McCarter vs. Kovitz Shifrin Nesbit

Filing 106

MEMORANDUM Opinion Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 1/5/2015:Mailed notice(kef, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JANICE McCARTER, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly
situated,

)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
KOVITZ SHIFRIN NESBIT, an Illinois )
professional corporation,
)
)
Defendant.
)

No. 13 C 3909

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the court are the plaintiff’s: (1) motion for partial
class certification; (2) motion to strike; (3) motions for findings
of relatedness; and (4) motion to withdraw her motion to add an
additional plaintiff.

For the following reasons, the court: (1)

grants the plaintiff’s motion for partial certification; (2) denies
her motion to strike; (3) grants her motions for findings of
relatedness; and (4) grants her motion to withdraw her motion to
add an additional plaintiff.
BACKGROUND
This is a putative class action suit against a law firm,
Kovitz Shifrin Nesbit (“Kovitz”), for allegedly violating the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (the “FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et
seq.

The plaintiff, Janice McCarter, alleges that Kovitz sent her

two

debt-collection

letters

demanding

past-due

condominium

assessments owed to the Malibu East Condominium Association (the
“Condo Association”).

In Count I, McCarter alleges that the

payment demand in the first paragraph below “overshadows” the
FDCPA-required validation notice in the second paragraph:
THIS IS YOUR NOTICE THAT PAYMENT IN FULL OF THE AMOUNT
STATED ABOVE IS DEMANDED OF YOU, AND THAT UNLESS YOUR
PAYMENT OF THE FULL AMOUNT IS MADE IN CERTIFIED FUNDS
(CASHIER’S CHECK OR MONEY ORDER) ON OR BEFORE THE
EXPIRATION OF THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF MAILING
OF THIS NOTICE, THE ASSOCIATION MAY COMMENCE AN ACTION
AGAINST YOU UNDER ARTICLE IX OF THE ILLINOIS CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE GOVERNING FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
SEEKING AN ORDER OF POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES AND WHICH
MAY RESULT IN A MONETARY JUDGMENT BEING ENTERED AGAINST
YOU. . . . ONLY FULL PAYMENT OF ALL AMOUNTS DEMANDED IN
THIS NOTICE WILL INVALIDATE THE DEMAND, UNLESS THE PERSON
CLAIMING POSSESSION, OR HIS OR HER AGENT OR ATTORNEY,
AGREES IN WRITING TO WITHDRAW THE DEMAND IN EXCHANGE FOR
RECEIVING PARTIAL PAYMENT.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THIRTY DAYS AFTER YOU RECEIVE THIS
LETTER TO DISPUTE THE VALIDITY OF THE DEBT OR ANY PART OF
IT. IF YOU DON’T DISPUTE IT WITHIN THAT PERIOD, I’LL
ASSUME THAT IT’S VALID.
IF YOU DO DISPUTE IT BY
NOTIFYING ME IN WRITING TO THAT EFFECT I WILL, AS
REQUIRED BY LAW, OBTAIN AND MAIL TO YOU PROOF OF THE
DEBT. AND IF, WITHIN THE SAME PERIOD, YOU REQUEST IN
WRITING THE NAME AND ADDRESS OF YOUR ORIGINAL CREDITOR,
IF THE ORIGINAL CREDITOR IS DIFFERENT FROM THE CURRENT
CREDITOR, I WILL FURNISH YOU WITH THAT INFORMATION TOO.
IF YOU REQUEST PROOF OF THE DEBT OR THE NAME AND ADDRESS
OF THE ORIGINAL CREDITOR WITHIN THE THIRTY-DAY PERIOD
THAT BEGINS WITH YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS DEMAND, THE LAW
REQUIRES ME TO SUSPEND MY EFFORTS (THROUGH LITIGATION OR
OTHERWISE) TO COLLECT THE DEBT UNTIL I MAIL THE REQUESTED
INFORMATION TO YOU.
THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A
DEBT. ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT
PURPOSE.
(“30 Day Notice and Demand,” dated Dec. 3, 2012, attached as Ex. A
to Am. Compl. (capitalization in original; underlining added).)
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The court has held that McCarter’s allegations with respect to the
December 3, 2012 letter state a claim against Kovitz under 15
U.S.C. § 1692g. See McCarter v. Kovitz Shifrin Nesbit, 6 F.Supp.3d
797, 802 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“[P]ayment is demanded ‘on or before the
expiration of thirty (30) days after the date of mailing’ of the
notice (emphasis added), when the thirty-day federal validation
period runs from receipt of the notice, and there is no explanation
of how those periods of time fit together.”); see also 15 U.S.C. §
1692g(b) (Collection activities and communications during the
thirty-day period “may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the
disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request
the name and address of the original creditor.” ).

