Kolcraft Enterprises, Inc. v. Artsana USA, Inc. et al

Filing 184

OPINION and Order. Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 11/14/2017. Mailed notice. (kp, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
KOLCRAFT ENTERPRISES, INC.
Plaintiff,
v.
ARTSANA USA, INC. d/b/a CHICCO
USA, INC.
Defendant.

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No. 13 C 4863
Judge Sara L. Ellis

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kolcraft Enterprises Inc. (“Kolcraft”) filed this case against Artsana USA, Inc.
(“Artsana”) alleging patent infringement in violation of Title 35 of the United States Code. The
parties now seek construction of various terms in the claims of the subject patent, U.S. Patent
No. 8,388,501 B2 (the “‘501 patent”), which describes “Play Gyms and Methods for Operating
the Same.” The construction of the disputed claims and the Court’s analysis is stated below.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Judicial ‘construction’ of patent claims aims to state the boundaries of the patented
subject matter, not to change that which was invented.” Fenner Investments, Ltd. v. Cellco
P’ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Not all claims require construction, only those in
dispute and only to the extent necessary to resolve the dispute. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. &
Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Claims construction analysis begins with the intrinsic evidence which “includ[es] the
claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history of the patent.” Sunovion
Pharms., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citations
omitted). The Court first reviews the language of the claims themselves, applying a “heavy

presumption that claim terms take on their ordinary meaning as viewed by one of ordinary skill
in the art.” Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citations and
quotations omitted). The presumption of ordinary meaning prevails in all but two situations:
(1) “when a patentee acts as his own lexicographer” or (2) “when the patentee disavows the full
scope of the claim term in the specification or during prosecution.” Poly-Am., L.P. v. API Indus.,
Inc., 839 F.3d 1131, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
If analysis of the intrinsic record resolves the ambiguity of a disputed term, “it is
improper to rely on extrinsic evidence,” which includes dictionary definitions, expert testimony,
and other “evidence that is external to the patent and file history.” Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583–84 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Court may consider extrinsic
evidence to ensure that the Court’s construction of a claim “is not inconsistent with clearly
expressed, plainly apposite and widely held understandings in the pertinent technical field.”
Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003). But it
“may not be used to vary or contradict the claim language or the import of other parts of the
specification.” Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(citation and quotations omitted).
While claims must be construed in light of the specification, limitations from the
preferred embodiments or specific examples in the specification typically cannot be read into the
claims. Enercon GmbH v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 151 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This
court has repeatedly stated that while claims are to be construed in light of the specification, they
are not necessarily limited by the specification.”) (citing Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc.,
53 F.3d 1270, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Thus, while the specification may be used to aid in the

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interpretation of the claims, it may not be used as a source for adding extraneous limitations.
Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
Finally, if a claim describes a function without describing adequate structure for
accomplishing that function, the claim falls under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 61 and is a “mean-plusfunction” claim. In such a case, the structure for performing the function is limited to a
corresponding structure appearing in the specification. See Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel
Corp., 325 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003). There is a presumption that if a claim includes the
word “means” it is a means-plus-function claim and a converse presumption that if it does not
include that word, it is not a means-plus-function claim. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792
F.3d 1339, 1347–1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). The presumption can be overcome, however,
if “person of ordinary skill in the art [understands the claim] to have a sufficiently definite
meaning as the name for structure.” Id. When construing means-plus-function claims, a court
first defines the particular function claimed then identifies the structure to perform that function
in the specification. See JVW Enters. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
ANALYSIS
A.

“Connector” or “Connectors” in Claims 7, 11, 13, and 14

The first disputed claim is the term “connector” or “connectors” as used in Claims 7, 11,
13, and 14. The relevant portions of the disputed claims are as follows:

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Congress amended 35 U.S.C. § 112 when it passed the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), and
the amendments took effect on September 16, 2012. Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 4 125 Stat. 284, 296–97
(2011). Because the application resulting in the ‘501 patent was filed on August 20, 2012, before the
effective date of the AIA, the Court refers to the pre-AIA version of § 112. The AIA did not make any
substantive change to § 112; therefore, the analysis is identical under both versions.

