James v. Colvin

Filing 29

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 1/20/2016. (ma,)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ASHLEY A. JAMES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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No. 13 CV 2210
Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim

January 20, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Ashley James applied for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) based on her
claim that she is disabled by a combination of asthma, depression, and bipolar
disorder. After the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)
denied her application, James filed this suit seeking judicial review. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Before the court are the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment.
For the following reasons, James’s motion for summary judgment is granted, the
government’s is denied, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings:
Procedural History
On July 30, 2002, James’s mother filed an application for SSI on behalf of
James when she was a minor.

(Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 116-20.)

The

Commissioner found that James was disabled with an onset date of October 1, 2003,
based on her affective mood disorder, conduct disorder, and asthma. (Id. at 44-45.)
James then received SSI benefits as a disabled child for about four years. On June

8, 2007, the SSA informed James that it no longer considered her disabled as of the
month after she turned 18 years old. (Id. at 48, 89-92.) As a result, her SSI benefits
discontinued as of September 2007. (Id.) When the benefit termination decision
was upheld upon reconsideration, (id. at 13-15), James sought and was granted a
hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), (id.).
The hearing took place in October 2009, but the ALJ’s decision did not go in
James’s way. (Id. at 16.) However, the Appeals Council subsequently remanded
the matter to a different ALJ for another look. (Id.) On remand, the presiding ALJ
scheduled a hearing to take place on October 18, 2011. (Id.) James herself did not
appear at the hearing but her attorney did, along with a Vocational Expert (“VE”).
(Id.) The ALJ issued a decision a month later finding that James’s disability ended
on June 1, 2007. (Id. at 13, 26.) When the Appeals Council denied James’s request
for review, the ALJ’s denial of benefits became the final decision of the
Commissioner, see Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2015). James filed
this lawsuit seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision, (R. 1); see 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), and the parties consented to this court’s jurisdiction, (R. 6); see 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
Facts
James was 22 years old at the time of the ALJ’s 2011 decision denying her
SSI benefits. She has a high-school education and does not have any past relevant
work experience. James seeks SSI based on her claim that her asthma, depression,
and bipolar disorder render her unable to work. At her hearing before the ALJ,

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James’s attorney submitted documentary evidence in support of her claim, but
because she was absent at the hearing, she was unable to provide testimonial
evidence.
A.

Medical Evidence
During a consultative examination on February 13, 2008, Dr. M.S. Patil

noted that James has been suffering from asthma for many years and that her
asthma is triggered if she is around animals, dust, or people wearing strong
perfumes. (A.R. 594.) James reported to Dr. Patil that she has frequent asthma
attacks lasting from 30 minutes to sometimes 24 hours, as many as three to four
times a week. (Id.) According to Dr. Patil’s report, James was hospitalized for
asthma three times as a child.

(Id.)

deformity of her chest and lungs.

Dr. Patil examined James and found no
(Id. at 595-96.)

Although his diagnostic

impression was chronic bronchial asthma, he noted that James’s lungs were clear.
(Id.) Dr. Patil also noted that James’s mental activity was normal. (Id. at 597.)
From 2008 through 2011, James frequently sought emergency room
treatment for her asthma. In August 2008 James visited an emergency room for an
exacerbation of asthma after she was unable to administer her asthma treatments
at home because of a power outage. (Id. at 724-32.) Once treated at the ER, she
was released with improved condition and with no pain indicated. (Id. at 726.) Two
months later James returned to the emergency room for bilateral chest pain and
shortness of breath. (Id. at 748.) However, her patient report log shows that her
lungs were clear and normal. (Id. at 758.) In February 2009 James again returned

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to the emergency room, this time for an upper respiratory infection that aggravated
her asthma. (Id. at 739.) Upon examination, she was found to be wheezing but was
not otherwise suffering from respiratory distress. (Id.) She was discharged and
instructed to take her prescribed medication for asthma. (Id. at 741.)
In 2010 James visited the emergency room 11 times. (Id. at 680-705, 832995.)

Records from those visits show that James had normal x-rays with no

abnormalities and was always discharged the same day she came in. (Id.) In July
2010 James visited the emergency room for strep and acute asthmatic bronchitis.
(Id. at 932.) Once again her chest x-ray did not show any abnormality. (Id. at 940.)
With regard to her mental impairments, Dr. John Jones of the Bureau of
Disability Determination Services (“DDS”) completed a psychiatric evaluation of
James on April 8, 2008.

(Id. at 603-06.)

Dr. Jones diagnosed James with

depression, tensed psychomotor activity, paranoia, hallucinations, and inadequate
impulse control.

(Id. 604-05.)

