Maum Meditation House of Truth et al v. Lake County
Filing
54
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 7/16/2014:Mailed notice(rth, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MAUM MEDITATION HOUSE OF
TRUTH, an Illinois not-for-profit
Corporation, in its corporate capacity and
also on behalf of certain members of the
organization, and SHEEHYUNG SUNG,
Plaintiffs,
v.
LAKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, an Illinois
Municipal corporation,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 13-cv-3794
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs, MAUM Meditation House of Truth, certain of its members and Sheehyung Sung
(collectively “MAUM” or “plaintiffs”), filed an Amended Complaint after this Court’s denial of
MAUM’s motion for preliminary injunction and MAUM’s acquiescence that it should pursue an
appeal with the zoning board before proceeding with the instant action. Defendant Lake County
moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim [34]. MAUM renewed its
motion for preliminary injunction [31]. For the reasons set forth below, this Court grants Lake
County’s motion to dismiss and denies MAUM’s motion for preliminary injunction.
Background
MAUM’s complaint in this matter requests a permanent injunction and declaratory relief
based on Lake County’s decision that MAUM needs a “change of use” permit to operate a
meditation center in Mr. Sung’s residence at 1122 Elm Road, Lake Forest, Illinois, 60045.
MAUM is seeking to use the property as both a residence for Mr. Sung and two meditation
guides, and a meditation center comprising two rooms for small group meditation. MAUM estimates
1
that approximately twenty people per day in groups of two to five persons would use the facility.
MAUM maintains that they do not need to comply with building code or apply for a “change of
use” permit because they are not changing the use of the premises. MAUM contends that the
meditation center is an “accessory” use to the residence and thus they are in compliance with the
building code without making any renovations.
Lake County supplemented its motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint with the
transcripts and findings of the hearings from the Zoning Board of Appeals. On January 21, 2014,
and February 11, 2014, the Lake County Zoning Board of Appeals held public hearings on MAUM’s
request for administrative appeal to reverse an administrative decision by the Chief Engineer and
Building Official of the Lake County Planning, Building and Development Department. As a result
of those hearings, the Zoning Board of Appeals issued a decision finding that:
1) the proposed use of the property entails the establishment of a place of religious worship in an
existing residence;
2) if the existing residence were to also contain the proposed place of religious worship, the building
would contain two occupancies as defined by the International Building Code of 2006;
3) as proposed, the existing residence would remain the principle use or purpose of the subject
building;
4) the activities that would occur in the proposed place of religious worship would not be necessary
for the exiting residence to properly function and could otherwise reasonably exist apart from the
existing residence;
5) as such, the proposed place of religious worship would be neither accessory nor ancillary to the
existing residence; and
6) the proposed use does not qualify for an exception from the application of Section 508 of the
International Building Code of 2006 that applies to “mixed uses and occupancies.”
2
The Zoning Board of Appeals therefore affirmed the Chief Building Official’s determination that
the proposed use of a religious institution and residence is a mixed use that does not qualify for an
exemption. Further, the mixed use constitutes a change of use under the building code.
In order to comply with Lake County’s decision MAUM would have to make a variety of
renovations to the residence. Among the alterations which MAUM asserts that it would have to
make to the property are the addition of ten parking spaces (one for disabled persons) with 24 feet
of clearing lane, moving the sign 10 feet back from the current location, accessibility compliant door
handles and hardware, two accessible restrooms of approximately 70 square feet each, emergency
lighting, sprinkler system, 1 hour fire rated wall between the meditation center and the residential
portion of the house, separate heating and air-conditioning systems, a floor integrity check, wetland
delineation, and civil engineering study. MAUM complains that the cost of compliance would be
approximately $200,000, which would constitute a substantial burden on MAUM’s free exercise of
religion.
The Amended Complaint contains five counts against Lake County stemming from the
alleged deprivation or burdening of MAUM’s religious freedom: Count I alleges violation of the
Free Exercise Clause under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 3 of the
Illinois Constitution; Count II alleges a violation of the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(‘IRFRA”), 775 ILCS 35/21; Count III alleges a “class of one” violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Count IV alleges a violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and Count V alleges
violations of free speech and free association under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
and Article I, § 4 of the Illinois Constitution.
