Bless v. Cook County Sheriff's Office et al

Filing 469

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John Z. Lee on 8/3/20.Mailed notice(ca, )

Case: 1:13-cv-04271 Document #: 469 Filed: 08/03/20 Page 1 of 17 PageID #:22663

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ROBERT BLESS,
Plaintiff,
v.
COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE;
TOM DART in his official and individual
capacity; DEWAYNE HOLBROOK;
JOSEPH WAYS, SR.; ZELDA WITTLER,
SHERYL COLLINS; EDWARD DYNER;
HENRY HEMPHILL; ROSEMARIE
NOLAN; COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S
MERIT COMMISSION; COOK COUNTY,
a unit of local government,
Defendants.

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No. 13 C 4271
Judge John Z. Lee

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In 2013, the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Commission (“Merit Board”) issued
an administrative decision directing the Cook County Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s
Office”) to terminate Police Officer Robert Bless. Invoking Illinois’s Administrative
Review Law, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-102, Bless asks the Court to vacate that decision
and order the Sheriff’s Office to reinstate him. For the reasons below, Bless’s motion
is granted in part and denied in part.1

Bless also has filed claims under 18 U.S.C. §1983 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against the Cook County Sheriff’s Office and numerous
individual defendants, alleging race discrimination and First Amendment retaliation.
Accordingly, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim. Defendants
have moved for summary judgment as to these claims, and the motion is granted for the
reasons discussed in the accompanying order.
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I.
A.

Background

Factual Background
Bless served as a police officer with the Sheriff’s Office until the Merit Board

voted to fire him on May 6, 2013. R.2 at 24–28. During the last few years of his
employment with the Sheriff’s Office, Bless also worked secondary employment as a
lawyer and as a McHenry County Board Commissioner. Id. at 488, 496–97.
In September 2008, Bless suffered serious injuries as a result of a car accident
that occurred while he was on duty. Id. at 435, 512–15. At the time, Bless was placed
on injured on-duty status and granted temporary disability benefits. Id. For the next
two years, Bless collected those benefits; at the same time, he continued to work as a
lawyer and Commissioner. Id. at 489–98.
Under the Sheriff’s Office’s rules, an employee may only work other jobs if he
or she submits a secondary employment request form and receives authorization. Id.
at 1083–91. Bless claims that he properly submitted secondary employment forms
for both his law practice and his role with McHenry County. Id. at 499, 507–08.
Defendants dispute this, asserting that Bless had not submitted any requests from
early 2009 through late 2010. Id. at 498–500, 509, 511, 560–61.
For that reason, the Office of Professional Review (“OPR”), a division of the
Sheriff’s Office, brought administrative charges against Bless in May 2011. Id. at
692–93. Following an investigation, the Sheriff’s Office filed formal charges before

For convenience’s sake, the Court cites to the Administrative Review Record, filed as
ECF Nos. 26–29, as “R.” followed by the relevant page numbers.
2

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the Merit Board in October 2011. Id. at 18–23. In its complaint, the Sheriff’s Office
accused Bless of driving without first obtaining authorization from his physician,
engaging in unapproved secondary employment, and lying to investigators. Id.
B.

The Merit Board’s Decision
After holding a three-day evidentiary hearing that featured testimony from ten

witnesses, the Merit Board issued a written decision on May 6, 2013. R. at 24–28.
Among other factual findings, the Board concluded that:
•

“[Bless] was classified as injury duty status. . . .; [s]uch status precluded
[him] from driving. . . . ; [and] he was in fact driving . . . in violation of his
classification.” Id. at 26.

•

“[Neither] Respondent’s Department nor designee gave authorization to the
Respondent to engage in secondary employment in 2009 through and
including November 23, 2010.” Id. at 27.

