Brown et al v. Haymes et al

Filing 117

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 5/28/2015. (et, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

FRANCES M. BROWN and JAMES E.
BROWN, SR., For themselves and
parents, guardians, and next friends of
COBIE BROWN, JAMES BROWN
JR., ROSE BROWN, VENSON JONES
and AHIJAH BROWN,

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Case No. 13 C 2478
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Magistrate Judge Geraldine Soat Brown
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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JEFFREY E. HAYMES, and LINDA
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C. HAYMES,
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are the Plaintiffs’ three Motions in Limine. [Dkt 101, 102, 103.]
Defendants have responded to those motions. [Dkt 111, 112, 113.] The court ruled from the
bench on those motions on May 22, 2015. This opinion sets out the reasons why Plaintiffs’
Motion in Limine #1 is denied, Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #2 is granted in part and denied in
part, and Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #3 is denied.
This lawsuit is about why the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Brown and their family, and the
defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Haymes, could not get along as neighbors. More specifically, the issue
is whether the inability to get along was the result of racial animus on the part of the defendants
and, if so, whether that racial animus caused damage to the plaintiffs that is remediable under the
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. Mr. and Mrs. Haymes deny that they had racial
animus and assert that the tensions resulted from difficulties and disturbances caused by the

Browns, not racial discrimination on the Haymes’ part.
Generally, “[m]otions in limine are disfavored.” Mi-Jack Prods. v. Int’l. Union of
Operating Eng’rs., Local 150, No. 94 C 6676, 1995 WL 680214 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 1995)
(Conlon, J.). “Evidence should not be excluded in limine unless it is clearly inadmissible on all
potential grounds.” Id. Rather, rulings on evidence “ordinarily should be deferred until trial,”
when they may be resolved in the proper context. Id. The movant bears the burden of showing
that the evidence it seeks to preclude is “clearly inadmissible.” Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc.,
864 F. Supp. 67, 69 (N.D. Ill. 1994). Denial of a motion in limine is not a ruling that the
evidence subject to the motion is necessarily admissible. Rather, it means only that “outside the
context of trial, the court cannot determine whether the evidence in question is admissible.” Id.
Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #1
Motion in Limine #1 seeks to preclude the defendants from presenting any evidence that
the plaintiffs used police services to aid in a family matter or mention the fact that plaintiffs
called the police.
Any evidence about events that could effect a neighbor during the time that the Browns
and the Haymes lived side by side is potentially relevant. For example, if the Browns had family
discussions among themselves, that is not relevant. But if the discussions rose to a volume
where a neighbor heard them, that is relevant.
Mr. and Mrs. Haymes may present evidence of their experience of living next to the
Browns, what Mr. and Mrs. Haymes heard and saw, including any observations of shouting,
arguments, or police activity.
Motion in Limine #1 is denied. The court will, however, consider a request for a limiting
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instruction directing the jury not to speculate about who among the members of the Brown
family was right or wrong in any disagreement among those members of the Brown family, but
rather consider only the Haymes’ experience of it. It is up to the party who seeks a limiting
instruction to propose it.
Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #2
Motion in Limine #2 seeks to preclude evidence regarding Corey Clair’s prior arrests in
reference to domestic incidents or the mention of any orders of protection that have been sought
against him.
An arrest is not a conviction and so cannot be admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 609 (dealing
with impeachment by evidence of a criminal conviction. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1) provides that
evidence of a crime, wrong or other bad act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.
The same rationale applies to orders of protection. Accordingly, the fact that Corey Clair was
previously arrested cannot be admitted for the purpose to show a propensity to act as charged in
the arrests or as alleged in the motion for an order of protection.
However, that evidence may be admissible for other purposes. The Seventh Circuit has
stated that, subject to balancing under Fed. R. Evid. 403, an arrest may be used on crossexamination as a specific incident of conduct under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b), if probative of the
witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Thompson v. City of Chicago, 722 F.3d
963, 977 (7th Cir. 2013).1
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The case cited by the plaintiffs in their Motion in Limine to the effect that an arrest
cannot be used under Rule 608 is a district court decision that predates the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion in Thompson. See Pls.’ Motion in Limine # Two at 3 (citing El-Bakly v. Autozone, Inc.,
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An arrest may also be admissible for other purposes. The defendants point out that the
plaintiffs stated in the Complaint:
Defendants called the police and made a false report that Clair had assaulted
Defendant Jeff Haymes. One or two days later, Clair was arrested on this charge
and kept overnight in jail. Although the case was dismissed in April 2012, that
report may have a significant negative impact on Clair’s education and pursuit of
a career in law enforcement. It also caused great emotional distress to Plaintiffs to
witness Clair’s ordeal, hear racial slurs, and participate in the hearings related to
this incident.
(Verified Compl. ¶ 31.) [Dkt 1.]
If the plaintiffs or any of their witnesses testify or argue that the allegations made by Mr.
Haymes which resulted in the police arresting and charging Corey Clair caused any damage or
injury to Corey Clair, that will open the door to evidence that Corey Clair had previously been
arrested and had other encounters with law enforcement. Likewise, in the event that the plaintiffs
claim that participating in the law enforcement procedings and sitting in the hearings related to
the incident caused them distress, the defendants may introduce evidence that the plaintiffs had
experienced similar situations previously with Corey Clair.
Also, Plaintiffs’ Motion states that Corey Clair never resided at the Browns’ residence
during the time they lived next to the Haymes. (Pls.’ Mot. Limine #2 ¶ 4.) The defendants state
that the police records and other court records show Corey Clair’s address as the Browns’
residence. In the event that plaintiffs or their witnesses testify that Corey Clair did not live at the
Browns’ residence at the relevant time, the defendants may introduce evidence to contradict that
testimony. This is not a ruling on the admissibility of the police records but rather a ruling

No. 04 C 2767, 2008 WL 1774962 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2008)). To the extent that this court’s oral
ruling on May 22, 2015 differs from this opinion in any respect, this opinion governs.
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denying a motion that would preclude their use at trial for any purpose.
Motion in Limine #2 is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine #3
Motion in Limine #3 seeks to preclude the defendants from presenting evidence to
support the Haymes’ belief that the Brown family children were attempting to poison the
Haymes’ dog. The plaintiffs claim that the Haymes’ poisoning theory is speculation. The
plaintiffs state, “A jury could be unfairly prejudiced by the mere implication that Defendants
believe that the children intended to poison their dog.” (Pls.’ Mot. Limine #3 ¶ 5.)
The motion is denied. A key issue in this case is the Haymes’ state of mind. An element
of a claim under the Fair Housing Act is that the defendants were motivated by an intent to
discriminate on the basis of race. “We hold that a showing of intentional discrimination is an
essential element of a § 3617 claim.” East-Miller v. Lake Cnty. Highway Dept., 421 F.3d 558,
563 (7th Cir. 2005). As previously noted, the Haymes may testify to what they observed and the
inferences they drew from what they observed. Conclusions about a party’s state of mind are for
the jury, which will draw its own conclusions about the credibility of the parties from all of the
evidence.
At trial, if any party believes that evidence is being introduced in violation of these
rulings, that party must bring that to the court’s attention by objecting at the time.

______________________
Geraldine Soat Brown
United States Magistrate Judge
May 28, 2015
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