McCarter also

alleges that she received a second letter from Kovitz, dated
January 17, 2013, which improperly failed to “state, identify, or
itemize all the charges adding up to the amount demanded in [the
letter].”

(See Am. Compl. ¶ 41.)

The amended complaint alleges

two separate classes, defined in relevant part below:
Class A:
All persons [who], within twelve months prior to the date
of filing of this action, resided in Illinois and
received (1) a form collection letter similar to
Plaintiff’s collection letter dated December 3, 2012 and
(2) those persons whose collection letters were sent but
were not returned by the postal service as undelivered or
undeliverable . . . .
Class B:

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All persons [who], within twelve months prior to the date
of filing of this action, resided in Illinois and
received (1) a form collection letter similar to
Plaintiff’s collection letter dated January 17, 2013
demanding payment without identifying the itemized
charges and (2) those persons whose collection letters
were sent but were not returned by the postal service as
undelivered or undeliverable. . . .
(Id. at ¶ 13.)

McCarter’s motion for “partial” certification asks

the court to certify Class A, only. (See Mot. for Partial Class
Cert. as to Count I, dated Mar. 14, 2014, Dkt. 61.)
Kovitz argues that the court should deny class certification
because McCarter and her attorneys will not adequately represent
the class’s interests.

Among other things, Kovitz contends that

one of McCarter’s attorneys, Mark Lavery, is affiliated with a law
firm that the Illinois Attorney General charged with misconduct.
McCarter has moved to strike this argument as “scandalous.”

(See

Mot. to Strike Scandalous Matter, dated Apr. 24, 2014, Dkt. 75.)
After the parties fully briefed the class-certification motion and
the motion to strike, McCarter filed: (1) a motion to add Krystyna
Scehura as an additional class representative, (see Mot. to Add Pl.
and Proposed Class Rep., dated Sept. 30, 2014, Dkt. 84); and (2) a
motion for a finding that Lill v. Kovitz Shifrin Nesbit, 14-cv-2647
(N.D. Ill.) (Wood, J.) is related to this case and should be
reassigned to this court, (see Mot. to Relate Cases, dated Sept.
30,

2014,

Dkt.

86)).

Shortly

after

filing

these

motions,

McCarter’s attorneys filed a separate lawsuit on Scehura’s behalf.

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See Scehura v. Kovitz Shifrin Nesbit, P.C., Case No. 14-cv-8838
(N.D. Ill.) (Dow, J.).

McCarter has moved to withdraw her motion

to add Scehura as a plaintiff, and instead seeks a finding that
Scehura — like Lill — is related to this case and should be
reassigned.

(See Combined Mot. to Withdraw and to Relate the

Scheura Action to this Case, dated Nov. 5, 2014, Dkt. 93.)1
DISCUSSION
I.

McCarter’s Motion for Class Certification
McCarter has the burden to establish that the putative class

action satisfies the following elements:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

If McCarter satisfies these prerequisites,

she must also establish that the proposed class satisfies one of
Rule 23(b)’s criteria.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).

In this case,

McCarter argues that the proposed class satisfies Rule 23(b)(3):
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is
satisfied and if:
[. . .]
1/
McCarter later filed a separate motion for a finding that Scehura is
related to this case. (See Mot. for Relatedness, dated Nov. 19, 2014, Dkt. 99.)

- 5 -

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters
pertinent to these findings include:
(A) the class
controlling the
actions;

members' interests in
prosecution or defense

individually
of separate

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already begun by or against class
members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); (see also Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Class
Cert. at 8-9.).
A.

