Stanek v. Saint Charles Community Unit School District # 303

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John W. Darrah on 3/27/2014. Mailed notice(mgh, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLIONOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MATTHEW STANEK, by and through
his Parents, SANDRA STANEK and
BOGDAN STANEK,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SAINT CHARLES COMMUNITY UNIT
SCHOOL DISTRICT #303, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-cv-3106
Judge John W. Darrah

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Matthew Stanek, by and through his parents, Sandra Stanek and Bogdan Stanek,
have brought this action against Saint Charles Community Unit School District # 303 and several
school administrators, directors and teachers. Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7). For the reasons presented
below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, Matthew Stanek (“Matthew”) and his parents, Sandra and Bogdan
Stanek,proceeding pro se, initiated this action on April 1, 2013, in the Circuit Court of Kane
County. Defendants thereafter removed it to federal district court. On August 27, 2013, this
Court granted Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement. Plaintiffs then filed a sixcount Amended Complaint for alleged violations of the Individuals with Disabilities in
Education Act (the “IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (Count I); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794 (Counts II, IV, V, and VI); the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Count III); and the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

(Counts V and VI). Each count was brought by Plaintiffs Sandra and Bogdan Stanek only on
behalf of Matthew and is predicated upon Defendants’ alleged failure to provide Matthew with
an appropriate education, as well as Defendants’ discrimination, retaliation, and harassment of
Matthew. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-8.) The following summary is taken from the allegations in the
Amended Complaint, which is assumed to be true only for purposes of deciding a motion to
dismiss.
Matthew is a nineteen-year-old male with autism. He currently attends Loyola
University of Chicago as a full-time student. Starting at a young age, he began receiving
services to address delays in expressive and receptive language, communication, motor
functioning, sensory integration and social skills. Matthew has qualified for special education
services throughout high school, was given an Individual Education Plan (“IEP”), and has
received various accommodations for his disability, including extended time on tests and
homework and study guides. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 21-23.)
Under the IEP, Matthew achieved As and Bs in his classes, including honors classes. (Id.
¶ 26-29.) That changed, however, when Matthew entered his junior year, and his teachers began
to pressure him to drop his honors and Advanced Placement (“AP”) classes as too challenging
for him. During his junior year, Matthew received low and failing grades in most of his classes.
(Id. ¶¶ 30-33.) Matthew’s parents scheduled a meeting on November 4, 2012, with Matthew’s
teachers and his case manager because the accommodations in Matthew’s IEP were not being
followed, including not giving Matthew extended time and study guides. (Id. ¶ 34.) Matthew’s
teachers expressed the view that the extended time was hurting Matthew, not helping him, with
which his parents disagreed. (Id. ¶ 36.)

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After Matthew refused to drop his honors classes and Matthew’s parents started
questioning the teachers about his IEP not being followed, Matthew’s teachers started retaliating
by entering wrong grades, omitting good grades, refusing to follow Matthew’s IEP, refusing to
respond to Matthew’s questions about his work and refusing to show Matthew’s graded work to
him or his parents. (Id. ¶ 39.) Matthew did not receive credit for completed work that was
turned in late. (Id. ¶ 41.)
In February 2012, Matthew was due for a mandated reevaluation, to which Matthew’s
parents had previously consented, but they withdrew their consent because they did not trust his
teachers, who had retaliated, harassed, discriminated, and mentally abused Matthew. (Id. ¶ 46.)
As a result of that revocation of consent, Matthew’s annual IEP meeting was also cancelled. (Id.
¶¶ 47-48.) In March 2012, during a water polo game, Matthew suffered an eye injury that
required his eye to be bandaged. His teachers, however, refused to permit Matthew to take his
tests at a later date, even though his parents kept him home from school due to the pain. (Id. ¶
51.)
On February 29, 2012, Defendant Saint Charles Community Unit School District # 303
(“District # 303”) requested a due process hearing because Matthew’s parents denied their
consent for his reevaluation. On May 3, 2012, Matthew’s parents also requested a hearing, and
on May 29, 2012, they filed an amended complaint with the hearing officer. On November 30,
2012, in an order titled In the matter of MS v. Community Unit School 303 School District, Case
No. 2012-339, the Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”), Ann Breen-Greco, issued a decision
finding that Matthew’s parents had failed to participate in the mandated pre-hearing procedures
and holding that, as a matter of law, their complaint must be dismissed. (See Dkt. No. 15, Pls.’
Reply, Exh. 2, Nov. 30, 2012 Breen-Greco Order.)

