Rosenbach et al v. Maffey et al
Filing
8
WRITTEN Opinion signed by the Honorable John J. Tharp, Jr on 4/19/2013: For the reasons set forth in the Statement section of this Order, the plaintiffs' amended complaint 6 , 7 is dismissed without prejudice. Case terminated. (For further details see minute order) Mailed notice(air, )
Order Form (01/2005)
United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge or
Magistrate Judge
John J. Tharp Jr.
CASE NUMBER
13 C 02158
CASE
TITLE
Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge
DATE
4/19/2013
Rosenbach, et al. vs. Maffey, et al.
DOCKET ENTRY TEXT
For the reasons set forth in the Statement section of this Order, the plaintiffs’ amended
complaint [6], [7] is dismissed without prejudice. Case terminated.
Docketing to mail notices.
[ For further details see text below.]
STATEMENT
I.
Background
Jayme and Cyndi Rosenbach (the “Rosenbachs”) filed this action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 pertaining to a state-court proceeding in which the state took custody of their infant son.
They name as defendants Bill Maffey, an investigator with the Illinois Department of Children
and Family Services (“IDCFS”), Lutheran Children and Family Services (“Lutheran Services”),
Jane Doe, an unidentified IDCFS investigator, Jennifer Lindt, a DuPage County Assistant State’s
Attorney (“ASA Lindt”), Matthew Guerrero, a DuPage County public defender, and Ronald
Sadowski, the attorney appointed to represent the Rosenbachs’ son, Jayme D. Rosenbach IV, in
the custody hearing. The Rosenbachs allege that the defendants conspired to deprive them of
custody of their son by presenting false evidence during the state-court proceeding, leading to
the order depriving them of custody of their son and thereby destroying their marriage and
family.
In an Order issued on March 29, 2013 (“March 29 Order”), this Court dismissed the
Rosenbachs’ complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Order, Dkt.
5. In that Order, this Court explained that the Rosenbachs’ cause of action was barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because their claim was inextricably intertwined with the state-court
judgment that caused their alleged injury, and that, the Rosenbachs had a reasonable opportunity
to raise their federal claims in the state-court proceedings. See id. at 4-5. Further, the
Rosenbachs’ application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted; but because this Court
determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claim, their motion
for appointment of counsel was denied. The plaintiffs were then granted leave to file amended
pleadings to assert a claim not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine within 30 days of the
March 29 Order. See id. at 5.
On April 4, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. Am. Compl., Dkt. 6. The
13C02158 Rosenbach, et al. vs. Maffey, et al.
Page 1 of 6
plaintiffs then filed supplemental pleadings on April 9, 2013. Am. Compl., Dkt. 7. In those
amended pleadings, the Rosenbachs further allege that state officials took custody of their son
when he was born on February 21, 2012, on the grounds that the child was born addicted to
heroin. Am. Compl., Dkt. 6 at 1. The plaintiffs state that their son was not born with heroin in
his system, but that he was born “addicted to methadone.” See id. at 2. According to the
Rosenbachs, a doctor had prescribed methadone to Cyndi and did not wean her off the drug
during her pregnancy due to health concerns for both Cyndi and the unborn child. See id. The
plaintiffs contend that, given those health concerns, IDCFS could not have pursued their case for
neglect against the plaintiffs on the grounds that their son was born addicted to methadone.
Therefore, in order to take custody of the Rosenbachs’ child, IDCFS claimed their son was born
addicted to heroin. Id. To that end, the plaintiffs allege that IDCFS switched the medical records
of the Rosenbachs’ newborn son, Jayme, with those of the Rosenbachs’ firstborn daughter,
Isabella, who, the plaintiffs state, had been born exposed to opioids. See id. These records were
then provided to Lutheran Services to support IDCFS’s claim in state court. See id.
On April 24, 2012, Jayme Rosenbach received a letter from IDCFS stating that an
investigation of child abuse or neglect regarding his son had been “indicated.” See Compl., Dkt.