•

“[T]he Respondent made an inaccurate and false statement when [he told
investigators] that he did submit a secondary employment [form] each year
for Bless & Associates [his law firm].” Id. at 26 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Based on those findings, the Merit Board ordered the Sheriff’s Office to
terminate Bless. Id. at 27. In reaching that result, the Board emphasized that “the
egregiousness of Respondent’s acts set[ ] this matter apart from others.” Id. “The
evidence clearly demonstrates that the Respondent lied,” the Board explained, “so
[as] to continue looting Cook County taxpayers by continuing to receive temporary
disability checks.” Id. “This Respondent was sworn to uphold the public trust of not
just the taxpayers of Cook County,” the Board continued, “but also the public trust of
the taxpayers of McHenry County.” Id. Shortly after the Merit Board released its
decision, Bless filed suit in this Court.

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II.

Legal Standard

Illinois’s Administrative Review Law governs this claim and empowers courts
to review agency decisions. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-110. In doing so, courts must
take agencies’ factual findings as “prima facie true and correct” and refrain from
reweighing the evidence. Id.; see Launis v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 603 N.E.2d
477, 481 (Ill. 1992). “Rather, review is limited to determining whether findings of
fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence, and if not, whether those
findings supported the administrative decision.” Wright v. Vill. of Franklin Park, No.
05 C 3696, 2008 WL 820560, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2008) (citing Launis, 603 N.E.2d
at 484).
Still, the deference owed to an agency’s decision is not “boundless.” Kouzoukas
v. Ret. Bd. of the Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 917 N.E.2d 999, 1011 (Ill. 2009)
(citation omitted). “Although a decision may be supported by some evidence, which
if undisputed would sustain the administrative finding, it is not sufficient if upon a
consideration of all the evidence, the finding is against the manifest weight.” McRay
v. Ross, No. 17 C 01588, 2018 WL 2432164, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2018) (citing
Bowlin v. Murphrysboro Firefighters Pension Bd. of Trs., 857 N.E.2d 777, 782 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2006)). That means that review “cannot amount to a rubber stamp of
proceedings below.” Bowlin, 857 N.E.2d at 782.
In reviewing “an administrative agency’s decision to discharge an employee,”
courts follow “a two-step process.” Marzano v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Merit Board, 920
N.E.2d 1205, 1208 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). At the first step, courts ask whether an

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agency’s “findings of fact are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” Walker
v. Dart, 30 N.E.3d 426, 435 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (citation omitted). At the second step,
courts analyze whether those “findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for [the
agency’s] conclusion that cause for discharge exists.” Id.
III.

Analysis

The threshold question is whether this Court retains jurisdiction to hear
Bless’s administrative review claim. In the accompanying order, the Court granted
summary judgment in Defendants’ favor as to Bless’s federal claims. See 8/3/2020
Order, ECF No. 466. When “all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial,” the
Seventh Circuit has held that “the usual practice is to dismiss . . . state supplemental
claims.” Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999). One exception is
when “the statute of limitations has run on the pendent claim, precluding the filing
of a separate suit in state court.” Sharp Electronics Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 578 F.3d 505, 514–15 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
That exception applies here. Under Illinois law, courts may only consider an
administrative review claim if it is filed within thirty-five days of an agency’s
decision. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-103. But Bless lodged his claim here, rather
than in state court. And, because Illinois courts reject equitable tolling in this
context, Bless’s filing of the claim in federal court within thirty-five days would not
toll the limitations period. See Van Milligen v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 868 N.E.2d 1083,
1093 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Davis v. Cook Cty., 534 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2008) (in
deciding questions of supplemental jurisdiction, federal courts should consider

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whether a state court would apply “a rule of tolling”). Given that an Illinois court
would likely refuse to hear Bless’s administrative review claim, the Court exercises
its discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over that claim. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a). With that, the Court turns to the merits.
Bless argues that the Court should set aside the Merit Board’s decision for
three reasons.3 First, the Board’s decision is too vague to permit proper review;
second, each of the Board’s factual findings contradict the manifest weight of the
evidence; third, even if the Board’s findings were accurate, those findings would not
justify discharge.
A.

Vagueness
At the outset, Bless casts the Board’s decision as so vague as to preclude

meaningful review. An agency must provide “in writing, a reasoned explanation for
its decision in [each] case, complete with findings and conclusions.” Medina Nursing
Ctr., Inc. v. Health Facilities & Servs. Review Bd., 992 N.E.2d 616, 621 (Ill. App. Ct.
2013). In doing so, the agency must “adequately articulate the bases of their action,
showing a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Id. at
620.

