Moore v. Dart et al
Filing
68
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 12/18/2014: Defendants' motions for summary judgment 45 and 49 are denied. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DWIGHT MOORE,
Plaintiff,
No. 13 CV 3276
v.
Judge Manish S. Shah
THOMAS DART, Sheriff of Cook County,
and COOK COUNTY,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
While a pre-trial detainee at Cook County Jail, Dwight Moore was taken to
an offsite hospital for medical care. He was unconscious on arrival, and his injuries
left him unable to eat, so he was fed intravenously. Throughout his stay, pursuant
to the Cook County Sherriff’s express policy, Moore was guarded by correctional
officers and shackled to his bed. Moore sued the Sheriff, Thomas Dart, in his official
capacity, alleging that the shackling policy violated Moore’s due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Dart moves for summary judgment. For the
reasons below, that motion is denied.
I.
Legal Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir.
Moore voluntarily dismissed his claims against defendants based on their alleged
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. [52], [56].
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2014); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A genuine dispute as to
any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court
must construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 528
(7th Cir. 2014).
II.
Facts2
Dwight Moore was admitted to Cook County Jail on May 18, 2011. DSOF
¶ 12. He was classified as a maximum-security detainee. DSOF ¶ 35. At admission,
medical personnel noted that he limped and needed a cane to walk. PSOF ¶ 2. Two
days later, he was evaluated by a registered nurse, who noted that Moore “walks
with a walking stick with poor gait” and had to be “helped to the dispensary by
another detainee.” PSOF ¶ 3.
On July 3, 2011, Moore was assaulted (or was in a fight), and he sustained
injuries that required immediate attention. DSOF ¶¶ 6, 13–15. He was assessed by
medical staff and sent to Mt. Sinai Hospital. DSOF ¶ 6. After losing consciousness,
Moore arrived at Mt. Sinai with a swollen right mandible and contusions on his
chest and face. PSOF ¶ 4. He was diagnosed with a broken hand, a lacerated liver,
The facts are taken from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements. “DSOF” refers to
defendants’ statements, with Moore’s responses ([54] at 1–13). “PSOF” refers to Moore’s
statements, with Sheriff Dart’s responses ([58] at 1–4).
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and a contusion to the head. DSOF ¶ 6. His injuries prevented him from eating, so
he was fed intravenously. PSOF ¶ 9; DSOF ¶ 37.
Mt. Sinai is a public hospital, where detainees are not segregated from
others. DSOF ¶ 16. Moore shared a room with a non-custodial patient. DSOF ¶ 26.
Moore’s family was sometimes present in the room. DSOF ¶ 37. On July 6, 2011,
Moore was moved to Stroger Hospital. PSOF ¶ 11; DSOF ¶ 39. Stroger is a large
facility that treats many patients and has a large staff. DSOF ¶ 54.
The Sheriff maintains an express policy concerning hospital detainees, which
provides, among other things, that:
“Constant visual surveillance of detainee is required and maintained
at all times. At no time is a detainee to be left unattended under any
circumstances.”;
“Handcuffs will be applied to one wrist . . . . Chain will be wrapped
around bed frame (not to be attached to hand rails of bed or to part of
bed that can be broken off) and padlocked secured.”;
“[O]ne [l]eg shackle will be applied to the opposite ankle . . . . Other leg
shackle is to be attached to a sturdy part of bed[.] [L]eg shackles are
also to be double locked.”;
“Handcuffs, shackles blue box, chain and padlock will be standard
policy for all detainees at hospitals.”; and
“If detainee is to be ambulated, transported or tested, supervisor will
assign two officers to perform task. Detainee is still to be restrained
either with handcuffs or leg shackles or other approved restraining
devi[c]e.”
[47-4, pp. 75–82] at 75–76 (emphasis in original). While at Mt. Sinai and Stroger,
pursuant to this policy, Moore was shackled by arm and leg to his hospital bed, and
was always guarded by at least one correctional officer (and sometimes two). PSOF
¶¶ 8, 12–13; DSOF ¶¶ 7, 18, 23–25, 40; see also [57] at 13; [46] at 14.
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III.
Analysis
Plaintiff sued Sheriff Dart in his official capacity, so the suit is treated as one
against the county itself. Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2008).3
Moore must therefore show that he suffered a constitutional injury, and that injury
was caused by: (1) an express policy; (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent
and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) a
person with final policy-making authority. Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633,
637 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). There is no dispute that the Sheriff’s
shackling policy is an express policy, therefore the question is whether that policy,
as applied to Moore, caused a constitutional injury. That analysis proceeds under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d
474, 480 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Claims concerning the conditions of confinement of civil
detainees are assessed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of
bodily restraints in a manner that serves to punish a pre-trial detainee.” May v.
Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 316 (1982); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–37 (1979); Murphy v. Walker, 51
F.3d 714, 717–18 (7th Cir. 1995)). “The use of bodily restraints constitutes
punishment in the constitutional sense if their use is not rationally related to a
The county is also a named defendant, as an indemnifier. See Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle
County, 324 F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003).
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legitimate non-punitive government purpose or they appear excessive in relation to
the purpose they allegedly serve.” May, 226 F.3d at 884 (citing Wolfish, 441 U.S. at
561).
Sheriff Dart argues that the shackling policy is rationally related to
preventing escapes. [46] at 17. That is a legitimate non-punitive government
purpose. Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he detention
facility has an interest in . . . preventing escapes.”). And shackling detainees while
they are on hospital visits furthers that purpose. May, 226 F.3d at 884 (“Certainly,
shackling all hospital detainees reduces the risk of a breach of security and thus
furthers a legitimate non-punitive government purpose.”). The shackling policy is
rationally related to a non-punitive purpose, but it may still violate due process if it
is excessive in relation to its escape-prevention purpose. In May, the Seventh
Circuit said that shackling hospital detainees “around the clock, despite the
continuous presence of a guard” was “plainly excessive in the absence of any
indication that the detainee poses some sort of security risk.” Id.
