Hoekstra v. Ford Motor Company

Filing 64

MEMORANDUM Opinion Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 10/27/2015: Mailed notice (mw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
HEATHER HOEKSTRA,

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Plaintiff,
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant.

No. 13 C 2814

MEMORANDUM OPINION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendant Ford Motor Company’s (Ford)
motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the motion for
summary judgment is granted in part, and the remaining state law claim is dismissed
without prejudice.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Heather Hoekstra (Hoekstra) allegedly began working for Ford in
1996 at Ford’s Chicago Stamping Plant (Plant) on the production line. In 2004,
Hoekstra was promoted to an inspector position, which she currently holds.
Hoekstra claims that starting in the late 1990s she was sexually harassed at work, and
that after complaining to management about the alleged harassment, she suffered

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retaliation. According to Hoekstra, there was not one continuous perpetrator or
group of perpetrators that engaged in such misconduct during her years of
employment. Instead, according to Hoekstra, the accused persons harassed her or
retaliated against her only for a limited period of time or in some cases in only one
isolated instance. Those accused of harassment and retaliation include a variety of
persons with no apparent connections, including co-workers, supervisors, security
guards, and other unknown individuals at the Plant. Over the course of a decade and
a half Hoekstra claims to have suffered discrimination, harassment, and retaliation,
by more than 15 co-workers, six supervisors, and various other unknown,
unidentified, and random male employees. During that time, Hoekstra allegedly
made numerous complaints to management about her perceived treatment and took
various medical leaves for her alleged anxiety. Hoekstra also attributes certain
isolated events during the course of the years of her employment, such as finding a
power cord missing one day, and a scooter swerving near her, to an alleged hidden
conspiracy against her.
In 2013, Hoekstra brought the instant action and includes in her amended
complaint a claim alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) (Count I), a Title VII hostile work environment claim
(Count I), a Title VII retaliation claim (Count II), and an Illinois Whistleblower Act,
740 ILCS 174/1 et seq. claim (Count III). Ford moves for summary judgment on all
claims.

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LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c); Smith v. Hope School, 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2009). A “genuine
issue” in the context of a motion for summary judgment is not simply a
“metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material
fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);
Insolia v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000). In ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the record as a whole, in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Bay v. Cassens
Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION
I. Sex Discrimination Claim
Ford moves for summary judgment on the Title VII disparate treatment sex
discrimination claim. (SJ. Mem. 5 n.2). Hoekstra includes allegations in her
complaint indicating that she is bringing a sex discrimination disparate treatment
claim along with her hostile work environment claim. Hoekstra alleges in Count I
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that Ford “discriminated against [Hoekstra] based upon her gender. . . .” (A. Compl.
Par. 2). Hoekstra further alleges that “Ford discriminated against Hoekstra based on
her sex, female, by subjecting her to different terms and conditions of employment
and to a hostile work environment. . . .” (A. Compl. 53)(emphasis added). In
response to Ford’s motion for summary judgment, however, Hoekstra offers no
arguments as to establishing the requirements under the direct method of proof or the
requirements under the indirect method of proof. See Nichols v. Michigan City Plant
Planning Dep’t, 755 F.3d 594, 604 (7th Cir. 2014)(explaining direct and indirect
methods of proof). Instead, Hoekstra has focused on her hostile work environment
claim in Count I despite the fact that Ford has moved for summary judgment on all
claims. (Mem. SJ 5 n.2, 22). To the extent that Hoekstra has assumed that the
hostile work environment claim is one and the same under the law as the sex
discrimination disparate treatment claim, or that she can bring a hybrid of the two,
she is mistaken. There are entirely distinct criteria for the two types of claims. See
Orton-Bell v. Indiana, 759 F.3d 768, 773-78 (7th Cir. 2014)(separately addressing
hostile work environment claim and sex discrimination claim). Hoekstra has not
clarified whether her failure to argue in support of her sex discrimination disparate
treatment claim expresses her intent to abandon such claim and voluntarily dismiss
such claim. Therefore, to the extent that Hoekstra is still seeking to pursue a Title
VII sex discrimination disparate treatment claim against Ford, Ford’s motion for
summary judgment on that claim is granted.