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LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint “ for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint will only survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if: (1) the complaint describes the claim in sufficient detail to
give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests; and (2) the
factual allegations plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising the possibility
above a “speculative level.” EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs,. Inc., 496 F. 3d 773, 776 (7th
Cir. 2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Rule 12(b)(7) provides that an action can be dismissed for failure to join a necessary
party under Rule 19. Rule 19 permits joinder of persons in whose “absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). As with Rule
12(b)(6) motions, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s factual allegations. See, e.g.,
Davis Cos. v. Emerald Casinos, Inc., 268 F.3d 477, 479 n.2 (7th Cir. 2001).
Furthermore, for an action to be justiciable under Article III, a plaintiff must have
standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To establish standing, a
plaintiff must show three elements: a violation of a concrete, particularized legally protected
interest (an injury in fact); a causal relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the injury
to the plaintiff; and the likelihood that the injury can be redressed if a court finds in the plaintiff's
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favor. Id. at 560-61. The threat of injury to the plaintiff “must be actual and imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.” ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 590 (7th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)). As with other motions at the
pleading stage, the factual allegations of the complaint are accepted as true. Perry v. Vill. of
Arlington Heights, 186 F.3d 826, 829 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).
The pleadings of pro se litigants are not held to the same stringent standard as pleadings
drafted by formally trained lawyers; instead, they must be liberally construed. See Kyle II v.
Patterson, 196 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, Ind., 839
F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988)). Under this standard, a pro se complaint “may only be dismissed
if it is beyond doubt that there is no set of facts under which the plaintiff could obtain relief.”
Wilson, 839 F.2d at 378. Despite the deferential standard for pro se litigants, the pleadings still
must comply with the procedural rules governing them, and the complaint still must be
“otherwise understandable.” Hudson v. McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 1998); see also
Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001).
ANALYSIS
Administrative Appeal Under the IDEA (Count I)
In Count I, Plaintiffs seek review of the administrative decision of the hearing officer,
Breen-Greco, pursuant to the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (g)(2), and the Illinois School Code, 105
ILCS 5/14-8.02 a(i). As a preliminary matter, Defendants argue that Sandra and Bogdan Stanek
do not have standing to assert claims on behalf of Matthew because Matthew was eighteen when
the suit was filed and is currently nineteen. 1
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Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ 32-page Response Brief should be stricken because it
exceeds the fifteen-page limit imposed by the Northern District’s Local Rules, and Plaintiffs did
not seek court approval for the excessive brief pages prior to filing it. See N.D. Ill. L R. 7.1.
Given Plaintiffs’ pro se status, the Court declines to strike the brief.
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The IDEA provides parents with individual enforceable rights. See Winkelman v. Parma
City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 526 (2007). However, under Illinois and federal law, those rights
transfer to the student when the student becomes an adult. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m); 105 ILCS
5/14-6.10; 23 IL ADC § 226.690; see also Loch v. Edwardsville Cmty. Sch. Dist. #7, 327 Fed.
App’x 647, 650 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of parents as plaintiffs because student was
eighteen when suit was filed). The IDEA provides that “[a] State . . . may provide that, when a
child with a disability reaches the age of majority under State law . . . all other rights accorded to
parents under this subchapter transfer to the child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m). Likewise, the Illinois
School Code provides that “[w]hen a student who is eligible for special education . . . reaches
the majority age of 18 years, all rights accorded to the student’s parents . . . transfer to the
student . . . .” 105 ILCS 5/14-6.10; see also 23 Ill. Adm. Code § 226.690. Therefore, it is clear
that the individual rights of Sandra and Bogdan Stanek transferred to Matthew when he turned
eighteen.
Plaintiffs concede that their rights transferred to Matthew when he turned eighteen, but
respond that Matthew delegated his rights to make educational decisions by a signed consent
form. 2 They further argue, without citing any legal authority, that because Matthew delegated
his educational decisions to them, this extends to his rights to bring this lawsuit. However, the
consent form signed by Matthew and developed by the Illinois State Board of Education
(“ISBE”) clearly applies only to his educational decisions while he was a student at District
#303. The form, which is entitled “Delegation of Rights to Make Educational Decisions,” states
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This is the first time that Plaintiffs have referenced this consent form; no mention of the form
appears in their Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs attached the form to their Response Brief as
Exhibit 7. However, Plaintiffs failed to file their Response Brief or the corresponding exhibits
and only provided copies directly to the Court. For this reason, the Court has docketed
Plaintiffs’ Response Brief and Exhibits for them.
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that Matthew has delegated his right “to give consent and make decisions concerning my
education to the individual identified below [Bodgan and Sandra Stanek].” It also discusses the
development of the student’s IEP and states the student has a right to raise issues or concerns
with the school district. Furthermore, the purpose of the consent form has been mooted;
Matthew is no longer a student at District #303. He has graduated from District #303 and is
currently attending college at Loyola University as a full-time student. The delegation of
Matthew’s educational decisions to his parents when he was a student at District #303 clearly
does not apply to this litigation.
Indeed, to extend this delegation of Matthew’s rights to his parents in this lawsuit would
be contrary to Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 17 provides that “[a]n
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1). In
this case, Matthew is the real party in interest and must prosecute his own lawsuit.
Since the right to bring a suit under the IDEA has transferred to Matthew, his parents,
Sandra and Bogdan Stanek, lack standing for purposes of Count I, and this Count is dismissed as
to Sandra and Bogdan Stanek. See Loch, 327 Fed. App’x at 650. Furthermore, this dismissal as
to Sandra and Bogdan Stanek is with prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is
appropriate where “it is plainly unlikely that the plaintiff will be able to cure the standing
problem.” Fieldturf, Inc. v. Southwest Rec. Indus., 357 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, Sandra and Bogdan Stanek’s claims are
predicated exclusively on alleged injuries to their son’s high school education by District #303,
and it is plainly unlikely that they will not be able to cure their standing problem. This reasoning
is also applicable to Plaintiffs Sandra and Bogdan Stanek as to the remaining claims, as
discussed below.