“Class A”
1.

Rule 23(a)(1): Numerosity

Kovitz concedes that the individuals who fall within Class A’s
definition are so numerous that it would be impracticable to join
them in one lawsuit.
2.

(See Kovitz’s Opp’n. at 10.)

Rule 23(a)(2): Common Questions of Law or Fact

“Where the same conduct or practice by the same defendant
gives rise to the same kind of claims from all class members, there
is a common question.”

Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d

750, 756 (7th Cir. 2014).

Kovitz effectively concedes that the

letter that it sent to McCarter on December 3, 2012 is a form

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letter.

If the court finds that the letter violates the FDCPA,

then that finding will apply to all Illinois residents who received
the same letter during the class period. Thus, there is a question
of law common to the entire class.
3.

Rule 23(a)(3): Typicality

The typicality requirement “primarily directs the district
court to focus on whether the named representatives’ claims have
the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at
large.”

Muro v. Target Corp., 580 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2009)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
that

McCarter’s

claim

is

atypical

because

it

Kovitz argues
has

“arguable

defense[s] peculiar to McCarter:” (1) she only “skimmed” Kovitz’s
December 3, 2012 letter; and (2) she went on the internet and
obtained a form validation demand after receiving the letter,
suggesting that she understood her rights. (See Kovitz’s Opp’n. at
2-3, 8.)

These facts do not support even an arguable defense to

McCarter’s FDCPA claims.

“Claims brought under the [FDCPA] are

evaluated under the objective ‘unsophisticated consumer’ standard.”
Gruber v. Creditors' Protection Service, Inc., 742 F.3d 271, 273
(7th

Cir.

2014).

Thus,

it

is

irrelevant

understood, or even read, the letter.

whether

McCarter

See Bartlett v. Heibl, 128

F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he question whether a dunning
letter violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not
require evidence that the recipient was confused — or even, as we
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noted earlier, whether he read the letter . . . .”).

The same

alleged deficiencies in Kovitz’s form letter will underlie each
class-member’s claim, including McCarter’s.

The court concludes

that her claim is typical of the claims of the class.
4.

Rule 23(a)(4): Adequacy of Representation
a.

Whether McCarter Will Adequately Represent the
Class

Kovitz argues that McCarter cannot adequately represent the
class because: (1) she has a “poor memory;” (2) she was reluctant
to

divulge

information

that

she

deemed

personal

during

her

deposition; and (3) she did not disclose that one of her attorneys
in this case, Kenneth DucDuong, represented her in a lawsuit that
she filed against the Condo Association. (See Kovitz’s Opp’n at 24, 8-9.) According to Kovitz, the following testimony supports its
argument that McCarter’s “poor memory” will impair her ability to
represent the class:
Q.

At any time have you been treated for drug or
alcohol abuse?

A.

No.

Q.

Do you have any reason to believe that you have any
trouble with your memory?

A.

I’m older [McCarter is 66 years old].

Q.

Is that a yes?

A.

Yes.

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That’s . . .

(See McCarter Dep, attached as Group Ex. A to Def.’s Resp., at 29.)
Kovitz also cites McCarter’s testimony that she could not recall
exactly when she retained Mr. DucDuong to represent her in this
lawsuit.

(See id. at 60.)

These trivial admissions do not

undermine McCarter’s adequacy as a class representative. As Kovitz
points out, McCarter did object to divulging certain information
during her deposition that she considered too “personal.”

On the

whole, though, the portions of the transcript that Kovitz has cited
do not support the inference that McCarter was evasive.

(See,

e.g., id. at 20-21 (declining to state her birth date, but stating
her age); id. at 30 (declining to state the name of her current
business, but describing the nature of the business); id. at 39
(initially declining to identify the name of her former employer,
but then answering the question after prodding from counsel).) Nor
does

the

transcript

indicate

that

McCarter

participate in the class-action process.

is

reluctant

to

(See id. at 113 (“Q. Why

did you agree to be a class representative?