3
Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) sets forth the basic pleading requirement of a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although Rule 8 does
not require a plaintiff to plead particularized facts, the factual allegations in the complaint must
sufficiently raise a plausible right to relief above a speculative level. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742,
751–52 (7th Cir. 2011). When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
“As the Supreme Court has observed, ‘a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and
drastic remedy, on that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden
of persuasion. To justify this relief, movants must show that (1) they have a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law exists; (3) they will suffer irreparable harm
which, absent injunctive relief, outweighs the irreparable harm the respondent will suffer if the
injunction is granted; and (4) the injunction will not harm the public interest.” (Internal citations
omitted). Goodman v. Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, 430 F3d 432, 437 (7th
Cir. 2005).
Discussion
This Court will first address Lake County’s motion to dismiss before considering MAUM’s
motion for preliminary injunction since resolution of the Lake County’s motion will impact the
preliminary injunction factor of MAUM’s likelihood of success on the merits. See Joelner v. Village of
4
Washington Park, Illinois, 378 F.3d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 2004) (“When a party seeks a preliminary
injunction on the basis of a potential First Amendment violation, the likelihood of success on the
merits will often be the determinative factor.”). Lake County moves to dismiss all counts of the
Amended Complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies or, alternatively, for failure to
state a claim.
I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Lake County argues that MAUM’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies because MAUM had state remedies available for compensation. MAUM
responds that it is not required to exhaust its administrative remedies because it is alleging a bona fide
equal protection claim and, even if it were required to exhaust its administrative remedies, it has
done so by appealing to the Zoning Board of Appeals.
MAUM must exhaust its administrative remedies. All final decisions of the board of appeals
are subject to judicial review pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Review Law. 65 ILCS
5/11-13-13. An aggrieved party may seek judicial review of an administrative decision without
complying with the exhaustion of remedies doctrine where the agency cannot provide an adequate
remedy or where it is patently futile to seek relief before the agency. Constantine v. Village of Glen
Ellyn, 575 N.E. 2d 1363, 217 Ill. App. 3d 4 (2d Dist. 1991). Jurisdiction and venue for judicial review
of administrative decisions is vested in the County Circuit Courts. 735 ILCS 5/3-104. Such courts
will examine the zoning action de novo for arbitrariness as a matter of substantive due process under
the six-part test set forth in LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65
(1957). Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Saville, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1027, 922 N.E.2d 1143
(2d Dist. 2009).
Here, MAUM only appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals and did not pursue their claims
through the Administrative Review Law. MAUM argues that it need not proceed through the Circuit
5
Court of Lake County on an appeal of the zoning board decision because the requirement to
exhaust their administrative remedies is inapplicable where there are fundamental rights, a suspect
class, or a bona fide equal protection claim at issue. Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 371 (7th
Cir. 2000). A bona fide equal protection claim is shown by “governmental action wholly impossible to
relate to legitimate governmental objectives.” Id. For reasons set forth fully below, this Court finds
that the claims on which MAUM relies to avoid exhaustion of administrative remedies are
insufficiently stated and its equal protection claim not bona fide. MAUM must therefore exhaust its
administrative remedies by seeking review of the zoning board of appeals decision in the Circuit
Court of Lake County. MAUM’s Amended Complaint is dismissed on that basis. This Court will
examine whether MAUM sufficiently stated a claim under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
the sake of completeness.
II. Failure to State a Claim
Count I of MAUM’s Amended Complaint alleges that by requiring MAUM to comply with a
Change of Use permit and make various cost-prohibitive renovations to the property. MAUM
asserts that Lake County’s building code allows for MAUM’s proposed use of the property without a
change of use permit and therefore Lake County has imposed a substantial burden on MAUM’s free
exercise of religion without a compelling government interest applied through the least restrictive
means. Lake County argues that MAUM fails to adequately allege a free exercise violation.
