Bryant v. Dart et al
Filing
28
ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 10/29/2013: The Court denies Defendant's amended motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 22 . Defendants shall answer by 11/19/13. Status hearing set for 12/17/13 is stricken and reset to 11/20/13 at 8:30 a.m. [For further details, see attached Order.] Mailed notice(kef, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
NELSON L. BRYANT,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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THOMAS DART, Sheriff of Cook County )
and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
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Defendants.
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Case No. 13 C 3608
Judge Amy St. Eve
ORDER
The Court denies Defendant’s amended motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [22]. Defendants shall answer by 11/19/13. Status hearing set
for 12/17/13 is stricken and reset to 11/20/13 at 8:30 a.m.
STATEMENT
On August 5, 2013, Plaintiff Nelson L. Bryant, who is a detainee at Cook County Jail,
brought the present Amended Complaint alleging violations of Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., against Defendant Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart in his
official capacity.1 Before the Court is Defendant’s amended motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s
motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. See Hallinan v.
Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule
8(a)(2) must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)
(citation omitted). Under the federal notice pleading standards, a plaintiff’s “factual allegations
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Cook County is a Defendant to this lawsuit because it is an indispensable party due to
Illinois law requiring the County to pay judgments entered against a sheriff’s office in its official
capacity. See Askew v. Sheriff of Cook County, 568 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2009); Carver v.
Sheriff of LaSalle County, 324 F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003); 55 ILCS 5/5–1002.
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Put differently, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “In reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, [courts] accept the well-pleaded facts
in the complaint as true.” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013). In
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, district courts may also consider documents attached to the
pleadings without converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment, as long as the
documents are referred to in the complaint and central to the claims. See Geinosky v. City of
Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012); Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547,
556 (7th Cir. 2012); Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c).
BACKGROUND
In his Amended Complaint, Bryant alleges that he has been a detainee in Cook County
Jail since 2008. (R. 17, Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) He further alleges that when Cook County Jail
medical personnel processed him, they determined that he was disabled and required the
assistance of a hearing aid. (Id. ¶ 6.) The medical personnel then made the decision to permit
him to possess his hearing aid while he was in the Cook County Jail. (Id.)
Bryant also maintains that from 2008 until the present, Cook County Jail personnel did
not assign him to an “ADA complaint” housing unit and that after 2010 personnel did not
provide him with his hearing aid. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 9.) More specifically, following his assignment to a
non-ADA compliant housing unit, Bryant alleges that jail personnel confiscated his hearing aid
in a shakedown in 2010. (Id. ¶ 10.) Bryant further alleges that he complained to correctional
staff and filed numerous grievances about his need for his hearing aid. (Id.) As a result, Bryant
contends that he was deprived programs and services available to other detainees — he was
unable to enjoy television in the dayroom, he had extreme difficulty interacting with persons on
his tier, and he was unable to be engaged in routine activities on the tier, such as being able to
respond to the fire alarm. (Id.)
As a result, Bryant alleges that he has suffered pain, has had difficulty sleeping, and was
unable to meaningfully participate in his criminal defense. (Id. ¶ 11.) Moreover,
notwithstanding his complaints and grievances, Bryant contends that he remains at the Cook
County Jail in a non-ADA compliant housing unit and that his living unit does not have
accommodations such as a TDD (telecommunications device for the deaf), TTY (text
telephones), or a dayroom television with closed-captioning. (Id. ¶ 12.)
