e A L J n o t e d t h a t s h e l o o k e d t o t he claimant’s

admission at the hearing that he had not gotten any treatment
for his alleged depression, which she noted tends to indicate
that the claimant himself does not view it as a serious issue.
Id.

Furthermore, on September 7, 2010, Tyrone Hollerauer,

Psy.D., completed a Psychiatric Review Technique form on the

15

claimant's case for the State agency.

Dr. Hollerauer stated

that the claimant did not have any severe mental impairments.
On December 20, 2010, Michael Schneider, Ph.D., affirmed Dr.
Hollerauer's opinion as written.

The ALJ stated that she

g a v e great weight to the opinions of Dr. Hollerauer and Dr.
Schneider as they were consistent with, and supported by, the
objective evidence in this matter. (R.15).

The ALJ further

noted that she considered the four broad functional areas set
out in the disability regulations for evaluating mental
disorders and in section 12.00C of the Listing of Impairments
(20 CFR, Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1). These four
functional areas are known as the "paragraph B" criteria- daily
living, social functioning, concentration/persistence/pace, and
episodes of decompensation.

The ALJ found that Mr. Musso has a

mild limitation in activities of daily living, mild limitation
in social functioning, mild difficulties maintaining
concentration, and no episodes of decompensation, which have
been of an extended duration. (R.15-17.)
At step three, the ALJ determined that Mr. Musso’s
impairments did not meet or equal any of the listed impairments
in the enumerated listings.

(R.17).

At step four, the ALJ determined that Mr. Musso “has the
residual functional capacity to perform light work . . . except
that: the claimant should not stand/walk more than two to four

16

hours in an eight hour workday; the claimant is unable to climb
ladders, ropes and scaffolds; the claimant can occasionally
climb ramps and stairs; the claimant can occasionally balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; the claimant must avoid all
exposure to temperature extremes and to hazards, such as moving
machinery or unprotected heights; the claimant must avoid
driving motor vehicles; and the claimant is limited to unskilled
work tasks that can be learned by demonstration or in 30 days or
less.”

(R.17).

The ALJ supported this determination, by considering all
Mr. Musso’s symptoms, and the extent to which the symptoms can
reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical
evidence and other evidence, based on the requirements of 20 CFR
404.1529 and 416.929 and SSRs 96-4p and 96-7p, as well as
opinion evidence in accordance with the requirements of 20 CFR
404.1527 and 416.927 and SSRs 96-2p, 96-5p, 96-6p, and 06-3p.
(R.18).

The ALJ noted that Mr. Musso is alleging disability due

to: “a seizure disorder, with alleged associated head trauma,
concentration issues, and cognition issues; a broken femur,
status-post pinning, with alleged associated pain when sitting
or standing for long and with an alleged associated need to
walk on occasion; and depression… The claimant alleges the
following side effects from his medications: drowsiness;
delirium/confusion; irritability; tremors; joint pain; and

17

muscle spasms/movement.”

(R.18).

The ALJ then explained that,

while Mr. Musso’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause his alleged symptoms, his
subjective claims as to the intensity of the pain and
impairments were not credible.

(R.19).

The ALJ noted that, with regard to Mr. Musso’s seizure
disorder, she finds his allegations, as well as those of his
family, that his impairment is work-preclusive t o b e far less
than fully credible given that work-preclusive limitations due
to this impairment are not supported by the objective evidence
that shows that his seizures are well-controlled and infrequent
when he is compliant with his medications.

(R.20).

She points

to the record on June 4, 2010, where the claimant had a CT scan
that was largely unremarkable, with no specific negative
findings, after complaining of headaches.

Id.

On June 14, 2010,

the claimant visited his treating source for refills on his
seizure medications, and, importantly, the claimant had no
seizure­ related complaints. Id.
underscores

that

the

The

ALJ

additionally

record reflects that Mr. Musso

admitted that he had gone for at least six months without a
seizure as of that visit (and the seizure six months earlier was
reported to have been caused by medication non-compliance).
“On that day, the claimant's treating source stated that the
claimant's seizure disorder was stable, and these treatment

18

Id.

records tend to show that the claimant's seizure disorder is
well-controlled when the claimant is compliant with his
medications.” Id.
In terms of Mr. Musso’s alleged depression, his broken
femur’s status post-pinning, and medication side-effects, the
ALJ finds that there is evidence establishing some limitation,
however, he is still capable of performing light exertional work
on a sustained basis, with additional limitations. (R.19).