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Claim 72: “the floor mat having a connector positioned in
proximity to a perimeter edge of the floor mat,” “the play gym
having a fastener to engage the connector of the floor mat to
couple the play gym to the floor mat,” “the connector of the floor
mat is positioned on an underside of the floor mat,” and “the
connector is pivotally coupled to the underside of the floor mat.”
Claim 113: “a second plurality of connectors provided on the
second surface of the floor mat adjacent the first plurality of
connectors,” “the play gym having a plurality of fasteners, the
fasteners to couple to respective ones of the second connectors
when the play gym is coupled to the floor mat”
Claim 13: “a second plurality of connectors provided on the
second surface of the floor mat adjacent the first plurality of
connectors;” “the play gym having a plurality of fasteners, the
fasteners to couple to respective ones of the second connectors
when the play gym is coupled to the floor mat,” and “the second
plurality of connectors is pivotally coupled to the second surface of
the floor mat.”
Claim 14: “the floor mat defining an upper surface and a bottom
surface, the bottom surface having a first connector that includes
an opening to receive the fastener of the leg when the play gym is
coupled to the floor mat”
Artsana argues that the Court should construe the term “connector(s)” in these claims as
“pivoting connector(s),” because in each of these claims the connectors are described as being
located on the bottom or “second surface” of the floor mat, and the specification states in one
example that the connectors must be pivoted “in to their first positions so that they do not
interfere with positioning the connectors within the bassinet or the play yard.” (JA-000015, col.
6, lns. 35–39 (part number omitted). Artsana argues that any non-pivoting connectors must be
located on the top side of the mat and within the perimeter.

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Claim 7 depends on Claim 6 and Claim 1. All references to Claim 7 include the subject matter of
Claims 1, 6, and 7.

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Claims 11 and 13 depend on Claim 9 and include the subject matter of Claim 9.

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Kolcraft counters that the specification actually contemplates fixed connectors, which
may be located on the bottom side of the floor mat. The specification states, “Alternatively, the
connectors may not be pivoted to the mat and/or the connectors may be located within the
perimeter of the mat to permit coupling of the play gym to the mat when the mat is located
within the bassinet and/or play yard.” JA-00015, col 6. lns. 48–52.
Although the specification seems to strongly favor the use of pivoting connectors to
avoid interference with the bassinet or play yard when the floor mat is placed inside either, the
Court cannot import the requirement that the connection of the floor mat to the play yard or
bassinet be totally without interference. Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 1270,
1277 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[A] patent claim is not necessarily limited to a preferred embodiment
disclosed in the patent.”). The use of pivoting connectors may be a preferred embodiment in the
specification, but the claims do not require it. Furthermore, where the claims require the
connectors to pivot, they are described as pivotally coupled. See Claim 7 and Claim 13.
Therefore, the terms “connector” and “connectors” do not require further construction.
B.

