Williamson v. Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
Filing
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Enter MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION: Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 11/7/2013: For the reasons stated herein Fermilabs Motion to Dismiss the class allegations is denied, and Fermilab may raise its alternative argument regarding the date for commencement of the 300-day window in response to any motion for class certification.Mailed notice(tsa, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
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CARRIE WILLIAMSON, f/k/a Carrie
Holzgrafe, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
FERMI NATIONAL ACCELERATOR
LABORATORY, c/k/a Fermilab,
Defendant.
13 C 4221
Judge Virginia M. Kendall
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Carrie Williamson filed suit on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals against
Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, c/k/a Fermilab 1 for violation of the Genetic Information
Nondisclosure Act of 2008 (GINA), via 42 U.S.C. § 1981, when Fermilab required all
employees to submit to a physical exam and questionnaire that included questions about family
medical history.
Ms. Williamson also alleges, for herself only, that Fermilab unlawfully
discharged her from her position as administrative assistant in violation of Title I of the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).
Fermilab moves to dismiss the class action portion of Count I of Ms. Williamson’s
Complaint on grounds that Williamson did not exhaust administrative remedies because her
EEOC charge allegations did not contain and are not reasonably related to allegations of classwide discrimination. In the alternative, Fermilab argues that the Court should limit the class
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Defendant states that this is the incorrect name for Defendant. According to Defendant, the correct name
is Fermi Research Alliance, LLC. (Def. Mem. 1). Because the caption has not yet been amended, we will refer to the
name used in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
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period to the period beginning December 3, 2011, 300 days before the EEOC issued its
determination letter dated September 28, 2012. For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss
the class claims is denied.
FACTS
When considering a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor
of
the
non-moving
party,
and
the
veracity
of
the
well-pleaded
allegations
is
assumed. See Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank, 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Savory v.
Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006)). On May 13, 2010 Fermilab hired Williamson by letter
as an Administrative Support Assistant IV in the Directorate/Program Planning Department.
(Compl. ¶ 6).
Williamson started her employment with Fermilab on May 15, 2010. Id.
Sometime after starting her job at Fermilab, Fermilab required Williamson to fill out a medical
questionnaire, provide a DNA sample, and submit to a physical examination. Id. at ¶ 8. On the
questionnaire, which included questions regarding Williamson’s family medical history,
Williamson disclosed that she suffered from depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) and is genetically predisposed to heart disease, hypertension, hearing problems, and
cancer. Id. at ¶ 8-9. Approximately ten days after her physical exam, Fermilab required
Williamson to submit to an EKG test, a hearing test, and a vision test. Id. at ¶ 10.
On July 15, 2010, Williamson was fired without warning from her employment at
Fermilab. Id. at ¶ 7. The termination letter stated that the reason for the discharge was “deficient
job performance.” Id. at ¶ 24. Up until being fired, Williamson had received no warnings or
criticism of her job performance. Id. at ¶ 11. Williamson filed a timely charge to the EEOC,
alleging that Fermilab had discriminated against her in violation of both the ADA and GINA. Id.
at ¶ 12. Williamson’s charge in relevant part stated,
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“I began my employment with Respondent on May 15, 2010 and
my most recent position was Administrative Assistance. On July
15, 2010, I was discharged.
I believe I was discriminated against because of my disability, in
violation of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990, as
amended.
I also believe I was discriminated against because of my genetic
information, in violation of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008.” (Def. Ex. 8-1). 2
By letter dated September 28, 2012 3 the EEOC made the following determination,
…the evidence obtained in the investigation establishes reasonable
cause to believe that Respondent discriminated against Charging
Party because of her disability and her genetic information, in that
she was discharged, in violation of the ADA and GINA.
. . .
I have also determined that Respondent discriminated against a
class of individuals, including Charging Party, by acquiring their
genetic information, in violation of GINA.
(Compl. ¶ 12) (emphasis added).
On April 10, 2013, the EEOC issued a Right to Sue Letter to Williamson. (Cmplt. at ¶
13). This action commenced on June 6, 2013. Williamson alleges that Fermilab violated GINA
by requiring all new employees, including Williamson, to submit to a physical exam and to
complete a medical questionnaire that included required questions concerning family medical
history. Id. at ¶ 16-17. Williamson further alleges that Fermilab terminated her employment
2
Williamson did not include a copy of the EEOC Charge in her Complaint. However, because she relies on
the Charge in her Complaint and it is central to her claim, the Charge is considered part of the pleadings and may be
considered in ruling on Fermilab’s motion to dismiss. See EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773,
778 (7th Cir. 2007).