A. I felt that it was

my duty to represent the class if there was something done wrong,
as we noted, so — so that this would not happen to others.”).)
Kovitz relies heavily on McCarter’s failure to disclose during
her deposition that Mr. DucDuong filed a lawsuit on her behalf
against the Condo Association in November 2013. “For an assault on
the

class

representative’s

credibility

to

succeed,

the

party

mounting the assault must demonstrate that there exists admissible
- 9 -

evidence so severely undermining plaintiff’s credibility that a
fact finder might reasonably focus on plaintiff’s credibility, to
the detriment of the absent class members’ claims.” CE Design Ltd.
v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 728 (7th Cir.
2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
omission does not rise to that level.

McCarter’s

Kovitz’s attorney asked

McCarter whether Mr. DucDuong represented her in other lawsuits.
She stated that he represented her in the Condo Association’s
lawsuit against her, but did not disclose her lawsuit against the
Condo Association.

(See McCarter Dep. at 70; see also id. at 86

(testifying that she has been a party in several lawsuits, without
identifying her suit against the Condo Association).)
suggests

that

McCarter

deliberately

omitted

this

Kovitz

information

because she “had already filed a motion for default in that matter
and was quietly setting it up for default, with a default judgment
indeed

entered

on

March

14,

2014,

Association] only recently learned.”
This argument is a stretch.

about

which

the

[Condo

(Kovitz’s Opp’n. at 3-4.)

As far as the record reveals, she

properly served the Condo Association’s registered agent. (See id.
at 4.) The court concludes that McCarter will adequately serve the
class’s interests.
b.

Whether Plaintiff’s Counsel Will Adequately
Represent the Class

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Mr.
actions.

Lavery

has

significant

experience

litigating

class

(See Lavery Decl., attached as Ex. B to Mot. to Cert., ¶

9 (stating that he has litigated “several dozen class actions,” and
citing representative cases).)2

Nevertheless, Kovitz argues that

McCarter’s attorneys are inadequate because: (1) Mr. Lavery’s law
firm is related to a law firm that the Illinois Attorney General
sued for taking advantage of consumers; and (2) neither Mr. Lavery
nor Mr. DucDuong has malpractice insurance.
at 5, 9-10.)

(See Kovitz’s Opp’n.

Mr. Lavery is an attorney with Hyslip & Taylor, LLC,

L.P.A., the “assumed name” of a limited liability company called
Lifetime Debt Solutions, LLC.
attached

as

McCarter’s

Ex.

J

to

(Id. at 5; LLC File Detail Report,

Kovitz’s

class-certification

Opp’n.)
motion,

In

its

Kovitz

response
asserts,

to
on

information and belief, that Lifetime Debt Solutions, LLC “is the
successor, or otherwise a reincarnation, of ‘Legal Helpers Debt
Resolution, LLC’” (“Legal Helpers”).

(Kovitz’s Opp’n. at 5.)

It

then cites a newspaper article reporting that the Illinois Attorney
General

sued

Legal

Helpers

for

circumventing

charging up-front fees for “debt settlement.”

restrictions

on

(See Ameet Sachdev,

Chicago Law: Debt-settlement firm to wind down business, Chicago
Trib., July 27, 2012, attached as Ex. L to Kovitz’s Opp’n.)

In its

2/
Mr. DucDuong's class-action experience is limited.
(See DucDuong
Decl., attached as Ex. A to Mot. to Cert., ¶ 4.) Presumably, that is why he
associated with Mr. Lavery before filing McCarter’s class-certification motion.

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response to McCarter’s motion to strike these accusations, Kovitz
appears to abandon its argument that Hyslip & Taylor, LLC is the
“reincarnation” of Legal Helpers.

Instead, Kovitz argues that one

of Mr. Lavery’s colleagues at the firm — Jeffrey Hyslip — was (or
is) affiliated with Legal Helpers.
Strike at 2.)

(See Kovitz’s Resp. to Mot. to

Kovitz further states that it did not intend to

impugn Mr. Lavery’s ethics.

(Id.)

Rather, it meant to underscore

the risk of counsel’s failure to maintain malpractice insurance.
(Id.)
Kovitz’s theory is pure speculation.

Kovitz asserts that

Hyslip & Taylor may have legal troubles in the future because one
of its attorneys was affiliated with a law firm that had legal
troubles in the past.

