Williams v. City of Chicago Southside Police Department et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM Order, Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 5/28/2013.(ea, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RONALD WILLIAMS-EL,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO SOUTHSIDE
POLICE DEPARTMENT, MACY’S AND
PREMIER SALONS AND ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION ENFORCEMENT
DEPARTMENT UNIT 9511 HARRISON
STREET DEPLANES IL ALSO BOX 90
POSTAL SERVICE,
Defendants.

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No.

13 C 3769

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Ronald Williams-EL (“Williams-EL”) has brought pro se what
he has labeled as an “Improper Persona in Sui Juris Complaint,”
in which he targets the numerous defendants named above in the
case caption.

That filing has been accompanied by an In Forma

Pauperis Application (“Application”) and a Motion for Appointment
of Counsel (“Motion”).1

Because the federal litigation system is

not a haven for objectively frivolous filings (see, e.g., Lee v.
Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir. 2000)), and because the
obvious absence of subject matter jurisdiction here fits that
description, this Court dismisses this action--a dismissal that
calls for the denial of the Application and the Motion on

1

Both the Application and the Motion have been tendered on
the printed forms made available by the Clerk’s Office, with the
requested information being supplied by Williams-EL’s handprinted
inserts.

mootness grounds.
This Court has of course been long aware of, and has
consistently applied, the teaching in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972)(per curiam) that pro se pleadings are to be
read through a more generous lens.

But that proposition, born

out of solicitude for the inexperienced litigant trying to go it
alone in an unfamiliar judicial system, does not at all call for
such treatment of a litigious serial litigant such as WilliamsEL.
Some clues on that score emerge from simply reading the
current Complaint, which reveals in a number of places that he is
hardly a stranger to the federal litigation system.

In his often

incomprehensible Complaint narrative he refers to having filed a
substantial number of other lawsuits, and his lengthy account
contains specific references to litigation before Judges Moran,
Aspen and St. Eve.

Those things alone suggest that Williams-EL

is scarcely the type of unlettered and inexperienced pro se
litigant for whom the commendable Haines v. Kerner doctrine was
conceived.
And there is more--most likely a good deal more.

This

Court’s courtroom deputy has engaged in a superficial search of
cases brought by “Ronald Williams,” which she limited to lawsuits
that provided the same telephone number or post office box or had
the same handwriting as this case.

2

That surface look has turned

up Case Nos. 07 C 4976 (originally assigned to Judge Manning,
then transferred to Judge St. Eve), 08 C 2048 (assigned to Judge
Lefkow), 08 C 2083 (assigned to Judge Gottschall), 08 C 4070
(assigned to this Court), 09 C 1769 (assigned to Judge Manning),
09 C 2968 (assigned to Judge Hart) and 12 C 2456 (assigned to
Judge Aspen)--and there is of course the very real possibility
that a more searching search would uncover more cases.
Hence neither Haines v. Kerner simpliciter nor a more
watered-down version of its principle call for the same
solicitude that is accorded to the pro se litigant who confronts
the difficulties of handling federal litigation for the first
time--and the Haines v. Kerner surely does not require this Court
to try to ferret some viable claim out of the hodgepodge that
Williams-EL has tendered.

As Judge Richard Posner has colorfully

stated in a different context, but in terms strikingly
appropriate for dealing with Williams-EL’s rambling and unfocused
narrative (United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.
1991)):
Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles.
In that regard, although the Complaint itself does not state
any predicate for federal subject matter jurisdiction, the
Motion’s statement as to Williams-EL’s unsuccessful effort to
obtain counsel on his own says, “I have been unable to find an
attorney because many of them do not want to get involved in

3

1983.”

This memorandum order will accordingly look at Williams-

EL’s filing from the perspective of 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“Section
1983”), because diversity of citizenship is clearly unavailable
and because no other potential federal-question claim emerges
from the Complaint’s rambling narrative.
With all of that said, an examination of Williams-EL’s
discursive submission compels its dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.

Williams-EL’s first named defendant, “City

of Chicago, South Side Police Department,” is of course not a
suable legal entity.2

Next, neither Macy’s nor Premier Salons is

a “state actor,” so that Section 1983 is obviously not relevant
to the Complaint’s references to them--and again no other source
of federal jurisdiction implicating them is identified.

As for

the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, which
Williams-EL characterizes as “nothing more than a fraudulent
Corporation who allow foreigners to commit fraud in Chicago,”
this Court finds it impossible to connect that bizarre assertion
to a viable federal claim.

And finally, just what the caption’s

reference to “Also Box 90 Postal Service” has to do with this
District Court’s jurisdiction is a total mystery.
Conclusion
As stated at the outset, this action is dismissed for lack

2

And although Williams-EL names a number of Chicago police
officers in his filing, none of his references appear to assert a
constitutional deprivation cognizable under Section 1983.
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of subject matter jurisdiction, and both the Application and the
Motion are accordingly denied as moot.

Finally, this memorandum

order has been considerably longer than Williams-EL’s Complaint
might justify, but this Court has considered it important to
refer this matter to the Executive Committee of this District
Court for its consideration as to whether Williams-EL should be
added to its list of restricted filers.

________________________________________
Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
Date:

May 28, 2013

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