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Defendants also argue that Count I should be dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to name
Breen-Greco or the ISBE. However, Defendants do not cite to any cases in support of their
argument, and these two parties do not appear to be necessary defendants. Defendants also argue
that District #303 is not the proper party and must be dismissed; this argument is supported by
Illinois law. The Illinois School Code “designates the board of education as the governing body
through which a school district operates.” Bd. of Educ. of Bremen High Sch. Dist. No. 228 v.
Mitchell, 899 N.E.2d 1160, 1163 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (citing 105 ILCS 5/10-2 (“All school
districts . . . shall be governed by a board of education.”). Thus, under Illinois law, the board of
education for a particular school district is the proper party to be sued, not the school district
itself. Id.; see also Klean v. Bd. of Educ. of Proviso Twp. Sch. Dist. 209, No. 08 C 6233, 2010
WL 3732218, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2010) (dismissing claims against school district and
noting that the board of education is the proper defendant). In this case, the proper defendant
appears to be the Board of Education for District #303, who has not been named as a party.
Because District #303 is not a proper party to be sued, it must be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs have also named the following ten individual Defendants, both in their
individual and official capacities: Dr. Donald Schlomann, Superintendent of District #303;
Dr. John Knewitz, Assistant Superintendent for Special Services; Beth Jones, Associate Director
of Special Education; Korie Bowers, Special Education Case Manager; Kimberly Zupec (no title
given); Kathy Zimmer, Spanish teacher; Shannon Von Essen, English teacher; Justin Dohm, PreCalculus teacher; Bethany Herrera, Psychology teacher; Cindy Sulak, History teacher
(collectively, “the Individual Defendants”). These Defendants are not proper defendants in their
individual capacities; they were not named at the administrative hearing, and they are not legally
accountable under the IDEA.

