Johnson v. S.A. Godinez et al

Filing 71

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 1/9/2015. Mailed notice(ef, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JERROLD D. JOHNSON,

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Plaintiff,

S.A. GODINEZ; ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; MARCUS HARDY;

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Judge Joan B. Gottschall

MICHAEL MAGANA; DAVID GOMEZ;
ARTHUR FUNK, M.D.; IMHOTEP CARTER

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No. 13 CV 2045

M.D.; KAREN ROBIDEAU; K. COAKLEY; L.
DENNIS; CYNDI GARCIA, R.N.; ANNA
MCBEE; and WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,
INC.,

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v.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Jerrold D. Johnson (“Johnson”) is proceeding with the assistance of
recruited counsel. He filed an amended complaint on January 17, 2014, against S.A.
Godinez, the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), Marcus Hardy, Michael
Magana, David Gomez, Arthur Funk, M.D., Imhotep Carter, M.D., Karen Robideau, K.
Coakley, L. Dennis, Cyndi Garcia, R.N., Anna McBee, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
(collectively, “Defendants”). Johnson alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I),
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (Count II), and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. (Count III), that
Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs arising from his
seizure disorder and have failed to reasonably accommodate his disability.

Defendants IDOC, Salvador Godinez, Marcus Hardy, Michael Magana, David
Gomez, Karen Robideau, and Karemah Coakley (collectively, the “IDOC Defendants” or
“IDOC”) seek to dismiss Johnson’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
Additionally, because this motion to dismiss does not affect the counts against
Defendants Funk, Carter, Garcia, or Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (collectively, the
“Wexford Defendants”) or Count I (violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983) against Defendants
Hardy, Gomez, Robideau, Coakley, Dennis, and McBee, the IDOC Defendants request
an extension of time in which to answer or otherwise plead to the remaining counts until
thirty days after their motion to dismiss is resolved.
For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied in part and granted in part.
IDOC’s motion to dismiss Johnson’s Amended Complaint is denied. IDOC’s requests
that the court dismiss Johnson’s request for injunctive relief, Count I of the Amended
Complaint against IDOC, and Counts II and III against IDOC are denied. The motion to
dismiss individual defendants Godinez, Hardy, Magana, Gomez, Rabideau, Coakley, and
Dennis in their official capacities is granted. The request for an extension of time to
answer or otherwise plead on behalf of the Wexford Defendants and individual
defendants for Count I is granted.
I. FACTS
The court draws the following facts from Johnson’s amended complaint and
accepts them as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss. See Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v.
Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 946 (7th Cir. 2013).
Johnson is an inmate at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”), a correctional

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facility operated by the State of Illinois and IDOC. In approximately 2005, while in
IDOC custody at an institution other than Stateville, Johnson developed a neurological
condition called brain arteriovenous malformation. This condition results in frequent and
severe seizures and impairs Johnson’s ability to walk without fear of falling.
Prior to being incarcerated at Stateville, Johnson underwent neurosurgery at the
University of Illinois at Chicago Medical Center, received a prescription for anticonvulsant medication, and was issued a “low bunk/low gallery” permit to prevent injury
in case of seizure during sleep. The low bunk/low gallery permit was also issued so
Johnson could be housed in a ground floor cell that would allow for easy access to, and
transportation from, Johnson’s cell during medical emergencies. Further, a ground floor
cell would permit Johnson to freely participate in prison programs, services, and
activities.
When Johnson began his incarceration at Stateville, his IDOC medical records
confirmed his seizure disorder and that he continued to be prescribed anti-convulsant
medication. He was also re-issued a low bunk/low gallery permit. Despite this medical
permit, IDOC initially assigned Johnson to a cell on an upper gallery. After Johnson
suffered a seizure, IDOC moved him to a ground floor cell.
Johnson spent the next two years in a ground floor cell before IDOC reassigned
him to a cell in an upper gallery. Johnson ascended and descended stairs daily to reach
his cell. Johnson filed repeated grievances regarding his cell location, which were denied
or ignored. On March 22, 2011, in the presence of correctional officers, Johnson fell
down a flight of stairs after experiencing a seizure, injuring his head and back. On March
28, 2011, Johnson submitted an emergency grievance regarding his recent injury and its