The

ALJ gave little to no weight to the “lay opinions” of the
claimant’s brother, mother, and father whom submitted letters
and forms opining that they did not think Mr. Musso could work
due to his seizures. (R.21). The ALJ found that their opinions
were not consistent with, and not supported by, the objective
evidence in this matter, showing that Mr. Musso’s seizures are
well-controlled when he maintains medication compliance. Id.
Lastly, the ALJ noted that she imposed more limitations than
that of the two doctors who completed a Residual Functional
Capacity Assessment (RFC) on Mr. Musso’s case for the State
agency, “in order to give the claimant every possible benefit of
the doubt.” (R.21).
At step five, the ALJ determined that, considering the
plaintiff’s “age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the [plaintiff] can

19

perform.”

(R.22).

The VE listed the following positions:

office helper, DOT code 239.567-010, (300,000 nationally/30,000
Chicago); order clerk (sedentary exertional level and unskilled),
DOT code 209.567-014, (20,000 nationally/2,000 Chicago); and
addresser (sedentary exertional level and unskilled), DOT code
209.587-010, (12,000 nationally/ 1,200 Chicago).

Id. After

listening to the testimony of a VE, the ALJ determined that Mr.
Musso would be “capable of making a successful adjustment to
other work that exists in significant numbers in the national
economy.” (R.23).

The ALJ concluded that “[a] finding of “not

disabled” is, therefore, appropriate…” Id.
Mr. Musso requested review by the Appeals Council but the
request was denied on January 22, 2013, leaving ALJ Supergan’s
decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. 1).
March 15, 2013, Mr. Musso filed suit in this Court.

On

The Court

has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c).
The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate
Judge on June 25, 2013. [dkt. #16].

Mr. Musso filed his motion

for summary judgment [dkt. #21] on September 5, 2013, and the
Commissioner filed its response and cross motion for summary
judgment [dkt. #34] on January 17, 2014. Mr. Musso filed his
reply on January 31, 2014.

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Standard of Disability Adjudication
An individual claiming a need for

Disability Insurance

benefits and SSI must prove that he has a disability under the
terms of the SSA.

In determining whether an individual is

eligible for benefits, the social security regulations require a
sequential five-step analysis.

First, the ALJ must determine if

the claimant is currently employed; second, a determination must
be made as to whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
third, the ALJ must determine if the impairment meets or equals
one of the impairments listed by the Commissioner in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; fourth, the ALJ must determine
the claimant’s RFC, and must evaluate whether the claimant can
perform his/her past relevant work, and fifth; the ALJ must
decide whether the claimant is capable of performing work in the
national economy.
Cir.1995).

Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th

At steps one through four, the claimant bears the

burden of proof; at step five, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner.

Id.
Standard of Review

A district court reviewing an ALJ’s decision must affirm if
the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free
from legal error.

42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); Steele v. Barnhart, 920

F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).

Substantial evidence is “more

than a mere scintilla”; rather, it is “such relevant evidence as

21

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct.

1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).

In reviewing an ALJ’s decision for

substantial evidence, the Court may not “displace the ALJ’s
judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence or making
credibility determinations.”

Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836,

841 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212
(7th Cir. 2003)).

Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable

minds to differ, the responsibility for determining whether a
claimant is disabled falls upon the Commissioner, not the
courts.

Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1990).

An ALJ must articulate her analysis by building an accurate
and logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusions, so that
the Court may afford the claimant meaningful review of the SSA’s
ultimate findings.

Steele, 290 F.3d at 941.

It is not enough

that the record contains evidence to support the ALJ’s decision;
if the ALJ does not rationally articulate the grounds for that
decision, or if the decision is insufficiently articulated, so
as to prevent meaningful review, the Court must remand.

Id.

Discussion
Mr. Musso argues that the Commissioner’s decision denying
benefits should be reversed or remanded because: (1) the ALJ
erred in not reviewing the prior medical record; (2) the ALJ
failed to discuss all his significant medical impairments; (3)

22

the ALJ erred by failing to consider evidence of cognitive
dysfunction; (4) the ALJ erred by failing to consider all
limitations supported by the record in the RFC and hypothetical;
and (5) the ALJ failed to properly determine credibility.