If Hyslip & Taylor is required to pay a

judgment or settlement on these hypothetical claims, according to
Kovitz, it could impact the counsel’s ability “to represent and
protect the class’s interests.”

(See id. at 4.)

is insufficient to deny class certification.

This speculation
With respect to

Kovitz’s broader point about maintaining malpractice insurance, it
has not cited any case law supporting its argument that this is an
important consideration in class-action cases.

Instead, it relies

on an 8-year old article from The Madison-St. Clair Record about
another law firm.

(See Jesse Ammerman, Class action masters Freed

& Weiss don’t carry malpractice insurance, The Madison-St. Clair
Record, Dec. 22, 2006, attached as Ex. 1 to Kovitz’s Resp. to Mot.
- 12 -

to Strike.)

The author’s discussion about the importance of

malpractice insurance in class-action cases does not provide a
basis to find counsel here inadequate.

The court concludes that

Mr. DucDuong and Mr. Lavery will adequately represent the class.
c.

McCarter’s Motion to Strike “Scandalous Matter”

“The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

McCarter contends that Kovitz’s argument

about counsel’s lack of malpractice insurance was a pretext for
implying Mr. Lavery’s guilt by association with Legal Helpers.
Kovitz clarified in its response to McCarter’s motion to strike
that it did not intend to impugn Mr. Lavery’s ethics.
Resp. to Mot. to Strike at 2.)

(See Def.’s

Considering the record as a whole,

the court concludes that Kovitz’s argument is not “scandalous.”
The court denies McCarter’s motion to strike.
6.

Rule 23(b)

The proposed class satisfies Rule 23(b)(3).

The central

question in this lawsuit as it pertains to Class A is whether
language in Kovitz’s form letter “overshadows” the FDCPA-required
validation notice.

Besides purported defenses that the court

already has rejected, see supra, Kovitz has not identified any
other issue that will uniquely impact particular class members.
The court concludes that common issues will predominate over any
questions affecting only individual class members.
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Finally, this

is a run-of-the-mill FDCPA case. Most class members likely will be
entitled only to statutory damages. Few individuals would have the
incentive file a lawsuit to recover such a small amount of money.
See Crawford v. Equifax Payment Services, Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 880
(7th Cir. 2000) (Because FDCPA lawsuits “are small-stakes cases, a
class suit is the best, and perhaps the only, way to proceed.”).
Here, a class action “is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(3).
B.

“Class B”

McCarter has not moved to certify Class B.

In a footnote to

her motion to certify Class A, McCarter states that Class B “is a
subclass of Class A.

As such, should this Court grant Plaintiff

her motion to class A in this Motion [sic], it is not necessary to
certify Class B.”

(See Pl.’s Mot. for Cert. at 1, n.1.)

Rule

23(c)(5) states that, “[w]hen appropriate, a class may be divided
into subclasses that are each treated as a class under this rule.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5).

Courts applying Rule 23(c)(5) have

required plaintiffs to satisfy Rules 23(a) and (b) as to any
subclass.

See 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 4:45 (11th ed.)

(collecting cases); 7AA Charles Allan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1790 (3d ed.).3

3/

Kovitz asserts

The court has not found any recent Seventh Circuit authority directly
addressing this issue. The court, however, interpreted an earlier version of
Rule 23(c)(5) to require plaintiffs to establish the prerequisites for class
- 14 -

that it has not stipulated that members of Class B are sufficiently
numerous to support a class action, and McCarter does not argue
otherwise.

Indeed, except for the just-cited footnote, McCarter

does not discuss Class B at all. Accordingly, the court denies any
request to certify Class B.
II.

McCarter’s Motions to Reassign
McCarter has moved for a finding that Lill and Scheura are

related to this case and for reassignment.4
40.4.

See N.D. Ill. L.R.

Two or more civil cases are “related” if they “involve some

of the same issues of fact or law.”

See N.D. Ill. L.R. 40.4(a)(2).

Kovitz argues that the plaintiffs’ claims are unrelated because
they involve different debts, and Kovitz sent letters to them at
different times.

(See Kovitz’s Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. to Relate

(Scehura) at 4.)