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Williamson states the date of the Determination Letter as November 9, 2012, while Fermilab presents a
Determination Letter dated September 28, 2012. Since Williamson provided a copy of this letter and relies heavily
on the September 28, 2012 date, the Court accepts the date of September 28 as reflected on the document. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 10(C).
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because she suffers from PTSD in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and that any
claim of deficient job performance by Fermilab was only pretext. Id. at ¶ 22, 24.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint, not its merits. Gibson v.
Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990) citing Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous.
Authority, 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir.1989). A complaint must only contain an identification of
the basis of jurisdiction and a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Detailed factual allegations” are not required, but the
plaintiff must allege facts that, when “accepted as true…’state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929
(2007)). On a motion to dismiss, a court considers to be true all well pleaded allegations, as well
as any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th
Cir. 2008). A court may also consider documents attached to the complaint as part of the
complaint. Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).
DISCUSSION
I.
Class Allegations
Williamson argues that Fermilab violated GINA, 42 U.S.C § 2000ff-1, as to herself and
to a Class of individuals when Fermilab required Williamson and all other new employees to
submit to a physical exam and answer a medical questionnaire. Fermilab argues that the Court
should dismiss the class allegations contained in Count I of Williamson’s Complaint for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies with the EEOC because Williamson did not explicitly make
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allegations of class-wide discrimination or discrimination allegedly suffered by others in her
Charge to the EEOC.
As a general rule, a plaintiff cannot bring a discrimination claim in a lawsuit that was not
included in her EEOC charge. Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500
(7th Cir. 1994) citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S. Ct 1011, 1019
(1974). This rule affords the EEOC and the employer an opportunity to “settle the dispute
through conference, conciliation, and persuasion” and gives the employer notice of the charge.
Id.; see also Schnellbaecher v. Baskin Clothing Co.. 887 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1989). But because
most EEOC charges are completed by laypersons, a plaintiff need not allege in an EEOC charge
each and every fact that forms the basis of each claim in her complaint. Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500.
Likewise, the charge need not explicitly state that the plaintiff intends to pursue representative
action. See Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 852 F.2d 1008, 1017, (7th Cir. 1988)
(“[W]e do not believe that such an explicit mention that a representative action is contemplated
is necessary.”) Factual allegations in a complaint need not be laid out in an EEOC charge as long
as they are “like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such
allegations.” Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1976).
In the present case, although the determination letter written to by the EEOC to Fermilab
following investigation of Williamson’s charge contains findings of class-wide discrimination,
Williamson’s initial charge to the EEOC does not. Fermilab relies on several cases to support
the conclusion that this omission in Williamson’s charge requires us to dismiss Williamson’s
class allegations notwithstanding the contents of the EEOC’s subsequent letter; however, only
two of the cases cited were decisions on Rule 12. They are Schnellbaecher v. Baskin Clothing
Co., 887 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1989) and a case from this Court, Bluford v. Swift Transp., No. 11-
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6932, 2012 WL 1755772 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2012). The nature and circumstances of these cases
are distinguishable from the present case for an important reason: the notice that the EEOC’s
investigation provided to Fermilab.
The Schnellbaecher court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s class allegations
because the EEOC charges in question each referred to only specific individual instances of
discrimination. Schnellbaecher, 887 F.2d at 128. However, in reaching its decision the court
focused on the defendant’s lack of notice of a pending class action. See id. at 127-128 (stating
“Neither the charge nor the ensuing investigation put Baskin…on notice of the plaintiffs'
intention to file a lawsuit containing allegations of class-wide discrimination.” (emphasis
added)). Also unlike the present case, in Schnellbaecher, the scope of the EEOC’s investigation
into the plaintiff’s charge was much narrower than the allegations set forth in the subsequent
complaint. Id. at 128 (“Because both the EEOC charge and the ensuing investigation were
insufficient to put the defendants on notice of any intention of the plaintiffs to make allegations
of class-wide discrimination in their complaint, the district judge was correct in dismissing the
charges of class-wide discrimination.”)
In Bluford, this Court dismissed the plaintiff’s class allegations because “the original
Charge contain[ed] no reference to any class-wide allegations…” 2012 WL 1755772 at *6. But
the circumstances leading to the plaintiff’s complaint in Bluford were different from the present
case, because EEOC had not issued Bluford a Determination Letter, as it did here, making a
finding about class-wide discrimination. Therefore, we concluded in Bluford that “the
investigation in the instant case was insufficiently broad to adequately put Swift on notice that
Bluford intended to file a complaint alleging class-wide discrimination.” Bluford, 2012 WL
1755772 at *6 (emphasis added).