The

Court will analyze each claim in turn.
A. The ALJ Erred in not Reviewing the Prior Medical Record
Mr. Musso first faults the ALJ for not reviewing the prior
medical records which pre-dated the ALJ decision of March 12,
2010, citing HALLEX 1-2-6-58 Conduct of Hearings - Admitting
Evidence into the Record at the Hearing.

Pl.’s Br. 4-8.

HALLEX

1-2-6-58 states the ALJ must obtain records of prior hearing and
add them to the current list of exhibits.

DI 81020.030 states

evidence from a previously processed case may have adjudicative
significance to the evaluation and determination of the current
case. Program Operations Manual System (POMS) DI 81020.030
(Prior Folder Material)(emphasis added).

Mr. Musso avers that

the ALJ did not review Exhibits 1E (R. 258) through 5E (R.283)
and 1F (R. 360) through 11 F. (R. 1000), and that the exhibits
are significant as they show that he had multiple head and leg
injuries from motor vehicle accidents and from falling and
striking his head as a result of seizures.

Mr. Musso opined

that the cumulative effect of those injuries was decreased
cognition, and that all the exhibits should have been considered
for that reason.

23

The Commissioner counters that the ALJ did comply with the
requirements of HALLEX I-2-6-58(A), which require an ALJ to
obtain the records of the prior hearing and add them to the
current list of exhibits.

The Commissioner avers that the ALJ

included medical exhibits 1F to 12F, covering the prior
adjudicated period (R. 360-1076).

Additionally, the

Commissioner argues that the ALJ included the hearing
transcripts of the two administrative hearings on Plaintiff's
prior claim (R. 71-122), therefore, all materials were properly
included in the administrative record for Mr. Musso’s current
claim. Def.’s Br. 5-7.
Upon review of the entire double record before the Court,
the Court finds that all of the information on Mr. Musso’s prior
claim is included therein.

However, contrary to Plaintiff's

suggestion, the administrative procedures do not require the ALJ
to conduct an exhaustive reconsideration of all of the evidence
in the prior claim.

The ALJ was not required to discuss every

piece of evidence contained in the prior or current
administrative record.

Instead, the ALJ is required only to

articulate "at some minimum level, [her] analysis of the
evidence to allow the appellate court to trace the path of his
reasoning." Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307B08 (7th Cir. 1995).
"The ALJ's failure to address [certain] specific findings . . .
does not render his decision unsupported by substantial evidence

24

because an ALJ need not address every piece of evidence in his
decision." Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir. 2002);
see also, e.g., Hodges v. Barnhart, 399 F. Supp. 2d 845, 855
(N.D. Ill. 2005) (affirming decision where "ALJ summarized the
substantial medical evidence provided by the claimant and
considered the medical evidence in its entirety"). "[A]n ALJ
need only 'minimally articulate' his or her justification for
rejecting or accepting specific evidence of a disability." Rice,
384 F.3d at 371 (quoting Stewart v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 1295, 1299
(7th Cir. 1988)).
Here, the ALJ certainly met the standard.

Not only did she

include and take into consideration all of the evidence, stating
that she would be using the prior information to inform her
analysis of the current record and, accordingly, her decision,
but also the Court can trace the path of the ALJ's reasoning
regarding the evidence from the prior claim, as her functional
capacity conclusions matched the medical expert's testimony (R.
17, 103-04).
The ALJ's conclusions regarding Mr. Musso’s residual
functional capacity, the primary issue in this claim, match the
conclusions of Dr. Ezike, the medical expert who testified at
the 2010 hearing on Plaintiff's prior claim (R. 17, compared
with Rr. 104). The medical expert reviewed the evidence from the
prior claim and testified that Plaintiff could lift twenty

25

pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; sit for about six
hours in a workday; stand and walk for two to four hours in a
workday; was unable to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; could
occasionally climb ramps and stairs; could occasionally balance,
stoop, squat, bend, and crawl; and must avoid all exposure to
temperature extremes and hazards such as moving machinery or
unprotected heights (Rr. 103-04).