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connection with his housing assignment. He requested that his low bunk/gallery permit
be honored. On April 4, 2011, Warden Hardy deemed Johnson’s emergency grievance a
“non-emergency” and instructed Johnson to resubmit his grievance in the “normal
manner.”
On May 12, 2011, a Stateville counselor, L. Dennis, responded to Johnson’s
grievance by writing: “According to the placement officer, Karen Robideau, 2 gallery in
unit F is considered a low gallery. OTS reflects offender Johnson is housed in F213.”1
Because of this characterization, IDOC did not change Johnson’s housing assignment. A
little less than a month later, on June 3, 2011, Johnson had a seizure in his cell and passed
out. A nurse arrived at his cell, and when Johnson regained consciousness, she reportedly
told Johnson that “he must be alright (sic)” and left.
On June 6, 2011, correctional officers again witnessed Johnson have a seizure and
fall down the stairs while climbing the stairs to his gallery cell. Johnson was admitted to
the Health Care Unit (“HCU”) for three days. On June 12, 2011, Johnson submitted a
letter describing the events to Stateville’s medical director, Dr. Funk, to no avail. On
November 13, 2011, Johnson submitted another emergency grievance requesting that his
medical permit be honored and that he be moved to a ground floor cell. Warden Hardy
again determined that Johnson’s grievance was a “non-emergency” and on November 18,
instructed Johnson to file his grievance in the “normal manner.” The same day, Johnson
also spoke with Warden Hardy, who, in response to Johnson’s requests to be transferred
to ground floor housing and to receive medical treatment, stated, “[Y]ou look alright (sic)
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According to the complaint, the “low gallery” characterization is misleading. Although
designated a “low gallery,” Johnson’s cell – 2 gallery unit F – is not a ground-floor cell.
Inmates must ascend and descend stairs to go to and from cells in this gallery. (Amended
Complaint, ECF No. 23 at 9.)
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to me,” and told Johnson to “be more careful” on the stairs.
On February 29, 2012 and March 6, 2012, Johnson submitted additional grievances
regarding the injuries and mental anguish caused by his housing assignment. He again
requested that his housing assignment be changed to ground floor housing. Johnson
spoke to several others about his desire to be transferred to a ground floor housing
assignment: IDOC Northern Director David Gomez, who responded “if Warden Hardy
didn’t think it was an emergency, then it must not be” and Director of Nursing Cyndi
Garcia, who told Johnson, “as far as placement of a specific cell/gallery, that is not [in]
the medical unit’s control.”
Johnson’s anxiety about having a seizure while climbing or descending stairs to his
cell grew severe. On September 6, 2012, he saw Dr. Catherine Larry, a mental health
counselor, who made inquiries about ground floor housing for Johnson. Approximately
two weeks later, Johnson was moved to a ground floor cell. He has been housed in a
ground floor cell since September 2012.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion under 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which
relief may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 635 (7th Cir. 2012). A
complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement must “give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). To survive a motion to
dismiss, the complaint must have “facial plausibility,” which occurs “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 622, 678
(2009). In addition, on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a court must “accept as true all of
the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
The IDOC Defendants make three arguments in support of their motion to dismiss
Johnson’s complaint. First, they argue that Johnson’s request for injunctive relief should
be dismissed because “prisoner housing is an administrative decision left to the discretion
of prison officials.” (Def. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 44, at
3.) Second, they argue that Johnson “fails to state a claim against any State defendant
under the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act.” (Id. at 4.) Finally,
IDOC Defendants argue that Johnson’s “monetary claims against the State defendants in
their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” (Id. at 5.)
A. Johnson’s Motion for Injunctive Relief
IDOC Defendants argue that Johnson’s request for injunctive relief should be
dismissed because the court should afford deference to the administrative decisions of
prison officials. The relief IDOC Defendants take issue with is Johnson’s request that the
court:
Issue an injunction that Mr. Johnson be housed in a ground floor cell for the
remainder of his incarceration and requiring Defendants to submit and
implement a plan describing the measures they will take to provide Mr.
Johnson with adequate medical treatment for the injuries sustained as a result
of Defendants’ deliberate indifference to Mr. Johnson’s serious medical
condition and failure to reasonably accommodate his disability.
(Amended Complaint at 17, ECF No. 23.)
IDOC Defendants assert that if the court granted this injunction it would “usurp the
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discretion traditionally accorded prison officials.” (Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss at 3, ECF No. 44.) They characterize the requested relief as an injunction that
would “force prison officials to specifically house him where he would prefer to be” and
that because housing decisions are made by prison administrators, granting such an
injunction would “invade the province of prison administrators.” (Id. at 4.) IDOC
Defendants reiterate this argument in their reply, stating:
These cases [cited by Johnson in his response] simply do not support the
broad and perpetual injunctive relief sought by [Johnson] against IDOC in
this matter. Even still, [Johnson] admits that he has already received what he
wants – a ground level cell. Despite this, [Johnson] nonetheless seeks the
“assurance” (enforced through an injunction) that he will remain there for the
rest of his life [sentence].
(Def. Reply at 2, ECF No. 50) (citations omitted).
IDOC Defendants further emphasize “[h]ere, [Johnson] seeks injunctive relief in case he
is ever moved to a cell that is not on the ground floor , and he wants an injunction to be in
effect for the remainder of his life.” (Id. at 3 (emphasis as in original).)
Johnson argues that IDOC Defendants’ argument is “nonsensical” and that prison
officials “cannot exercise their ‘discretion’ regarding housing in a manner that violates
the law and the Constitution.” (Pl.’s Response, ECF No. 48, at 3). Instead, Johnson
argues, injunctions are an appropriate form of relief where violations of the law or
constitutional rights exist.
At this stage of the proceedings it is unnecessary and inappropriate for the court to
determine the merits of Johnson’s request for injunctive relief. The question is whether
the complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted. Both parties argue at
length about the circumstances under which a court may grant an injunction related to
prison conditions, and this reveals the crux of the issue. IDOC Defendants argue that
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Johnson’s request should be dismissed because an injunction is simply not something a
court may issue in these circumstances. The court finds this unpersuasive as grounds for
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
Courts may intervene when prisoners suffer constitutional violations; prison
management is not a third rail that federal courts may never touch. “Federal courts do not
interfere with prison management, such as which facility a particular prisoner is housed
[in], without a showing that a particular situation violates the Constitution.” Youngblood
v. Wilson, No. 07-CV-0079, 2008 WL 215739, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 24, 2008) (citing
Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1292 (7th Cir. 1986)) (emphasis added). For example,
courts in this district have granted injunctive relief in a case where a legally blind inmate
was denied access to prison programs and activities (the prison library, the showers, and
the dining hall). See Williams v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 97-CV-3475, 1999 WL
1068669, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1999).
The IDOC Defendants argue that Johnson’s case is distinguishable because the
inmate in Williams dealt with an inmate who was actively being denied access to a
program or activity, whereas Johnson is not actively being denied access to his request: a
ground floor cell. The court understands the distinction but finds it unavailing because it
mischaracterizes the type of injunction Johnson seeks.
What Johnson asks for, in effect, is a preventive injunction – one that will prevent
him from ever being housed in a cell that is not on the ground floor. Courts in this circuit
have treated such requests as requests for preliminary injunctions pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 65(a). Manges v. Harman, 11-CV-369, 2011 WL 4478458,
at *1 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 2011). Although an “extraordinary remedy,” it is one that can