ANALYSIS
In the present motion to dismiss, Defendant Dart argues that Bryant has failed to state a
valid claim under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. See Jaros v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d
667, 671 (7th Cir. 2012) (relief under ADA and Rehabilitation Act is coextensive). To state a
claim under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, Bryant need only allege that (1) he is a qualified
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person, (2) with a disability, and (3) the Cook County Jail denied him access to an activity or
program because of his disability. See id. at 672. Disability is defined as the limitation of one or
more major life activities, which include seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing,
lifting, bending, or communicating. See E.E.O.C. v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 546 F.3d 438, 442
(7th Cir. 2008); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
In his motion to dismiss, Defendant Dart does not challenge Bryant’s status as a qualified
individual with a disability. Instead, Defendant Dart argues that Bryant cannot show that he was
denied services, programs, or activities based on his disability. In addition, Defendant argues
that there is no evidence underlying Bryant’s allegations. Defendant, however, misunderstands
the legal standard governing Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Bryant need not “show” that he
was denied these activities or present evidence at this procedural posture, rather, Bryant “must
plead facts which plausibly (even if improbably) support each element of his claim.” Jaros, 684
F.3d at 672; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (citation omitted).
In any event, Defendant argues that Bryant has failed to properly allege that the Cook
County Jail denied him access to an activity, service, or program based on his disability because
Bryant did not allege a physical injury as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 804 (7th Cir. 2008). Here,
Bryant alleges that he suffered personal injuries, experienced pain, and had difficulty sleeping.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) Also, Bryant attaches an October 2, 2009 detainee grievance to his response
brief in which he stated that he was bleeding from his ear and that because he cannot hear, he
fears for his life. (R. 25-1, Ex. 1, 10/2/2009 grievance.) Because this grievance is mentioned in
Bryant’s Amended Complaint and is central to his claim, the Court considers it in the context of
the present Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Wigod, 673 F.3d at 556; McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d
882, 892 (7th Cir. 2006). Viewing Bryant’s allegations of personal injury, pain, lack of sleep,
and a bleeding ear in a light most favorable to Bryant, he has alleged sufficient facts that he
suffered a physical injury. Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit teaches, a “physical injury ... is not
a filing prerequisite for the federal civil action itself.” Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 614 (7th
Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Next, Defendant argues that Bryant has not sufficiently alleged that the Cook County Jail
denied him the benefits of services, programs, or activities under the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act. “Although the ADA does not explicitly define ‘services, programs, or activities,’ the
regulations promulgated pursuant to the act state that ‘title II applies to anything a public entity
does.’” Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir.
2002) (citation omitted). As the Supreme Court explains, “[m]odern prisons provide inmates
with many recreational ‘activities,’ medical ‘services,’ and educational and vocational
‘programs,’ all of which at least theoretically ‘benefit’ the prisoners (and any of which disabled
prisoners could be “excluded from participation in”).” Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey,
524 U.S. 206, 210, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998).
In his Amended Complaint, Bryant, as a hearing-impaired person, has sufficiently alleged
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that the jail denied him access to telephone services via TDD or TTY. See 42 U.S.C. §
12103(1)(A); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1) (defining auxiliary aids and services to include text
telephones); see, e.g., Chisolm v. McManimon , 275 F.3d 315, 329 (3d Cir. 2001). Also, Bryant
has sufficiently alleged that the Cook County Jail denied him access to the courts because
without his hearing aid, there was a physical barrier resulting in his inability to meaningfully
participate in his criminal defense. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522-23, 124 S.Ct.
1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (Title II of the ADA “also seeks to enforce a variety of other basic
constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching judicial
review...like the right of access to the courts.”).2 Because Bryant has sufficiently alleged that the
Cook County Jail denied him the benefits of services, programs, or activities, the Court need not
address Defendant’s specific argument that television is not a “service” or “activity” within the
meaning of Section 12132.
On a final note, Defendant Dart argues that the Cook County Jail has complied with the
ADA’s regulations under the circumstances. Defendant’s argument attempts to refute Bryant’s
factual allegations, and it is well-established that factual questions are best left for summary
judgment after the parties have developed the record. See Stalter v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 195
F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1999).
Dated: October 29, 2013
______________________________
AMY J. ST. EVE
United States District Court Judge
2
Because Bryant is bringing this claim against the Cook County Sheriff, there are no
Eleventh Amendment issues as discussed in United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159, 126
S.Ct. 877, 163 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006).
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