Plaintiff has failed to show

any restrictions that the ALJ left out based on the evidence
from his prior claim.
Furthermore, although the ALJ explained that she was not
reopening or disturbing the prior claim findings, properly
finding that they were “denied conclusively on res judicata
grounds prior to March 13, 2010 (R. 12),” does not mean that she
did not evaluate the evidence and allow it to inform her
decision, as she said she would.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's

argument that the ALJ failed to consider the impact of his prior
injuries and impairments on his functional capacity are without
merit.
B. The ALJ Failed to Discuss Significant Medical Impairments
Next, Mr. Musso argues that his case is more than a seizure
case in that his claim also revolves around injuries incurred
due to his seizures.

He points to his medication list as

evidence that he has other problems, as he takes medications for
diabetes, asthma and bronchitis (R. 1169-1171).

26

In July 22,

2010, he had a productive cough with yellow sputum for 2 months.
He was treated with an albuterol nebulizer and diagnosed with
bronchitis (R.1169-1171).

He was prescribed albuterol,

azithromycin, and arithromycin (R.1174). On August 6, 2010, he
was diagnosed with acute (adult) asthma (R.1168).

He uses an

albuterol nebulizer, azithromycin and arithromycin (R. 1174). Mr
Musso argues that the ALJ erred in not considering such issues
as serious impairments, as the impairments and medications are
to be considered in their totality (R. 1118-1121).

Additionally,

he argues that both ALJs failed to consider pain in his legs due
to breaking both femurs and his neck.
The Commissioner contends that it is Mr. Musso’s burden to
prove that his impairments cause specific restrictions, and that
he has failed to identify any medical source opinion that
suggests any of his conditions had a greater impact on his
functional capacity than the ALJ found, physically or mentally.
Indeed, the Court finds that the ALJ assessed greater limits
than the state agency physicians and psychologists (R. 17,
compare with exhibits 14F, 15F, 18F, at Rr. 1083, 1244 (Dr.
Hollerauer and Dr. Schneider - no severe mental impairment ), R.
1098 (Dr. Kim - no exertional limits established), R. 1099 (Dr.
Kim - never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds), and Rr. 1101,
1244 (Dr. Kim and Dr. Bitzer - avoid concentrated exposure to
hazards such as machinery and heights).

27

The ALJ assessed light work restrictions with a variety of
postural and environmental restrictions that concurred with
medical expert's testimony from Plaintiff's earlier claim
(compare R. 17 and 104).

The ALJ explained in her decision that

she recognized her restrictions were greater than some of those
assessed by the state agency reviewing medical sources, but
reasoned her greater restrictions were assessed in order to give
Plaintiff's symptom allegations "every possible benefit of the
doubt" (R. 21).

She accommodated Mr. Musso's seizure disorder

with limits against climbing ladders, ropes and scaffolds;
avoiding temperature extremes and hazards such as moving
machinery or unprotected heights; and avoiding driving motor
vehicles (R. 21).

The ALJ stated that she accommodated his

history of femur fracture and associated symptoms of pain with a
limit for light work that did not require standing or walking
for more than two to four hours; occasionally climbing ramps and
stairs; and occasionally balancing, stooping, kneeling,
crouching, and crawling (R. 21).

In order to accommodate

Plaintiff's symptoms related to depression, cognition,
concentration, and side effects to medication, she limited Mr.
Musso to unskilled tasks that could be learned by demonstration
or in thirty days or less (R. 21).

28

All of the above considerations for Mr. Musso’s
restrictions allow the Court to reasonably trace the path of the
ALJ’s reasoning regarding her functional capacity findings.
Although Mr. Musso asserts that he has disabling restrictions
due to his physical conditions, he does not identify any
specific functional capacity restrictions that the ALJ left out
that would be related to his physical impairments.

As Defendant

highlighted, Mr. Musso does have the burden of proving that his
impairments caused specific restrictions. See Bowen v. Yuckert,
482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987).

Mr. Musso does not direct the

Court to any medical sources that assessed greater restrictions
than the ALJ, and the Court was unsuccessful at locating any
sources as well.

Mr. Musso has not shown that any of his

doctors stated that he was disabled, or that his capacity should
be restricted beyond a reduced range of light work.

The ALJ

adequately addressed the evidence of Plaintiff's conditions, and
her decision reasonably reflects the path of her reasoning. See
Johansen v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 2002); Diaz v.
Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307-08 (7th Cir. 1995).