Free Exercise Clause analysis begins with an inquiry into whether the law at issue is neutral
and generally applicable. Vision Church, United Methodist v.Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 996 (7th
Cir. 2006). The International Building Code, as adopted by Lake County is neutral and generally
applicable. The particular provision at issue here is Section 303.1: “A room or space used for
assembly purposes with an occupant load of less than 50 persons and accessory to another
occupancy [in this case residential] shall be classified as a Group B occupancy or as part of that
6
occupancy… A room or space used for assembly purposes that is less than 750 square feet (70m2) in
area and is accessory to another occupancy shall be classified as a Group B occupancy or as part of
that occupancy.” (Amend. Compl. Ex. W). Nothing in this section of the building code suggests that
it applies exclusively to religious institutions. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, Christ Center, Christian
Covenant Outreach Church (“C.L.U.B.”) v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 765 (7th Cir. 2003). Even
neutral laws of general applicability will be subject to strict scrutiny if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion, Vision Church, 468 F.3d at 996, and (1) the government is allowed to make
individualized assessments, or (2) a “hybrid rights” claim exists. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hiyaleah, 508 U.S. 520, 537 (1993). MAUM alleges that Lake County impermissibly made an
individualized assessment by interpreting the building code without having any guidelines for
defining an “accessory” use and that its right to freedom of association is a companion right to free
exercise that is also violated by Lake County’s actions.
The Commentary of the International Building Code states that an “accessory” use must be
functionally related to the primary use. See 2006 International Building Code and Commentary Volume I,
commentary to Section 303. Although MAUM argues that there is no evidence on which this Court
may rely to determine that Lake County consistently applies the IBC’s commentary definition of
“accessory” use, it is MAUM’s burden to allege sufficient facts from which this Court may infer that
MAUM’s rights have been violated. Nothing suggests that Lake County deviated from the
“functionally related” definition of “accessory” when it determined that a religious institution of the
kind proposed by MAUM is not functionally related to a residence such that it would constitute an
“accessory” rather than a change of use. Unlike having a meditation room in one’s home for private
purposes of family and friends, MAUM is proposing two rooms be allocated for approximately 20
practitioners to meditate daily. Further, MAUM’s proposed meditation center is intended to be open
to the public. This Court finds that MAUM has therefore not adequately alleged that Lake County
7
made an individualized assessment that would subject the application of the building code to strict
scrutiny.
MAUM’s “hybrid rights” claim is also insufficiently alleged. “[A] plaintiff does not allege a
hybrid rights claim entitled to strict scrutiny analysis merely by combining a free exercise claim with
an utterly meritless claim of the violation of another fundamental right.” C.L.U.B., 342 F.3d at 765.
Here, MAUM is asserting equal protection, free speech, free association, and due process claims.
The Court will address each of those claims below.
In Count II, MAUM alleges a violation of the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“IRFRA”), 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq. Pursuant to IRFRA, “government may not substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (i) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest and (ii) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.” 775 ILCS 35/15. MAUM alleges that Lake County is substantially burdening
its free exercise of religion by requiring MAUM to apply for and make renovations to comply with a
“Change of Use” permit.
While IRFRA does not define “substantial burden,” courts in this district apply the same
guidelines as they do for claims brought pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. See, e.g., Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of
Evanston, 250 F.Supp.2d 961, 993-94 (N.D. Ill. 2003). A substantial burden is “one that necessarily
bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise – including the
use of real property for the purposes therefore within the regulated jurisdiction generally –
effectively impracticable.” C.L.U.B., 342 F.3d at 761. Here, MAUM has not sufficiently alleged a
substantial burden. It complains only of the financial implications of the County’s decision. “It is
well established that there is no substantial burden placed on an individual’s free exercise of religion
8
where a law or policy merely operates so as to make the practice of [the individual’s] religious beliefs
more expensive.” Id. at 762 (citing Stuart Circle Parish v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Richmond, 946
F.Supp. 1225, 1237 (E.D. Va. 1996), quoting Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961)).
In Count III, MAUM alleges a “class of one” violation of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. “[A] class-of-one plaintiff must show (1) that he
has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated, and (2) that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Fares Pawn, LLC v. Ind. Dep't of Fin. Insts., 2014 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11813 (7th Cir. June 20, 2014) (citing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564,
120 S. Ct. 1073, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (2000)). MAUM’s allegations do not sufficiently allege either of
these elements. MAUM has not offered any factual basis indicating that it was intentionally treated
any differently from any other individual or organization making a similar request. Nor is there
sufficient allegation that Lake County’s reason for its decision that MAUM’s proposed use of Mr.