“Connector” and in Claims 7 and 15

Artsana argues that “connector” as used in Claims 7 and 15 is invalid pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph (pre-AIA), because it is not supported by the written description
and lacks enablement within the written description. The relevant portions of the disputed
claims are as follows:
Claim 7: “the play gym having a fastener to engage the connector
of the floor mat to couple the play gym to the floor mat, the floor
mat to couple the play gym to the play yard or the bassinet when
the play gym is positioned in one of the play yard or the bassinet”
and ‘‘the connector is pivotally coupled to the underside of the
floor mat.”
Claim 15: “the floor mat defining an upper surface and a bottom
surface, the bottom surface having a first connector that includes
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an opening to receive the fastener of the leg when the play gym is
coupled to the floor mat” and “the floor mat to couple the play
gym to the play yard or the bassinet”
Artsana, as the party asking the Court to find that a claim is invalid, bears the burden of
proving lack of enablement by clear and convincing evidence. See Auto. Tech. Int’l, Inc. v.
BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The enablement requirement is met
“when one skilled in the art, having read the specification, could practice the invention without
‘undue experimentation.’” Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–37 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
Artsana argues that the only instance of the play gym coupling to the play yard or
bassinet by way of the floor mat in the specification requires the connectors to be on the top side
of the floor mat; therefore, the manner of describing the connection coupling in Claims 7 and 15
lacks enablement in the written specification. JA-00015, col. 5, lns 50-59. This incorrectly
states the content of the specification. The cited section does not require the connectors to be on
the top of the floor mat; rather, it states that “the mat may include non-pivoting connectors
located within the perimeter of the mat and accessible from the top of the mat.” Id. at lns. 54–56.
This language is clearly permissive rather than mandatory as Artsana insists.
However, Artsana is correct that there is no instance in the specification explicitly
explaining how the floor mat couples the play gym to the play yard or bassinet. But, taken as a
whole, the language of the claim itself and the specification are sufficiently clear to inform one
of ordinary skill in the art how to practice the invention without undue experimentation. The
specification states how the play gym connects to the floor mat. It also states how the floor mat
can couple to the play yard or bassinet. See JA-000014, col. 3, lns. 53–58 (“For example, the
floor mat 16 may be secured to the bassinet 12 and/or the play yard 14 by Velcro strips.
Alternatively, the floor mat 16 may be held in place by gravity without the benefit of
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fasteners.”). A person of ordinary skill in the art could read the entire patent, and, with little or
no experimentation, couple the play gym to the bassinet or play yard by way of the floor mat.
Therefore, Claims 7 and 15 are not invalid for lack of enablement.
C.

“To couple” in Claims 7 and 15

Artsana contends that the term “to couple” as used in Claims 7 and 15 is invalid pursuant
to 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, because it is indefinite and does not recite any structure
for how the floor mat is to couple. Alternatively, Artsana proposes that if “to couple” is not
invalid, it should be construed as “to link, connect, or fasten together.” Kolcraft agrees with this
proposed construction. The relevant portions of the disputed claims are as follows:
Claim 7: “the floor mat to couple the play gym to the play yard or
the bassinet when the play gym is positioned in one of the play
yard or the bassinet”
Claim 15: “the floor mat to couple the play gym to the play yard
or the bassinet”
Indefiniteness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Sonix Tech Co. v.
Publications Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Where the intrinsic evidence, e.g.
the specification, provides guidance on the scope of the claim such that a skilled artisan could
with reasonable certainty know what is claimed, the claim is not indefinite. Id.
In support of indefiniteness, Artsana argues that the patent does not recite any structure
for how the floor mat is to couple with the play yard or bassinet. Kolcraft counters that the
specification provides support for how the floor mat couples with the play yard or bassinet. The
specification states both that the floor mat can be secured using fasteners, such as Velcro, or
simply through gravity. An ordinarily skilled artisan could read the claims and specification and
understand what is meant by “to couple” in this context. Therefore, “to couple” is not indefinite.

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Because the term is not indefinite, the Court adopts the parties’ agreed construction and
construes “to couple” to mean “to link, connect, or fasten together.”
D.

“Fastener” or “fasteners” in Claims 7, 11, and 13.

Artsana argues that the term “fastener(s)” as used in Claims 7, 11, and 13 is not a term
generally understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite
meaning as the name for structure, and therefore the Court must construe “fastener” in
accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 as a means-plus-function claim, limiting the construction of
fastener to the specific embodiment found in the specification. Kolcraft argues that “fasteners”
has a plain and ordinary meaning as the name for structure and does not require construction.
The relevant portions of the disputed claims are as follows:
Claim 7: “the play gym having a fastener to engage the connector
of the floor mat to couple the play gym to the floor mat”
Claims 11 and 13: “the play gym having a plurality of fasteners,
the fasteners to couple to respective ones of the second connectors
when the play gym is coupled to the floor mat”
In determining whether or not 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies to a claim, the Court first must
determine whether or not the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in
the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure. Williamson, 792 F.3d at
1348. The fact that a term is defined in terms of its function and does not connote a precise
physical structure in the minds of those skilled in the art, does not render the term indefinite. It
is sufficient that the term convey to one knowledgeable in the art “a variety of structures” known
by that term. Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 705
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
Artsana contends that the term “fastener(s)” as used in claims 7, 11, and 13 recite a
generic term for a function without any structure because the term “fastener” does not have a
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generally accepted meaning within the art and fasteners are only identified in terms of their
function. In support, Artsana provides a declaration from Jerry Drobinksi, a consultant with
substantial experience in the juvenile products industry, and argues that in claims 7, 11, and 13,
the word “fastener” could simply be replaced with “means” and the meaning of the claim would
be the same.