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II. Hostile Work Environment Claim
Ford moves for summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim.
For a Title VII hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that “her
work environment was both objectively and subjectively offensive,” (2) that “the
harassment was based on her” protected characteristic, (3) that “the conduct was
either severe or pervasive,” and (4) that “there is a basis for employer liability.”
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 470 (7th Cir. 2011). Hoekstra alleges a
broad variety of facts detailing alleged harassment and retaliation that range from
physical contact such as unwanted hugs, oral statements of a sexual nature, and the
use of sarcasm, which Hoekstra also considered a form of sexual harassment. (H.
Dep. 191). Ford questions the veracity of Hoekstra’s many allegations, contending
that Hoekstra consistently lacked any corroboration for her accusations and that there
were investigations by Ford that indicated that Hoekstra’s versions of the facts were
not accurate. (Reply 12-13). Ford also indicates that to the extent that there was
evidence indicating any potential harassment or retaliation, such employees were
disciplined. The court need not resolve whether Hoekstra is telling the truth about
her many years of alleged mistreatment. Ford argues that even if for the purposes of
the instant motion, the court accepted Hoekstra’s allegations as true, she cannot
succeed on her hostile work environment claim since there is not sufficient evidence
to show that Ford can be held liable for any harassment.

A. Co-Workers
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Ford argues that there is not sufficient evidence to establish employer liability
for any of the alleged harassment by co-workers. In order for an employer to be
liable for harassment by co-workers, a plaintiff must establish that the employer was
“negligent either in discovering or remedying the harassment.” Vance, 646 F.3d at
471 (stating that “[o]nce aware of workplace harassment, the employer can avoid
liability for its employees’ harassment if it takes prompt and appropriate corrective
action reasonably likely to prevent the harassment from recurring”). Ford now
accuses the following co-workers of harassment during her years of working for
Ford: Ricky Miracle (Miracle) (2002), Brian Ripple (Ripple) (2003), Michael
Scalzetti (Scalzetti) (2003), Jay Soucci (Soucci) (2003), Jim Guth (Guth) (2008-09),
Rodney Zea (Zea) (2009), Andy Vargavich (Vargavich) (2011), Al Wills (Wills)
(2011), Eugene White (White) (2011), Perry Haynes (Haynes) (2011), Mark
Bowman (Bowman) (2012), Tyrone Lloyd (Lloyd) (2012), Jerry Summit (Summit)
(2013), Don Cooper (Cooper)( 2012-13), and Jesse Landingham (Landingham)
(2013). Hoekstra also accuses an unidentified security guard of harassment in 2004,
unknown and unidentified individuals of harassment in the “mid-2000’s,” and other
unknown individuals during other time periods. (R SF Par. 28, 81). Hoekstra
testified at her deposition that she recalls “occasional comments from unknown,
random employees in the hallway” that she considered harassment. (H. Dep. 27).

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1. Unreported Conduct
In regard to Miracle, Ripple, Soucci, Scalzetti, and Zea, it is undisputed that
Hoekstra failed to report the alleged harassment to Ford. (R SF Par. 23, 24, 36).
Ford cannot be considered negligent in discovering any such alleged harassment,
when it is first informed of such harassment in a lawsuit filed over a decade after the
alleged conduct occurred. Hoekstra also contends that she never reported the alleged
harassment because she feared retaliation. However, if such an explanation were
sufficient, there would never be any reporting obligation on an employee. The court
also notes that Hoekstra’s explanation is not consistent with the undisputed facts that
show that Hoekstra frequently complained to management about workplace issues.
In regard to Guth, Hoekstra indicated at her deposition that she did not report
his alleged harassment to Ford. (H. Dep. 189). Ford has also shown that Hoekstra in
her response to interrogatories indicated during discovery that she never reported
Guth’s alleged conduct to Ford. (Reply R SF Par. 35). In regard to Vargavich, it is
undisputed that after the alleged harassment, Hoekstra never reported it to Labor
Relations. (R SF Par. 38). The record merely reflects that Hoekstra later mentioned
the alleged conduct when being interviewed as a potential witness in another
investigation. (R SF Par. 38).
In regard to the various unknown individuals accused of misconduct, Hoekstra
also admits that she never reported to Ford the conduct of the unknown individuals.
(R SF Par. 28, 81). Nor could Ford be negligent in remedying alleged harassment
when Hoekstra was not even able to provide names of those she accused. As to the
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unknown security guard, Hoekstra claims to have told her union representative at
some point, but she has not shown that she informed Labor Relations or any
management at Ford about the issue or that steps were not taken to address the
complaint. (R SF Par. 25).

