David v. City Colleges of Chicago

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 4/24/2015: Civil case terminated.Mailed notice(wp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CELESTE DAVID,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 13 C 2508
v.
Judge Harry D. Leinenweber
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT
NO. 508, d/b/a CITY COLLEGES
OF CHICAGO,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before

the

Court

Judgment [ECF No. 16].

is

Defendant’s

Motion

for

Summary

For the reasons stated herein, the

Motion is granted.
I.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed except where noted.
Plaintiff Celeste David (“David” or “Plaintiff”) used to work
for Defendant City Colleges of Chicago (“CCC”).

David is an

African-American woman who started with CCC in October 1980
and retired on June 30, 2012.

She held various positions

throughout her career, but at the time of her retirement, she
was

a

“Manager

of

End

User

Information Technology (“OIT”).

Services”

in

CCC’s

Office

of

David alleges that CCC paid

her less than other similarly situated employees because of

her race, age, and gender, in violation of Title VII, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Equal Pay
Act.
The central facts in this case involve the year leading
up to David’s retirement.

On August 1, 2011, David announced

her intention to retire eleven months later on June 30, 2012.
About a month after announcing her retirement, David met with
Craig

Lynch

department

(“Lynch”),
and

the

the

“Vice

person

in

Chancellor”

charge

of

of

the

OIT

approving

any

promotions, job re-classifications, or pay increases.

David

asked Lynch for a different job title and more pay because she
was performing what she describes as two jobs despite being
paid only as a Manager of End User Services.

In support of

this request, David completed and submitted a Job Analysis
Questionnaire, which is a form that CCC employees can fill out
to request formally more pay or a different title.

Lynch said

he would look into it, but David’s questionnaire was never
submitted to Human Resources for review or approval.

In the

end, David stayed at the same pay and job title until her
retirement.
About

six

months

prior

to

retirement,

David

met

with

CCC’s EEO officer, Aaron Allen (“Allen”), to file an internal
EEO Complaint Form with CCC.

In the form, David claims that

- 2 -

she met with Lynch on three different occasions to discuss her
pay and title.
referenced

On each occasion, according to David, Lynch

her

impending

retirement.

CCC’s

internal

EEO

office confirmed receipt of David’s complaint form on February
3, 2012, but Allen was unable to resolve the complaint before
David retired in June.
David’s complaint eventually wound its way through the
EEOC

and

she

received

a

right-to-sue

letter

on

January

2013, after which she timely filed her federal complaint.

9,
CCC

now moves for summary judgment, arguing that David has not
mustered sufficient evidence to establish discrimination and
that, even if she did, there are valid, non-discriminatory
reasons for any disparities in pay and treatment.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”
facts

are

those

that

affect

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
the

outcome

of

the

Material
lawsuit.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A

genuine

a

dispute

reasonable

jury

exists
could

“if

the

return

a

evidence
verdict

is
for

such
the

that

nonmoving

party.” Id. The moving party may meet its burden by showing
“there

is

an

absence

of

evidence

- 3 -

to

support

the

nonmoving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325
(1986).

If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the

non-moving

party

must

demonstrate

with

evidence

“that

a

triable issue of fact remains on issues for which [it] bears
the burden of proof.” Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463–64
(7th Cir. 2009).
The

judge’s

role

at

summary

judgment

is

not

credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.
v. Haupert, 481 F.3d 543, 550 (7th Cir. 2007).

to

make

Washington

In determining

whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court
construes all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party — in this case David.

See, Bellaver v. Quanex

Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2000).
III.
David’s

Complaint

ANALYSIS

includes

one

count

of

age

discrimination in violation of the ADEA, one count of race
discrimination in violation of Title VII, one count of gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII, and one count of
wage

discrimination

in

violation

of

the

Equal

Pay

Act.

Because the same analytical framework applies to Title VII and
ADEA

claims,

the

Court

will

consider

those

claims

first.

Next, the Court will consider David’s Equal Pay Act claim.

- 4 -

A.

Title VII and ADEA Claims

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against
“any

individual

conditions

or

with

respect

privileges

of

to

his

compensation,

employment,

because

terms,

of

such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
42

U.S.C.

§

2000e-2(a)(1).

Likewise,

the

ADEA

prohibits

employers from discriminating on the basis of a person’s age.
29 U.S.C. § 23(a)(1).
In

both

establish

Title

VII

and

discrimination

ADEA

either

cases,

a

directly

plaintiff
or

may

indirectly.

Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir. 2008).