The Eighth Circuit follows a different rule. In Haslar v. Megerman, 104 F.3d
178 (8th Cir. 1997), the plaintiff was taken to the hospital in a “virtually comatose”
state. Id. at 179. Despite his frail state, pursuant to official policy, he was guarded
and shackled to his bed at all times. Id. The Eighth Circuit held that the policy was
not excessive, and therefore not unconstitutional punishment, noting that “[a]
single armed guard often cannot prevent a determined, unrestrained, and
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sometimes aggressive inmate from escaping without resorting to force.” Id. at 180.4
The Eighth Circuit’s rule, unlike the Seventh Circuit’s, does not appear to consider
the security risk presented by the particular detainee at issue (who, in Haslar, was
virtually comatose). Haslar is, of course, not binding here; May is the authoritative
precedent in this circuit.
Sheriff Dart argues that May is no longer good law, in view of Florence v.
Board of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012). [57] at 7. In Florence, the
Supreme Court held that it is constitutionally permissible for a jail to strip-search
all detainees during the initial intake process—an individualized assessment is not
required. The plaintiff proposed that detainees should be exempt from initial stripsearches unless: (1) they were arrested for serious crimes; (2) they were arrested for
crimes involving weapons or drugs; or (3) they gave officers a particular reason to
suspect them of hiding contraband. Id. at 1514–15, 1520. The Court held that such
an individualized assessment would be unworkable and ineffective, given the
purposes of and circumstances surrounding initial intake. The Court considered the
jail’s need to urgently discover: (1) contagious diseases; (2) injuries requiring
immediate
medical
attention;
(3)
tattoos
indicating
gang-affiliation;
and
(4) weapons, drugs, alcohol, and other prohibited items. Id. at 1518–20. The Court
noted that exempting some detainees from strip-searches could put those detainees
at risk of being coerced by others into concealing contraband. Id. at 1521. The Court
Although the court used the word “inmate,” the plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee, 104 F.3d
at 179, and the court analyzed his claim as one lodged by a detainee, not a convicted
prisoner.
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also noted that the initial intake process happens immediately, and little may be
known about a particular detainee before the process begins. Id. at 1521–22.
Florence does not mention shackling off-site detainees, and the Seventh
Circuit has not revisited May since Florence was decided in 2012. The concerns that
framed the Court’s discussion in Florence are not the same as those present here.
The needs to screen for diseases, injuries, gang affiliation, or contraband do not
apply in the present context. Further, a detainee like Moore, who is sent offsite for
medical treatment, has already undergone an individualized assessment, so
concerns about timing and burden do not factor as heavily as they did in Florence.
In short, I conclude that May remains good law in this circuit; and accordingly, that
it can violate due process to shackle a hospital detainee “around the clock, despite
the continuous presence of a guard” “in the absence of any indication that the
detainee poses some sort of security risk.” May, 226 F.3d at 884.
May was decided at the motion to dismiss stage. The court stated that
“[p]erhaps after some discovery [the Sheriff] can produce evidence justifying both
his shackling policy in general and his shackling of May in particular, but May’s
allegations are more than adequate to survive a motion to dismiss.” 226 F.3d at 884.
In this case, the Sheriff has justified the policy in general, but Moore has raised a
genuine issue of material fact about his shackling in particular. Moore was sent to
the hospital because of a physical altercation with another detainee (whether it was
an assault or a fight is not a matter for summary judgment). DSOF ¶¶ 13–15. And
mere days after being discharged, Moore attempted to strike another detainee.
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DSOF ¶ 50. Although neither incident involved an attempted escape, they may
suggest that Moore presented some security concerns. On the other hand, Moore
argues that he was medically fragile, and thus not a flight risk. He argues that:
(1) he needed a cane to walk (PSOF ¶¶ 1–3); (2) he was unconscious when
transported to Mt. Sinai Hospital (PSOF ¶ 4); and (3) his injuries left him unable to
eat, so he had to be fed intravenously (PSOF ¶ 9; DSOF ¶ 39). Pursuant to the
Sheriff’s policy, he was guarded at all times by a correctional officer (sometimes two
officers). But despite his condition, and the presence of one or more guards, he was
continuously shackled by arm and leg to his hospital bed. On this record, viewing
the facts and making reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, Moore,
there is a genuine dispute as to whether the Sheriff’s policy, as applied, was
excessive (and therefore unconstitutional).5 Moore’s burden to prevail at trial is a
significant one, given the deference owed to the Sheriff, see Bell, 441 U.S. at 547,
but the Sheriff has not shown that no genuine dispute of material fact exists.
In similar cases, district courts in this circuit have cited May and denied the Sheriff’s
summary-judgment motions. In Jackson v. Dart, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146000 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 20, 2011), a class of plaintiffs challenged the widespread practice of shackling women
during labor despite the continuous presence of a guard. The Sheriff admitted that some
class members were not likely to attempt escape, but disputed the level of risk posed by
other class members, and there was undisputed evidence that some pregnant detainees had
previously attempted escape. Id. at *24. The district court found that summary judgment
could not be granted to either side on the question of whether the widespread shackling
practice was excessive. Id. In Flores v. Sheriff of Cook County, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34863, *16–17 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2014), an even more closely analogous case to this one, the
district court denied summary judgment when the particular detainee raised a factual issue
as to the application of the restraint policy to him.
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IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions for summary judgment [45]
and [49] are denied.
ENTER:
___________________________
Manish S. Shah
United States District Judge
Date: 12/18/14
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