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be granted “where there is a clear showing of need.” Id. (citing Cooper v. Salazar, 196
F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 1999)). Here, though, the court need not decide whether such an
injunction should be granted; it is sufficient to point out that this kind of relief is not, as
IDOC Defendants argue, an impossibility if justified by the facts.
The question is instead whether Johnson has pled facts sufficient to establish a
cause of action upon which relief may be granted. The court finds that he has. In his
Amended Complaint, Johnson goes into great detail about his placement in non-groundlevel cells, his transfer from ground-level cells to upper-level cells, and the injuries he
sustained while being housed in upper level cells. In addition, IDOC Defendants do not
appear to argue that Johnson has not pled facts sufficient to establish a violation of
§ 1983 for the alleged Eighth Amendment violations he endured. This, then, is potentially
a situation where a federal court may “interfere with prison management” if in fact a
“constitutional violation has occurred.” Youngblood, 2008 WL 215739, at *1.
For these reasons, IDOC Defendants’ motion to dismiss Johnson’s claim for
injunctive relief is denied.
B. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims
1. Sufficiency of Claims
IDOC Defendants next argue that Johnson’s claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation
Acts should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. IDOC Defendants argue that
Johnson has failed to allege facts sufficient to meet the three elements of a claim under
either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) he is a qualified person; (2) with a disability; and (3)
the Department of Corrections denied him access to a program or activity because of his