He also diagnosed James with moderate bipolar

disorder and a history of alcohol abuse as a teenager, but found that she does not
present symptoms of a psychotic disorder. (Id. at 606.) At her evaluation, James
denied psychiatric hospitalizations. (Id. at 604.)
That same month clinical psychologist L.M. Hudspeth, Psy.D., completed a
mental residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment form for James. (Id. at 61518.) He did not note any significant limitations in James’s evaluation but opined
that she would be moderately limited in her ability to understand detailed
instructions, maintain concentration, and work in proximity to others without being

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distracted by them. (Id. at 615.) Furthermore, Dr. Hudspeth noted that James has
mixed bipolar disorder but that she retains the capacity to perform unskilled work
in a socially limited environment. (Id. at 617.) He also completed a Psychiatric
Review Technique Form (“PRTF”) where he noted that James had moderate
restrictions in her daily living, marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning,
and mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace. (Id. at
629.)
On September 28, 2009, Dr. Cynthia Goldman, James’s primary care
physician, completed an RFC evaluation and diagnosed James with persistent
asthma, bipolar disorder, and depression. (Id. at 640-44.) In her RFC, Dr. Goldman
noted that James’s depression was affecting her physical condition, but that she
otherwise would be able to deal with moderate levels of stress and is capable of
performing low-stress jobs. (Id. at 641-43.) Dr. Goldman opined that James would
miss around four days of work per month because of her physical and mental
conditions.

(Id.)

She also opined that James would require two to three

unscheduled breaks in order to accommodate her impairments and that her
symptoms would interfere frequently with her ability to maintain attention and
concentrate. (Id.)
B.

Hearing Testimony
Because James was absent from the hearing, she did not testify. However,

the VE testified at the ALJ’s request and responded to several hypothetical
questions regarding the types of jobs a hypothetical individual with various

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limitations can perform. (A.R. 1014-17.) The ALJ first asked what, if any, work a
younger individual with a high school education could perform if she can lift and/or
carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, can sit, stand, or walk for
six hours in an eight-hour workday with no more than occasional exposure to dust,
fumes, and gases, and with limitations to no more than occasional, brief, and
superficial contact with supervisors, co-workers, and the general public. (Id.) The
VE answered that such individual would be capable of working various unskilled,
medium-exertion jobs, such as a burring-machine operator, motor vehicle
assembler, or hand packager. (Id. at 1015-16.)
For the second hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE whether a person could
perform any jobs if she were to miss four days of work a month and would require
two to three unscheduled breaks a day lasting 20 to 30 minutes. (Id.) The VE
testified that these limitations would not allow the individual to perform any job.
(Id. at 1016.) James’s representative then asked whether an individual would be
able to perform any job if she were off-task 20 percent of the time. The VE opined
that this person would also not be able to sustain any employment. (Id.)
C.

The ALJ’s Decision
On November 18, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that James is

not disabled and therefore not entitled to benefits. (A.R. 13.) The ALJ limited the
scope of her review to whether James could be found disabled as of May 2007, when
she turned 18.

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.994.

In applying the applicable five-step

sequence for assessing disability, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (a)(4); Stepp v. Colvin, 795

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F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2015), the ALJ found that the first step of the rule does not
apply to claimants seeking redetermination for SSI benefits at age 18, see 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.987(b); (A.R. 18, 19). At step two, the ALJ concluded that James suffers from
severe impairments of asthma and depression. (Id. at 19.) At step three, the ALJ
found that James’s impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or medically
equal a listed impairment. (Id. at 20-21.) The ALJ then determined that James
retains the RFC to perform medium work with some limitations because of her need
to be shielded from respiratory irritants. (Id. at 21-24.) At step four, the ALJ found
that James does not have any past relevant work. (Id. at 24.) Then at step five, the
ALJ concluded that based on the VE’s testimony and James’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, she is capable of performing jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy, including burring-machine operator, machine
tender, assembler, and packer jobs. (Id. at 25-26.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded
that James is not disabled. (Id. at 26.)
Analysis
James argues that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed for the following
errors: (1) she continued with the hearing without James’s attendance; (2) improper
credibility determination; (3) improper consideration of James’s treating physician’s
opinion; and (4) faulty step-five determination.

This court reviews the ALJ’s

decision only to ensure that it is supported by substantial evidence, defined as “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”

Stepp, 795 F.3d at 718 (internal quotation omitted).

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Under that

standard, the court will not substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s, reconsider
evidence, or reweigh the claimant’s credibility. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413
(7th Cir. 2008). At the same time, the court will not “simply rubber-stamp the
Commissioner’s decision without a critical review of the evidence” and will ensure
that the ALJ built a “logical bridge from the evidence” to the conclusion. Minnick,
775 F.3d at 935 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
A.