2. Wills
It is undisputed that after Hoekstra accused Wills of harassment, he was
interviewed by Rebecca Taylor (Taylor) from Labor Relations. (R SF Par. 45). It is
further undisputed that Wills was suspended pending the outcome of the
investigation, that during the investigation at least eight witnesses were interviewed,
and that none of the witnesses corroborated Hoekstra’s claim that Wills touched her
in the particular manner she claimed. (R SF Par. 45-48).

3. White
It is undisputed that after Hoekstra accused White of harassment, Labor
Relations conducted an investigation, and no witness corroborated Hoekstra’s
version of events. (R SF Par. 54-55). It is further undisputed that even though there
was no evidence to corroborate Hoekstra’s accusations, White received a verbal
coaching and counseling. (R SF Par. 55).

4. Haynes

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Hoekstra accused Haynes of swerving an electric scooter near Hoekstra. (R
SF Par. 56-57). Hoekstra indicated that she believes Haynes’ action to be a part of
the hostile work environment and may be part of a hidden conspiracy to retaliate
against her. (H. Dep. 92-97). It is undisputed that there were no allegations that
Haynes ever engaged in any alleged misconduct other than the swerving scooter. (R
SF Par. 56-59). It is further undisputed that Hoekstra has no knowledge that Haynes
had any connection with individuals whom she had accused of harassment. (R SF
Par. 58). The undisputed facts further show that after Hoekstra complained about
Haynes, he was counseled as to Ford’s anti-harassment policy and instructed to drive
more carefully. (R SF Par. 59); (Tay. Dep. 82-83).

5. Bowman
It is undisputed that when Hoekstra accused Bowman of harassment, she did
not know his identity. (R SF Par. 69)). It is further undisputed that Labor Relations
investigated the report and identified Bowman as the alleged harasser. (R SF Par.
70). It is also undisputed that during the investigation Bowman indicated that the
alleged statements were not even directed at Hoekstra and that she incorrectly
assumed he had been speaking to her. (R SF Par. 70). The undisputed facts show
that Taylor in Labor Relations investigated the accusations and found that there was
no evidence to verify Hoekstra’s version of events. (R SF Par. 70). The undisputed
facts further show that Bowman was coached and counseled. (R SF Par. 70).

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6. Lloyd
Hoekstra accuses Lloyd of making a punching motion toward her on one
occasion in 2012. Hoekstra does not explain the context of the alleged motion and
was not sure if he was joking around or not. (H. Dep. 132-33). Hoekstra indicates
that she believes the alleged conduct to be a part of her hostile work environment.
The undisputed facts indicate that Hoekstra reported Lloyd to Labor Relations, and
there is no showing that upon receiving the complaint Ford was negligent in
addressing the situation.

7. Summit
Hoekstra accused Summit of doing a “side butt bump” and calling her
“trouble” on one occasion in 2012 or 2013. (R SF Par. 75). It is undisputed that
although at the time Hoekstra thought Summit meant it as a joke, Hoekstra later
decided it was sexual harassment and reported Summit. (R SF Par. 75). It is
undisputed that Hoekstra never reported Summit to Labor Relations and that the
union representative whom she did inform spoke to Summit about the incident. (R
SF Par. 76).