Mr. Musso’s

disagreement with the significance that the ALJ assigned to the
evidence she cited does not mean that substantial evidence does
not support her decision. See Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419,
426 (7th Cir. 2010); Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 429 (7th
Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ provided

29

substantial evidence to reach her conclusion on Mr. Musso’s
significant limitations.
C. The ALJ Failed to Consider Evidence of Cognitive Dysfunction
Mr. Musso alleges that the ALJ erred in failing to list a
cognitive impairment as one of his severe impairments, and
argues that the ALJ should have included additional functional
capacity limits based on this impairment.

Mr. Musso argues that

old exhibits had evidence of head trauma, while in the new
record, reviewed on June 1, 2010, Dr. Richardson stated Mr.
Musso’s last seizure was 5 months ago (R. 1070).

Nonetheless,

the ALJ found at step two that Mr. Musso's seizure disorder was
a severe impairment (R. 15-17).

The ALJ also acknowledged that

Plaintiff had a diagnosis of depression, but explained that
Plaintiff had no treatment for this condition (R. 15). She
referred to medical evidence from Dr. Karr's consultative
psychological examination and the conclusions of two state
agency psychologists, Dr. Hollerauer and Dr. Schneider, who
reviewed those examination findings and made conclusions about
the impact of Plaintiff's mental condition on his functional
capacity (R. 15-17, referring to exhibits 13F, 14F, 18F at R.
1077-96, 1242-44).

The ALJ concluded that Mr. Musso's mental

condition did not cause more than minimal limitations of his
ability to perform basic mental activities (R. 15). The ALJ also
assessed a restriction for unskilled work to accommodate

30

Plaintiff's symptom allegations of depression, cognition issues,
concentration issues, and medication side effects, to the extent
she found those allegations partially credible (R. 16, 21).
The Court agrees with Mr. Musso, the ALJ did not refer to a
specific diagnosis of cognitive dysfunction in her discussion of
Plaintiff's mental condition.

However, she assessed Mr. Musso's

mental functioning and considered evidence of Plaintiff's mental
condition, as well as its impact on his functional capacity.
Specifically, the ALJ analyzed Plaintiff's mental condition, and
discussed his ability to function in the four "B criteria"
functional areas of activities of daily living, social
functioning, concentration, persistence or pace, and episodes of
decompensation (R. 15-16). The ALJ described specific evidence
from the psychologists in the record and cited statements from
Mr. Musso and his father about his ability to engage in
activities pertaining to each of these criteria (R. 15-17,
referring to exhibits 7E, 13E, 13F, 14F, 18F at Tr. 285-96, 32638, 1077-96, 1242-44).
In her discussion of Mr. Musso's mental condition, the ALJ
found he had no more than mild limits in any of the four "B
criteria" areas of functioning that she assessed (R. 15-17).
Importantly, Mr. Musso does not suggest any specific limits on
his mental functioning related to cognitive dysfunction. Pl. Br.
8-11, 13-17.

Moreover, Mr. Musso does not identify any

31

physicians or psychologists who diagnosed a cognitive impairment,
assessed any limits on his mental functioning, or found more
than mild limits in any areas of mental functioning. Pl. Br. 811, 13-17.
For example, Mr. Musso sets out that on August 17, 2010,
the examining psychologist, Dr. Jeffrey Karr, Ph.D., performed a
psychological evaluation for the State Agency which lasted 50
minutes.

Mr. Musso underscored how Dr. Karr noted that he

alleged head and leg pain following a car accident; he quit work
due to health problems in 2008; his first seizure was in 4th
grade; and he has sadness identifying, “I can’t live as normally
or as fully as others”.

Dr. Karr noted Mr. Musso was noticeably

underweight and his mood was dysphoric.

He felt Mr.Musso seemed

discouraged, solemn, subdued, soft-spoken and that he required
frequent repeated instructions, and responded slowly. (R.1082).
Although Mr. Musso directs the Court to Dr. Karr’s notation of
all of the above, it is in vain as Dr. Karr clearly recognized
Mr. Musso's depressive disorder, yet still chose not to diagnose
him with cognitive dysfunction, nor did he recommend any
specific limitations on his mental functioning (R. 1079-82).
Likewise, the state agency psychologist, Dr. Hollerauer, who
reviewed the record evidence, including Dr. Karr's examination
report (R. 1095), concluded that Mr. Musso had no severe mental
impairments (R. 1083), and no more than mild restrictions in any

32

area of mental functioning (R. 1093).

