Stanek v. Saint Charles Community Unit School District # 303

Filing 84

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable John W. Darrah on 8/26/2015. Mailed notice. (kp, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MATTHEW STANEK, SANDRA STANEK,
AND BOGDAN STANEK,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SAINT CHARLES COMMUNITY UNIT
SCHOOL DISTRICT #303, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-cv-3106
Judge John W. Darrah

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Matthew Stanek, Sandra Stanek, and Bogdan Stanek filed suit against
Defendants Saint Charles Community Unit School District #303 and several school
administrators, directors and teachers for alleged violations of the Individuals with Disabilities in
Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794; the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. On November 1, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was granted on
March 27, 2013. Plaintiffs appealed this dismissal and the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to
the district court. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reassignment pursuant to Seventh Circuit Rule
36, or in the alternative, if denied, seek interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Defendants oppose this motion. For the reasons provided below, Plaintiffs’ Motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
On April 1, 2013, Plaintiffs filed suit in the Circuit Court of Kane County. Defendants
then removed the case to federal district court. Plaintiffs Sandra and Bogdan Stanek brought suit

on behalf of their son, Matthew, alleging that Defendants failed to provide necessary educational
services to him. Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants harassed, discriminated against, and
retaliated against Matthew. (See Am. Compl. 5-8.)
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaint pursuant to Federal
Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7). This Court dismissed the action against Plaintiffs Bogdan and
Sandra Stanek because it determined that they lacked standing to sue and that, while Matthew
Stanek did have standing, dismissed his case for failure to sue an appropriate party. (Dkt. #39.)
Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of Matthew Stanek’s claim of retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, all
Plaintiffs’ official-capacity claims against the individual defendants except for Superintendent
Donald Schlomann, the individual-capacity claims arising under the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA. In all other respects, the decision was vacated, and the case was remanded back to the
district court. (Dkt. #70.) On remand, Plaintiffs filed this motion for reassignment of this case to
another judge pursuant to Seventh Circuit Rule 36, or in the alternative, if denied, seek
interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
ANALYSIS
Seventh Circuit Rule 36
Seventh Circuit Rule 36 states:
Whenever a case tried in a district court is remanded by this court for a new trial, it shall
be reassigned by the district court for trial before a judge other than the judge who heard the
prior trial unless the remand order directs or all parties request that the same judge retry the case.
In appeals which are not subject to this rule by its terms, this court may nevertheless direct in its
opinion or order that this rule shall apply on remand.”
7th Cir. R. 36. “The purpose of Rule 36 is to avoid on retrial after reversal, any bias or mindset
the judge may have developed during the first trial.” Cange v. Stotler and Co., 913 F.2d 1204
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(7th Cir. 1990).
Defendants correctly point out that only the Seventh Circuit may make reassignments
under Circuit Rule 36 and that it is in the Seventh Circuit’s discretion to apply the rule to cases
that have not reached trial. It is not within the power of the district court to reassign a case on
remand based on a rule intended for use by the Seventh Circuit. Plaintiffs contend that the
Seventh Circuit intended Circuit Rule 36 to be the default rule when cases are reversed and
remanded; however, “[t]he rule does not automatically apply where the judgment reversed has
not resulted from a trial . . . ” Cange at 1208.
Plaintiffs also argue that while there was no trial in this case, the Seventh Circuit has
exercised its discretion to apply Circuit Rule 36 to reversals of other types of decisions, notably
the reversal of a motion to dismiss in Cange. Id. (finding that courts can apply Rule 36 at their
discretion to avoid bias that “seems likely to have developed from consideration and decision of
motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment and the like.”) However, the Seventh
Circuit ordered the reassignment after review of the motion to dismiss revealed that the district
court treated it as a motion for summary judgment. Cange v. Stotler and Co., Inc., 826 F.2d 581
(7th Cir. 1987) (“Cange I”). Similarly, in AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale
1 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit exercised its discretion to apply Circuit Rule 36
to a reversal of summary judgment because “the district court did not limit itself to a
determination of whether there was a genuine issue of fact requiring trial, but rather proceeded to
evaluate the evidence as if the proceeding were a trial on the merits.”
While there are several cases where the Seventh Circuit did not strictly construe the words
of Circuit Rule 36 to apply only to remands for new trials, none of these cases involved a motion
to dismiss. See Lindquist Ford v. Middleton Motors, 658 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2011)
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(on appeal following a bench trial); Bedree v. Bedree, 396 Fed. App’x 312, 314
(7th Cir. 2010) (court was not required to reassign the case on remand because it had not
“reached trial” and the judge’s prior ruling did not show bias against the case). The analysis of
the facts in the prior order in this case did not rise to the level of a motion for summary
judgment, nor did it rise to the level of an evaluation required for a trial on the merits. Plaintiffs’
case was dismissed mainly due to issues of standing, the analysis of which did not delve deeply
into the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. The issues that will be decided moving forward are not the
same issues that resulted in dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case.
Plaintiffs also contend that this case should be reassigned because the prior order granted
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and this constituted an adverse ruling against them. Plaintiffs
argue that this adverse ruling creates the potential for prejudice or bias. A party requesting
recusal must present compelling evidence of bias so that a reasonable person would be convinced
that the judge is biased. United States v. Modjewski, 783 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiffs have failed to do so, contending that reassignment should be granted to “promote
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary and to avoid the appearance of
impropriety,” but offering no other evidence of bias. Further, “[a]dverse decisions do not
establish bias or even hint at bias.” Khor Chin Lim v. Courtcall, Inc., 683 F.3d 378, 380
(7th Cir. 2012). Thus, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reassignment is denied.
Interlocutory Review
In the alternative, Plaintiffs request an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
The district court may make a finding permitting an interlocutory appeal of an issue if the court
finds that there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion on the issue and that an
immediate appeal will materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. If the district
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court makes such a finding, it is within the appellate court's discretion whether to hear the
interlocutory appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The four statutory criteria for the grant of Section
1292(b) motions are: (1) a question of law; (2) the question of law must be controlling; (3) the
question of law is contestable; and (4) the resolution of the issue must accelerate the litigation.
See Ahrenholz v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill, 219 F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir.2000). The
motion must also be filed in the district court within a reasonable time after the order sought to
be appealed was issued. See Ahrenholz, 219 F.3d at 675. All of these criteria must be satisfied
for the district court to certify its order for an immediate appeal pursuant to Section 1292(b).
See Ahrenholz, 219 F.3d at 676. “Generally speaking, leave to appeal an interlocutory order will
not be granted absent exceptional circumstances.” BA Leasing Parties v. UAL Corp.,
2003 WL 22176068, at * 5 (N.D. Ill. Sept.15, 2003) (internal quotations omitted).
A “question of law” as used in the statute, refers “to a question of the meaning of a
statutory or constitutional provision, regulation, or common law doctrine . . . . ” Ahrenholz,
219 F.3d at 767. In other words, the question of law refers to a “‘pure’ question of law rather
than merely to an issue that might be free from a factual contest.” Ahrenholz, 219 F.3d at 677.
Thus, the appellate court could decide the issue “quickly and cleanly without having to study the
record.” Ahrenholz, 219 F.3d at 677. The question of whether Circuit Rule 36 applies to this
case is not a question of law, but rather a question of procedure. Plaintiffs also do not offer any
evidence that resolution of the issue would accelerate litigation or that exceptional circumstances
exist such that an interlocutory order would be appropriate. Plaintiffs’ request for interlocutory
appeal is denied.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reassignment and for Interlocutory
Review [76] is denied.

Date:

August 26, 2015

______________________________
JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Court Judge

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