James’s Absence
James first argues that the ALJ failed to discharge her duty to create a full

and fair record because despite being informed that James was ill and was unable
to attend the hearing on October 18, 2011, she nonetheless moved forward with the
hearing in James’s absence and then refused to grant a supplemental hearing. On
the day of the hearing James’s attorney appeared and advised the ALJ that James
had gone to the doctor the day before the hearing to seek treatment for a migraine
and asthma issues, and therefore was unable to make it to the hearing. (Id. 100708.) The ALJ declined to postpone the hearing and instead accepted documentary
evidence from James’s attorney and listened to the VE’s testimony.
James argues that the ALJ’s failure to credit her medical excuse stems from
her misreading of the record and that this warrants reversal or a remand.
Specifically, James contends that she provided good cause to reschedule the hearing
pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.1436, which states in part that “the ALJ will determine
good cause exists for changing the time or place of a scheduled hearing if the reason
is . . . a serious physical or mental condition or incapacitating injury mak[ing] it

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impossible . . . to travel to the hearing.” In accordance with the relevant procedures
for determining good cause, the ALJ informed James’s attorney that James could
provide medical records to demonstrate why she was unable to appear for her
hearing. She explained that a supplemental administrative hearing would be held
if good cause was found. On October 24, 2011, James submitted medical records to
explain her absence. After reviewing the records, however, the ALJ did not find
good cause. Instead, she found that “the treatment records show that James had
been short of breath, had a cough, and had been congested for a few days, with no
mention of a migraine.” (A.R. 17.) The ALJ further determined that “no significant
treatment was sought or offered for her alleged shortness of breath, and she
received no medication for her headache.” (Id.) Because the ALJ did not find good
cause for James’s absence, she declined to hold a supplemental hearing.
Here, the ALJ adequately explained why none of the evidence James
submitted to justify her absence demonstrates a serious illness that made it
impossible for her to attend her hearing.

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1436.

Although

James visited Dr. Goldman the day prior to her hearing, the examination record
shows that she complained chiefly of a shortness of breath, cough, and congestion,
with no reference to any complaint of a migraine.

(A.R. 996.)

Although

Dr. Goldman issued a form signed two days after the hearing to excuse James from
the hearing, (Id. at 998), she did not note any restriction that would have prevented
James from attending the hearing. Also, James submitted medical records from
Community Hospital to the ALJ with a note stating, “please add to file for this

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postponed hearing,” but it is unclear whether these records were submitted to
support a good-cause finding. The ALJ noted that the Community Hospital records
were from March 2010 through September 2011, with James’s last hospital visit
taking place a month before the hearing. (Id. at 832-995.) Based on the records
that the ALJ cited, substantial evidence supports her conclusion that James lacked
good cause to justify her absence at the October 2011 hearing.
B.

Credibility Determination
Next James argues that the ALJ’s credibility determination is flawed. She

first faults the ALJ for relying on boilerplate language often criticized by the
Seventh Circuit as being opaque, meaningless, and unsustainable. See Bjornson v.
Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2012). But the Seventh Circuit has also noted
that an ALJ’s use of this template is harmless if the ALJ provides additional
reasons for her finding. See Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2012).
Here, the ALJ pointed to several factors supporting her credibility determination,
including the fact that James was attending college to study to be a nurse, that
James claimed her absence from the hearing was because of a migraine and an
asthma attack but her doctor noted the reason to have been tonsillitis, and because
James did not seek psychiatric treatment or counseling for her alleged mental
impairments. Because the ALJ offered specific reasons to support her credibility
assessment, the use of the boilerplate language is harmless. See Filus, 694 F.3d at
868.

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James also contends that the ALJ erred when she reasoned that the lack of
psychiatric treatments rendered James’s allegations of mental impairments not
credible. In general, because the ALJ is in the best position to observe witnesses,
courts will not disturb credibility determinations as long as they have some support
in the record. Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2007). But courts have
greater freedom to review credibility determinations when those determinations are
based on objective factors rather than subjective observations. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor
v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 354 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, the ALJ discounted James’s
allegations of depression and bipolar disorder in part because the record showed
that she had stopped seeing a psychiatrist when she turned 15 and had received
what the ALJ characterized as “little or no counseling or psychiatric treatment”
since then. (A.R. 23-24.) But because the ALJ declined to hold a supplemental
hearing to take James’s testimony, she had no opportunity to ask James why her
psychiatric treatment ended. See Brindisi ex rel. Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d
783, 788 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that an ALJ’s references to credibility were
troubling where claimant did not testify at the hearing). Pursuant to SSR 96–7p,
the ALJ “must not draw any inferences” about a claimant’s condition unless the
ALJ has explored the claimant’s explanations as to the lack of medical care, Craft v.
Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 679 (7th Cir. 2008), including for example, the inability to
afford treatment or intolerable side effects, see SSR 96-7P, 1996 WL 374186, at *7*8 (July 2, 1996).

