Crockwell v. Dart, et al
Filing
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ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion to dismiss 12 . To the extent that Plaintiff's complaint can be read to assert a claim against Defendant Dart in his individual capacity under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, the Court dismisses those claims. All other claims remain pending. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 12/23/2013. Mailed notice(tbk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RAYMONE CROCKWELL,
Plaintiff,
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v.
THOMAS DART, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 13 C 4880
Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Raymone Crockwell alleges that he was denied reasonable access to special
facilities during his time as a pre-trial detainee at Cook County Jail. In his complaint, he asserts
that Defendant Thomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, violated his rights under § 202 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Fourteenth Amendment,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff joined Defendant Cook County as a necessary party.
Defendants seek dismissal of the § 1983 claims asserted against Dart in his individual and
official capacities as well as Plaintiff’s claims under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act against Defendant Dart in his individual capacity. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss [12]. To the
extent that Plaintiff’s complaint can be read to assert a claim against Defendant Dart in his
individual capacity under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, the Court dismisses those claims.
All other claims remain pending.
I.
Background1
Plaintiff Raymone Crockwell was a pre-trial detainee at the Cook County Jail (“CCJ”)
from June 6, 2012 until March 29, 2013.
According to the complaint, in 2008 or 2009,
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For purposes of Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court assumes as true all well-pleaded allegations
set forth in the complaint. See, e.g., Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th
Cir. 2007).
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Defendant Dart learned through a case known as Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County that facilities
in Division 2 of CCJ did not provide detainees with reasonable access to toilets, sinks, and
showers.
Thereafter, in the course of the Phipps litigation, Defendants installed handicap
accessible toilets and appropriate grab bars in two dorms in Division 2 of CCJ. Defendants also
modified the showers in those two dorms to add a ramp, grab-bars, and water controls accessible
to a seated person. In addition, Defendants provided an appropriate shower chair in each of
those two dorms.
As part of the intake procedure in June 2012, medical personnel determined that Plaintiff
was wheelchair bound and required a special toilet, sink, and shower to attend to his basic needs.
According to Plaintiff’s allegations, jail personnel should have assigned him to a wheelchair
accessible housing unit, but they did not. Based on the allegations in the complaint, the handicap
accessible toilets were not functioning when jail personnel assigned plaintiff to Division 2, and
Plaintiff was required to use a non-handicap accessible toilet and shower. Plaintiff suffered
personal injuries while trying to transfer to the toilet from his wheelchair.
II.
Legal Standard
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is not to decide the merits of the case; a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d
1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court
takes as true all factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in
his favor. Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007). To survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the claim first must comply with Rule 8(a) by providing “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” (Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2)), such that the defendant is given “fair notice of what the * * * claim is and the
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grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Second, the factual allegations in the claim must be
sufficient to raise the possibility of relief above the “speculative level,” assuming that all of the
allegations in the complaint are true. E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773,
776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). However,
“[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what
the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (ellipsis in original). The Court reads the complaint
and assesses its plausibility as a whole. See Atkins v. City of Chi., 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir.
2011); cf. Scott v. City of Chi., 195 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Whether a complaint
provides notice, however, is determined by looking at the complaint as a whole.”).
III.
Analysis
Plaintiff has sued Defendant Dart in both his individual and official capacities.
A.
Individual-Capacity Claims Under ADA and Rehabilitation Act
Defendant Dart argues that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against him in his individual
capacities should be dismissed because the plain language of Title II of the ADA precludes
individuals from being held liable. In response, Plaintiff states that he is not attempting to assert
claims against Defendant Dart in his individual capacity under either the ADA or the
Rehabilitation Act. Rather, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are brought solely against
Defendant Dart in his official capacity. The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s
complaint, which appears intentionally vague, could be read as attempting to assert ADA and
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Rehabilitation Act claims against Dart in his individual capacity. Thus, to the extent that
Plaintiff’s complaint can be read to assert claims against Defendant Dart in his individual
capacity under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, the Court dismisses those claims. See, e.g.,
Brewer v. Wis. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 270 Fed. Appx. 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2008).
B.
§ 1983 Claims Against Dart
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against “[e]very person, who, under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws.” The statute is not “itself a source of substantive rights, but merely
provides a means for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred,” Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3 (1979)), such as in
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Under § 1983, there are two ways in which a party may
sue an individual government actor: in the actor’s official capacity or in his individual, or
personal, capacity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). Here, Plaintiff has
sued Defendant Dart in both his individual and official capacities.
1.
Official capacity claims
Official capacity suits are simply a way of pleading an action against an entity of which
the officer is an agent. Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)); see also Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626,
629 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A claim against a government employee acting in his official capacity is
the same as a suit directed against the entity the official represents.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s officialcapacity allegations against Defendant Dart are in essence a suit against Cook County. Cook
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County also is a named party to the suit. See, e.g., Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle Cnty., 324 F.3d
947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that “a county in Illinois is a necessary party in any suit
seeking damages from an independently elected officer.”). Municipal entities such as Cook
County “may be liable for monetary damages under § 1983 if the unconstitutional act
complained of is caused by: (1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its officers; (2) a
governmental practice or custom that, although not officially authorized, is widespread and well
settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.” Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690).