1, Ex. 1. According to the letter, a finding of “indicated” meant that “credible evidence of child
abuse or neglect ha[d] been found.” Id. However, the letter also stated that Jayme was “not
named as a person responsible for the child abuse or neglect.” Id. A state-court hearing to
determine the Rosenbachs’ custody of their son was then held on October 23, 2012. Am. Compl.
Dkt. 6 at 1. At this hearing, the Rosenbachs allege that Matthew Guerrero, the public defender
appointed to represent Jayme, had a copy of the letter from IDCFS which stated that Jayme was
not responsible for the alleged neglect or abuse. Id. at 2. Instead of defending Jayme, however,
Guerrero conspired with ASA Lindt and agreed with her assertions that the Rosenbachs’ son had
been born with heroin in his system. See id. at 2. Moreover, according to the plaintiffs, Guerrero
was aware that Cyndi was in a drug rehabilitation program during the October 23 state-court
proceedings, and that IDCFS was liable for the approximate 245 days that the Rosenbachs’ son
had been taken prior to those proceedings. See id. According to the plaintiffs’ supplemental
filing, Am. Compl., Dkt. 7, although Cyndi was not present at the hearing, she was represented
by another, unidentified DuPage County public defender. Id. at 1. As a result, the DuPage
County court determined that both parents were in neglect and placed the child in foster care.
See Compl., Dkt. 1 at 4.
II.
Analysis
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which governs complaints filed in the context of an
application to proceed in forma pauperis, such as the plaintiffs’, this “court shall dismiss [a] case
at any time if the court determines that…the action…fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); see also Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Haight, 697
F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Our first task, as it is in every case, is to determine whether we
have subject matter jurisdiction.”). To that end, the Court reviews the complaint under the same
standard as that for a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
See Vann v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., No. 13 C 01058, 2013 WL 1222060, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
25, 2013) (citing Allen v. JP Morgan Chase, No. 10 C 02137, 2010 WL 1325321, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 30, 2010), citing Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000)). As such, the
Court will treat all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the
13C02158 Rosenbach, et al. vs. Maffey, et al.
Page 2 of 6
plaintiffs’ favor. See Mann v. Vogel, 707 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2013). While the plaintiffs need
not plead detailed factual allegations, their “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir.
2013) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). That is, their “complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Council 31 of the Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. and Municipal Emps., AFL-CIO v.
Quinn, 680 F.3d 875, 884 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009),
quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
As the Court explained in its March 29 Order, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims seeking review of and challenging state-court
judgments. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (holding that Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine, “confined
to cases…brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.”). “The doctrine applies not only to claims that were actually
raised before the state court, but also to claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state
court determinations.” Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16). That said, plaintiffs may proceed in federal court on
independent claims that are distinct from the implicated state-court determination, id. (citing
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293), or on claims that the plaintiffs did not have a “reasonable
opportunity” to present in state court. Id. at 605. But “[i]f the plaintiff could have raised an issue
in state court, the claim is barred under Rooker-Feldman.” Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442
(7th Cir. 2012).
While the Rosenbachs have pled additional facts concerning the events preceding and
during the October 23 state-court hearing in which their son was placed in foster care, the gist of
their complaint remains the same—they have been subjected to “court terrorism,” see Compl.,
Dkt. 1 at 4, in that the state-court hearing in which their son was placed in foster care was
flawed. The Rosenbachs contend both that ASA Lindt and Guerrero conspired during the
October 23 state-court hearing to deprive them of custody of their son, and that the judge should
have granted Jayme custody of the child, since IDCFS had determined that he was not the person
responsible for the alleged abuse or neglect. These allegations are challenges to the state-court
judgment. And to the extent that the plaintiffs continue to contest the propriety and outcome of
the October 23 state-court hearing, their claim is effectively an appeal of the state-court
determination, over which this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Homola v.
McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A defendant who has lost in state court and sues
in federal court does not assert injury at the hands of his adversary; he asserts injury at the hands
of the court, and the second suit therefore is an effort to obtain collateral review.”). As
previously explained, claims that invite district court review and rejection of state-court
judgments are barred under Rooker-Feldman. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.