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Because James did not testify at the hearing, the ALJ had no way of knowing
whether one of these reasons was behind James’s sparse mental-health treatment
record. As James points out, the ALJ’s willingness to discredit her despite this lack
of information in the record raises questions about whether the ALJ met her
obligation to fully develop the record to support the credibility assessment. See
Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Smith v. Apfel, 231 F.3d
433, 437 (7th Cir. 2000)) (noting that part of “basic obligation” to develop full and
fair record is to thoroughly develop facts). “The adjudicator may need to recontact
the individual or question the individual at the administrative proceeding in order
to determine whether there are good reasons the individual does not seek medical
treatment or does not pursue treatment in a consistent manner.” See SSR 96-7P,
1996 WL 374186, at *7. An ALJ’s failure to fulfill her duty to develop the facts
provides good cause to remand for gathering of additional evidence. Smith, 231
F.3d at 437.
To determine whether an ALJ has discharged her obligation to develop a full
and fair record, the Seventh Circuit considers a number of factors: (1) whether the
ALJ obtained all of the claimant’s medical and treatment records; (2) whether the
ALJ elicited detailed testimony from the claimant at the hearing; and (3) whether
the ALJ heard testimony from examining or treating physicians. Binion v. Shalala,
13 F.3d 243, 245 (7th Cir. 1994). Here, the ALJ conducted a 13-minute hearing
during which James’s attorney provided medical evidence and the VE answered her
hypothetical questions.

Also during this brief period the ALJ discussed

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administrative

matters

with

James’s

attorney,

such

as

how

good-cause

determinations are made and the process for submitting evidence to show good
cause. (A.R. 1007-1013.) The court finds that the ALJ did not develop the record
sufficiently to determine why James stopped seeing her psychiatrist and, as such,
this observation is insufficient to support the adverse credibility assessment. See
Craft, 539 F.3d at 679.
In addition to the lack of psychiatric treatment, the ALJ also discredited
James’s allegations because James was taking courses to become a nurse. The ALJ
references Dr. Patil’s consultative examination of Plaintiff on February 2008 where
the doctor noted that James was then studying at South Suburban College. (A.R.
594.) However, there was no mention of James’s studies in Dr. Hudspeth’s April
2008 PRTF and in her November 2008 disability report James stated that she had
not completed any vocational school or job training. (Id. at 331, 631.) And again,
because the ALJ did not take testimony from James, she had no basis to evaluate
the intensity, duration, or time commitment involved in James’s studies to
determine whether those activities are inconsistent with her disability allegations.
A claimant’s preparations to try to find work do not disqualify her from a disability
determination, and because here the ALJ failed to explore the details surrounding
James’s participation in a nursing program, she had little basis on which to
evaluate the consistency between that participation and James’s allegations. See
Pierce v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that claimant’s
“dogged efforts” to work should not detract from her credibility); see also McClesky

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v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 2010) (criticizing an ALJ’s finding that
claimant’s semester-long college attendance cast doubt on her disability claim).
Finally, the ALJ found James incredible because James had attributed her
absence from the hearing to a “proportionate migraine and asthma,” and according
to the ALJ, the doctor’s letter seeking to excuse James from the hearing only
referenced tonsillitis.

(A.R. 24.)

But the attached physician’s note, which is

handwritten and cryptic, appears to reference both pain and asthma. (Id. at 997.)
Accordingly, it appears that this aspect of the credibility determination rests on a
misreading of the record. Although an ALJ is generally in the best position to
determine a claimant’s truthfulness and forthrightness, Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390
F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2004), without James’s testimony at the hearing, the reasons
the ALJ gave in support of the credibility determination are inadequate.

On

remand the ALJ should contact James to gather additional evidence regarding her
lack of medical and psychiatric treatments and about her schooling when assessing
how those factors support or detract from her credibility. See SSR 96-7P, 1996 WL
374186, at *7 (July 2, 1996).
C.

Treating Physician’s Opinions
James argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinion of her treating

physician, Dr. Goldman, without providing a reasoned explanation.