The

direct method does not necessarily require “direct evidence”
of discriminatory intent; rather, it simply requires evidence
that

“points

directly”

employer’s action.
The

indirect

Douglas

method

shifting

to

a

discriminatory

reason

for

the

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
involves

framework

application

described

more

of

the

McDonnel

thoroughly

below.

Id. at 672.
Either method, however, requires proof of a materially
adverse employment action, because “not everything that makes
an

employee

unhappy

is

actionable.”

Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996).

Smart

v.

Ball

State

An employment action

is materially adverse if it results in “a significant change

- 5 -

in the claimant’s employment status such as hiring, discharge,
denial

of

promotion,

significantly

reassignment

different

job

to

a

position

responsibilities,

that causes a substantial change in benefits.”

or

an

with
action

Rhodes v. Ill.

Dep’t of Trasnp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004).
CCC argues that the only actions that were materially
adverse in this case are David’s claims relating to pay and
her non-promotion.

Accordingly, CCC asks the Court to dismiss

any claim based on (1) CCC’s alleged failure to submit David’s
Job

Analysis

Questionnaire

to

CCC’s

Human

Resources

Department, and (2) CCC’s failure to take action on David’s
EEO complaint before she retired.

In response, David argues

that CCC’s failure to process her Job Analysis Questionnaire
and her internal EEO complaint are materially adverse actions
because they limited and deprived her of a better job title.
David’s arguments on this issue are devoid of citations to any
legal

authority,

and

the

Court

cannot

find

a

case

where

similar conduct was found to be an adverse employment action.
The failure to process the Questionnaire or the EEO complaint
did not “cause a substantial change in [David’s] benefits.”
Id.

Instead, those failures are, at most, the vehicles by

which CCC did engage in materially adverse employment actions
— that is, CCC’s denial of David’s request for a better job

- 6 -

title and more pay.

The Court therefore finds that the only

materially adverse employment actions in this case are CCC’s
refusal to give David a new job title and a pay increase.
With that in mind, the Court will discuss David’s arguments
under the direct and indirect methods in turn.
1.

Direct Evidence of Discrimination

The direct method of proving discrimination “requires the
plaintiff to put forth evidence that demonstrates that she was
a member of a protected class and ‘as a result suffered the
adverse employment action of which [s]he complains.’”

Burks

v. Wisc. Dep’t of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 750 n.3 (7th Cir.
2006) (quoting Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc.,
453 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir. 2006)).

This can involve direct

or

typical

circumstantial

evidence,

and

circumstantial

evidence includes:
“(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written
statements, or behavior toward or comments directed
at other employees in the protected group; (2)
evidence, whether or not rigorously statistical,
that
similarly
situated
employees
outside
the
protected
class
received
systematically
better
treatment; and (3) evidence that the employee was
qualified for the job in question but was passed
over in favor of a person outside the protected
class and the employer’s reason is a pretext for
discrimination.”
Atanus, 520 F.3d at 672 (quoting Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com,
Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2007)).

- 7 -

There is no doubt that David, an African-American woman
over forty, is a member of several protected classes.

The

issue is whether she was denied a better job title and more
pay because of her age, race, or gender.

David relies on

remarks CCC employees made regarding her retirement as direct
evidence of discrimination.
her

upcoming

[David],

retirement

and

how

her

According to David, remarks about

are

age

“evidence

reflected

of

how

[CCC’s]
she

was

view

of

treated.”

(Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment at 5,
ECF No. 27).
David

is

correct

that

a

defendant’s

remarks

may

constitute direct evidence of discrimination if the remarks
are made “around the time of, and . . . in reference to, the
adverse employment action.”

Hunt v. City of Markham, Ill.,

219 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
apply to all remarks.

But the rule does not

Rather, the remarks must come from

those responsible for the adverse employment action or “those
who provide[d] input into the decision.”

Id.

The only statements David relies on are those made by
Lynch

and

a

person

named

Kevin

Williams

(“Williams”),

who

appears to be the person responsible for assigning seats in
the OIT

department.

David

has

presented

no

evidence

that

Williams had authority or provided input regarding her denied

- 8 -

pay

increase

and

job

title

requests.

disregards any statements Williams made.
As

to

Lynch,

David

cites

commented on her retirement.

two

Thus,

the

Court

where

Lynch

See, id.
occasions

The first statement was made in

response to David’s first request for a pay increase and title
change, which David made after she had announced her plans to
retire.

According to David, Lynch responded to her request by

asking, “[A]ren’t you about to retire?”
came

two

months

later

when

regarding her initial request.

