Lane v. Salgado et al

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: Lane's motion for entry of a protective order that permits him to disseminate the information in the CR files about Salgado's conduct 22 , is denied. The parties shall submit a revised proposed protective order consistent with this ruling. Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 3/5/2014:Mailed notice(srn, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
TRAVIS LANE,
Plaintiff,
No. 13 C 3764

v.
OFFICER DANNY SALGADO AND THE CITY
OF CHICAGO ,

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Travis Lane alleges that Officer Danny Salgado of the Chicago Police
Department falsely arrested him in violation of the Fourth Amendment, among
other related claims. R. 1. Defendants have already produced files of three closed
investigations into misconduct complaints (known as Complaint Registries, or “CR
files”) made against Officer Salgado. One of the three complaints was sustained
after investigation. The parties agree that certain information in the CR files is
private (e.g., “personal identity information, such as home addresses, phone
numbers, driver’s license numbers, and social security numbers”), and should not be
disclosed outside of the litigation. See R. 29-3 ¶ 2. They disagree over whether Lane
should be allowed to disseminate information about Officer Salgado’s conduct
contained in these files to the public beyond use in this litigation. Lane has filed a
motion to have a protective order entered permitting him to publicize certain

information about Officer Salgado’s conduct contained in the CR files. R. 22.1 For
the following reasons, Lane’s motion is denied.
Lane has not specified in what manner or for what purpose he would
disseminate the CR files to the public. This is largely because, as Lane’s counsel
represented in open court on February 11, 2014, Lane has not yet seen the CR files.
Defendants contend that Lane, a journalist with a community newspaper who has
published articles about his encounter with Officer Salgado, see R. 25-1, would use
the CR files in his column.2 Lane admits that he has “more than a ‘general public
interest’ in the CRs. . . . and has a particular interest in writing about police
practices and curbing misconduct.” R. 29 at 8.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1) permits the Court, for good cause
shown, “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense” that might arise during discovery. Lane first argues that
Defendants cannot demonstrate good cause because they cannot make “a particular
and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory
statements,” that dissemination of the CR files “will result in a clearly defined and
very serious injury.” R. 29 at 3. Publication of misconduct claims and discipline
would certainly damage Officer Salgado’s reputation (especially with respect to the
two complaints that were not sustained). The Supreme Court has held that
Originally, Lane also sought various other orders regarding discovery in his
motion. See R. 22. These requests are moot either because the Court has already
addressed them, see R. 35; R. 39, or because the parties have come to agreement.
See R. 29.
1

See http://www.examiner.com/african-american-community-in-chicago/travles-lane
(describing Lane as a “columnist”) (last visited March 5, 2014).
2

2

“damage[e] to reputation” can be a sufficient basis for a court to issue a protective
order. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984). Thus, to the
extent that Lane is correct that Defendants must meet a “threshold burden” of
establishing “potential harm,” R. 29 at 3, Defendants have done so.
The question is then whether the potential harm to Officer Salgado
outweighs “the importance of disclosure to the public.” Wiggins v. Burge, 173 F.R.D.
226, 229 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see also Calhoun v. City of Chicago, 273 F.R.D. 421, 422
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2011); Rangel v. City of Chicago, 2010 WL 3699991, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 13, 2010). In deciding whether to issue orders protecting police misconduct
files from public dissemination, a number of courts in this district have held that
“[t]he manner in which . . . allegations [of police misconduct] are investigated is a
matter of significant public interest.” Wiggins, 173 F.R.D. at 229; see also Henry v.
Centeno, 2011 WL 3796749, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2011); Rangel, 2010 WL
3699991, at *4; cf. Hutchins v. Clarke, 661 F.3d 947, 955 (7th Cir. 2011) (in
analyzing a claim under a Wisconsin privacy statute stating that “the public has a
particularly strong interest in being informed about its public officials, especially in
the case of law enforcement officers.”). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has
held that there is a “substantial interest” in ensuring that the discovery process is
not “abuse[d]” such that it causes “damag[e] to reputation.” Seattle Times, 467 U.S.
at 35.
The Court finds that, in the context of the discovery stage of this litigation,
the “substantial interest” in protecting a defendant police officer’s reputation

3

outweighs the public’s interest in learning how a municipal government
investigates police misconduct claims. See Calhoun, 273 F.R.D. 421 (Gottschall, J.);
Brown v. City of Chicago, 2011 WL 222840 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2011) (Shadur, J.);
Coffie v. City of Chicago, 2006 WL 1069132 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2006) (Nolan, M.J.).
This does not necessarily mean, however, that Lane will not have the opportunity to
publicly file and thereby publicize information in the CR files at an appropriate
time in the course of this litigation. On summary judgment or at trial, the Court
will be required to address any evidence that is relevant to Lane’s claims, and in
that context, Lane may be permitted to expose that evidence to public scrutiny.
Evidence that is necessarily part of the decision-making process almost always
should be available to the public in order for the public to understand why a court
or jury made a decision. But “there is a difference between the public’s interest in
evidence presented at a public trial and materials exchanged between the parties
during the discovery process.” Coffie, 2006 WL 1069132, at *2 (citing Hobley v.
Burge, 225 F.R.D. 221, 224 (N.D. Ill. 2004)). “Much of the information that surfaces
during pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the
underlying cause of action.” Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33. If Lane believes public
disclosure of the CR files is necessary to the prosecution of his case, he should set
forth why and seek leave before publicly filing any information contained in the CR
files.3

Defendants argue that a protective order is appropriate because the CR files
constitute private information under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act
(“IFOIA”). Courts in this district are split on whether this is a correct interpretation
3

4

Conclusion
Lane’s motion for entry of a protective order that permits him to disseminate
the information in the CR files about Salgado’s conduct, R. 22, is denied. The parties
shall submit a revised proposed protective order consistent with this ruling.
ENTERED:
______________________________
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge

Dated: March 5, 2014

of the statute. Compare, e.g., Henry, 2011 WL 3796749, at *5 (Gettleman, J.), with,
Brown, 2011 WL 222840, at *2 (Shadur, J.). But it appears that courts in this
district have come to agree that whether the IFOIA treats CR files as private
information is not dispositive of the issue, but merely serves to inform a federal
court’s determination of whether a protective order is appropriate under Rule 26(c).
In light of the Court’s decision on Lane’s motion, it is unnecessary to reach this
issue.
5