Dr. Schneider, another

state agency psychologist, reviewed Mr. Musso's updated medical
records and concurred with Dr. Hollerauer's earlier findings, as
well (R. 1244).
Mr. Musso avers that a reasonable mind would conclude that
his seizures have caused trauma to his entire body, especially
his head and his hips, that he had hurt himself substantially
and that the record supports head and hip trauma.

The Court

finds that the ALJ did reasonably conclude that his seizures had
caused trauma to his entire body, especially his head, that she
took the injuries into consideration, and that she supported her
decision with substantial evidence.
D. The ALJ Failed to Consider all Limitations
Next, Mr. Musso argues that, although the RFC limited him
to unskilled work tasks that can be learned by demonstration or
in 30 days or less, such a restriction does not account for his
mental limitations.

Mr. Musso relies on Stewart v. Astrue, 561

F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2009), and states that when determining the
RFC, the ALJ must consider all medically determinable
impairments, physical and mental, even those that are not
considered severe, and that a restriction to unskilled work is
not a substitute for appropriate mental limitations.
Additionally, he argues that limiting the RFC to simple, routine
tasks that do not require constant interaction with co-workers

33

or the general public does not account for moderate limitations
on concentration, persistence and pace (O’Connor-Spinner v.
Astrue, 627 F. 3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Defendant contends that the ALJ was more that generous in
her assessment, and distinguishes Plaintiff’s case law based on
Mr. Musso’s mild restriction.

Defendant explains that in both

Stewart and O’Connor-Spinner:
the ALJ found the claimant had at least
moderate restrictions in concentration,
persistence, or pace. Here, in contrast, the
ALJ found Plaintiff had only a mild
restriction in concentration, persistence, or
pace (Tr. 16), as supported by the state
agency psychologist (Tr. 1093). Thus, the ALJ
could have assessed no limit at all on
Plaintiff's mental functioning, given that his
mental impairment was not severe (Tr. 1083, Dr.
Hollerauer - mental impairments not severe; Tr.
1093, Dr. Hollerauer - mild limitations in
concentration, persistence or pace; Tr. 1244,
Dr. Schneider - non-severe psychiatric review
technique form and unlimited mental residual
functional capacity). Instead, the ALJ gave
Plaintiff "every benefit of the doubt" and
assessed an unskilled work limit to
accommodate some of Plaintiff's allegations of
concentration symptoms, even though they were
poorly supported by the record (Tr. 21).
Def.’s Br. 12
The Court finds that, contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the
ALJ was indeed generous when she assessed the unskilled work
restriction, as none of the physicians who treated or examined
Mr. Musso, or reviewed his records, assessed such a restriction.
Likewise, Mr. Musso has not shown limits on decision making,

34

changes in work setting or pace or production quotas were
warranted.

Pl. Br. 17.

Dr. Karr did not find that Plaintiff

had reduced memory, thought disorders, judgment problems, or
communication problems (R. 1079-82).

As discussed earlier, the

examining psychologist, and the state agency psychologist who
reviewed Dr. Karr's findings, found that Plaintiff had an intact
memory for dates, news events, and digit recall (R. 1080-81,
1095), no thought disorders (R. 1080), and organized, coherent
speech (R. 1080, 1095).

He demonstrated intact judgment when

answering questions about mailing an envelope found on the
ground and reporting a fire in a movie theater (R. 1081, 1095).
He was not distracted or preoccupied during testing (R. 1080),
and concentrated well enough to complete mathematic calculations
(R. 1081).

Moreover, as the reviewing physician noted, the

notation from Dr. Karr regarding a need for repeated
instructions and slow response (Rr. 1080), was not corroborated
by other neurological examination findings in June 2010 (R.
1095).

Thus, the ALJ reasonably relied on this evidence in

finding no restrictions beyond unskilled work, and the Court
finds that the ALJ provided substantial evidence to reach her
conclusion.
E. The ALJ Failed to Properly Determine Credibility
Lastly, Mr. Musso contends that the ALJ did a very minimal
credibility analysis, mainly relying on his RFC analysis.

35

He

argues that before an ALJ can use lack of treatment, the ALJ
must question the individual for his explanation. Jelinex v.
Astrue, 662 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2012).