Plaintiff alleges that he is wheelchair-bound with an “objectively serious medical need”
which, upon his entry to CCJ, was diagnosed by a health care professional. Plaintiff alleges that
he should have been assigned to a wheelchair accessible housing unit but was not, due to the fact
that the handicap-accessible toilets were not functioning when Plaintiff was admitted to the jail,
and that he was injured during the course of using a non-handicap-accessible toilet. Plaintiff also
alleges that Defendants have adopted a “policy of inaction” after receiving actual knowledge that
handicap-accessible facilities are non-functioning. To Plaintiff’s way of thinking, installing the
handicap-accessible facilities falls short of solving the problem if Cook County officials fail to
ensure that the facilities are functioning. These allegations are sufficient to raise a plausible
claim as to the existence of a policy, practice, or custom that resulted in Defendants acting with
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs.
2.
Individual capacity claims
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 individual capacity claim on the ground
that the complaint does not meet Rule 8(a) pleading requirements because it fails to allege
plausibly that Sheriff Dart knowingly engaged in misconduct. Section 1983 individual capacity
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claims require a plaintiff to make a showing of personal involvement by a defendant government
actor. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff that successfully
pleads the essential elements of the individual capacity claim – namely, that a defendant had
knowledge of and consciously disregarded a serious risk – also succeeds in alleging the personal
involvement of the individual defendant by virtue of the fact that those elements are subjective in
nature. See id. (holding that “an official satisfies the personal responsibility requirement of
section 1983 * * * if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at his direction or
with his knowledge and consent” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (omission in
original)); see also Thomas, 604 F.3d at 301 (noting that to have committed the tort, an “official
must have subjective knowledge of the risk to the inmate’s health and also must disregard that
risk”). By the same token, a defendant who moves to dismiss a § 1983 individual capacity claim
on the ground that the plaintiff failed to allege that the individual defendant knew of and
disregarded a serious risk has asserted that the defendant lacked “personal involvement” in the
alleged acts.
A jail official may be named as a defendant in his or her individual capacity in a § 1983
claim when the official personally participated in or had personal knowledge of the types of acts
or omissions that form the basis of the claim. See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428 (7th
Cir. 1996). A senior jail official who was not personally involved in the acts or omissions
complained of nonetheless may be liable in his individual capacity if he can be expected to have
either known of or participated in creating systemic inadequate conditions at the jail. Id. at 142829 (holding that because sheriff and director of jail could have been expected to have personal
responsibility for alleged systemic violations, claims regarding those violations could not be
dismissed on the ground that deliberate indifference of defendants was not adequately pleaded);
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Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that “defendants such as the
Sheriff and the Director of the Jail can realistically be expected to know about or participate in
creating systematic jail conditions”).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 individual capacity claims should be dismissed
because the complaint fails to set forth sufficient facts to plausibly support the legal conclusion
that Defendant Dart knew of and consciously disregarded Plaintiff’s serious medical needs and
the systemic conditions that put him at risk in light of those needs.
The Court denies
Defendants’ motion as to the individual capacity claims because Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts
to plausibly suggest that (1) Defendant Dart was aware that members of the prison population
had serious medical needs that required the use of handicap-accessible facilities, and (2) Dart, in
his individual capacity, was deliberately indifferent to the risk posed by those needs. See
Thomas, 604 F.3d at 301. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Dart is personally involved in the
formulation and implementation of policies at CCJ. He also alleges that Dart learned from the
Phipps litigation about the need for handicap-accessible toilets in Division 2. Finally, Plaintiff
alleges that Dart was deliberately indifferent to the systemic conditions that in part caused
Plaintiff’s injury—namely, that Dart failed to ensure that handicap-accessible facilities were in
working order or were fixed in a timely manner.
As in Antonelli and Sanders, the Sheriff here was responsible for overseeing the general
conditions of confinement at the jail. See Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1428-29; Sanders, 198 F.3d at
629. As such, he can be expected have been aware of or to have participated in creating the
deleterious conditions that Plaintiff alleges existed in the jail. See Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1428-29;
Sanders, 198 F.3d at 629. Given that the conditions complained of form part of the basis of
Plaintiffs’ individual capacity claim against Sheriff Dart, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that
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Sheriff Dart had subjective knowledge of the risk to detainees’ health needs and disregarded that
risk. See Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1428-29; see also Thomas, 604 F.3d at 401. While Plaintiff does
not allege that Defendant Dart personally assigned him to the unit where he was injured, such an
immediate causal link is not required. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.
1995). Rather, the Seventh Circuit has observed that “if the supervisor personally devised a
deliberately indifferent policy that caused a constitutional injury, then individual liability might
flow from that act.” Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 581 (7th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has
alleged that Defendant Dart failed to correct a deliberately indifferent policy—naming,
neglecting
maintenance
of
the
handicap-accessible
facilities—that
caused
Plaintiff’s
constitutional injury. The Court therefore denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ §
1983 individual capacity claim as to Sheriff Dart.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’
motion to dismiss [12]. To the extent that Plaintiff’s complaint can be read to assert a claim
against Defendant Dart in his individual capacity under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, the
Court dismisses those claims. All other claims remain pending.
Dated: December 23, 2013
_____________________________
Robert M. Dow, Jr.
United States District Judge
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