Sung’s residence is a change of use lacks a rational basis. In general, zoning ordinances imposing
restrictions on use and occupation of private land, including distinguishing between residential and
commercial and other uses, satisfy the rational basis test. C.L.U.B., 342 F.3d at 766 (citing Village of
Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926)). Here, Lake County concluded based on the
proposed use that would have approximately twenty people (140 a week) in addition to three
residents coming and going from the property every day necessitated the change of use permit and
its attendant building code requirements. The permit requirements, including things such as
additional parking, handicap accessibility, and fire and safety measures all relate to the increase in
traffic and use.
In Count IV, MAUM alleges a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, MAUM alleges that its proposed use is not a
change of use under the building code and therefore it does not need to obtain permission from
9
Lake County to use the property in the manner proposed. MAUM asserts that by requiring it to
obtain a change of use permit, Lake County has violated its due process rights. Lake County argues
that MAUM has not pursued the due process available to it and, further, MAUM is not attacking the
constitutionality of the building code, but is challenging Lake County’s interpretation of its building
code.
This Count also fails to state a claim. First, MAUM has not appealed the decision of the
Lake County Zoning Board through the channels available to it. Second, the building code provision
pursuant to which MAUM claims it is operating and thus has not changed its use of the property,
applies only to “accessory” uses. Lake County’s interpretation of “accessory” use under its building
code to mean a use that is functionally related to the primary use does not present a due process
violation. “The right to petition the government for redress of grievances is found in the First
Amendment to the Constitution but has been held to be enforceable against the states by virtue of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005,
1006 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235, 9 L. Ed. 2d 697, 83 S. Ct.
680 (1963), and Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Building Authority, 100 F.3d 1287, 1294 n. 5
(7th Cir. 1996)). The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of “life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
Here, MAUM initially opted not to avail itself of the procedures provided by Lake Coutny to
redress complaints about the application of its building code. Lake County’s building code has a
provision for appealing to the Zoning Board of Appeals for claims “that the true intent of this
ordinance or the rules legally adopted there under has [sic] been incorrectly interpreted, the
provisions of this code do not fully apply, or an equal or better form of construction is proposed.”
International Building Code of 2006, § 112 (2006), as adopted and amended by Lake County, Ill., Ordinances
(Nov. 14, 2006). Initially, MAUM did not avail itself of this procedure. MAUM has since appealed to
10
the Zoning Board of Appeals and been denied. MAUM has further due process available to it
through the Administrative Law to appeal the Zoning Board of Appeals decision to the Circuit
Court of Lake County. Accordingly, this Court finds that MAUM cannot adequately allege a claim
for denial of due process.
In Count V, MAUM alleges violations of free speech and free association under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 4 of the Illinois Constitution. MAUM’s claim
of a free speech and free association violation under the First Amendment and the Illinois
Constitution fails for the same reason as its Free Exercise claim. There is no indication that Lake
County’s application and interpretation of the building code relates MAUM’s message and it does
not unduly burden MAUM’s exercise of these rights. MAUM’s argument that Lake County is
preventing MAUM from exercising their speech and association rights is nonsensical. MAUM argues
that Lake County’s application of the building code is contrary to the text and is therefore a contentbased determination. MAUM misunderstands the meaning of content-neutral versus content-based
regulation of speech or assembly. The court in C.L.U.B. explained that “to the extent that the [city
ordinance] incidentally regulates speech or assembly within churches, such regulation is motivated
not by any disagreement that Chicago might have with the message conveyed by church speech or
assembly, but rather by such legitimate, practical considerations as the promotion of harmonious
and efficient land use. In this respect it is content neutral.” C.L.U.B, 342 F.3d at 765. Accordingly,
this Court finds that MAUM fails to state a claim for violations of its free speech and assembly
rights.
II. Preliminary Injunction
Based on the foregoing reasons for granting Lake County’s motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint in its entirety this Court finds that MAUM cannot carry its burden of persuasion and
make a clear showing that a preliminary injunction is appropriate. This Court’s dismissal of the
11
Amended Complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and, additionally, for failure to
state a claim compels this Court to find that MAUM is not likely to succeed on the merits. That
issue is determinative and this Court need not address the remaining factors for a preliminary
injunction.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, this Court grants defendant Lake County’s Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint [34] and denies plaintiff MAUM et al.’s Renewed Motion for Preliminary
Injunction [31].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: July 16, 2014
Entered: ______________________________
United States District Judge
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?