Mr. Musso asserts that

the ALJ did not explore any reasons explaining why he did not
always take his medication, forgot to take his medication, or
ran out of medication, and that SSR 96-7P requires the ALJ to
consider any information in the case record that may explain a
failure to follow a regular course of treatment, such as Mr.
Musso’s explanation that he does not always take Keppra because
it is not generic and he cannot afford it (R. 990).
The Commissioner argues that, contrary to Plaintiff's
suggestion, the ALJ considered a variety of appropriate factors
when assessing Plaintiff's credibility, including corroboration
by objective medical findings, consistency of allegations with
Plaintiff's stated activities, use of medication and other forms
of treatment to relieve symptoms, medication side effects, and
physician opinions assessing the impact of his symptoms on his
functioning (R. 15-21). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)
(objective medical evidence is a useful indicator to assist us
in making reasonable conclusions about the intensity and
persistence of your symptoms); Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431,
435-36 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The discrepancy between the [symptoms]
attested to by the witness and that suggested by the medical
evidence is probative that the witness may be exaggerating her

36

condition.”)

Defendant points to the ALJ’s consideration of

Plaintiff's complaints of disabling symptoms due to femur
fractures, but noted that the state agency physician imposed no
restrictions based on this condition (R. 15, referring to
exhibit 15F at Tr. 1097-104).
The ALJ provided evidence of her consideration of Mr.
Musso’s normal mental evaluation findings when considering his
various mental symptoms (R. 15-17, referring to exhibits 13F,
14F and 18F at R. 1079-96, 1242-44).

The ALJ also considered

that Plaintiff's seizures were well-controlled with medication,
only occurring when Plaintiff failed to take his medications or
drank alcohol (R. 20-21, see e.g., Plaintiff's testimony at R.
55-56).

Additionally, the ALJ considered that Plaintiff

reported no medication side effects to his physicians (R. 19).
The ALJ also considered that Plaintiff took no medication or
treatment for any mental conditions (R. 15, see Tr. 1095, Dr.
Hollerauer - "no mental source treatment or hospitalizations
related to a mental impairment"). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)
(we consider the type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of
any medication you take to alleviate your symptoms).
Moreover, the ALJ considered various activities that
Plaintiff engaged in that contradicted his claims of limitations
due to his symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (we
consider your daily activities).

37

For example, Mr. Musso

complained of leg pain due to a history of fractures, but also
described activities that included walking frequently and taking
public transportation by himself, and riding a bicycle (R. 15
and 19, referring to exhibit 13F at R. 1079, 1081 and 13E at R.
333; R. 19, referring to evidence in exhibit 7E at R. 292).
The ALJ also relied on other daily activities, such as using a
computer, shopping in stores, and handling money as examples
that showed Plaintiff's concentration and cognition symptoms
were not as bad as he claimed (R. 16, referring to exhibit 13F
at R. 1079 and 13E at R. 333-34).
Plaintiff attempts to discount the ALJ’s reliance on Mr.
Musso’s own statements, including that he could handle a
checking and savings account and money orders, as unreasonable
due to him being a person with cognitive deficits, and that his
family members reported otherwise.

The Court finds this

argument unavailing, as Plaintiff, again, has failed to meet the
burden of proving he has cognitive deficits to the degree that
would cause him to relay such information inaccurately.
Instead, the Court finds that the ALJ reasonably considered
all of the factors above when evaluating the impact of Mr.
Musso’s alleged symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(v).
The specific examples of medical findings and treatment evidence
given by the ALJ help trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning and
build a logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusion. See

38

Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000). "An ALJ is
in the best position to determine a witness's truthfulness and
forthrightness." Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 505 (7th Cir.
2004).

An ALJ's credibility finding is entitled to substantial

deference and will be upheld "as long as [there is] some support
in the record" and it is not "patently wrong." See Schmidt v.
Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 842 (7th Cir. 2007); Diaz v. Chater, 55
F.3d 300, 308 (7th Cir. 1995). "It is only when the ALJ's
determination lacks any explanation or support that [a court]
will declare it to be "patently wrong." Elder v. Astrue, 529
F.3d 408, 413 14 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Jens v. Barnhart, 347
F.3d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 2003).

Here, the Court finds that the

ALJ adequately explained her credibility analysis, and the Court
will defer to the ALJ's conclusions.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Mr.
Musso’s motion [21] for summary judgment and grants the
Commissioner’s motion [34] for summary judgment, affirming the
decision.

Date: May 22, 2014
E N T E R E D:
_________________________________
MAGISTRATE JUDGE ARLANDER KEYS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

39