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The circumstances of the present case, namely the EEOC’s determination of class-wide
discrimination, merit a different conclusion, because although Williamson’s initial charge may
not have put Fermilab on notice of allegations of class-wide discrimination, the Determination
Letter certainly did so. In light of this fact, the reasoning of another case of this district, U.S.
E.E.O.C. v. Roadway Exp., Inc., is more persuasive than either of Fermilab’s suggested
precedents. Roadway, No. 06-C-4805 2007 WL 2198363 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 31, 2007). In Roadway,
as here, the EEOC issued a Determination Letter finding “…reasonable cause to believe that
[Roadway] discriminated against a class of employees, including Charging Party…” Roadway,
2007 WL 2198363 at *1. Unlike this case, the plaintiff in Roadway did include class allegations
in his EEOC charge. See id. at *1. However, the Roadway court again focused on the notice to
the defendant when determining which class-wide allegations would continue. Id. at *6 (“The
EEOC's ensuing investigation and determination were sufficiently broad to put Roadway on
notice of a potential class-action challenging its overall disciplinary system.”) (emphasis added).
The purpose of limiting a plaintiff’s complaint to the allegations in the EEOC charge is to
provide notice to the charged party and to promote conciliation. Schnellbaecher, 887 F.2d at 126.
The Determination Letter sent to Williamson and Fermilab on September 28, 2012, finding
discrimination against a class of individuals and inviting Fermilab to participate in conciliation,
meets both of those goals in the present case. The EEOC, in its determination letter, does not
indicate a mere belief that Fermilab discriminated against a class, but states “I have determined
that Respondent discriminated against a class of individuals…” (Def. Ex. 8-2) (emphasis added).
This determination was sufficient to put Fermilab on notice that Ms. Williamson and/or a
broader class of individuals might pursue legal action against them.
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In light of the determination letter, it is not appropriate to dispose of Ms. Williamson’s
class claims at the motion to dismiss phase when it is clear from the Determination Letter that
the EEOC discovered facts that it believed supported findings of class discrimination while
conducting its investigation into Ms. Williamson’s charge. It is clear from the Determination
Letter that, after Ms. Williamson filed her initial charge, the EEOC found something indicating
class-wide discrimination, and the Letter provided adequate notice to Fermilab of the existence
of a potential class.
II.
Limitation of Class Period to 300 Days Prior to Determination Letter
In the alternative, Fermilab argues that the class period should be limited to 300 days
before the EEOC’s Determination Letter, dated September 28, 2012. In support of its argument,
Fermilab relies almost entirely on Vasich v. City of Chicago, No. 11-04843, 2013 WL 80372
(N.D.Ill. Jan. 7, 2013), a case in which multiple women brought individual charges to the EEOC
and later collectively brought a class claim against the City of Chicago. The Vasich court
measured the 300-day class period from the date of the latest charge filed, which was the only
one to include class allegations. Vasich, 2013 WL 80372 at *7. In making its decision, the Vasich
court expressed concerned with the notice the defendant had “that the discrimination was against
not only the claimant but an entire group of people.” Id. at *4 (citing Schnellbaecher, 887 F. 2d
at 127-128).
The class period should be measured from the point at which Fermilab knew that the
allegations of discrimination extended beyond the plaintiff to a group. See Schnellbaecher, 887
F.2d at 127-128. In the present case, at this early stage in the case it is not apparent when
Fermilab became aware of existence of a potential class.
Instead, the pleadings provide
bookends to that notice – a charge made on July 26, 2010 containing no class allegations, and a
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Determination Letter dated September 2012 summarizing the EEOC’s investigation and finding
of class-wide discrimination. At some point between the execution of these two documents, the
EEOC conducted an investigation and uncovered facts indicating to the EEOC that Fermilab
engaged in class-wide discrimination. It follows that Fermilab, at some point during the EEOC
investigation, obtained notice of potential class-wide concerns. This notice occurred at the latest
with the letter dated September 28, 2012, but quite possibly before. At this early stage in the
case there is not enough information to set this date specifically.
Therefore, Fermilab’s
alternative motion to limit the period to 300 days before September 28, 2012 is denied without
prejudice to raise the issue again in connection with a response to any motion for class
certification.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein Fermilab’s Motion to Dismiss the class allegations is
denied, and Fermilab may raise its alternative argument regarding the date for commencement of
the 300-day window in response to any motion for class certification.
________________________________________
Virginia M. Kendall
United States District Court Judge
Northern District of Illinois
Date: November 7, 2013
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