Holood vs. World Fuel Services Inc. et al
Filing
11
Entered MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order:For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Sabbahs motion to dismiss. 8 Count II is therefore dismissed in its entirety, and Sabbah is dismissed from the case without prejudice. Hadad may seek leave of Court to amend her complaint if she can cure the deficiencies in Count I related to Sabbah. This opinion does not affect the FLSA claim in Count I against World Fuel Services, Inc. Mahmoud Sabbah terminated. Status hearing set for 1/23/2014 at 09:00 a.m. to discuss this case. Hadad should be prepared to explain his efforts, if any, to serve World Fuel Services, Inc. Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 12/11/2013:Mailed notice(srn, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
HOLOOD HADAD,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
WORLD FUEL SERVICES, INC., and
MAHMOUD SABBAH,
Defendants.
No. 13 C 3802
Judge Thomas M. Durkin
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Holood Hadad brings this suit against World Fuel Services, Inc. (“WFS”), and
Mahmoud Sabbah, seeking relief against both Defendants for violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207 et. seq. (“Count I”), and against
Sabbah individually for battery under Illinois state law (“Count II”). R. 1. Sabbah
has moved to dismiss Count I against him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), and Count II under Rule 12(b)(1). R. 8. For the following reasons, Sabbah’s
motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
The following relevant facts, drawn from Hadad’s complaint, are accepted as
true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in Hadad’s favor. See Mann v. Vogel,
707 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2013).
WFS is a business that owns and operates a gas station in Chicago, Illinois.
R. 1 ¶ 4. At all times relevant to her complaint, Hadad alleges that she was an
employee of the gas station, and Sabbah was an employee, agent, and/or servant of
1
WFS. R. 1 at ¶¶ 6, 7. Hadad alleges that she did not receive proper compensation
for the overtime hours she worked during her employment at the gas station from
February 2012 until February 2013. 1 R. 1 ¶ 10. In total, Hadad claims that she did
not receive adequate compensation for 196 overtime hours. R. 1 ¶ 11.
Hadad alleges that she had a conversation with Sabbah on January 20, 2013,
regarding missed overtime payments. R. 1 at ¶ 9. According to Hadad, “Sabbah
cornered her near the tobacco stand, then proceeded to the register” where he
“removed money from the cash register” and “forcefully” placed it into her hand. R.
1 at ¶¶ 12-13. Sabbah then allegedly tightly squeezed Hadad’s hand until she
“screamed in pain.” R. 1 at ¶ 13. Hadad alleges that Sabbah subsequently grabbed
her wrist, and yanked and twisted it down, causing Hadad’s shoulder to make a
“popping sound.” R. 1 at ¶ 14. Afterward, Sabbah allegedly “hit [Hadad’s] arm with
a hanger and threatened to drag [Hadad] by her hair if she did not leave the store.”
R. 1 at ¶ 15.
On May 22, 2013, Hadad filed this suit against Sabbah and WFS, alleging a
violation of the FLSA and a battery claim under Illinois law. R. 1. Hadad asked the
Court to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction authority over her Illinois state law
battery claim. R. 1 at ¶ 1.
Although Hadad alleges that she was not adequately compensated between
February 2012 and February 2013, the last week Hadad says she did not receive
adequate compensation was the week of November 11, 2012. See R. 1 at ¶ 11.
1
2
LEGAL STANDARD
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. See, e.g.,
Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th
Cir. 2009). A complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to
provide defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This “standard demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must “contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Mann v. Vogel, 707 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes the Court to dismiss any
claim for which the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1). Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution defines the outer bounds of a
federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction, although generally, a court’s jurisdiction
in a non-criminal case arises from a federal question, a deprivation of one’s civil
rights, or diversity among the parties. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1343; see also
3
Rabe v. United Air Lines, Inc. 636 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2010). When a defendant
challenges jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a court’s
jurisdiction. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). As with a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” St. John's
United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999)).
ANALYSIS
The Court will first address Sabbah’s motion regarding the FLSA claim in
Count I and, second, the Illinois state law battery claim in Count II.