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Likewise, naming the Individual Defendants in their official capacities is redundant and
unnecessary because their employer, District #303, is a named Defendant who has had an
opportunity to respond to the suit. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Evanston Tp. High
Sch. No. 202, No. 09 C 797, 2009 WL 2258982, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2009) (dismissing
claims against individual defendants in their official capacities as redundant when the municipal
entity employer was also a named defendant); Kerry M. v. Manhattan School District # 114, No.
03 C 9349, 2004 WL 2538303, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2004) (same). Therefore, the Individual
Defendants are also dismissed with prejudice.
Count I is dismissed without prejudice as to Matthew and with prejudice as to Sandra and
Bogdan Stanek. Defendant District #303 and the Individual Defendants are also dismissed with
prejudice. 3
Violations of the Rehabilitation Act (Counts II, IV, V, VI)
In Counts II, IV, V, and VI, Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which prohibits discrimination against a disabled person
based on his disability by a recipient of federal financial assistance. Plaintiffs’ claims are based
on alleged failures with respect to Matthew’s IEP and do not allege that Matthew’s parents
themselves suffered any discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. Consequently, as discussed
above, Sandra and Bogdan Stanek are dismissed as Plaintiffs with prejudice. Likewise, for the

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Defendants also contend that Count I should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have failed to
submit the entire administrative record, although again fail to cite any cases to support their
argument. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(C) requires that the court “shall receive the records of the
administrative proceedings,” and 105 ILCS 5/140-8.02a(i) likewise provides that the court “shall
receive the records of the impartial due process hearing.” Plaintiffs have submitted, as exhibits,
two opinions issued by Breen-Greco, an interim one and the final one. Generally, the entire
administrative record must be submitted; however, here, it is not a reason to dismiss Count I on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion with prejudice, given Plaintiff Matthew Stanek’s pro se status.
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same reasons discussed above, District #303 and Individual Defendants, as named in their
official capacities, are not the proper parties and are therefore dismissed with prejudice.
The Individual Defendants, as named in their individual capacities, are also dismissed
with prejudice because the Rehabilitation Act does not provide for individual liability. See, e.g.,
Dent v. City of Chi., 02 C 6604, 2003 WL 21801163 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2003) (“the law is wellsettled that there is no individual liability under Title VII, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and
the ADEA”) (citing EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279-82 (7th Cir.
1995)); Vollmert v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Transp., No. 97-C-547-C, 2000 WL 34235982, at *3
(W.D. Wis. Aug. 14, 2000) (“[I]ndividuals do not seem to fit within the Rehabilitation Act’s
provision for suits against ‘any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance’”);
Cordova v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac, 3:11-CV-210 RM, 2011 WL 6257290, at *1 (N.D. Ind.
Dec. 13, 2011) (dismissing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against individual). As such,
Plaintiffs’ claims under the Rehabilitation Act, as contained in Counts IV, V, and VI, are
dismissed without prejudice as to Matthew and with prejudice as to Sandra and Bogdan Stanek.
Defendant District #303 and the Individual Defendants are also dismissed with prejudice.
Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III)
In Count III, Plaintiffs seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of their
rights under the IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. For the same reasons stated
above, Defendant District #303 and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities must be
dismissed with prejudice as improperly named parties. Likewise, Sandra and Bogdan Stanek
must be dismissed with prejudice as Plaintiffs because their allegations in Count III do not assert
any violations of their individual rights.