The court

agrees. The “treating physician” rule directs the ALJ to give controlling weight to
the medical opinion of a treating physician if it is “well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and is “not inconsistent

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with the other substantial evidence.” 20 C.F.R. 416.927(d); Hofslien v. Barnhart,
439 F.3d 375, 376 (7th Cir. 2006). If the treating physician’s medical opinion is
well-supported and there is no contradictory evidence, there is no basis on which
the ALJ could refuse to accept it. Bauer v. Astrue, 532 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2008).
However, once contradicting evidence is introduced, the treating physician’s
evidence is no longer entitled to controlling weight. Id. At that point, the treating
physician’s evidence is just one more piece of evidence for the ALJ to weigh,
balancing the regulatory factors such as how often the treating physician has
examined the claimant and whether the physician is a specialist in treating the
condition claimed to be disabling. Id. “If the ALJ discounts the physician’s opinion
after considering these factors, [the court] must allow the decision to stand so long
as the ALJ minimally articulate[d] [her] reasons—a very deferential standard.”
Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008).
Here, the ALJ did not properly explain why she discredited Dr. Goldman’s
opinion. The ALJ briefly stated that:
The claimant’s treating physician Dr. Goldman, MD opined in
September 2009 that the claimant could stand/walk for two hours in
an eight hour workday, occasionally lift 50 pounds, frequently lift 20
pounds and would miss on average four days of work per month. I
afford this opinion little weight. This opinion is not supported by
treatment records, including Exhibit 34F. Although claimant has
asthma exacerbations, they are not of the frequency asserted in this
opinion. Further, the record also fails to support Dr. Goldman’s
reported depressive episodes.
(A.R. 24.)

The ALJ’s cursory reasoning here fails to build the requisite logical

bridge between this conclusion and the record. First, the ALJ references Exhibit

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34F, which contains James’s medical records from Community Hospital. (Id. at
832-995.)

Those records show that she was treated in the emergency room for

asthma exacerbations on numerous occasions from March 4, 2010, through
September 6, 2011. It is difficult to understand how the ALJ could have concluded
that James’s asthma exacerbations are not of the frequency asserted in the opinion
when the exhibit that she references demonstrates that James visited Community
Hospital’s emergency room six times in 2011 and over eleven times in 2010. (Id.
832-995.) She also had emergency room visits at Advocate Hospital in 2008 and
2009 for her asthma. (Id. at 734-43, 745, 766, 775.) Moreover, her history of mental
disorders has been documented by several treating physicians such as Dr. Moolayil,
Dr. Patil, and Dr. Hudspeth. (Id. at 591, 597, 617.)
Notably, the ALJ also failed to adequately engage with the regulatory factors
dictating how an ALJ must weigh a treating physician’s opinion. Once the ALJ
declines to give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating physician, she must
offer “good reasons” that are “sufficiently specific” in explaining what weight, if any,
she assigned it. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Schmidt, 496 F.3d at 842. If an ALJ
does not give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, the regulations
require the ALJ to consider the length, nature, and extent of the treatment
relationship, frequency of examination, the physician’s specialty, the types of tests
performed, and the consistency and supportability of the physician’s opinion. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 2009). The ALJ
failed to discuss these factors, including the records showing that Dr. Goldman has

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been James’s primary care provider since October 2007. (A.R. 645-54.) No other
treating physician has treated James for as long a period as Dr. Goldman. She saw
James for both her mental and physical impairments. (Id. at 645-51, 655-57.) On
remand, the ALJ must evaluate what weight to designate to Dr. Goldman’s opinions
based upon the factors specified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). See Campbell v.
Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 308 (7th Cir. 2010).
As with the credibility determination, a careful analysis of Dr. Goldman’s
treating notes and RFC evaluation is essential because it may alter the ALJ’s
decision at step five. Dr. Goldman opined that James would miss around four days
of work monthly due to her physical and mental conditions. (A.R. 641-43.) She also
asserted that if James started working, she would require two to three unscheduled
breaks in order to accommodate her impairments. (Id. at 643.) Dr. Goldman opined
that James’s symptoms would frequently interfere with her ability to maintain
attention and concentrate on work tasks. (Id. at 641.) The VE testified at the
hearing that such limitations would disqualify James from employment. (Id. at
1016-17.) For all of these reasons, the need for a thorough vetting of the weight the
ALJ gave Dr. Goldman’s opinion is particularly crucial to the overall disability
determination in this case.1

There is no need to address James’s step-five argument. The case is remanded for
a new credibility assessment and evaluation of Dr. Goldman’s opinion. Any change
that results from these new assessments will necessarily require a new RFC
assessment and a step-five evaluation.

1

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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, James’s motion for summary judgment is granted,
the government’s is denied, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
ENTER:

______________________________
Young B. Kim
United States Magistrate Judge

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