Bless also suggests that the Merit Board was biased against him because some of its
members were political supporters of Sheriff Dart, a Democrat. Mot. Admin. Rev. at 9–10,
ECF No. 434. But “[a] party must raise a claim of bias by the administrative agency soon
after learning of it because it would be improper to allow a party to withhold a claim of bias
until it obtained an unfavorable ruling.” Royal Towing, Inc. v. City of Harvey, No. 03 C 4925,
2005 WL 1563198, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2005) (citing A.R.F. Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution
Control Bd., 528 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)). Seeing no reason for Bless’s delay, the
Court concludes that he has waived this argument.
3

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To the extent that Bless casts the Board’s entire decision as vague, that
objection is unsubstantiated. While brief, the four-page opinion summarizes the
evidence presented, arrives at factual findings, and links those findings with legal
conclusions. And, contrary to Bless’s suggestion, the Board had no obligation to
discuss each exhibit entered and witness tendered. What matters is that the decision
is sufficiently detailed for a court to “conduct a meaningful review of the issues.”
Roman v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Merit Bd., 17 N.E.3d 130, 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). Read
as a whole, the Board’s opinion clears that hurdle.
This result accords with Roman, the case upon which Bless relies. In Roman,
a court chastised the Board for “fail[ing] to provide any analysis or explanation
whatsoever in its initial decisions.” Id. at 156 (emphasis added). Here, by contrast,
the Board outlined the evidentiary basis for its findings and the legal conclusions
they support. Taken as a whole, the Board’s decision is not so vague that this Court
cannot review it.
B.

Factual Findings
When reviewing an administrative decision under Illinois law, the first step is

to decide whether the agency’s “findings of fact are contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence.” Walker, 30 N.E.3d at 435. In essence, the Board’s decision boils
down to four factual determinations: (1) Bless drove a car when his injury status
precluded him from doing so, (2) Bless worked several second jobs without prior
authorization, (3) Bless lied to investigators, and (4) Bless flouted a series of other
rules. See R. at 26–27.

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1.

Driving Restriction

First, the Board found that Bless’s “duty injury status . . . prevented him from
driving” between September 2008 and November 2010, and that he did so anyway.
R. at 26. The parties agree that Bless began driving in February 2009, id. at 467–69,
but disagree as to whether his leave status prevented him from doing so.
During the evidentiary hearing, Rosemarie Nolan, the Sheriff’s Office’s
personnel director, testified that Bless’s “injured on duty status” included a driving
restriction. Id. at 426–27. Similarly, in an April 2009 memorandum, Nolan wrote
that Bless “had a driving restriction documented and on file with the Risk
Management Office.” Id. at 1043. Although Nolan later admitted that she never saw
that file herself, she clarified that a contact in Risk Management told her about its
contents.4 Id. at 438.
The Board also heard evidence from medical professionals who treated Bless.
Doctor Salehi, who examined Bless on behalf of Risk Management, stated that he
warned Bless against driving during a November 2008 appointment. Id. at 611. And
in early 2009, Salehi again cautioned Bless not to drive until a physical therapist or
doctor determined that his range of motion had returned. Id. at 614–15. For the first
few months of that year, a physical therapist named Chris Wallace worked with

Bless failed to raise any evidentiary objections to Nolan’s testimony about the contents
of the file before the Merit Board. Nor does he advance any such arguments here. Thus, any
such objections are deemed waived. See Shipley v. Chi. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 947 F.3d
1056, 1063 (7th Cir. 2020) (noting that “perfunctory and undeveloped arguments . . . are
waived”).
4