Kolcraft argues that fastener has a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for

structure. In support it cites the dictionary, the specification of the ‘501 patent, the use of
“fastener” in patents held by Artsana, and deposition testimony from the former COO of Artsana.
Despite the parties’ efforts to direct the Court to numerous sources of extrinsic evidence,
the Court can evaluate this claim based on its plain meaning. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13
(claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the
art). Where the terms in question are commonly understood words, the meaning may be readily
apparent “even to lay judges.” Id. at 1314. The term “fasteners” is just such a term; it does not
require elaborate interpretation or special training to comprehend. A fastener can be many
things, but the term conveys a variety of physical structures. Therefore, it does not require
additional construction and does not invoke paragraph six.
E.

“Pivotally coupled” in Claims 7, 13, and 20.

Artsana argues that the term “pivotally coupled” in Claims 7, 13, and 20 should be
construed as “each connector is linked, connected or fastened to the floor mat by a fixed pivot
element, such as a shaft or pin, about which the connector turns, rotates, or moves about. A
pivotal coupling is different than a coupling that is fixed and/or bendable.” Kolcraft asks the
Court to construe the term as meaning “linked, connected or fastened together by or as if on a
pivot.” During the claim construction hearing, Kolcraft agreed with the first sentence of
Artsana’s proposed construction, but objected to the inclusion of the second sentence “[a] pivotal

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coupling is different than a coupling that is fixed and/or bendable.” The relevant portions of the
disputed claims are as follows:
Claim 7: “the connector is pivotally coupled to the underside of the floor mat”
Claim 13: “the second plurality of connectors are pivotally coupled to the second
surface of the floor mat”
Claim 20: “the second plurality of connectors are pivotally coupled to the second
surface of the floor mat”
Because there is no dispute about the first sentence of Artsana’s proposed construction,
the Court considers only the second sentence. Artsana asserts that Kolcraft has already assented
to the inclusion of the second sentence because it included similar language in its proposed
construction as part of the Inter Partes Review (“IPR”) of the ‘501 patent. The specific language
of this proposed construction states that “Pivotal coupling and pivotal movement resulting from
such a coupling differs from that of a fixed coupling and bending movement.” JA-000966. The
Court agrees that Kolcraft’s own words in the IPR serve to limit the claims’ construction, but
Artsana’s construction goes a half-step too far. In the IPR, Kolcraft distinguished “pivoting
movement” and “bending movement.” Pivoting movement is not the subject of Claims 7, 13,
and 20, only the couplings are discussed. Therefore, the Court finds that it is appropriate to
apply the limitations to the description of “coupling” from the IPR but not the limitations to the
description of “movement.”
The Court construes “pivotally coupled” in Claims 7, 13, and 20 as “each connector is
linked, connected or fastened to the floor mat by a fixed pivot element, such as a shaft or pin,
about which the connector turns, rotates, or moves about. A pivotal coupling is different than a
coupling that is fixed.”
F.

