Willis v. City of Chicago et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John W. Darrah on December 19, 2013. Mailed notice(mgh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
REGINA WILLIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS
K.A. OTTEN, M.J. KASPUT, and
the CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendants.
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Case No. 13-CV-4385
Judge John W. Darrah
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On June 6, 2013, Regina Willis filed suit against Defendants City of Chicago,
Chicago Police Officer K.A. Otten, and Chicago Police Officer M.J. Kasput. In the Complaint,
Willis alleges the following claims: (I) excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (II) failure to
intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (III) a state-law claim for assault, (IV) a state-law claim for
battery, (V) an indemnity claim, (VI) a claim of respondeat superior liability against the City,
and (VII) negligent training and supervision of the police officers. The City of Chicago moves
to dismiss Count VII of the Complaint, the claim of negligent training and supervision. This
Motion has been fully briefed. For the reasons provided below, the City’s Motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes
of the Motion to Dismiss. See Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat'l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir.
2010).
Willis is a United States citizen who resides in the Northern District of Illinois. (Compl.
¶ 4.) Defendant Officers Otten and Kasput are present or former employees of the City of
Chicago Police Department. (Id. ¶ 5.) The City is a municipal corporation incorporated under
the laws of the State of Illinois and employs Defendant Officers. (Id. ¶ 6.)
On July 15, 2012, Willis and her family were at Rainbow Beach Park in Chicago, Illinois.
(Id. ¶ 7.) Willis was listening to music from her car radio when Defendant Officers approached
her and demanded she lower the volume of her music. (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendant Officers requested
Willis’s identification, and she declined to provide it. (Id. ¶ 9.) Defendant Officers informed
Willis they would impound her car due to the noise violation. (Id. ¶ 10.)
Willis sat down in her car, and Defendant Officers forcefully pulled her from the car and
handcuffed her. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) After handcuffing Willis, Officer Kasput struck her to the
ground. (Id. ¶ 13.) Then, Defendant Officers threw Willis in their squad car, causing her to
bump her head. (Id. ¶ 14.) As a result of Defendant Officers’ actions, Willis suffered a
contusion to her left brow, swelling and bruising to her left eye, and swelling and bruising to
both of her arms. (Id. ¶ 15.)
In Count VII of the Complaint, Willis alleges that on and before the date of the incident,
the City breached its duty of reasonable care with respect to the training and supervision of the
Police Department and its officers. (Id. ¶ 44.) Specifically, Willis asserts the City failed to
properly train and supervise Defendant Officers in the manners of: proper use of force, proper
de-escalation techniques when dealing with ordinary citizens, proper community care-taking
functions and techniques, control techniques during disagreements with citizens, and anger
management. (Id. ¶ 45.) Willis further alleges the City acted willfully and wantonly by
“covering up their assaults and batteries” and by condoning “a code of silence among police
officers that leads to the cover up of assaults and batteries.” (Id. ¶¶ 47-48.) The City asserts that
Count VII should be dismissed because Willis failed to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
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12(b)(6) and because the claim is barred by the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act. (Mot. at 1.)
LEGAL STANDARD
To properly assert a claim in a complaint, the plaintiff must present “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for the relief
sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a court is to accept all allegations contained in a complaint as true,
this principle does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
A defendant may file a motion to dismiss a claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief that is
“plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is
facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949.
However, “[w]here the well-settled pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ –
‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)). For a claim to be plausible, the plaintiff must put forth enough “facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting the plaintiff’s allegations.
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
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ANALYSIS
Failure to State a Claim
Willful and Wanton Conduct
First, the City moves to dismiss Count VII of the Complaint on the basis that Willis has
failed to adequately state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Willis contends she
adequately pled the claim by asserting duty, breach, and causation with respect to the City’s
training and supervision of Defendant Officers. However, the Complaint specifically alleges that
the City acted willfully and wantonly in failing to properly train and supervise its officers.
“A claim for willful and wanton supervision requires a plaintiff to put forth a course of
action demonstrating ‘an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional,
shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property.’”
Beasley v. Cichy, Case No. 13 C 1281, 2013 WL 6123166, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2013)
(quoting 745 ILCS 10/1-210). To establish conscious disregard, a plaintiff must show that a
defendant knew or should have known its employee behaved in a dangerous, otherwise
incompetent manner and failed to exercise ordinary care to prevent it. Beasley, 2013 WL
6123166, at *2 (quotation omitted). In the Complaint, Willis fails to allege any deliberate intent
or conscious disregard with respect to the City’s supervision and training of Defendant Officers.
Beyond using the words “willful and wanton,” Willis has not pled any facts which would permit
a reasonable inference that the City is liable under Count VII of the Complaint. Therefore, this
claim is dismissed on that basis.
Monell Claim
Willis also appears to assert a Monell claim within Count VII of the Complaint, alleging
that the City has created the Independent Police Review Authority, “but in actuality and purpose
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serves to protect officers by covering up their assaults and batteries.” (Compl. ¶ 47.) Willis
further asserts that the City “condones a code of silence among police officers.” (Id. ¶ 48.)
When a custom, policy, or practice of a municipality inflicts injury, that municipality may be
liable. Monell v. Dep’t. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). However, simply alleging
that the City condones a code of silence with nothing further is insufficient to state a claim under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Here, because Willis has failed to put forth enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the City’s condoning a code of
silence, this claim fails under Rule 12(b)(6). Brooks, 578 F.3d at 581.
Immunity
Finally, even if Willis had sufficiently stated a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), which, for the
reasons provided above, she has not, the City contends it is entitled to immunity under the
Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. That Act
provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, neither a local public entity nor a
public employee who undertakes to supervise an activity on or the use of any
public property is liable for an injury unless the local public entity or public
employee is guilty of willful and wanton conduct in its supervision proximately
causing such injury.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, neither a local public entity nor a
public employee is liable for an injury caused by a failure to supervise an activity
on or the use of any public property unless the employee or the local public entity
has a duty to provide supervision imposed by common law, statute, ordinance,
code or regulation and the local public entity or public employee is guilty of
willful and wanton conduct in its failure to provide supervision proximately
causing such injury.
745 ILCS 10/3-108. Under the Act, “willful and wanton conduct” entails “a course of action
which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows
an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property.” 745
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ILCS 10/1-210. As discussed above, beyond invoking the phrase “willful and wanton,” Willis’s
Complaint fails to sufficiently allege any willful or wanton conduct on the part of the City with
respect to the training or supervision of its officers. Thus, the City is entitled to immunity as to
Count VII of the Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the City of Chicago’s Motion to Dismiss Count VII [20]
is granted, and Count VII of the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. See
James Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Construction Co., 453 F.3d 396, 400-401 (7th Cir. 2006) (find
district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing claims with prejudice where plaintiff did
not request leave to amend).
Date:
December 19, 2013
______________________________
JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Court Judge
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