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Bless. Id. at 358–61. Although Bless exhibited some improvement in his range of
motion, Wallace never told him “when he could drive or should start to drive,” because
he preferred to leave that decision to Bless’s doctors. Id. at 360–61.
Based on this record, the Court cannot say that the Merit Board clearly erred
in finding that Bless drove in violation of his duty status. Bless did testify that his
driving had not been restricted in February 2009. Id. at 587–88. But, considering
Nolan, Salehi, and Wallace’s testimony, the Merit Board could reasonably have
disbelieved Bless. That Salehi later reviewed a video of Bless driving in early 2009
and opined that it was safe for him to do so makes little difference. Id. at 620. The
question is not whether Bless had the ability to drive. Rather, the question is whether
he violated his duty status by doing so. Given Nolan’s testimony that Bless’s file
included such a restriction, and given that none of his healthcare providers lifted that
restriction before February 2009, the Board’s conclusion is not contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, this finding against Bless is sustained.
2.

Secondary Employment

The Board also found that Bless had engaged in secondary employment
without obtaining authorization from the Sheriff’s Office.5 R. at 26–27. At the time,
the Office’s rules required employees to secure permission to work secondary jobs. Id.
at 209–10. Moreover, these rules put the onus on police officers to obtain approval

More specifically, the Board concluded that Bless disobeyed the “Secondary
Employment” and “Knowledge of Rules, Orders, Procedures, and Bulletins” general orders.
R. at 25; see also id. at 20–22 (listing the relevant sections of the rules). Although Bless casts
those conclusions as vague, that is incorrect. As discussed in the paragraphs that follow, the
Board adequately explained its conclusion that Bless had violated the cited rules.
5

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before accepting or starting another job. Id. at 209–10, 246; see also id. at 412–413
(“Q: Is it [employees’] responsibility to ensure that approval is obtained before they
start working? [Nolan]: Yes”).
According to Nolan, the personnel department maintains a database that
“identifies all of the employees in the Sheriff’s Office that have submitted a secondary
employment form to their department head that has been forwarded on to us.” Id. at
411. When the Office started to investigate Bless, Nolan searched the database for
secondary request forms. Id. at 415. But she says that she discovered no requests
from Bless—approved or unapproved—for the relevant time period. Id. 420. Based
on that testimony, the Board concluded that Bless had failed to obtain approval to
work as a lawyer and elected official from early 2009 until late 2010. Id. at 26–27.
In challenging that determination, Bless points to evidence that he had
submitted a request for that period. For example, he cites the testimony of three
patrol officers and a sergeant who recalled that Bless had filed a request form in early
2009. Id. at 370–66, 378–82, 386–93, 590–91. Additionally, Bless complains that he
“was never informed that his ability to engage in secondary employment was not
approved.”

Mot. Admin. Rev. at 18.

That misses the point.

The rules make

employees responsible for securing approval before starting a second job, not just for
submitting a request. R. at 209–10. And, as Bless admitted to the Board, he “never
received approval” for his work as a lawyer and Commissioner during 2009. Id. 560–
61. That is enough to support the Board’s factual finding.

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Equally unavailing is Bless’s argument that the Board should have
disregarded Nolan’s testimony entirely.6 During the trial, Nolan stated that Bless
had no secondary employment requests on file from before 2008; this was incorrect.
Id. at 429, see id. at 814–39. But that error does not necessarily discredit Nolan’s
other testimony; after all, her review was focused on whether Bless’s file contained
request forms for 2009 and 2010. What is more, “it is not the function of [a reviewing]
court to reevaluate witness credibility.” Nwaokocha v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l
Regulation, 105 N.E.3d 16, 30 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (citation omitted). And that is
especially true here, where nothing in the record indicates that anyone in the Sheriff’s
Office approved Bless’s requests for secondary employment in 2009 or 2010.
The Board did not clearly err in concluding that Bless disobeyed the Office’s
secondary employment rules, and Bless’s objections to this finding are rejected.
3.

