Sequoia Financial Solutions, Inc. v. Godfrey, Jr. et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM Order Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 10/1/2013. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SEQUOIA FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS,
INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID GODFREY, JR., et al.,
Defendants.

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No.

13 C 2983

MEMORANDUM ORDER
This action, which like most mortgage foreclosure actions
filed in this District Court predicates federal jurisdiction on
diversity of citizenship, was filed on behalf of mortgagee
Sequoia Financial Solutions, Inc., (“Sequoia”) by counsel who
offices in Georgia.1

That initial filing marked counsel’s first

failure to familiarize himself with local practice in this
district, for he failed to comply with the explicit directive of
this District Court’s LR 5.2(f), which requires the delivery of a
paper copy of the complaint to the assigned judge’s chambers
within one business day after filing.
Although that minor and non-substantive glitch ought to have
been enough to alert the out-of-state counsel to the need to
familiarize himself with the substantive aspects of Illinois

1

This Court has no idea as to how that Georgia
connection came about, for the mortgaged property is here in
Illinois and Complaint ¶1 identifies both Sequoia’s place of
incorporation and the location of its principal place of business
as sited in California.

mortgage foreclosure practice, what counsel did after process was
served on defendants was to file on July 18, 2013 a motion asking
the Clerk of Court to enter an order of default against
defendants.

But this Court had earlier issued a June 28 order

that called on plaintiffs to move for a default judgment (a
motion that under Fed.R.Civ.P. (“Rule”) 55(b)(2) requires court
action rather than entry by the clerk).
That being the case, this Court’s brief September 12
memorandum order reflected that just after the previously
scheduled August 16 hearing date it “took the issue of default
under advisement with the understanding that Sequoia’s counsel
would promptly supply the customary orders in that respect:

an

order of default, an order appointing a special commissioner, and
a judgment of foreclosure.”

In an effort to assist Sequoia’s

lead counsel in that respect, on August 19 this Court’s secretary
placed a call to that lead counsel, and she was then told that he
would provide the required documents within 48 hours.
It was against that background that the September 12, 2013
memorandum order concluded with this text paragraph:
Three weeks have elapsed since then, with none of the
promised documents having been provided--indeed, the only
“message” from Sequoia’s counsel has been that of total
silence. It is not this Court’s responsibility to monitor
what lawyers in cases assigned to its calendar should be
doing or have promised to do. Accordingly Sequoia’s motion
for default (Dkt. 13) is denied, and absent appropriate
action on Sequoia’s part on or before September 23, 2013
this action will be dismissed for want of prosecution.

2

Under the circumstances, it might have been expected that at a
minimum Georgia counsel would then have sought the assistance of
a local lawyer familiar with Illinois mortgage foreclosure
practice -- and preferably familiar with any variations
customarily applicable to such practice in the federal courts.2
Instead, what Sequoia’s counsel submitted on September 23
were two motions:

Dkt. No. 18’s Motion To Appoint a Special

Commissioner and Dkt. No. 17’s Motion for Default Judgment.

As

for the first of those, the motion itself is non-problematic -but counsel did not, as is always done, tender a draft order for
signature by this Court.

As for the second motion, it too did

not include a proposed order -- and when that deficiency was
identified to Sequoia’s counsel by still another telephone call
from this Court’s secretary, the work product that then came from
Sequoia’s counsel copied a good portion of a foreclosure form
that is in standard usage here -- but it lacked entirely the
judgment order that is an essential component of every judgment
in foreclosure.
In sum, the actions that have been taken on Sequoia’s part
cannot be characterized as “appropriate.” As forecast in the

2

It is not that mortgage foreclosure is a particularly
complex part of the legal practice. But real estate law in
general, and mortgage foreclosure practice specifically, are the
quintessential examples of areas of practice where local culture
and local law are likely to involve idiosyncratic aspects that
call for local knowhow.
3

September 12 memorandum order, this action is dismissed for want
of prosecution.

_________________________________
Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
Dated: October 1, 2013

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