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disability.” Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012).
Defendants do not dispute that Johnson is a qualified person and that he has a disability.
Rather, IDOC Defendants argue that Johnson has failed to state an ADA or
Rehabilitation Act claim because he has “failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate
that he was denied access to an actual program or activity as a result of the alleged
claim.” IDOC Defendants base this argument on the premise that “incarceration is not a
program or activity.” (Def.’s Memo. at 5, ECF No. 44.)
Incarceration itself is not a program or activity, but other activities, like “meals and
showers made available to inmates” are programs and activities. Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672.
In Jaros, IDOC’s “refusal to accommodate Jaros’s disability kept him from accessing
meals and showers on the same basis as other inmates.” Id. The Seventh Circuit
concluded that under these circumstances, Jaros pleaded a plausible claim for failure to
make reasonable accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act.2
Johnson’s amended complaint alleges that Johnson’s “anxiety about having a seizure
while climbing or descending the stairs to his upper gallery cell grew so severe that it
impeded his daily life, including at times preventing him from going to meals.”
(Amended Compl. at 13, ¶ 52, ECF No. 23) (emphasis added). This allegation satisfies
the “program or activity” element of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. In fact, it
precisely mirrors the lack of access to meals that the Seventh Circuit found satisfied the
“program or activity” element. Additionally, this is not a “conclusory allegation,” which
is how IDOC Defendants construe it. The allegation that Johnson’s housing arrangements
prevented him from participating in daily life activities of inmates, including going to
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The analysis is the same under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA so the analysis
of whether Johnson was denied access to a program or activity is the same under both
acts. Cassidy v. Ind. Dep’t of Corrections, 199 F.3d 374, 375 (7th Cir. 2000).
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meals, is factually specific. This allegation does not, as IDOC Defendants argue, require
the court to “draw inferences which are not apparent on the face of the amended
complaint.” (Def.’s Memo. at 5, ECF No. 44.)
2. Sovereign Immunity
The IDOC Defendants next argue that ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against “the
individual IDOC employees are barred.” (Def. Memo. at 5, ECF No. 44.) Johnson asserts
that this argument is “pointless” because Johnson’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims
against the IDOC employees are against the IDOC employees in their official capacities.
(Pl.’s Brief in Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 7-8, ECF No. 48.) The court agrees that
individual Defendants Godinez, Magana, Gomez, Robideau, Coakley, Dennis, Garcia,
and McBee were sued in their official capacities, and thus that the individual capacity
argument is without merit. (Amended Compl. at 15-16, ECF No. 23.)
However, in their reply, the IDOC Defendants raise a different argument: that the
official capacity claims against the individual defendants are invalid because the
individual employees are not proper defendants. The court first notes that it is improper
for IDOC Defendants to raise a new argument in their reply because “arguments raised
for the first time in a reply brief are waived.” Satkar Hospitality Inc. v. Cook County Bd.
of Review, 819 F.Supp.2d 727, 740 (citations omitted).
Despite this procedural misstep, the IDOC Defendants raise a valid point. When the
Rehabilitation Act and ADA “obligations of the individual defendants are derivative of
the [government entity’s] obligations, and any relief would come from the [government
entity] itself, the claims against [individual defendants] are redundant and unnecessary”
and should be dismissed. Michael M. v. Board of Educ. of Evanston Tp. High School