I. FLSA Claim Against Sabbah
Count I is an FLSA claim for overtime pay. R. 1. To prove an FLSA claim,
Hadad bears the burden of proof and must establish that (1) she performed
uncompensated overtime, and (2) Sabbah, as her employer, had “actual or
constructive knowledge” of that overtime work. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); Kellar v.
Summit Seating, Inc., 664 F.3d 169, 177 (7th Cir. 2011). Sabbah challenges the
sufficiency of Count I in Hadad’s complaint, which seeks to hold Sabbah liable in his
individual capacity. R. 8. Specifically, Sabbah argues that Hadad has not alleged
sufficient facts to indicate that he was Hadad’s employer for purposes of the FLSA.
R. 8 at 2. He contends Hadad’s allegation that he was an “employer[] engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the
4
FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §[§] 206(a) and 207(a)” is conclusory and thus insufficient to
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. R. 8 at 2. The Court agrees.
The Seventh Circuit has explained, “The word ‘employer’ is defined broadly
enough in the FLSA . . . to permit naming another employee rather than the
employer as defendant, provided the defendant had supervisory authority over the
complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged
violation.” Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987); see Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1088 (7th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, Hadad has not
alleged any facts that show Sabbah had any authority over her or that Sabbah had
any role in the alleged violation of the FLSA. Hadad alleges that Sabbah “was an
employee, agent and/or servant” of WFS, but that does not establish any type of
supervisory role or control of the day-to-day operations at the gas station. Cf.
Morgan v. Speak Easy, LLC, 625 F. Supp. 2d 632, 646 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (describing
factors the court considered in determining the defendant’s liability for the alleged
FLSA violations). The allegation also does not establish that Sabbah had any type
of ownership in, or corporate-officer relationship with, WFS or the gas station,
which might be sufficient under the FLSA. See McLaughlin v. Lunde Truck Sales,
Inc., 714 F. Supp. 920, 922 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Furthermore, Hadad’s allegation that
Sabbah opened the cash register, removed money from it, and gave the money to
her likewise does nothing more than establish that Sabbah allegedly worked at the
gas station with Hadad. Those allegations, as well as Hadad’s contention that
“Defendants have been and continue to be employers . . . within the FLSA,” R. 1 at
5
¶¶ 12-13, 18; are insufficient to establish Sabbah’s personal liability under the
FLSA. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[I]n considering the
plaintiff’s factual allegations, courts should not accept as adequate abstract
recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.”).
In sum, Hadad’s complaint does not adequately allege facts demonstrating
Sabbah was Hadad’s employer within the purview of the FLSA.
II. Illinois State Law Battery Claim
Having determined that Count I was inadequately pled, the Court looks to
whether it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Hadad’s state law battery
claim in Count II. 2 Sabbah argues the Court should not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Count II because it “alleges no more than an on-the-job physical
altercation and injury claim by one employee against another employee that is
unrelated to any alleged violation of FLSA.” R. 8 at 2. Again, the Court agrees.
28 U.S.C. § 1367 allows a district court to decide any “claims” related to other
claims over which the court has original jurisdiction “if they are so closely related to
the plaintiff’s federal-law claims as to be in effect part of the same case.” Williams
Elecs. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 479 F.3d 904, 906 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a)); see Hansen v. Bd. of Trs. of Hamilton Se. Sch. Corp., 551 F.3d 599, 607
(7th Cir. 2008). The purpose of supplemental jurisdiction is to promote “economy in
litigation,” as it would be inefficient to adjudicate essentially the same issues in two
separate forums. See Williams, 479 F.3d at 906-08.
Hadad does not set forth any other basis for the Illinois state law battery claim to
be in federal court.
2
6
Hadad argues there is a “common nucleus of operative facts” between her
state law battery claim and her FLSA claim because “the motivating factor behind
Defendant Sabbah’s aggressive treatment was overtime payment” and “Sabbah’s
tortious actions are reflective of why Plaintiff Hadad was not paid for her overtime
work,” R. 9 at 4, but these arguments miss the mark. The Court must look to what
forms the basis for the claims in Counts I and II—e.g., the required elements—to
determine whether the state law battery claim “form[s] part of the same Article III
case or controversy” as the FLSA claim in Count I. See Ervin v. OS Restaurant
Servs., Inc., 632 F.3d 971, 980 (7th Cir. 2011). The underlying rationale for why
Sabbah might have engaged in the tortious conduct alleged does not in and of itself
make the claims “intertwined,” as Hadad contends. R. 9 at 5.