Further, despite their additional factual allegations, the plaintiffs have not shown that
they lacked a “reasonable opportunity” to present their claim in state court. For instance, the
plaintiffs assert that Cyndi was in a drug rehabilitation program during the state-court
proceedings, and therefore did not have a reasonable opportunity to present her claim. In those
13C02158 Rosenbach, et al. vs. Maffey, et al.
Page 3 of 6
same pleadings, however, the plaintiffs concede that Cyndi was appointed and represented by a
public defender, and that Jayme was both present and represented by counsel. And while the
Rosenbachs contend, again, that Guerrero conspired with ASA Lindt to deprive the plaintiffs of
their constitutional rights, the plaintiffs have still failed to point to “some action taken by the
state court or state court procedures…[which have] formed the barriers that [the plaintiffs were]
incapable of overcoming in order to present [their] claims to the state court,” as required under
the “reasonable opportunity” exception. Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 560 (7th
Cir. 1999).
As the Kelley court explained, “the ‘reasonable opportunity’ exception inquires whether
the plaintiff had any reasonable opportunity to raise his or her claims, including transferring or
appealing the case to a state court that can evaluate the claims.” 548 F.3d at 606 (original
emphasis). Neither Illinois law, see, e.g., Long, 182 F.3d at 560 (plaintiff did not have a
reasonable opportunity to raise federal claim during forcible entry and detainer proceedings,
because Illinois law only permitted claims germane to the issue of possession during those
proceedings), nor some other state-court action or procedure prevented the plaintiffs from raising
their claim that evidence had been falsified in state court. See, e.g., Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d
660 (7th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff lacked reasonable opportunity to raise federal claims in state court
where parents were prohibited from participating in state-court hearing, and the plaintiff was
neither present nor represented at the state-court hearing in which she was directed to remain in
foster care). Both plaintiffs were represented by counsel, and Jayme was present at the
proceedings. Moreover, the allegation that Guerrero failed to properly defend Jayme, or even
conspired with ASA Lindt, is not enough. See, e.g., Long, 182 F.3d at 558 (“It is not enough for
[the plaintiff] to say that because she was kept away from the Circuit Court…proceeding[s] by
the defendants’ chicanery, she was denied a reasonable opportunity to raise her claims before the
Circuit Court.”). And as this Court previously explained in its March 29 Order, while the
plaintiffs’ allegations against Guerrero may suffice to state a legal malpractice claim (a question
as to which the Court takes no view), that is a state law claim that does not implicate the federal
Constitution. Accordingly, despite their amended pleadings, the core of the plaintiffs’ complaint
seeks review of an allegedly flawed state-court proceeding, but that review must take place, in
the first instance, in state court. As the Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds, a federal district court
has no jurisdiction to review a state court judgment. See, e.g., Homola, 59 F.3d at 649, 651
(plaintiff’s allegations that a municipal attorney “knew or should have known the city had a bad
case” against him and that a state judge acted in the absence of jurisdiction when he found the
plaintiff in contempt and ordered his arrest, i.e., allegations that his state-court proceedings were
flawed, “dismissed for want of jurisdiction”).
That said, to the extent that the plaintiffs’ complaint may be reasonably construed to
allege a separate injury, based not on the October 23 state-court hearing, but on the initial taking
of their child by IDCFS officials the day the child was born, the Court must consider whether
they have stated a claim independent of the state-court judgment. The Rosenbachs contend that
IDCFS knew that Cyndi had been prescribed methadone and could not be weaned off that drug
during her pregnancy due to health concerns, and, therefore, did not have grounds to take
custody of their son at the hospital. In this respect, the plaintiffs appear to argue that IDCFS
seized their son without probable cause. If the Rosenbachs’ son was taken by IDCFS without
probable cause, that claim could potentially constitute an independent constitutional violation.