David

Lynch

flatly

rejected

her

The second statement

followed

up

with

Lynch

This time, David claims that

request,

stating

that

David

was

about to retire and that her position was a low priority for
him. David argues that these two statements demonstrate that
Lynch denied her a pay increase and promotion because of her
age.

In response, CCC argues that those statements do not

demonstrate any animus because “retirement is not a proxy for
age” and that David’s looming retirement was an appropriate
factor

to

consider

when

deciding

whether

to

grant

David’s

requests.
CCC has the better argument here.

Several courts have

found that remarks related to retirement do not demonstrate
animus based on age.
where

the

court

For example, CCC’s relies on Nabat,

considered

the

- 9 -

plaintiff’s

argument

that

retirement-based remarks constituted direct evidence of agebased discrimination.

Nabat v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 92

C 945, 1993 WL 390373, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1993).

The

court found that none of the statements made reference to the
plaintiff’s age and they therefore could not provide direct
evidence of discriminatory intent.

Id. (citing Finnegan v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 867, 876 (N.D. Ill.
1991),

aff’d,

statements

at

967

F.2d

issue

in

refer to David’s age.
address

this

argument

distinguishable.

1161

(7th

Nabat,

Cir.

here

1992)).

none

of

the

Like

the

statements

Moreover, David’s response does not
or

explain

Thus,

the

how

Court

cases

like

finds

Nabat

that

are

Lynch’s

statements do not provide direct evidence of discrimination.
The

remaining

arguments

in

David’s

brief

under

the

“direct evidence” heading largely overlap with other issues,
such

as

pretext

employees.

None

or

the

of

these

existence

other

arguments

similarly

“point

directly”

discriminatory reason for the employer’s action.
F.3d at 671.

a

to

a

Atanus, 520

At most, they go to David’s indirect evidence

argument, which is discussed below.
present

situated

genuine

issue

of

Thus, David has failed to

material

fact

under

the

direct

method, which leaves the indirect method as David’s only hope
for surviving summary judgment.

- 10 -

2.

Indirect Evidence of Discrimination

Under the indirect method of proving discrimination, a
plaintiff must show that:

“(1) she is of a protected class;

(2) she is qualified for the position; (3) she was rejected
for the position; and (4) the position was given to someone
outside

the

protected

class

who

was

similarly

or

less

qualified than she.” Hobbs v. City of Chicago, 573 F.3d 454,
460 (7th Cir. 2009).

If a plaintiff makes such a showing,

then the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some
legitimate,

nondiscriminatory

employment action.
792,

802

(1973).

nondiscriminatory

reason

for

the”

adverse

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
Finally,
reasons

for

if

a

its

defendant
actions,

can
then

articulate
the

burden

shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s
reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination.

Id. at 804.

As to David’s initial burden, there is no doubt that she
has satisfied the first and third elements; she is of multiple
protected classes and CCC does not dispute that it denied her
requests for a job title and pay increase.

CCC focuses its

challenge on the fourth element, arguing that David has not
pointed

to

a

similarly-situated

better than her.

- 11 -

employee

that

CCC

treated

“An employee is similarly situated if the employee is
‘comparable

to

the

plaintiff

in

all

material

respects.’”

Warren v. Solo Cup Co., 516 F.3d 627, 630–31 (7th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Crawford v. Ind. Harboer Belt R.R. Co., 461 F.3d 844,
846–47

(7th

Cir.

2006)).

“The

similarly-situated

analysis

calls for a flexible, common-sense examination of all relevant
factors.”
2012).

Coleman

v.

Donahoe,

667

F.3d

835,

846

(7th

Cir.

The relevant factors include “whether the employees

(i) held the same job description, (ii) were subject to the
same standards, (iii) were subordinate to the same supervisor,
and

(iv)

had

comparable

experience,

education,

and

other

qualifications - provided the employer considered these latter
factors in making the personnel decision.”

Warren, 516 F.3d

at 631 (internal quotation marks omitted).
These factors are not all-inclusive, however, and there
is no “rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic” way of determining
whether two employees are truly comparable.
at 846.
and

Coleman, 667 F.3d

Instead, the Court must simply look at the employees

evaluate

the

available

evidence

“in

light

of

common

experience” to determine whether they are comparable.

Id.

Moreover, whether an employee is similarly situated is usually
a

fact

question

appropriate

only

for
when

the
no

jury;

thus,

reasonable

- 12 -

“summary

judgment

fact-finder

could

is

find

that plaintiffs have met their burden on the issue.”

Id. at

846–47.
Preliminarily,

the

Court

notes

that,

although

David’s

Complaint and interrogatory answers name several employees who
allegedly

received

preferable

treatment,

David’s

summary

judgment briefing and related statement of facts refer to only
two

employees:

Rodriguez

Christopher

(“Rodriguez”).