8. Cooper
It is undisputed that after Hoekstra accused Cooper of harassment, Labor
Relations conducted an investigation, and no witness corroborated Hoekstra’s
version of events. (R SF Par. 77-78). It is further undisputed that even though there
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was no evidence to corroborate Hoekstra’s accusations, Cooper received a verbal
coaching and counseling. (R SF Par. 78). Hoekstra admits that afterwards there was
no other misconduct by Cooper other than one time when he allegedly stared at her
from a distance away that she believed to be more harassing behavior. (R SF Par.
78).

9. Landingham
It is undisputed that after Hoekstra accused Landingham of harassment, Labor
Relations conducted an investigation, and no witness corroborated Hoekstra’s
version of events. (R SF Par. 79). It is further undisputed that even though there was
no evidence to corroborate Hoekstra’s accusations, Landingham received a verbal
coaching and counseling. (R SF Par. 79).
Thus, based on the above, in regard to alleged harassment by co-workers, the
undisputed facts show that Ford was not negligent either in discovering or remedying
the alleged harassment. Much of the alleged harassment was not brought to light by
Hoekstra until many years later and on the various occasions when she did accuse
others of misconduct, Ford took steps to investigate the accusations and correct any
potential problem.

B. Supervisors
Ford argues that there is not sufficient evidence to establish employer liability
for any of the alleged harassment by supervisors. An employer is generally strictly
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liable for harassment made by supervisors of a plaintiff. Vance, 646 F.3d at 469-70.
However, under the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense an employer can avoid
liability for the conduct of a supervisor if no tangible employment action was taken
against the plaintiff by the supervisor and the employer can establish: (1) that “the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any . . .
harassing behavior,” and (2) that “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or
to avoid harm otherwise.” Cerros v. Steel Technologies, Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 951-52
(7th Cir. 2005). Ford now accuses the following supervisors of harassment during
her years of working for Ford: Wayne Rosentrater (Rosentrater) (late 1990’s), Carl
Horton (Horton) (2001-03), Ray Vega (Vega) (2003, 2008, 2012), Bernie Burr
(Burr) (2007-09), Eric Suyak (Suyak) (2010), and Jeff Gossage (Gossage) (2013).
Hoekstra has not pointed to sufficient evidence to show that any of such supervisors
took a tangible employment action against Hoekstra. The undisputed facts show that
Ford has promulgated an anti-harassment policy and taken reasonable steps to
prevent unlawful harassment in the workplace.
In regard to the allegations made against Rosentrater and Horton, the alleged
misconduct supposedly occurred in 2003 and earlier. Such conduct, which occurred
prior to a gap of several years in alleged harassment, is outside the limitations period
for Title VII claims and cannot be introduced under the continuing violation theory.
Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 683-87 (7th Cir. 2010). In regard to Vega,
the undisputed facts show that Hoekstra did not inform Ford of the alleged conduct
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by Vega in 2002 and 2008 until years later in 2012. (R SF Par. 30-31). Nor has
Hoekstra pointed to sufficient evidence to show that Vega’s alleged conduct in 2012
was sufficient to be actionable conduct. In regard to the accusations against Burr,
Suyak, it is undisputed that Hoekstra never informed Ford of their alleged
misconduct. (R SF Par. 32, 37). In regard to the accusations against Gossage, who
allegedly called Hoekstra “babe” and “kiddo,” it is undisputed that Hoekstra never
reported the alleged conduct to Ford. (R SF Par. 80). Thus, the undisputed evidence
shows that Hoekstra failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities at Ford in regard to alleged conduct by supervisors. It is also apparent,
based on the many complaints made by Hoekstra to Labor Relations, that she was
familiar with how to pursue a sexual harassment complaint. Therefore, Ford’s
motion for summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim is granted.