The problem, however, is that based on the plaintiffs’ pleadings, again accepted as true only for
13C02158 Rosenbach, et al. vs. Maffey, et al.
Page 4 of 6
purposes of this review, the DuPage County court reviewed the facts and determined that it was
appropriate for IDCFS to take custody of the child. As the plaintiffs contend, IDCFS took
temporary custody of their son at the hospital based on the grounds that the child was born
addicted or exposed to heroin. If the state court determined there was probable cause to place the
Rosenbachs’ son in foster care based on the condition of the child at birth, that determination
necessarily implies that probable cause existed when IDCFS initially took custody as well.
Therefore, like the plaintiffs’ previous claims, these allegations are inextricably intertwined with
the October 23 state-court judgment. This is so because, while the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
does not generally apply to determinations made by state administrative agencies, i.e. IDCFS,
see, e.g., Van Harken v. City of Chi., 103 F.3d 1346, 1348-49 (7th Cir. 1997), “if the decision of
a state agency has been upheld by a state court, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies,
because a challenge to the agency’s decision necessarily involves a challenge to the judgment of
the state court.” See McGinnis v. Perry Cnty. Court, No. 11-802-GPM, 2011 WL 4344211, at *1
(S.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2011) (quoting Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1994)).
Accepting the plaintiffs’ allegations as true, it is clear that the DuPage County court affirmed
IDCFS’s decision to remove the Rosenbachs’ son from their custody. Accordingly, this Court is
barred from reviewing IDCFS’s decision to take custody of the child at the hospital because it
would necessarily involve a review of the state-court judgment which affirmed it—precisely the
type of action prohibited under Rooker-Feldman. See id. (“Here it is clear from the allegations of
the complaint that the decision of DCFS has been affirmed by the [state court], and therefore the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the Court from reviewing the agency’s decision.”). 1
To be clear, this Order does not address the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim—indeed, the
Court is prohibited from doing so for want of jurisdiction—but only addresses the appropriate
forum in which their claim should be pursued. “A state court litigant seeking review of a state
court judgment must follow the appellate process through the state court system and then
directly to the United States Supreme Court.” Kelley, 548 F.3d at 603 (emphasis added) (citing
GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, Ill., 995 F.2d 726, 727 (7th Cir. 1993)). Because the
Rosenbachs are, at bottom, seeking review of a state-court determination, their claim belongs in
the state court system. See, e.g., Homola, 59 F.3d at 651 (“Once a court issues an order, the
collateral bar doctrine prevents the loser from migrating to another tribunal in search of a
decision he likes better,” citation omitted). Further, the Rosenbachs had a reasonable opportunity
to raise their claims in state court. See, e.g., Jensen, 295 F.3d at 749 (“Plaintiffs could have
sought leave to appeal the temporary custody order, Ill. S.Ct. R. 306(a)(5), or moved to modify
or vacate the order,” citing 705 ILCS 405/2-10(9)). As such, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claim, and, therefore, it is dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 748
(explaining that when Rooker-Feldman applies, “there is no federal jurisdiction and a dismissal
1
Because the Rosenbachs’ complaint centers on the legitimacy of the October 23 custody
hearing, the Court believes, as set forth above, that they are challenging—i.e., effectively
appealing—the state-court judgment and Rooker-Feldman therefore applies. To the extent,
however, that the plaintiffs are seeking to relitigate the custody case, Rooker-Feldman would not
apply. Their claims would still be barred, however, by issue preclusion. See Jensen v. Foley, 295
F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2002) (claim that child protection authorities unlawfully took custody of
infant barred by issue preclusion, not Rooker-Feldman, where plaintiffs did not challenge
legitimacy of the court proceedings and federal claim would require relitigation of the same issue
on which the state court judgment was premised).
13C02158 Rosenbach, et al. vs. Maffey, et al.
Page 5 of 6
is not on the merits,” citation omitted). Case terminated.
Courtroom Deputy
Initials:
13C02158 Rosenbach, et al. vs. Maffey, et al.
AIR
Page 6 of 6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?