Statement to Investigators

Next, the Board found that Bless had lied in a written statement to OPR
investigators regarding his work as an attorney by falsely stating that “he had a
secondary employment request on file.” Id. at 27 (emphasis added).7 R. at 26–27.
But that is not exactly what Bless wrote in his statement. Rather, as the Board

Bless also attempts to discredit Nolan’s testimony by referring to information not
contained in the administrative record, including her deposition in this case. But the Board
could only consider the evidence before it, and the Court’s review is confined to the
administrative record. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-110.
6

Specifically, the Board determined that Bless’s allegedly false statement violated a
rule providing that “no member of the Department will make false official record(s), reports
or report any inaccurate, false or improper information.” R. at 26.
7

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acknowledges elsewhere in its decision, Bless actually told investigators that “he did
submit a secondary employment application each year for [his law firm].” Id. at 699–
700 (emphasis added). The question then is whether the Board clearly erred in
finding that Bless had lied when he said that he had submitted a secondary
employment form for his legal practice. Id. at 26.
To reach that conclusion, the Board relied on the testimony of Nolan, the
personnel director, and Henry Hemphill, an OPR investigator. Id. at 26. As noted,
Nolan attested that the Office did not have any secondary employment request forms
on file for Bless for 2009 or 2010. Id. 409–39. Likewise, Hemphill testified that he
had asked several employees at the Sheriff’s Office to check whether Bless had any
requests on file for that period. Id. at 449–50. When that search failed to turn up
any request forms, Hemphill decided that Bless’s statement that he had submitted
such a request in 2009 was a lie. Id. 452, 455.
But the Board heard other evidence that undermines Hemphill’s hypothesis.
Most important, Sergeant Larry King said that he met with Bless at a Dunkin’
Donuts in late 2008 or early 2009. Id. at 570. During that meeting, King says, Bless
handed him a secondary employment request form for his legal work. Id. According
to King, he forwarded those forms up the chain of command, just as the Office’s
policies required. Id. at 571–72. “I surrendered the forms to the Lieutenant,” King
explained, “and then I believe either he put them in the admin box or they got turned
in with the paper.” Id. at 572. The record is silent as to what happened to the forms
after that.

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Three other officers were present at the Dunkin’ Donuts and corroborated
King’s account. Officer Francisco Ruiz stated that, in early 2009, he had witnessed
Bless hand King a secondary employment request form. Id. at 388–89. Officer
Christopher Garcia represented that, although he did not see the form itself, he had
heard Bless tell King that “he was turning in his secondary employment form.” Id.
373–74. And Officer Jose Del Valle testified to hearing the same statement. Id. at
381–82.
The Court is mindful that the Merit Board’s determinations deserve “the
benefit of the doubt.” Coyne v. Milan Police Pension Bd., 807 N.E.2d 1276, 1285 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004). Still, the manifest weight of the evidence contradicts the Board’s
conclusion that Bless had lied when he said that he submitted a request form in 2009.
See Royal Towing, 2005 WL 1563198, at *5 (emphasizing that “the manifest weight
standard is not a mere stamp of approval for agency decisions”) (citation omitted).
Here, four other police officers corroborated Bless’s story that he had submitted an
authorization form in early 2009.
This is not a case where the Board faced a choice between conflicting evidence.
See Launius, 603 N.E.2d at 481 (warning that “it is not the court’s function to resolve
factual inconsistencies”). Notably, Nolan’s assertion that Bless’s personnel file had
contained no relevant request forms is not inconsistent with the officers’ testimony.
As Nolan acknowledged, each form must pass through six different supervisors before
it arrives at the personnel office. R. at 432. Although supervisors were told to forward
files to Nolan’s office, there was no system in place to make sure that happened. Id.

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at 432. Thus, the most plausible reading of the record is that Bless had submitted a
request form in 2009, but it was misplaced before it reached his personnel file. The
Board failed to consider that possibility, let alone explain why it was rejected. See
Coyne, 807 N.E.2d at 1285 (noting that, while the Board’s “prerogative undoubtedly
includes making credibility determinations,” it “must articulate the findings
underlying [those] choice[s] to facilitate meaningful review”). Because the finding
that Bless lied to investigators contradicts the manifest weight of the evidence, that
aspect of the Board’s decision is vacated.
Furthermore, as Bless points out, the decision suggests that the Board may
have believed that Bless had engaged in other deliberate conduct to conceal his
secondary employment. For example, the Board faulted Bless for “looting Court
County taxpayers” and described his conduct as “extremely egregious.” Id. at 27.
That language can be interpreted in two ways. One reading is that it follows from
the Board’s conclusion that Bless had lied to OPR investigators. Another reading is
that the Board understood Bless to have engaged in other acts of concealment. If so,
such a finding also must be vacated, because the Board failed to specify those acts or
articulate how the record supports them. See Medina, 992 N.E.2d at 621 (recognizing
that an agency must provide “a reasoned explanation for its decision”). On remand,
the Board should clarify whether it determined that Bless practiced other forms of
deliberate concealment, and if so, should explain that conclusion.