“First plurality of connector”/“first connector” and “second plurality
of connectors”/“second connector” in Claims 11, 13, and 16.
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Artsana argues that the terms “first plurality of connector” and “first connector” as they
appear in Claims 11 and 13 require construction in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, par. 6, and
therefore limited to the type of connector specifically mentioned in the specification, namely,
Velcro strips. Additionally, Artsana contends that the Court should construe the “second
plurality of connectors” and “second connectors” as separate and distinct from the “first plurality
of connectors” and “first connector.” The relevant portions of the disputed claims are as follows:
Claim 11 & 13: “a first plurality of connectors provided on the second surface of
the floor mat, the first plurality of connectors to couple the floor mat to the play
yard when the floor mat is positioned in the play yard”
Claim 16: “the floor mat . . . having a first connector that includes an opening to
receive the fastener of the leg when the play gym is coupled to the floor mat” and
“the floor mat comprises a second connector to couple to the play yard or the
bassinet”
Artsana argues that “first connector” and “first plurality of connectors” are means-plusfunction terms because Claims 11 and 13 recite a function with no supporting structure. As
discussed above with respect to “fasteners,” the Court can evaluate “connectors” in light of its
plain meaning. This term is commonplace and does not require additional construction.
Connectors may be many different things, but the term conveys a variety of structures that are
called “connectors,” and therefore is not subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, par. 6. Personalized Media
Commc’ns, LLC, 161 F.3d at 705 (A term is one for structure where one knowledgeable in the art
would know a variety of structures by that term).
Artsana also argues the “second plurality of connectors” and “second connectors” must
be construed as separate and distinct from the “first plurality of connectors” and “first
connector.” Kolcraft does not dispute that the sets must be distinct, but argues that the claim
does not require that the parts be separate. In support of its argument that the word “separate”
should also be included, Artsana cites to Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP,
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616 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2010), which held, “[w]here a claim lists elements separately,
‘the clear implication of the claim language’ is that those elements are ‘distinct component[s]’ of
the patented invention.” Id. (quoting Gaus v. Conair Corp., 363 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir.
2004)). However, Artsana does not explain why the parts must also be separate. The claim
language states that the connectors are adjacent to each other, but adjacent does not necessarily
mean separate, it can mean near, close, or contiguous. Adjacent Definition, Dictionary.com,
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/adjacent (last visited October 2, 2017). There is nothing in
the claim language requiring the connectors to be separate in addition to distinct, and the Court
declines to read such a limitation into the claims. Therefore, the Court construes the “second
connector” and “second plurality of connectors” as distinct from the “first connector” and “first
plurality of connectors.”
G.

“Movably coupled” in Claim 11.

Artsana initially asked the Court to construe “movable coupled” in claim 11 as “each leg
of the play gym can be moved relative to the hub while the first end of each leg is linked,
connected, or fastened to the hub. ‘Movably coupled’ is different than a coupling that is
‘removably coupled’ or fixed and/or bendable.” The relevant portion of the disputed claim is as
follows:
Claim 11: “the play gym comprises a plurality of legs movably coupled to a hub,
each of the legs having a first end coupled to the hub”
At the claim construction hearing, in response to questioning from the Court, Artsana
changed its position on the second clause, requesting that the Court replace their suggested
construction with “The relationship between the leg and the hub remains constant about the
coupling.” Kolcraft agreed with including the first clause in the construction of “movably
coupled” but continued to object to the second clause as revised.
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The Court finds that both iterations of the second clause are unnecessary and
impermissibly import limitations from the specification into the claim. Artsana argues that every
time the specification discusses a part that is “removably” connected to another part, it is shown
as capable of being disassociated from that part, and that the descriptions and illustrations of the
“movably coupled” connections show the leg and hub are not capable of disassociation. Neither
of these arguments is persuasive. The fact that some other parts are described as removably
coupled has no bearing on whether or not it is necessary to further limit “movably coupled” to
exclude removably coupled. Artsana does not explain why the Court should import this
additional limitation into the claim, beyond stating that unrelated components are described as
removably coupled and the leg-hub connection is not. This is insufficient to convince the Court
that it should so limit the claim.
Artsana’s suggestion that the second clause be revised to state, “The relationship between
the leg and the hub remains constant about the coupling,” seeks to achieve the same limitation
through different means, and the Court similarly rejects it. The Court finds that there is no basis
in the language of the claim to limit its construction to the single embodiment shown in the
specification.
Therefore, the Court construes “movably coupled” as “each leg of the play gym can be
moved relative to the hub while the first end of each leg is linked, connected, or fastened to the
hub.”
H.

“First fastener” in Claim 14

Artsana argues that “first fastener” in Claim 14 requires construction pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, because fastener is a generic term that is devoid of structure. For the same

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reasons stated in Section D above, the Court disagrees. First fastener in Claim 14 does not
require further construction.
I.

“Positionable” in Claim 14.