The relevant question is whether the alleged

violations are similar, and in this case they are: the plaintiffs
in McCarter, Lill, and Scheura challenge the same form letter.
(See First Am. Compl., Lill, 14-cv-2647, Dkt. 16, ¶¶ 24-29 (Count
I); Compl., Scehura, Case No. 1:14-cv-8838, Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 19-25 (Count
I).)

The cases also allege overlapping classes.

(Compare Am.

certification as to any subclass.
See In re General Motors Corp. Engine
Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106, 1129 fn. 38 (7th Cir. 1979) (Subclasses
must “independently meet the requirements of Rule 23 for the maintenance of the
class action.”); see also In re Nanophase Technologies Corp. Litigation, Nos. 98
C 3450, 98 C 7447, 1999 WL 965468, *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999) (same).
4/

In light of counsel’s decision to file a separate lawsuit on Scheura’s
behalf, the court grants McCarter’s motion to withdraw her motion to add Scheura
as a plaintiff in this case.
- 15 -

Compl.

¶

13

14-cv-2647,

(“Class
Dkt.

16,

A”),
¶

with

29),

Am.

and

Compl.,

Compl.,

Lill,

Case

No.

Scehura,

Case

No.

14-cv-8838, Dkt. 1, ¶ 13); see also N.D. Ill. L.R. 40.4(a)(4) (two
or more class action suits may be related if “one or more of the
classes involved in the cases is or are the same”).

The court

finds that the Lill and Scehura are related to this case.
The cases also satisfy Local Rule 40.4(b)’s conditions for
reassigning related cases.

All three cases are pending in the

Northern District of Illinois.

See N.D. Ill. L.R. 40.4(b)(1).

It

would be more efficient for one judge to oversee the issues common
to all three lawsuits: class certification, class notice and
administration, and liability with respect to the form debtcollection letter.

See N.D. Ill. L.R. 40.4(b)(2).

Although

discovery has progressed further in this case than it has in Lill
and Scheura, the parties can bring those cases up to speed without
substantially delaying this case.

See N.D. Ill. L.R. 40.4(b)(3)

(the court will not reassign the earlier-filed case if it has
“progressed to the point where designating a later filed case as
related would be likely to delay the proceedings in the earlier
case substantially.”) (emphasis added).

Kovitz has stipulated to

numerosity as it applies to Class A, (see supra), a stipulation
that logically applies to the classes alleged in Lill and Scehura.
If Kovitz intends to challenge the plaintiffs’ adequacy as class
representatives,

the

court

can
- 16 -

set

short

dates

for

their

depositions. Likewise, Kovitz’s pending motions to dismiss in Lill
and Scehura will not substantially delay this case.

The motions

will be fully briefed before the end of January, and they track
some of the arguments that this court has already considered and
rejected. (See Mot. to Dismiss, Scehura, Case No. 14-cv-8838, Dkt.
13, at 4; Mot. to Dismiss, Lill, 14-cv-2647, Dkt. 23, at 2-5.)
Finally, the plaintiff in Lill alleges a claim against Kovitz based
upon its collection attempts after sending the initial debtcollection

letter.

(See

First

14-cv-2647, ¶¶ 30-62 (Count II).)

Am.

Compl.,

Dkt.

16,

Lill,

Kovitz has not identified any

obstacle to adjudicating that claim in the same proceeding as the
parties’ other claims.

See L.R. 40.4(b)(3).

CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

court:

(1)

grants

the

plaintiff’s motion for partial certification [61]; (2) denies the
plaintiff’s motion to strike [75]; (3) grants her motions for
findings that Lill v. Kovitz Shifrin Nesbit, Case No. 14-cv-2647
(N.D. Ill.) and

Scehura v. Kovitz Shifrin Nesbit, P.C., Case No.

14-cv-8838 (N.D. Ill.) are related to this case [86 and 99]; and

- 17 -

(4) grants her motion to withdraw her motion to add an additional
plaintiff [93].

McCarter’s motion to add Scehura as an additional

plaintiff [84] is withdrawn.

DATE:

January 5, 2015

ENTER:

_______________________________________________
Amy St. Eve, United States District Judge

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