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4.

Other Rule Violations

Aside from the factual findings discussed above, the Board also concluded that
that Bless disobeyed the Office’s general orders related to (1) “Absence Due to Injuries
Received While on Duty,” (2) “Conduct Regarding the Performance of Duty,” and (3)
“Standard of Conduct.” R. at 25; see also id. at 20–22 (listing the relevant sections of
the rules). But the Board does not explain why it decided that Bless broke those
rules. Indeed, even after reviewing the Board’s decision, the Court is left to guess the
factual support for these conclusions. See Medina, 922 N.E.2d at 620 (requiring “a
rational connection” between factual findings and an agency’s choices). Accordingly,
the Court vacates the Board’s determination that Bless had violated the enumerated
rules. To the extent that those rules factor into the Board’s decision on remand, the
Board should articulate what led it to believe that Bless had violated them.
C.

Discharge Decision
“[When] an important pillar of the Board’s discharge decision [is] vacated, the

next question is whether the affirmed findings provide ‘cause’ for the firing.” McRay,
2018 WL 2432164, at *10; see Walker, 30 N.E.3d at 435 (asking whether an agency’s
“findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for [its] conclusion that cause for discharge
exists”).

In voting to dismiss Bless, the Board placed great weight on its

determination that he had made a false statement to the investigators. Indeed, the
Board described Bless’s alleged lie as “extremely troubling” and found that it
contributed to a “malicious[ ] breach of the public trust.” Id. at 26–27. Given that

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the Board’s discharge decision depended in large part on its finding that Bless had
lied, that decision must be revisited.
Under the Act, a reviewing court may “reverse and remand [an agency’s]
decision in whole or in part, and, in that case, . . . state the questions requiring further
hearing or proceedings.” 735 Ill. Comp. Stat 5/3-111(a)(6). Furthermore, because
“[t]he Merit Board, not the reviewing court, is in the best position to determine the
effect of an employee’s conduct,” that approach is appropriate here. Lopez v. Dart,
118 N.E.3d 580, 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). Therefore, the Court remands this case to
the Board for it to decide whether the vacatur of the false-statement finding alters its
conclusion that discharge is warranted. See, e.g., McRay, 2018 WL 2432164, *10
(“[R]ather than deciding in the first instance . . . the Court will exercise its discretion
under the Illinois Administrative Review Act and remand to the Board.”).
In doing so, the Board should keep in mind that the “[Illinois] Supreme Court
has discussed a special need for uniformity or consistency in sanctions in disciplinary
proceedings.” Siddiqui v. Ill. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 718 N.E.3d 217, 228 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1999) (citing In re Wigoda, 395 N.E.2d 571, 575 (Ill. 1979)).

In deciding to

discharge Bless, the Board declined to consider “other respondents’ disciplinary
results.” R. at 27. Perhaps the Board will permit Bless to introduce those disciplinary
records on remand. Or perhaps not. Either way, it should explain that choice in a
way that enables a court to “conduct a meaningful review.” Roman, 17 N.E.3d at 156;
see also Royal Towing, 2005 WL 1563198, at *6 (noting that a court must be able to
“discern from the record why the Board disregarded . . . evidence”).

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IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s administrative review claim is granted in
part and denied in part.

The Merit Board’s finding that Bless had lied to the

investigators is not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence and is vacated.
Furthermore, because the finding was material to the Board’s conclusion that Bless
be terminated, the matter is remanded to the Board.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED 8/3/20

__________________________________
John Z. Lee
United States District Judge

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