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Dist. No. 202, 2009 WL 2258982 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2009). Here, both IDOC and the
individual defendants (in their official capacities) who work for IDOC are named as
defendants in their official capacities. This is redundant and unnecessary. Therefore, the
court dismisses Counts II and III of Johnson’s amended complaint against individual
defendants Godinez, Magana, Gomez, Robideau, Coakley, and Dennis in their official
capacities. If Plaintiff disagrees, he may file a request for reconsideration within 14 days.
A. Eleventh Amendment
IDOC Defendants finally argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars Johnson’s
monetary claims against state defendants. Defendants’ brief focuses on the sovereign
immunity of individual defendants in their official capacities. As discussed above,
however, Counts II and III as to individual defendants are dismissed. Thus, the only
question that remains is whether IDOC is immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment.
1. Count I (§ 1983 Claim)
IDOC first seeks to dismiss Count I on the grounds that it states an impermissible
claim for money damages against a state agency. IDOC argues that “[e]ven in cases
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 raising constitutional claims, the Eleventh Amendment
bar [to suit] remains” and that “[§] 1983 does not authorize suits against states.” (Def.’s
Memo. at 6, ECF No. 44.) IDOC draws the court’s attention to Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 169 n. 17 (1985) which states that “the Court has held that § 1983 was not
intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.”
This argument is untenable. The footnote directly after the footnote cited by IDOC
makes it very clear that in certain situations the State’s immunity can be overcome. Id. at

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n. 18. By naming IDOC as a defendant and seeking injunctive relief, the Eleventh
Amendment bar poses no obstacle to Plaintiff’s claim for relief. See Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 674 (“[A] federal court’s remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief”). Furthermore,
“monetary relief that is ‘ancillary’ to injunctive relief also is not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted). IDOC makes much of Johnson’s prayer for relief,
which includes a request that the court “award Mr. Johnson actual, consequential,
compensatory, punitive, and any other damages that the court may deem appropriate.”
(Amended Compl. at 17, ECF No. 23.) However, the prayer for relief also requests that
the court issue an injunction requiring Johnson to be housed in a ground floor cell for the
remainder of his incarceration. The request for equitable relief is consistent with Count I
(the § 1983 claim), which states, “[N]o adequate remedy at law exists to ensure Mr.
Johnson will be housed in a ground floor cell for the remainder of his incarceration.”
(Amended Compl. at 14, ¶ 60). It is reasonable for the court to infer that Johnson requests
equitable relief, and not money damages, for his § 1983 claim. To the extent Johnson
seeks monetary damages for Count I, monetary damages, but not ancillary awards, are
prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. For these reasons, IDOC’s motion to dismiss
Count I on Eleventh Amendment grounds is denied.
2. Counts II and III (ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims)
IDOC next argues that it has sovereign immunity from the Rehabilitation Act and
ADA claims. The court disagrees. Sovereign immunity does not bar Johnson’s claims
under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.
With respect to the Rehabilitation Act claim, “Illinois has waived its immunity from

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suits for damages under the Rehabilitation Act as a condition of its receipt of federal
funds.” Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672 n. 5. Thus, IDOC may not claim sovereign immunity as
grounds for dismissing the Rehabilitation Act claim.
As to the ADA claim, where the state’s conduct is alleged to violate both the
Constitution and the ADA, a state is not immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006). Here, in addition to
the ADA claim, Johnson claims that “Defendants’ deliberate and unlawful indifference to
Mr. Johnson’s serious medical needs has deprived [him] of [his rights] under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments . . . and has resulted in actual physical and emotional harm
to Mr. Johnson.” (Amended Compl. at 14, ¶ 59.) Because Johnson has alleged
Constitutional violations that resulted in actual harm in addition to his ADA claim, IDOC
is not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. For these reasons, the court
denies IDOC’s motion to dismiss Counts II and III.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this Order, the motion to dismiss [43] is denied in part
and granted in part. Specifically, IDOC’s motion to dismiss Johnson’s Amended
Complaint is denied. IDOC’s requests that the court dismiss (1) Johnson’s request for
injunctive relief, (2) Count I (§ 1983 claim) of the Amended Complaint against IDOC,
and (3) Counts II (ADA claim) and III (Rehabilitation Act claim) against IDOC are
denied. The motion to dismiss individual defendants Godinez, Magana, Gomez,
Rabideau, Coakley, and Dennis in their official capacities is granted. The request for an
extension of time to answer or otherwise plead on behalf of the Wexford Defendants and
individual defendants for Count I is granted. IDOC shall answer or otherwise plead

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within 30 days of entry of this order.

ENTER:

/s/
JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL
United States District Judge

DATED: January 9, 2015

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