Artsana argues that “positionable” in Claim 14 lacks an ordinary and customary meaning
and must be construed, in light of the specification, as “The first end of each leg the play gym
can be moved within a range of positions relative to the cavity of the hub while the first end of
each leg remains attached to the hub. A coupling that is ‘positionable’ is different than a
coupling that is fixed and/or bendable.” The relevant portion of the disputed claim is as follows:
Claim 14: “ a first fastener coupled to the first end of the leg to attach the leg to
the hub, . . . the first fastener to enable the first end of the leg to be positionable
relative to the cavity of the hub”
The word positionable in Claim 14 is perfectly clear in its meaning. A lay judge, and
even a jury, can read this claim and understand that a leg that is “positionable” is one that is
“able to be positioned.” Artsana’s proposed construction is unnecessary to clarify this central
aspect of “positionable.” The additional language Artsana seeks to include is once again an
attempt to import limitations into the claims from the specification. Therefore, the claim does
not require further construction.
J.

“Play gym” in Claims 7 and 13–20

During the claim construction hearing, the parties agreed in principal that a “play gym”
as the term is used in the ‘501 patent, should be construed as being “a structure or apparatus
which is capable of suspending an object over a defined area.” This construction is consistent
with the specification and how the term is used throughout the patent. Therefore, the Court
adopts this construction for “play gym.”

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K.
“Connector of the floor mat is positioned on an underside of the floor mat” in
Claim 7, “second plurality of connectors provided on the second surface of the floor
mat” in Claims 11 and 13, and “floor mat defining . . . a bottom surface, the bottom
surface having a first connector that includes an opening” in Claim 14
Kolcraft asserts that each of these claims should be constructed to state that the
connectors are attached to the underside of the floor mat. Specifically, Kolcraft advocates for the
following constructions:
Claim 7: “connector of the floor mat is positioned on an underside of the floor mat”
should be construed to mean “connector of the floor mat is attached to the underside of
the floor mat.”
Claims 11 and 13: “second plurality of connectors provided on the second surface of the
floor mat” should be construed to mean “second plurality of connectors are attached to
the second surface of the floor mat.”
Claim 14: “floor mat defining . . . a bottom surface, the bottom surface having a first
connector that includes an opening” (claim 14) should be construed to mean “the first
connector, which includes an opening, is attached to the bottom surface of the floor mat.”
The current claims clearly state that the connectors are located on the bottom. Kolcraft
does not provide any additional justification for why the claims require inclusion of the word
“attached” to be properly constructed. Furthermore, during the claim construction hearing
Kolcraft agreed that this word was unnecessary. Therefore, the Court declines to further
construe these claims.
CONCLUSION
The Court construes the disputed terms as follows:
Claim
7, 11, 13, 14, 15
7, 15

Disputed Term
“connector”/”connectors”
“to couple”

Construction
No construction necessary.
No construction necessary.

7, 11, 13

“fastener”/”fasteners”

No construction necessary.

7, 13, 20

“pivotally coupled”

Each connector is linked, connected or
fastened to the floor mat by a fixed pivot
element, such as a shaft or pin, about
which the connector turns, rotates, or
moves about. A pivotal coupling is
different than a coupling that is fixed.
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11, 13, 16

“first plurality of
connectors”/”first connector”
and “second plurality of
connectors”/“second
connectors”

No construction necessary under 35
U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.

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“movably coupled”

Each leg of the play gym can be moved
relative to the hub while the first end of
each leg is linked, connected or fastened
to the hub.

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14
7, 11, 13–20

“first fastener”
“positionable”
“play gym”

7, 11, 13, 14

“connector of the floor mat is
positioned on an underside of
the floor mat” (Claim 7)

No construction necessary.
No construction necessary.
A structure or apparatus which is capable
of suspending an object over a defined
area.
No construction necessary.

The “second plurality of connectors” or
“second connector” is distinct from the
“first plurality of connectors” or “first
connector.”

”second plurality of
connectors provided on the
second surface of the floor
mat” (Claims 11, 13)
”floor mat defining . . . a
bottom surface, the bottom
surface having a first
connector that includes an
opening” (Claim 14)

Dated: November 14, 2017

______________________
SARA L. ELLIS
United States District Judge

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