Reyes

(“Reyes”)

Consequently,

employees the Court will consider.

those

and
are

Rosane

the

only

The starting point for

this analysis is to consider David’s role and qualifications
before

retirement

in

order

to

compare

her

to

Reyes

and

Rodriguez.
David retired as a Manager of End User Services.

At the

time of her retirement, David’s highest level of education was
a

high

position

school

diploma.

lists

CCC’s

under

job

description

“Qualifications”

the

for

David’s

following:

“Bachelor’s Degree in Computer Science, Information Science,
Computer

Information

Systems,

Data

Processing,

or

an

appropriate related field.” (Def.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt. Ex. M,
ECF No. 18).

In lieu of having such a degree, however, the

description explains that “[a] combination of educational and
work

experience

may

be

taken

discretion of the administration.”

- 13 -

into

consideration

at

the

(Id.). David described her

day-to-day

job

duties

as

compiling

certain

reports,

supervising help desk and technical personnel, and eventually
overseeing

“PeopleSoft

security,”

which

involved

providing

users access to PeopleSoft and developing that program “as
related to security.”

(Pl.’s Dep. 17:8–24:17 (May 29, 2014),

Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Ex. B, ECF No. 38).
In 2001, CCC hired Reyes, a younger Asian male who worked
for

Sync

Solutions

as

an

IT

consultant.

As

an

outside

consultant, Reyes assisted David in her PeopleSoft security
duties until 2011, when CCC hired Reyes from Sync Solutions as
a full-time Functional Applications Analyst (“App Analyst”).
Reyes has a Bachelor of Science degree in Computer Information
Systems,

which

position.

In

is
his

a

prerequisite

new

position,

for

CCC’s

Reyes

App

performed

Analyst
“totally

different” duties than what he performed while working for CCC
as

a

Sync

Solutions

consultant.

(Reyes

Dep.

25:10–14

(Sept. 3, 2014), Def.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Ex. K, ECF No. 18).
Rather
Reyes’s

than
new

working

exclusively

position

had

him

on

PeopleSoft

working

on

security,
PeopleSoft

administration, which involved setting up tuition amounts and
registration

information.

During

the

month

when

Reyes

transitioned into his new job as an App Analyst, Reyes split
his time between doing PeopleSoft security duties with David

- 14 -

and his newly acquired PeopleSoft administration duties. After
that

transition

PeopleSoft

period,

administration

however,
duties,

Reyes
while

stuck
David

strictly
performed

to
all

the security duties.
When

David

retired,

Reyes

took

over

at

least

David’s duties without receiving any additional pay.

some

of

Then, in

December 2012, CCC promoted Reyes to a Senior Security Analyst
(“Senior Analyst”) at a yearly salary of $93,808.00, which is
substantially

more

than

retirement.

Although

David

the

earned

Senior

at

the

Analyst

time

title

of

was

her

newly

created for Reyes, the parties dispute whether the position
was truly new.

David argues that Reyes is simply doing her

old job but with the better title and higher pay that David
asked for before she retired.

CCC argues that Reyes is doing

more than David did in her old role, and that it created the
new position to reflect Reyes’s superior education.
way,

the

Senior

“Qualifications”
Bachelor

of

Analyst

the

Science

job

following:
(BS)

description
“Bachelor

degree

in

of

Either

lists
Arts

Computer

under

(BA)

or

Science

or

equivalent, supplemented by 7 years related experience with
systems analysis, design, software support and application of
security
No. 18).

controls.”

(Def.’s

L.R.

56.1

Stmt.

Ex. I-9,

ECF

Unlike the job description for David’s position,

- 15 -

however, the Senior Analyst description includes no provision
that would allow experience to replace the requirement of a
college degree.
Rodriguez was hired as a Technical Applications Developer
a couple of years after David retired.

That position requires

a Bachelor of Arts or Science degree in a particular field,
which Rodriguez possesses.

As a Developer, Rodriguez assists

Reyes with PeopleSoft security duties, similar to what David
did before she retired.
Rodriguez

also

helps

In addition to PeopleSoft security,

Reyes

in

developing

“the

interaction

hub.” (Def.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 66, ECF No. 18).