III. Retaliation Claim
Ford moves for summary judgment on the Title VII retaliation claim. A
plaintiff bringing a Title VII retaliation claim seeking to defeat a defendant’s motion
for summary judgment can proceed under the direct or indirect method of proof.
Moultrie v. Penn Aluminum Intern., LLC, 766 F.3d 747, 754-55 (7th Cir. 2014). A
plaintiff who is bringing a Title VII retaliation claims can defeat a defendant’s
motion for summary judgment under the direct method of proof by pointing to direct
evidence of discrimination or to a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence. . .
.” Hobgood v. Illinois Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2013)(quoting
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Rhodes v. Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004)). Under the
indirect method of proof, a plaintiff who is bringing a Title VII retaliation claim must
first establish a prima facie case. Hobgood, 731 F.3d at 641-42. A plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) that the “plaintiff engaged in activity
protected by law,” (2) that “he met his employer’s legitimate expectations, i.e., he
was performing his job satisfactorily,” (3) that “he suffered a materially adverse
action,” and (4) that “he was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee
who did not engage in the activity protected by law.” Id.; see also Whittaker v.
Northern Illinois University, 424 F.3d 640, 648 (7th Cir. 2005)(explaining that the
definition of an adverse action is broader in the retaliation context than in the
discrimination context). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts back to the employer to present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action. Hobgood, 731 F.3d at 641-42. If the employer provides
such a reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s
reason is pretext. Id.
In the instant action, Hoekstra has not pointed to sufficient evidence to
proceed under the direct method of proof. For example, Hoekstra accuses Haynes of
swerving a scooter near Hoesktra as part of a hidden conspiracy of retaliation. (R SF
Par. 56-58). However, Hoekstra has pointed to no evidence tying Haynes to others
associated with alleged harassment or retaliation. Hoekstra’s personal belief and
speculation in the absence of evidence are not sufficient to show any causal
connection under the direct method of proof. See Greengrass v. Int’l Monetary Sys.
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Ltd., 776 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2015)(explaining a three-prong approach to the
direct method of proof). Nor has Hoekstra pointed to sufficient evidence, even when
considering it in its totality, to create a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence.
In regard to the indirect method of proof, Hoekstra has not pointed to similarlysituated employees outside the protected class who were treated more favorably. (SJ
Opp. 15-17). In addition, Ford has provided legitimate non-discriminatory reasons
for any actions taken that Hoekstra contends adversely affected her. For example,
Hoekstra claims that Ford cleaned out her locker during one of her medical leaves as
retaliation for her complaining about alleged harassment. (R SF Par. 72). Ford, in
response, has explained its security policy for emptying lockers that appeared to be
vacant. (R SF Par. 72-74). The burden thus shifted to Hoekstra to show that the
given reasons were a pretext for unlawful retaliation. Hoekstra, however, fails in her
opposition to the instant motion to even address the pretext requirement. (SJ Opp.
15-18). Hoekstra provides only an incomplete recitation of the indirect method of
proof and has failed to point to sufficient evidence to support her retaliation claim.
(SJ Opp. 15). Therefore, Ford’s motion for summary judgment on the Title VII
retaliation claim is granted.

IV. Remaining State Law Claim
Once the federal claims in an action no longer remain, a federal court has
discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state
law claims. See Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251-52 (7th Cir.
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1994)(stating that “the general rule is that, when all federal-law claims are dismissed
before trial, the pendent claims should be left to the state courts”). The Seventh
Circuit has indicated that there is no “‘presumption’ in favor of relinquishing
supplemental jurisdiction. . . .” Williams Electronics Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 479
F.3d 904, 906-07 (7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit has stated that, “in exercising
its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors, including “the nature of
the state law claims at issue, their ease of resolution, and the actual, and avoidable,
expenditure of judicial resources. . . .” Timm v. Mead Corp., 32 F.3d 273, 277 (7th
Cir. 1994). The court has considered all of the pertinent factors and, as a matter of
discretion, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims. The instant action is still in the pre-trial stage and there is not
sufficient justification to proceed solely on the remaining state law claim. The
remaining state law claim is therefore dismissed without prejudice.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Ford’s motion for summary judgment is
granted in part, and denied in part, and the remaining state law claim is dismissed
without prejudice.

Dated: October 27, 2015

___________________________________
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan
United States District Court Judge

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