Under Illinois law, an individual commits a battery if “(a) he acts intending
to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third
person, or imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with
the person of the other directly or indirectly results.” Bakes v. St. Alexius Med. Ctr.,
955 N.E.2d 78, 85-86 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2011) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 13 (1965)). As the Court previously explained, to prove an FLSA claim,
Hadad must establish that (1) she performed uncompensated overtime, and (2)
Sabbah, as her employer, had “actual or constructive knowledge” of that overtime
work. Kellar, 664 F.3d at 177. Thus, it is clear that the facts necessary to establish a
claim in Count I are completely unrelated to the facts necessary to establish a claim
in Count II; none of the elements in either Count has any bearing on the elements of
7
the other.
This situation is different from Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423, 424 (7th
Cir. 1995), a case Hadad cites, in which the court stated that a “loose factual
connection between the claims is generally sufficient.” In that case, the plaintiff
alleged a Title VII sexual harassment claim and state law claims for assault and
battery. Id. at 424-25. The court held that the claims arose from a common nucleus
of operative facts because the employer had a duty to take reasonable steps to
discover and rectify sexual harassment, and reasonableness depends on the “gravity
of the harassment.” Id. at 425. As the court stated, “[W]ithout reference to the facts
surrounding the assault, there could have been no sexual harassment claim against
the employer.” Id. The opposite is true here: whether Sabbah committed a battery
against Hadad has no bearing on whether WFS adequately compensated Hadad for
her alleged overtime work.
Hadad also cites Quela v. Payco-General American Credits, Inc., 84 F. Supp.
2d 956, 960 (N.D. Ill. 2000), to support her “loose factual connection” argument. R. 9
at 3. Quela is like Ammerman, however, in that both cases involved state law
assault and battery claims that essentially formed the basis for Title VII claims.
The difference between Quela and Ammerman is a Title VII claim in Quela was for
retaliation; the plaintiff alleged that “because he prepared and presented a
statement regarding the hostile work environment to management, he was
subjected to physical threats, intimidation and verbal abuse from his manager . . . .”
Id. at 960-61 (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, in this case, the time
8
period relating to Hadad’s FLSA claim in Count I was over two months before the
battery allegation in Count II, as Hadad does not allege that she did not receive
adequate compensation after the confrontation on January 20, 2013. See R. 1 at ¶¶
6-8, 10. Accordingly, unlike in Quela, the factual allegations of Count II are not
“highly relevant” to the determination of whether Hadad received adequate
compensation for overtime work. See Eager v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 187 F.
Supp. 2d 1033, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims for assault,
battery, and negligent infliction of emotional distress because “it [was] not the case
that the ‘factual allegations regarding incidents of physical assault and battery . . .
[were] highly relevant to the determination of whether a hostile work environment
existed.’” (quoting Lyman v. Foot First Podiatry Ctrs., 919 F. Supp. 1141, 1148 (N.D.
Ill. 1996)). Declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count II here will
have no effect on the adjudication of the allegations in Count I.
The Court recognizes that handling the FLSA claim and the state law battery
claim in a single proceeding may yield some minor benefits. Nonetheless, the claims
in Count II do not arise from the same core of operative facts as those in Count I,
especially in light of the Court’s dismissal of Sabbah from Count I.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Sabbah’s motion to dismiss. R. 8.
Count II is therefore dismissed in its entirety, and Sabbah is dismissed from the
case without prejudice. Hadad may seek leave of Court to amend her complaint if
she can cure the deficiencies in Count I related to Sabbah. This opinion does not
9
affect the FLSA claim in Count I against World Fuel Services, Inc.
The parties are directed to appear for a status hearing on January 23, 2014,
at 9:00 a.m. to discuss the case. Hadad should be prepared to explain his efforts, if
any, to serve World Fuel Services, Inc.
ENTERED:
______________________________
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: December 11, 2013
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?