CCC paid

Rodriguez substantially more than it paid David just prior to
retirement.
CCC argues that Reyes and Rodriguez are not sufficiently
similar to David to count as comparable employees for Title
VII and ADEA purposes.
and

Rodriguez

both

This is so, CCC argues, because Reyes
have

college

degrees

and

worked

in

positions that required such degrees, whereas David only has a
high

school

strictly

diploma

required

a

and

did

college

not

work

degree.

in
CCC

a

position

also

argues

that
that

Reyes and Rodriguez performed additional and different duties
than David, making them incomparable.
David

has

not

pointed

to

any

- 16 -

Finally, CCC notes that

employee

in

her

similar

circumstances that received better treatment — that is, David
has presented no evidence of another younger, non AfricanAmerican

male

employee

who

received

better

treatment

after

announcing his intention to stop working for CCC.
The

Court

evidence

of

finds

that

dissimilarity

there

is

between

too

David

much
and

undisputed

her

proposed

similarly situated employees to allow any reasonable jury to
find them truly comparable.
facts

that

example,

demonstrate

David

has

David did not dispute any of the

the

admitted

above
that

dissimilarities.

Reyes

and

For

Rodriguez

have

college degrees while she does not, which alone has been found
to disqualify an employee as similarly situated.

See, Boriss

v. Addison Farmers Ins. Co., No. 91 C 3144, 1993 WL 284331, at
*10–11 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 1993).
hired

simply

to

replace

David,

makes him incomparable.
and

Rodriguez

(Pl.’s
Reyes

Resp.
and

Def.’s

Rodriguez

Reyes’s

superior

education

David has also admitted that Reyes

performed
to

Thus, even if Reyes was

duties
L.R.

both

that

Stmt.

work

in

David

never

¶¶

65–66,

part

on

performed.

ECF

No.

28).

developing

“the

interaction hub,” and David has presented no evidence that she
did similar work.
David

makes

much

of

the

fact

that

Reyes

and

another

manager, Jackson, thought that Reyes was applying for David’s

- 17 -

“old job.”

According to David, these statements constitute

evidence that Reyes was simply doing David’s job, but with
better pay.

It does not matter, however, that Reyes thought

he would be taking David’s old job, because the record is
clear that in addition to doing that job, he performs other
duties and has an education that David does not.
Finally, David has not pointed to any employee who was
treated

differently

despite

being

in

her

similar

circumstances. The record contains no evidence of an employee
outside David’s class who announced that he was leaving and
yet received better treatment than David.

In sum, David has

not mustered sufficient evidence to establish that similarly
situated

employees

were

treated

differently,

which

is

essential element in proving indirect discrimination.

an

This

failure is fatal to David’s indirect discrimination claim, and
because

David

has

not

established

a

prima

facie

case

for

either direct or indirect discrimination, her Title VII and
ADEA claims fail.
B.

Equal Pay Act claims

The only remaining claim is David’s Equal Pay Act claim.
To establish a prima facie case for claims under the Equal Pay
Act,

a

plaintiff

plaintiff
must

must

show

satisfy

that

three

‘different

- 18 -

criteria:
wages

are

“First,
paid

to

employees of the opposite sex.’ Second, plaintiff must show
that she did ‘equal work which requires equal skill, effort
and

responsibility.’

Third,

plaintiff

must

show

employees ‘have similar working conditions.’”

that

the

Boriss, 1993 WL

284331, at *4 (quoting Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1208
(7th Cir. 1989)).
case,

the

burden

If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
shifts

to

the

defendant

to

show

by

a

preponderance of the evidence that the pay disparity “is due
to one of four factors.
system,

(2)

a

merit

These factors are (1) a seniority

system,

(3)

a

system

which

measures

earnings by quantity or quality of production or (4) any other
factor

other

omitted).

than

sex.”

Id.

(internal

quotation

marks

A “factor other than sex” need not be related to

the particular requirements of the job in question.
882 F.2d at 1211.

Fallon,

In fact, the non-sex factor need not be

business-related at all.

Id.

In this case, even assuming that David has established a
prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, that claim must fail
based

on

the

facts

that

doom

David’s

Title

VII

and

ADEA

claims. As noted above, CCC has presented an undisputed factor
other than sex that justifies a disparity in pay — namely,
Reyes’s college degree.
Moreover,

CCC

appears

See, Boriss, 1993 WL 284331, at *9.
to

pay

both

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men

and

women

more

for

having a college degree, as shown by the undisputed facts that
CCC paid both Reyes (a man) and Rodriguez (a woman) more than
David.
forward

These undisputed facts satisfy CCC’s burden of coming
with

complained-of

a
pay

factor

other

disparity.

than

sex

Thus,

that

David’s

explains
Equal

Pay

the
Act

claim also fails.
IV.
For

reasons

stated

CONCLUSION

herein,

CCC’s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment [ECF No. 16] is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated:4/24/2015

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