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The Individual Defendants, as named in their individual capacities, must also be
dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity. A government official is protected
from individual liability under § 1983 “for actions taken while performing discretionary
functions, unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1022
(7th Cir. 2000) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Plaintiffs have not
alleged any facts that would support that the Individual Defendants’ conduct clearly violated
their constitutional rights. With respect to the school administrators, Plaintiffs allege that they
were negligent in their supervision. However, supervisor negligence is not a basis for individual
liability under § 1983; rather, there must be allegations that the defendant caused or participated
in the alleged constitutional injury. See Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 495 (7th Cir.
1997); see also Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 574 (7th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiffs also have not alleged facts to state a § 1983 claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). In Monell, the Supreme Court held that a municipality can be
held liable under § 1983 where the municipality has adopted or otherwise promoted a policy or
custom that violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. Id. at 690. Municipalities are not
liable under the theory of respondeat superior for its employees. Id. at 692. Plaintiffs have not
alleged that District #303 has an “express policy” or a “widespread practice” that caused
constitutional injury. Id. Likewise, Plaintiffs have not alleged a constitutional injury caused by a
person with final policymaking authority. Id. Under Illinois law, only a board of education has
final policymaking authority, not the school district, and therefore, District #303 is not the proper
party for any Monell claim. See Duda v. Franklin Park Sch. Dist. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th
Cir. 1998) (citing 105 ILCS 5/10-20.5).

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Plaintiffs’ attempts to base their § 1983 claim on alleged violations of the Rehabilitation
Act or the IDEA also fail. Where a statute provides its own remedy, as both the Rehabilitation
Act and the IDEA do, § 1983 may not be used as a method for relief. See Rancho Palos Verdes
v. Abram, 544 U.S. 113, 124 (2005) (in context of different statute, noting that “limitations upon
the remedy contained in the statute are deliberate and are not to be evaded through § 1983”); see
also Brown v. Dist. 299-Chi. Pub. Schs., 762 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1080-81 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding
that plaintiff could not use § 1983 to remedy violations under the IDEA); A.W. v. Jersey City
Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 805 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the private, judicial remedy available
for violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act precludes the use of § 1983 for the same
violation).
Therefore, Count III is dismissed without prejudice as to Matthew and with prejudice as
to Sandra and Bogdan Stanek. Defendant District #303 and the Individual Defendants in their
official capacities are dismissed with prejudice; the Individual Defendants, as named in their
individual capacities, are dismissed without prejudice.
Violations of the ADA (Counts V & VI)
In Counts V and VI, in addition to seeking relief under the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiffs
also seek relief for retaliation and discrimination under the ADA. As discussed above, Plaintiffs
have not alleged any claims that are personal to Sandra and Bogdan Stanek, and therefore, they
are dismissed with prejudice. Likewise, as discussed above, District #303 and the Individual
Defendants, as named in their official capacities, are not proper parties and must be dismissed
with prejudice.
Furthermore, the ADA does not permit suit against individuals, including public
employees. EEOC, 55 F.3d at 1279-82; see also Briggs v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 914 F.

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Supp. 245, 251-52 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (dismissing ADA claims against individuals). Therefore, the
Individual Defendants, as named in their individual capacities, are dismissed with prejudice. For
these reasons, Plaintiffs’ ADA claims, as reflected in Counts V and VI, are dismissed without
prejudice as to Matthew and with prejudice as to Sandra and Bogdan Stanek.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [28] is granted. Plaintiffs
Sandra and Bogdan Stanek are dismissed with prejudice. Defendants Saint Charles Community
Unit School District # 303 is dismissed with prejudice as to all Counts. Defendants,
Dr. Donald Schlomann, Dr. John Knewitz, Beth Jones, Korie Bowers, Kimberly Zupec, Kathy
Zimmer, Shannon Von Essen, Justin Dohm, Bethany Herrera, and Cindy Sulak, are dismissed
with prejudice as to all Counts, except that they are dismissed without prejudice as named in
their individual capacities as to Count III. The Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff Matthew Stanek is granted leave to amend his claims, if he can do so pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, within thirty days of this Order.

Date:

March 27, 2014

______________________________
JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Court Judge

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